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ABSTRACT
This thesis will investigate key trends in the political relationship between the EU and Serbia
within a broader historical context. In order to better understand obstacles to EU accession by
the remaining non-EU states in the Western Balkans, it is necessary to investigate their
normative, or ideational foundations. Serbia is among the last few post-socialist countries from
the Western Balkans to negotiate accession conditions with the EU. This is paradoxical in the
sense that Serbia is a successor state to the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which
was the first socialist country to successfully conclude a comprehensive trade agreement with
the EU in 1970. This thesis holds that normative and domestic political factors have presented,
over the years, serious obstacles to Serbia’s European integration process.
There are different views about the nature of the political factors that have caused a delay in
Serbia’s adoption of EU standards and norms. A conventional approach to this research
question is to examine Serbia’s performance against the strict accession criteria of the EU’s
political conditionality. This dissertation, however, embarks on analysing the role of normative
factors in the complex and inherently social process that is Serbia’s European integration.
These relate to political attitudes espoused by the leading Serbian elites towards the EU, as
well as public opinion towards the EU in Serbia and Serbia’s accession in the EU, which
influence foreign-policy making of both diplomatic actors. Based on fieldwork interviews with
policymakers from Serbia and the EU, this thesis contends that the role of mainstream national
discourses, informal institutions and diplomatic practices, and ‘collective memory’ has had a
significant influence on Serbia’s adoption of EU standards, directly impacting also on the EU's
conditionality towards Serbia. The EU’s foreign policy towards Serbia produced better results
for mutual cooperation when the EU adopted an innovative diplomatic approach by engaging
in dialogue with the Serbian opposition.
iii
There are many lessons that can be learned about European integration from Serbia’s case. The
quality and nature (cooperative or confrontational) of bilateral relations between Serbia and
individual EU members will be a determining factor, amongst others, for Serbia’s eligibility to
join the EU. Such trend was previously evident with challenging accession experiences of other
countries, especially the United Kingdom. Furthermore, Serbia’s solidarity with the EU on
common policies, the degree of trust between them, and Serbia’s attitudes to EU foreign policy
statements in international, regional and domestic forums will influence the final outcome of
Serbia’s bid to join the EU. These ‘less formal’ criteria for EU accession have been under-
researched in the EU enlargement literature. This thesis aims to fill that gap in knowledge from
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1INTRODUCTION
Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built
through concrete achievements, which first create a de facto solidarity.1
This thesis aims to critically analyse political and diplomatic relations between the European
Union (EU) and Serbia, and to contextualise the main achievements and trends of these
relations within a broader historical context.2 As such, the research presented in this thesis
predominantly covers a period in Serbian politics after the Second World War until the first
half of 2014. Between 1945 and June 2006 (when Serbia became an independent state
following Montenegro’s referendum on separation from the state union), Serbia was part of
larger territorial units, including: the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Socijalistička
Federativna Republika Jugoslavija, SFRJ), from 1945 to 1992; the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (FRY), from 1992 to 2003; and the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, from
2003 to 2006.3 This thesis adopts a broader historical view, according to which EU–Serbia
diplomatic relations were first developed in the 1960s, when Serbia was part of the SFRJ, and
1 European Union, ‘The Schuman Declaration: 9 May 1950’, http://europa.eu/about-eu/basic-
information/symbols/europe-day/schuman-declaration/, (accessed 1 March 2014).
2 The term ‘European Union’ is used in this thesis as a collective term to also refer to its institutional
predecessors: the European Coal and Steel Community, the European Economic Community, and the European
Communities. The European Union as a term was formally established by the Maastricht Treaty, which was
signed in 1992 and entered into force in 1993. Although the EU’s official website states that this term ‘was first
mooted at the European summit of 1972’, it actually traces its origins to the French Government’s plan on
Federal European Union during the League of Nations era, also known as ‘the Briand Memorandum’. Europa,
‘Glossary: European Union’, http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/glossary/eu_union_en.htm, (accessed 12
April 2013). Republic of Ireland, Documents on Irish Foreign Policy (DIFP), ‘Letter from Francis T. Cremins
(for Joseph P. Walshe) to Count Gerald O’Kelly de Gallagh (Paris), enclosing the Irish response to the French
Government plan on Federal European Union, Dublin, 16 July 1930’, http://www.difp.ie/docs/1930/Briand-
plan-for-European-Union/1100.htm, (accessed 12 April 2013).
3 After the Second World War, socialist Yugoslavia was formally known as ‘Federal People’s Republic of
Yugoslavia’, with the official constitution coming into effect in January 1946. This country is, however,
commonly referred to as ‘the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’, which became its official name after
Yugoslavia’s second constitution came into force in April 1963. For a useful analysis of Yugoslavia’s
constitutions (1946, 1963, 1976) and constitutional amendments (1953, 1971) during Tito’s era, see P. Radan,
‘Constitutional law and the multinational state: the failure of Yugoslav federalism’, University of New South
Wales Law Journal, vol. 21, 1998, pp. 185–203.
2when the EU was composed of six member states.4 This stands in contrast to the majority of
academic writings on this topic.
A complex diplomatic and political relationship between the EU and Serbia is understood in
this thesis as a negotiated political process that has been inadequately explored from normative,
or ideational perspectives, which will be revisited throughout this thesis. Gaining a better
understanding of these perspectives is necessary in order to recognise a specific set of obstacles
Serbia has faced on its path towards European integration. Ideational political challenges to
Serbia’s European integration, which are both external and internal to Serbian politics, have
been under-recognised in the mainstream literature on EU enlargement. This thesis will argue
that these challenges are part of Serbia’s ‘identity politics’.5 They have presented serious
obstacles to Serbia’s European integration process, causing delays in EU-Serbia negotiations.
In order to better explain normative obstacles to Serbia’s European integration, this thesis will
examine the main political discourses in Serbia in the context of its post-socialist reform
process, also known as Europeanisation.6 A key division within mainstream political
discourses in Serbia is currently evident between pro-EU and anti-EU proponents at the elite-
level as well as societal level. This is a normative factor, which has contributed to Serbia’s
sluggish Europeanisation. This is evident from the inconsistencies found within Serbia’s
4 The founding member states of the EU are Italy, France, West Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg and the
Netherlands. Political scientist Simon Hix aptly described the EU as ‘the most formalised and complex set of
decision-making rules of any political system in the world’. Its ‘basic institutional quarter’ includes the
European Commission, the Council, the European Parliament and the Court of Justice, all of which were
established in the 1950s. S. Hix, The political system of the European Union, 2nd edn, New York, Palgrave
Macmillan, 2005, p. 3.
5 Like identity itself, ‘identity politics’ is a social construct, by which dominant political parties and pressure
groups resort to history, geography, biology, legal norms and institutions, collective memory and even ‘personal
fantasies’ of leaders to justify their ideological positions. M. Castells, The power of identity: the information
age, economy, society, and culture, 2nd edn, Chichester, John Wiley and Sons Ltd, 2010, p. 7.
6 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier have noted that the concept of ‘Europe’ in the literature on EU enlargement
has become almost synonymous with the EU, while ‘Europeanness’ or ‘Europeanisation’ in candidate countries
came to be measured through the intensity of their institutional relations with the EU, and their adoption of EU
norms and rules. F. Schimmelfennig and U. Sedelmeier, ‘Theorising EU enlargement: research focus,
hypotheses, and the state of research’, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 9, no. 4, August 2002, p. 502.
3foreign policy and its successive governments’ incoherent attitudes towards the EU as a
negotiating partner.
The normative principles of Serbia’s foreign policy
In order to better understand the conduct of Serbia’s foreign policy towards the EU, which is
essential for evaluating its effectiveness and the quality of their bilateral relations, it is
important to explain the basic pillars of this policy. Membership of the EU is ‘the first strategic
goal’ and a major foreign policy ambition of the Serbian Government today. This envisaged
end-point for Serbia’s ongoing reform process has been a declared ambition of Serbia’s
successive governments since the overthrow of its anti-EU leader Slobodan Milošević in
October 2000 (an event that is commonly referred to as ‘Serbia’s regime change’).7 Serbia has
been a potential candidate from the Western Balkans for EU membership as a democratic,
parliamentary republic with a unicameral National Assembly (250 seats) after a new, pro-EU
government was established in January 2001.8 Serbia’s foreign policy promotes
multilateralism; Serbia as an investment and export destination to potential partners overseas;
whilst also advocating for the ‘protection of national sovereignty and territorial integrity’,
including over a disputed territory of Kosovo, and the Serbian Government’s declared priority
of attaining EU membership.9
7 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia, ‘Politički odnosi Republike Srbije i Evropske unije’,
http://www.mfa.gov.rs/sr/index.php/spoljna-politika/eu/rep-srbija-eu?lang=lat, (accessed 18 June 2014).
8 The EU uses the term ‘Western Balkans’ for countries and entities in Southeast Europe that are not EU
members. While the term included Croatia until it joined the EU in July 2013, the term now includes Albania,
Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Kosovo, Montenegro, and
Serbia. The potential candidates for EU membership from the Western Balkans are Bosnia-Herzegovina,
FYROM and Kosovo, while formal candidates for EU membership include Albania, Montenegro and Serbia.
The asterisk (Kosovo*) is used when referring to Kosovo in EU policy documents since February 2012,
denoting the EU’s neutrality on the question of Kosovo’s final status. In this thesis, the term ‘Kosovo’ will be
used without an asterisk. European Commission, ‘Enlargement’,
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/check-current-status/index_en.htm#pc, (accessed 15 May 2014).
9 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia, ‘Spoljna politika: sektor za multilateralnu saradnju’,
http://www.mfa.gov.rs/sr/index.php/spoljna-politika/multilaterala?lang=lat, (accessed 18 June 2014).
4The significance of Serbia’s historical context for its EU accession
During the Cold War, when Serbia was home to socialist Yugoslavia’s capital (Belgrade),
Yugoslavia’s foreign policy was based on the principles of neutrality and ‘non-alignment’ in
international relations, which, as this thesis will argue, were connected to its historical
perception of having a balancing role between East and West.10 Yugoslavia’s socialism
precluded the Yugoslav Government from developing closer institutional ties to the EU,
including political discussions towards any potential membership. Moreover, Yugoslavia’s
support for decolonisation movements in the Third World, often at the expense of national
interests of West European EU members, contributed to the worsening of its bilateral relations
with them, especially France, at the time when the EU was in its early stages of development.
In October 1957, the government of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), under Chancellor
Konrad Adenauer severed diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia after latter officially
recognised the German Democratic Republic (GDR) that was under communist rule.11
In response to its political alienation from Western Europe that ensued, Yugoslavia became
involved in the creation of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in the late 1950s, which held
its inaugural conference in Belgrade in 1961. The NAM was instituted as an alternative to
political and military rivalry between the two Soviet Union and the United States of America
(USA). However, Yugoslavia’s foreign policy ideas of neutrality and East/West balancing
predate Yugoslavia’s non-aligned socialism. These normative constructs are found when
10 These concepts will be further explored in Chapter Two.
11 This development occurred following Germany’s decision to apply the so-called Hallstein doctrine against
Yugoslavia for the first time ever in the history of this policy. The ‘Hallstein doctrine’ refers to West Germany’s
decision, made in 1955, not to maintain diplomatic relations with any country that recognises East Germany
(which was under socialist rule) as a sovereign nation. The regulation made an exception for the Soviet Union,
which had a special status in East Germany as an occupying power. This doctrine was selectively applied, first
to Yugoslavia in 1957 and to Cuba in 1963, but not to Cambodia in 1969. By the early 1970s, this doctrine
became obsolete. ‘Der Abbruch der deutsch–jougoslawischen Beziehungen’, Bulletin des Presse- und
Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung, no. 197, Bonn, Deutscher Verlag, 22 October 1957, p. 1807.
5evaluating Serbia’s foreign policy orientation during earlier historical periods. This thesis
argues that the broader historical context also influences the Serbian Government’s position on
developing closer relations with the EU, including its Europeanisation trajectory. The relevance
of particular interpretations of key events from Serbia’s earlier nation-building experiences for
this country’s relationship with the EU will be explained later in this chapter.
Since the first democratic Serbian Government after the Second World War was formed in
January 2001 following a decade of conflict, EU accession has become Serbia’s key foreign
policy goal. Successive democratic, and generally pro-EU Serbian Governments held the view
that EU accession is strongly in Serbia’s national interest. This position was, and continues to
be disputed by Serbia’s anti-Western oriented political parties and social groups, which include
some former political leaders who were previously pro-EU oriented.12 It is possible that, if left
unaddressed, normative factors—especially the historically shaped ideas of political neutrality
and East/West balancing that have never lost appeal among some sections of the Serbian
electorate—will continue to present difficulties for Serbia to join the EU even if the Serbian
Government eventually meets all pre-accession requirements that EU membership entails.
Turkey’s difficult EU accession process shows that European integration of non-EU members
(‘third countries’) can be stalled indefinitely due to one or both parties’ internal factors and
inflexibility in their respective negotiating positions. Different normative frameworks between
the negotiating parties can, therefore, delay any country’s EU accession, particularly where
value-systems about international order and state sovereignty are incompatible between the
two negotiating sides.13 This is also true for Serbia in relation to the EU, which is treated in
this thesis as a case study.
12 Studio B, ‘Dačić: ulazak u EU nacionalni interes’, 28 October 2013, http://www.naslovi.net/2013-10-
28/studio-b/dacic-ulazak-u-eu-nacionalni-interes/7573616, (accessed 10 November 2013).
13 Turkey applied in 1987 to join the European Economic Community, becoming eligible for EU membership in
1997, and finally becoming a formal candidate in 1999. The country’s closer association with the EU dates back
6Research questions
In assessing the reasons for Serbia’s delayed EU accession, one group of scholars tends to focus
on formal agreements reached between the EU and Serbia, and on how Serbia’s institutional
and administrative capacities align, or not, with the EU legislation. Progress in that domain is
used as a yardstick to assess Serbia’s suitability to join the EU. This approach will be referred
to in this thesis as the structural approach to Serbia’s EU accession. It also focuses on declared
economic or political interests of the EU and Serbian political elites as key drivers of reform,
with interests being defined as the ‘basic goals people seek in building strategies of action’.14
The second analytical perspective utilises culture-related arguments to explain why Serbia’s
EU accession has been delayed. This approach will be referred to as the cultural approach to
Serbia’s EU integration. A key focus of this perspective rests with an extreme notion of Serbian
nationalism and even religion, which its proponents believe to be key factors preventing Serbia
from ‘moving forward’ in embracing a post-national, European identity. The third analytical
perspective focuses on assessing political conditionality that the EU applies to Serbia, such as
through annual progress reports.15 This approach will be referred to as the regulative approach
to Serbia’s EU integration.
to the Ankara Association Agreement which was signed in September 1963. However, some of the domestic
and foreign policy decisions of the Turkish Government, which contradicted many of the principles the EU
stands for, indicated that the Turkish Government’s normative framework was, and is not compatible with the
solidarity principle of the EU. Accession procedures require a candidate country to align its statements and
policies with the EU’s law and positions on major international issues, as frequently as possible, as well as to
adjust its domestic policy in line with the EU principles, which are enshrined in the acquis.
14 C. Parsons, How to map arguments in Political Science, New York, Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 9. For
writings on European enlargement and integration from an interest-based perspective, see A. Moravcsik and
M.A. Vachudova, ‘National interests, state power, and EU enlargement’, East European politics and societies,
vol. 17, no. 1, 2003, pp. 42–57.
15 Annual reports on Serbia, which are published by the European Commission and called ‘progress reports’, are
an assessment tool that the EU uses to evaluate the progress of Serbia’s European integration when measured
against the EU’s priorities for Serbia.
7Research for this thesis has shown that none of the aforementioned analytical approaches can
adequately explain the key policy shifts in Serbia’s and the EU’s preferences when applied to
their diplomatic relations. These shifts result in incoherences in foreign policy decisions, which
have created challenges to Serbia’s European integration process since 2001. In Serbia,
domestic shifts in preferences, regarding the direction or ‘orientation’ of Serbian foreign
policy, are linked to particular sets of normative ideas. This thesis will investigate these
ideational positions regarding Serbia’s place in regional and global politics. They are
predominantly determined by Serbia’s political leaders, but also influenced by the normative
obstacles that contradictory positions produce.
Furthermore, the bulk of scholarly output on EU-Serbia relations tends to focus on the period
after Serbia’s democratic changes in October 2000, without paying sufficient attention to
Serbia’s earlier diplomatic engagement with the EU, which can offer a useful conceptual
toolbox for evaluating their bilateral relations.16 This thesis hence sets out to answer the
following set of questions: What are the key determining factors that have influenced Serbia’s
course towards seeking European integration? Why has this led to Serbia’s EU accession
process being delayed at various times? Did Serbia’s recent past play any role, and if so what
kind of role regarding this delay? What lessons can be learned about EU foreign policy and its
future development from the case study of Serbia’s delayed accession?
To answer these complex questions, this thesis will employ the methods of narration, textual
analysis and a comparative method within this interdisciplinary inquiry into Serbia’s European
integration. Serbia represents a complex case in the EU’s enlargement policy and a test-case
16 The most notable exception is B. Radeljić, Europe and the Collapse of Yugoslavia: the role of non-state
actors and European diplomacy, London, I.B. Tauris, 2012.
8for the EU’s peace-building efforts in the region. The comparative method will examine what
lessons the earlier historical precedents of other countries’ challenging accession experiences
could highlight when analysing Serbia’s delayed accession. These methods are part of the
constructivist approach to social science research. Constructivism treats political actors as
highly social, normative and purposive participants that can shape foreign policy through
negotiation and persuasion; it also regards national interests not as a given (a priori) but as
socially and historically negotiated and/or constructed by the elites.17 While participants must
be mindful of various structural and political constraints within the environment in which they
operate, this thesis will argue that the actors’ normative frameworks influence their actions and
decisions in the foreign policy domain.18 This normative aspect of EU-Serbia relations has been
less frequently researched than other aspects of their multi-faceted relationship, such as
economic or trade interests. For this reason, the thesis will also delve deeper into their historical
engagement in order to demonstrate the depth and complexity of their pre-2001 relations,
which directly influence the specific normative constructs developed from Serbia’s past
towards EU-Serbia relations today. This thesis argues that there is a correlation between
domestic changes in Serbia, and progress, or backsliding in its European integration.
Relevance of the research project
Serbia has been variously described as a fledgling democracy, Europe’s pariah state, and a
country with a difficult transition to democracy.19 Over the past two decades, there has been a
17 These points will be elaborated upon later in the Introduction.
18 These are not ideological views per se but rather a set of shared beliefs among members of one political
community about their collective place and role in the world that can be held by political agents with completely
opposing ideologies (for instance, the socialists and liberal democrats).
19 L. Cendrowicz, ‘A pariah no more: Serbia bids to join the EU’, Time, 23 December 2009,
http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1949816,00.html, (accessed 15 May 2013). M. Joksić,
Democracy in Serbia after the revolution: bringing youth back in, Washington DC, Centre for International
Private Enterprise, 15 October 2007, p. 2.
9proliferation of academic works examining the EU’s role in the Balkans, as well as Serbian
nationalism. As references in this thesis will demonstrate, Serbia’s domestic politics has
attracted extensive media and scholarly attention. This was predominantly due to Serbia’s
involvement in Southeast Europe’s most violent conflict since the Second World War, the
Balkan conflict, which included the Bosnian War (1992–95) and armed conflicts of Serbia and
Montenegro (as part of the FRY) with Slovenia and Croatia. In 1999, Yugoslavia’s federal
government was also involved in an armed conflict with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), which brought NATO military action against the FRY over Serbia’s repression
against Kosovo Albanian rebels.20 The Bosnian War claimed the highest number of casualties,
with approximately 100,000 killed, although initial assessment figures were higher.21 It not
only displaced millions of people, but also caused long-term damage to key regional
infrastructure, personal property and the natural environment. The ongoing material
consequences of recent conflicts are exacerbated today because of inadequate regulations and
a lack of long-term vision for the region’s collective future in the EU.22 However, there are
also ongoing consequences that are not material, but deeply normative, social and political.
The Bosnian War drew into the region large numbers of international peacekeepers, who came
as guarantors of peace under UN authority. In some instances, the UN failed to prevent violence
20 The term ‘ethnic cleansing’ is used by scholars in different ways. In this thesis, the term refers to ‘the use of
force or intimidation to remove people of a certain ethnic or religious group from an area’. R. Cohen, ‘Ethnic
cleansing’, 2011, http://www.crimesofwar.org/a-z-guide/ethnic-cleansing/, (accessed 13 May 2013).
21 Greenberg Research, ‘People on war: country report Bosnia-Herzegovina’, International Committee of the
Red Cross, November 1999, http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/bosnia.pdf, (accessed 12 November
2013). M. Camo, ‘Konačan broj žrtava rata u BiH oko 100,000 ljudi’, Bosnian Institute, 11 March 2005,
http://www.bosnia.org.uk/news/news_body.cfm?newsid=2018, (accessed 12 April 2013). J. Zwierzchowski and
E. Tabeau, The 1992–95 war in Bosnia-Herzegovina: census-based multiple system estimation of casualties’
undercount, Conference Paper for the International Research Workshop on ‘The global costs of conflict’, The
Households in Conflict Network (HiCN) and The German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin),
Berlin, 1–2 February 2010.
22 P. Stoett, ‘Environmental Security in Post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina’, Centre d’études des politiques
étrangères et de sécurité (CEPES) report, no. 29, October 2005, p. 16.
10
from occurring in UN-designated safe havens, which were meant to be conflict-free areas.23
Serbia and Croatia organised their own paramilitary forces, which received external support
from other countries and diaspora groups.24 Another consequence of the war was the increased
threat to Europe of Islamic fundamentalism, as many radical Islamists came to Bosnia-
Herzegovina from afar to fight in the Bosnian War on the side of Bosnian Muslims (hereafter
referred to as ‘Bosniaks’).25 Apart from creating a negative image of the Balkans and Serbia in
the West, violent conflict during the 1990s precluded European integration of countries in this
region, and separated it from other European integration processes on the EU’s eastern borders
at that time. 26
Upon visiting the Bosnian War’s most visible scar, the Srebrenica mass grave at Potočari in
Eastern Bosnia-Herzegovina, the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon said ‘the international
community failed in preventing the genocide that unfolded’.27 Scholars have been discussing
ever since the causes and consequences of these tragic events. An established view is that the
EU did not do enough to prevent the outbreak of hostilities, or to provide a membership
perspective to Yugoslavia in 1990.28Therefore, many scholars commence their examination of
23 For an extraordinary story of how UN legal immunity was misused according to a personal account by a
former UN employee, see N.L. Diu, ‘What the UN doesn't want you to know’, The Telegraph, 6 February 2012,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/film/9041974/What-the-UN-Doesnt-Want-You-to-Know.html, (accessed 1
May 2013).
24 The full extent of crimes committed during this war, including by regular forces of the warring parties
involved, paramilitary groups, and also international actors, will probably never be known.
25 For information about local paramilitary groups involved in the Bosnian war, see J. Mueller, ‘The banality of
ethnic war’, in M.E. Brown et al. (eds), Nationalism and ethnic conflict, Cambridge, The MIT Press, 2001, pp.
97–125. For international involvement, see Q. Butt, ‘Islamabad refuses to hand over ex-ISI chief to Bosnia
tribunal’, The Express Tribune, 20 September 2011, http://tribune.com.pk/story/256199/islamabad-refuses-to-
hand-over-ex-isi-chief-to-bosnia-tribunal/, (accessed 1 May 2013). C. Hedges, ‘Muslims from afar joining
“Holy War” in Bosnia’, New York Times, 5 December 1992,
http://www.nytimes.com/1992/12/05/world/muslims-from-afar-joining-holy-war-in-bosnia.html, (accessed 1
May 2013).
26 Yugoslavia’s conflict-ridden disintegration stood in stark contrast to Czechoslovakia’s peaceful separation
(‘velvet divorce’) and even the Soviet Union’s dissolution in the early 1990s.
27 British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), ‘Ban Ki-moon first UN chief to visit Srebrenica graves’, 26 July
2012, http://m.bbc.com/news/world-europe-18996152, (accessed 13 May 2013).
28 Chapter Three will discuss some of these issues in more detail.
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Serbia’s European integration with the wars of Yugoslavia’s disintegration. This thesis will
limit its analysis of the wars of Yugoslavia’s disintegration to how these wars impacted on EU-
Serbia relations, and how they might have influenced the EU’s foreign policy towards Serbia
after the regime change in 2000.
Yugoslavia’s disintegration coincided with historic changes at the EU’s Eastern borders, as
socialism was being replaced with democratic governments in Central and East European
States (CEES). Serbia’s disproportionate military offensive against Slovenia and Croatia (after
they proclaimed independence in June 1991) ironically unfolded at the same time as the CEES
were democratising. While the war in Slovenia lasted only for ten days, the war in Croatia
lasted for four years, ending in 1995, like the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, with the involvement
of the United States (US). Furthermore, the Milošević regime’s confrontation with NATO in
1999 over the former’s actions in the disputed autonomous province of Kosovo degraded
Serbia’s already damaged international image after the siege of Sarajevo and murders of many
thousands of Bosnian Muslim boys and men in Srebrenica.29
Despite Kosovo proclaiming independence on 17 February 2008, with support from key EU
states (in particular, France and Germany), successive Serbian Governments strongly opposed
its international recognition (with diplomatic support from Russia and China).30 The issue of
Kosovo’s independence also divided EU members, preventing a common position.31 It also
29 For a useful overview of key approaches to the issue of NATO’s intervention to end the Kosovo conflict, see
D. Chandler, ‘Review essay: Kosovo and the remaking of international relations’, The Global Review of
Ethnopolitics, vol. 1, no. 4, June 2002, pp. 110–118. Chapter Four will discuss this conflict in more detail.
30 While Kosovo has been receiving international recognition progressively, it still cannot become a full member
of the United Nations (UN) and many international organisations where Russia has veto power. Political
scientist Milenko Petrović fittingly described Kosovo as an ‘in-between’ or a ‘quasi-state’, as it is not a ‘normal’
independent state which is recognised by the UN. M. Petrović, The democratic transition of post-Communist
Europe: in the shadow of communist differences and uneven EUropeanisation, Hampshire, Palgrave Macmillan,
2013, p. 157.
31 Five EU members, Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain pledged not to recognise Kosovo’s
independence without Serbia’s consent, despite the European Parliament’s call in 2010 to do so. ‘European
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made Serbia’s relations with its neighbours more complicated, as Slovenia, Croatia, Hungary,
Bulgaria and Macedonia recognise Kosovo’s independence, while Romania and Bosnia-
Herzegovina do not (mainly due to the opposition by Bosnian Serbs).32 Due to these events in
Southeast Europe’s recent history, Serbia has attracted strong academic interest, mostly
negative. Another reason for academic output in recent years has been Serbia’s difficult
European integration and frequent delays in the formal negotiations with the EU due to one or
both parties under-delivering on agreed commitments. This thesis argues that these shifts were
caused by changes in preferences by either the EU or the Serbian Government. Domestic
preference-change in Serbia was strongly influenced by the normative framework of the
governing party (or the coalition of parties) in power. For this reason, the thesis will investigate
the shifts in Serbia’s preferences towards the EU by using a chronological and thematic
approach (including by the Serbian Government in power). The next section will evaluate
major conceptual approaches to Serbia’s delayed accession, suggesting an alternative
approach. It will also explain key arguments, methodology, fieldwork methods, and the
structure of this thesis.
Thesis framework
Serbia was the last country in Southeast Europe to oust an autocratic leader, Slobodan
Milošević, from power in October 2000.33 Its democratic breakthrough, hence, occurred eleven
years after neighbouring Romanians toppled their notorious dictator, Nicolae Ceauşescu, and
Parliament urges EU members to recognise Kosovo’, Southeast European Times, 9 July 2010,
http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2010/07/09/feature-01,
(accessed 1 August 2013).
32 Serbia still protests Kosovo’s participation in many regional forums. A. Otašević and J. Cerovina, ‘Beograd
protestovao zbog pozivanja Prištine na skup u Briselu’, Politika, 12 July 2014,
http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/tema-dana/I-Kosovo-na-donatorskoj-konferenciji-za-Srbiju-i-BiH.lt.html,
(accessed 13 July 2014).
33 G.O. Hall, ‘The politics of autocracy: Serbia under Slobodan Milošević’, East European Quarterly, vol. 33,
no. 2, summer 1999, pp. 233–249.
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less than a year after Croatians elected their first reformist and pro-European government.34
However, both Romania and Croatia are today members of the EU, alongside nine other former
socialist states which had joined the EU over the last decade, while Serbia’s EU accession
remains, at best, a distant possibility.35 This discrepancy has led many scholars to ask what has
happened to the progress of Serbian reforms, and why this country has lagged so much behind
others from a similar institutional heritage that have joined the EU in 2004, 2007 and 2013.36
As the policy on enlargement currently stands, to be considered for EU membership, associated
states (candidates) need to progressively align their institutions, policies and legislation with
the EU’s body of law, the acquis communautaire (the acquis).37 At present, the latter is sub-
divided into thirty-five policy areas (or chapters).38 Candidates, including Serbia, must amply
address all policy areas that are specified in the chapters, for which they need to receive detailed
feedback from the European Commission (about their progress in meeting criteria in those
areas). Ultimately, the closing of chapters sends a clear signal to the EU that the applicant state
has fulfilled all procedural requirements for EU membership, so that negotiations on an
Accession Treaty can start. After the treaty receives support from key EU institutions
(European Commission, European Parliament and the Council of the European Union), EU
34 For information about EU incentives in Croatia’s move to democratise` in 1999–2000, see T. Freybourg and
S. Richter, ‘National identity matters: the limited impact of  EU political conditionality in the Western Balkans’,
Challenges to Democracy in the 21st century Working Paper, no. 19, National Centre of Competence in
Research (NCCR), June 2008.
35 Beta, ‘Teško će Srbija u EU 2020. godine, to je apsolutni optimizam’, 2 February 2014,
http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Politika/439374/Tesko-ce-Srbija-u-EU-2020-godine-to-je-apsolutni-optimizam,
(accessed 13 February 2014).
36 For a useful summary of main structural approaches to that question, see M. Petrović, The democratic
transition of post-Communist Europe, 2013, op. cit., pp. 2–6, 31–40.
37 EU accession norms will be discussed in more detail in Chapter One.
38 During their pre-accession screening, Bulgaria and Romania had to conclude with the EU thirty-one chapters,
and Croatia thirty-five, which possibly indicated a growing complexity of the EU accession process. European
Commission, ‘Chapters of the acquis’, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/conditions-membership/chapters-
of-the-acquis/index_en.htm, (accessed 1 May 2014).
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members and the acceding country must ratify the treaty before the candidate can join the EU
on the date specified in the treaty.39
Currently there are three dominant conceptual approaches that seek to explain Serbia’s
obstacles on its path towards obtaining EU membership. These are referred to in this thesis as
the structural approaches, cultural approaches and regulatory approaches. The three approaches
tend to emphasise different aspects of Serbia’s Europeanisation processes, offering different
causal explanations of what has led to delays in Serbia’s EU accession process. An alternative
or normative approach, which derives from the author’s own research findings and fieldwork,
will be detailed after the three dominant approaches are explained.
But what is precisely meant by the normative approach? A normative perspective refers here
to collectively-oriented, and in essence nationalistic (or exclusionary) political attitudes as
main reference points (‘ideational frameworks’) from Serbia’s political history. The elites in
Serbia, both political and religious, have resorted to such concepts in order to create a particular
vision or ‘collective mental map’ of Serbia’s place in the world, and European politics in
particular, having dismissed alternative viewpoints as anti-patriotic, foreign-inspired and
malicious.40 The process of collectively-oriented memory building was often not explicit but
implicit, by which elites adopted and furthered political discourses and policies of their
predecessors, political party comrades and even mentors.
A renowned German specialist of Balkan politics and Serbia’s nation- and state-building, Holm
Sundhaussen, found that contrary to a popular belief that Serbia represents a special case in
39 EU Information Centre, ‘Negotiation chapters: 35 steps towards the European Union’, Belgrade, January
2014, p. 6. Historical development of EU accession norms since the Copenhagen summit in 1993 will be
discussed in Chapter One.
40 H. Sundhaussen, Geschichte Serbiens, 19.-21. Jahrhundert, Vienna, Böhlau Verlag, 2007, pp. 10–14; 23–35.
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Southeast European politics (which had been, in his view, naively held by many Serbian
scholars and Western observers), Serbia was a ‘normal’ country that followed similar nation-
building processes to others in Central and Eastern Europe in the 19th century.41 Its ‘arrogant
religious and political elites’ created popular memory or ‘myths’ embodying uncritical
reflection of important events from Serbia’s past, most importantly the Kosovo battle of 1389,
and before the Ottoman conquest of the Balkan Peninsula, glorified nationalistic discourses of
Serbia’s territorial expansion under the Nemanjić’s political dynasty (12th and 13th centuries).42
Popular memory of such events has then been used in an instrumental way in order to further
political discourses and aims of the ruling elites. Examples include, during Milošević-era in
Serbian politics, a Greater Serbia narrative that was promoted by many of the leading Serbian
writers and political actors. In earlier times, it included the Serbian victimhood discourses in
Kosovo during the 1960s and 1970s that was promoted by the religious establishment.
This thesis argues that a similar trend can be observed when analysing Serbia’s Europeanisation
process. The thesis investigates concepts not covered specifically by Sundhaussen, those of
East/West balancing and political neutrality in foreign policy. These concepts, which will be
investigated in Chapter Two, are important examples of how elite-driven interpretations of
Serbia’s past political circumstances may have contributed to its delayed EU accession. By
arguing that Serbia should distance itself from the West (the EU being seen as part of the West)
and by promoting Serbia’s ‘historical’ role of bridging between civilisations (even if it involves
a closer alliance with Russia), EU-sceptic elites in Serbia have contributed to increased
41 The vast majority of Holm Sundhaussen’s work, including his seminal works on Serbian and Yugoslav
nation-building and politics, have never been published in English. The author of this thesis had to rely on the
original sources in German and the official translation of one of his books, Serbia’s history from the 19th to 21st
century, which is available in Serbian and in parts, also online. ‘H. Zundhausen: Stare tabue zamenjuju novi’,
Danas, 21 October 2008,
http://www.danas.rs/vesti/feljton/stare_tabue_zamenjuju_novi.24.html?news_id=143049, (accessed 1 July
2014).
42 N. Mišković, ‘Rezension zu Holm Sundhaussen: Geschichte Serbiens. 19.–21. Jahrhundert. Wien, Böhlau,
2007’, H-Soz-u-Kult, vol. 58, no. 3, 2008, pp. 369–371.
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resistance to the Serbian Government’s EU-oriented reform agenda domestically. This may, in
turn, assist opponents to further enlargement inside the EU to have arguments to reject even
more vehemently Serbia’s potential accession, by arguing that EU accession itself lacks
popular legitimacy in contemporary Serbian society.43
In Sundhaussen’s view, the emphasis on territorial expansion rather than the consolidation of
democratic institutions is an important factor that has derailed Serbia’s evolution into a modern
European state. Undoubtedly, functioning democratic institutions would certainly improve
Serbia’s prospects to join the EU, which is the argument put forward by advocates of
structuralist perspectives that will be discussed in the next secion. However, without a shared
understanding among pro-EU oriented Serbian elites about what democratic governance entails
in the first place, that this state of affairs is desirable at all levels of society (not only at the
state level in order to satisfy regular EU questionnaires that are linked to more development
assistance funds) and that transformation needs to occur precisely at the elite-level in order to
inspire all-encompassing change (by elites taking responsibility for diplomatic failures in
Serbia’s accession process rather than using slow reforms within state institutions as an excuse
for their own lagged performance), Serbia’s EU accession is less likely to occur. But let us now
turn to the structural approaches to Serbia’s delayed accession in order to evaluate what kind
of obstacles the proponents of structuralist approaches believe to be hindering Serbia’s
progression towards meeting its professed foreign policy end-goal, the membership of the EU.
43 Without a referendum on this issue in Serbia, it is difficult to precisely determine whether this might indeed
be the case.
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Structural approaches to Serbia’s delayed European integration
The first approach that this thesis has identified in the study of Serbia’s delayed EU accession
prioritises administrative and institutional (‘structural’) obstacles as the main reason behind
Serbia’s late start in adopting EU norms and standards, which has in turn led to its delayed EU
accession.44 These standards refer to Serbia’s adoption of the acquis and various regulations of
the EU across all sectors.45 For the proponents of structural approaches, Serbia is viewed as
one economic and administrative unit within a broader spectrum of other post-communist states
that have already joined the EU, especially the CEES. However, Serbia’s experiences with the
economic self-management system were vastly different from corresponding experiences in
other Europe’s socialist countries.46 Structural explanations of Serbia’s delayed EU accession
emphasise that Serbia had begun to chart its EU-oriented institutional reform course much later
than most other post-communist countries, and that its delayed institutional reforms have
hindered it from starting EU accession negotiations earlier.47
Supporters of structural arguments maintain that Serbia inherited its structural weaknesses from
the Milošević era, which still jeopardises its European integration.48 Some of these scholars go
44 It is important to note that scholars who place broader structural (institutional or economic) over other factors
in expaining the reasons behind Serbia’s delayed accession, do not necessarily share similar views on other
aspects of Serbia’s European integration. Their grouping in this thesis is the result of factors that they describe
as determining Serbia’s European integration and delayed accession. The same conclusion applies to proponents
of the other two conceptual approaches.
45 For a comprehensive survey of the adoption of European standards in Serbia, see J. Milić (ed.), Evropski
standardi u Srbiji: zbornik radova, Centre for Democracy, Belgrade, 2009. It is also important to note that many
of EU standards vary in practice from state to state. For example, fiscal policy standards, such as fiscal
discipline, would be differently understood and implemented in the UK when compared to Malta or Cyprus.
Country differentiation on fiscal policy matters also varies greatly within the Euro area. See, for instance,
European Central Bank, ‘Implementation of the excessive deficit procedure under the reinforced stability and
growth pact in euro area member states’, ECB Monthly Bulletin Box, September 2013.
46 A diversity of socialist legacies in post-Communist reform is emphasised by JH. Meyer-Sahling, ‘Varieties of
legacies: a critical review of legacy explanations of public administration reform in East Central Europe’,
International Review of Administrative Sciences, vol. 75, no. 3, 2009, pp. 509–528.
47 This approach is particularly prevalent in the policy documents of major financial donors.
48 J. Milić, ‘The elephant in the room: incomplete security sector reform in Serbia and its consequences for
Serbian domestic and foreign policies’, in V. Džihić and D.S. Hamilton (eds), Unfinished business: the Western
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further into Serbia’s past, arguing that Serbia’s inefficient state administration was a
continuation of its bureaucratic practices from state socialism, and even from royalist
Yugoslavia (1918–1941).49 Regional expert Jasmina Džinić has rightly observed that
partocracy has become the main challenge to Serbia’s institutional reforms since the overthrow
of Serbian autocrat Slobodan Milošević.50 Partocracy relies for its survival on non-merit based
employment practices and corruption.51 Partocracy continued to exist as a de facto system
during the Milošević era in Serbian politics.52 During that period in Serbian politics, many
senior civil servants and university lecturers who were not regarded as supporters of the regime
were dismissed from their positions.53 A Serbian sociologist, Srećko Mihailović, has argued
that Serbia’s widely-adhered to system of partocracy has become a major challenge to Serbia’s
democratic reform even after the regime change.54 A public opinion survey in Serbia of 2011
Balkans and the international community, Center for Transatlantic Relations, Johns Hopkins University, 2012,
pp. 159–178.
49 J. Džinić, ‘Public administration reform in Serbia’, Hrvatska i komparativna javna uprava, vol. 11, no. 4,
2001, p. 1078.
50 Milošević resigned from his position in early October 2000 after prolonged mass protests and under
increasing internal pressure to recognise his party’s electoral defeat in the elections of September 2000. Despite
his ‘voluntary resignation’, the moment of Serbia’s regime change is often referred to as Serbia’s 5 October
Revolution (‘Petooktobarska revolucija’). In this thesis, his resignation will be referred to as Serbia’s
‘democratic changes’ or just as the ‘regime change’. B. Barlovac, ‘Serbia marks 10th anniversary of October 5
Revolution’, Balkan Insight, 5 October 2010, http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/serbia-marks-10th-
anniversary-of-october-5-revolution, (accessed 1 May 2013). I. Miladinović, ‘Zapad za petooktobarsku
revoluciju dao 60 miliona dolara’, Politika, 1 October 2012, http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/Drustvo/Zapad-za-
petooktobarsku-revoluciju-dao-60-miliona-dolara.lt.html, (accessed 12 March 2013). For a detailed assessment,
see I. Spasić and M. Subotić (eds), Revolution and order: Serbia after October 2000, Belgrade, Institute for
Philosophy and Social Theory, 2001.
51 Partocracy is an informal system of governing in Serbia’s semi-democratised society that grants excessive
powers to political parties, especially those in power, which appoint senior public servants based on their
membership or affiliation to a political party that is in power, instead of on merit.
52 In the Yugoslav socialist system, nomenklatura or the Communist Party hieararchy would often determine
which party loyalist would obtain the highest or privileged official positions, including ambassadorial posts.
Milošević continued and adapted this system by encircling himself with loyalists, who were also from other
(non-SPS) political parties that supported his regime (such as Jugoslovenska Levica, JUL; and Srpska Radikalna
Stranka, SRS).
53 I. Jeffries, The former Yugoslavia at the turn of the 21st century: a guide to economies in transition, London,
Routledge, 2003, p. 451.
54 S. Mihailović, ‘Patrokratija u Srbiji’, 24 April 2007, http://www.politika.rs/pogledi/Srecko-
Mihailovic/t26222.lt.html, (accessed 18 May 2013).
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found that corruption in Serbia was particularly prevalent in publicly-funded companies and
government agencies and ministries.55
Proponents of structural approaches maintain that delays in Serbia’s adoption of EU standards
have been also caused by internal resistance to reform from within the public sector at all levels
of public administration, as well as specific ministries.56 Public institutions in Serbia have a
‘difficult to change’ mentality towards work, and opposition from senior management is strong
towards innovation and modernisation, especially towards the introduction of advanced
technologies and European standards.57 This ‘socialist-era mentality’ towards work is captured
by a popular saying: ‘Radio ne radio, svira ti radio’, which in a free translation can be rendered
as ‘even if you don’t work, you’ll still get paid’.58 Furthermore, Serbia’s lack of innovation in
the Information and Communications Technology (ICT) sector can be seen from its ranking in
a global ICT index, which shows that in 2011 and 2012 Serbia lagged behind all twenty-seven
EU members.59 Therefore, the lack of modernisation within Serbian state institutions, and little
changes in elite-level attitudes to governance is seen according to this perspective as major
hurdles to European integration, which slowed down Serbia’s reform process despite Serbia’s
shift to democracy and pro-EU rhetoric.
55 G. Necin, ‘Partokratija u Srbiji: Korupcija kao pravilo’, 22 November 2011, E-Novine,
http://www.antikorupcija-savet.gov.rs/dogadjaji/cid1042-1752/partokratija-u-srbiji-korupcija-kao-pravilo
(accessed 18 May 2013).
56 ibid.
57 S. Eriksen, ‘Institution building in Central and Eastern Europe: foreign influences and domestic responses’,
Review of Central and East European Law, no. 32, 2007, p. 338.
58 N. Šovljanski, ‘Radio ne radio svira ti radio: lice i naličje ocenjivanja zaposlenih’, E-kapija, 30 September
2009, http://www.ekapija.com/website/sr/page/283746/Radio-ne-radio-svira-ti-radio-lice-i-nali per centC4 per
cent8Dje-ocenjivanja-zaposlenih, (accessed 13 May 2013). This kind of attitude was common in state socialist
systems. In communist Poland, there was a similar saying that can be freely translated as: ‘If you are on your
feet or lying down, you still get two zloties’ (salary).




In the post-Cold War era, including in Serbia, the EU has certainly been a major external driver
of institutional reform, having financed many programs in Serbia towards this end. The EU
was extensively engaged in the processes of norms-diffusion and transfer of European
standards to former socialist countries generally. Political scientist Ian Manners has defined the
EU, a ‘hybrid polity’, as a globally-engaged actor that seeks to promote European standards to
non-EU members, striving to change existing institutional norms in third countries order to put
forward its own standards of state behaviour.60 The diffusion of democratic practices, norms
and institutional standards from the EU to the CEES before the latter’s EU accession was
deemed to be a relatively successful experience; although many institutional reforms in the
CEES were only partially completed when they joined the EU, and are in need of further
development.61
Some authors have observed that Serbia’s European integration was hindered by the inability
of Serbia’s reformist, post-Milošević governments to learn from past reform practices in the
CEES. A Norwegian expert on Serbia’s institutional reforms, Svein Eriksen, has argued that
Serbia’s structural reform process was weakened by the internal resistance to changing the
status quo, particularly the tendency in government administration to focus on controlling the
‘observance of existing arrangements and censuring non-compliance’.62 Eriksen also observed
that in Serbia during the early 2000s, the reform process was unevenly implemented from
ministry to ministry, while the delays in reform were able to be traced to the frictions between
60 I. Manners, ‘Normative power Europe: a contradiction in terms’, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 40,
no. 2, 2002, pp. 253.
61 For the Polish case, regarded as one of the most successful in the CEES, see J. Kaminska, ‘The link between
national foreign policy and the performance of a country in the European Union: the Polish case’, Journal of
Contemporary European Research, vol. 6, no. 1, 2010, pp. 69–84; G. Pridham, ‘Confining conditions and
breaking with the past: historical legacies and political learning in transitions to democracy’, Democratization,
vol. 7, no. 2, 2000, pp. 36–64.
62 S. Eriksen, ‘Unfinished transition–public administration reform in Serbia 2001–2004’, Paper presented to the
13th NISPAcee Annual Conference Democratic governance for the 21st century: challenges and responses in
CEE countries, Moscow, 21 May 2005, p. 24.
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individual ministers and outdated rules within which their ministries were operating. Eriksen
put it this way: ‘The norms governing political and bureaucratic behaviour respectively are
distinctly different … in Serbia than what is normally found in Western Europe. At the same
time as Serbian bureaucrats are expected to follow a very formal – some might say formalistic–
tradition in the German/Austrian style there is also an autocratic leadership ideal’, apparently
with its ‘roots in the Ottoman Turkish tradition’.63
Some of Eriksen’s observations are similar to research findings by political economist Milica
Uvalić, who was Assistant Minister for Foreign Economic Relations in Serbia’s first post-
Milošević democratic government. In Uvalić’s personal experience with implementing reforms
in Serbia’s economic sector, she observed that while the CEES’s experience generated specific
lessons on ‘neglected areas and the sequencing of reforms, the mistakes of [these] countries
seem to have been forgotten too easily in countries like Serbia, embarking on transition later’.64
Serbia’s limited capacities, especially those that were the consequence of Serbia’s economic
collapse in the 1990s, and the overly pronounced focus by its leaders on political issues rather
than economic and structural reform, prevented Serbia from moving as fast as the CEES
towards EU membership.65 However, Serbia could have been included earlier in the
membership negotiations had pre-accession talks with the EU not been stopped, from both
sides and in different historical moments, over issues which they individually saw as non-
compliance with earlier agreements.66
63 ibid., p. 26.
64 M. Uvalić, Serbia’s transition: towards a better future, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, p. 179.
65 Public expectations were also not met as the progress was much slower than Serbian citizens were expecting
at the time of the regime change in early October 2000.
66 The EU halted negotiations on a Stabilisation and Association (SAA) agreement in 2006 due to Serbia’s lack
of full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. On the other hand,
Serbia temporarily halted dialogue with the EU after Kosovo proclaimed independence in February 2008.
These moments were, in fact, lost opportunities to bring Serbia and the EU closer together, as they reflected
disagreements specific to that time without considering the long-term goal of Serbia’s membership in the EU.
Therefore, regardless of the level of institutional reform in associated states, including in Serbia, the political
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The structural perspective does not adequately explain, however, why the EU has during
previous accession rounds admitted members who, despite an earlier start to reform than
Serbia, also did not have entrenched democratic traditions or strong institutional capacities,
judiciary that was free of political influence, or a good anti-corruption record. Some CEES (in
particular, Bulgaria, Slovakia and Romania) were admitted before these conditions were
completely satisfied as the normative opposition to their membership was overcome (through
informal summitry and the cultivation of close personal relationship with influential leaders of
several EU members) with the processes of trust- and solidarity building.67 The structural
perspective also does not explain why Croatia, which turned more democratic less than one
year earlier than Serbia (in 1999), received political support from key EU members although
its structural weaknesses were similar to Serbia’s and only partially addressed.
Serbia’s complex structural conditions and institutional weaknesses include a weak judiciary,
inadequately reformed Parliament, an oversized and politicised bureaucracy, high levels of
corruption, the legacy of living under two different types of authoritarian regime. The socialist
Yugoslavia was a one-party state that was much better organised when compared to the chaotic
period in Serbian politics during the Milošević regime, when policy making was arbitrary, often
contradictory, and public institutions were extremely politicised.68 The proponents of structural
explanations, therefore, believe that problems which Serbia has faced in its European
integration process stem from two main sources: its structural legacy of communism and poorly
disagreements (underpinned by the clashes of normative frameworks between the EU and the Serbian
Government) were the primary reason behind the delays in formal talks, and not the structural factors.
67 Interview with Srđan Majstorović, Deputy Director of the Serbian European Integration Office, Belgrade,
June 2012.
68 Several interviewees made this comparison between Serbia’s two authoritarian regimes, the socialist one
during the SFRY and an autocratic one during the Milošević period. Interviews with Vladan Dinić, owner of an
independent Serbian newspaper Svedok, Belgrade, June 2010; and Srđan Srećković, Minister for Diaspora from
the Serbian Renewal Movement, Belgrade, July 2012.
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implemented institutional reforms after the regime change (including the lack of government
regulation and oversight that produced mass irregularities in virtually every political and
economic sector).69
The formidable ideological differences between the Serbian Government and the EU and its
members on a number of regional issues, including on the issue of Kosovo’s independence,
have also cost Serbia the opportunity to establish closer institutional and political ties to the
EU, despite some progress in Serbia’s institutional reform. Therefore, the structural approach
does not deal with normative or social factors, as it focuses on material or structural
preconditions of enlargement. It does not adequately explain the variation in the type of new
EU members which have acceded since 2004, all of which were also ‘latecomers’ in European
integration when compared to the more Europeanised Austria, Finland and Sweden, which
joined the EU in 1995.
Eight post-communist states in transition, which joined the EU in May 2004, constituted prior
to their accession a different breed of EU candidate from countries which had joined the EU in
1995.70 Their particular domestic conditions and specific economic need for knowledge and
technology transfers from the West required them to undertake far-reaching political and
economic reforms with the EU’s assistance.71 That was not the case with countries in the 1995
69 These irregularities include endemic corruption, nepotism, the lack of national standards and oversight of
education bodies (in particular, the obtaining of higher degrees at private universities), poor standards and
oversight in the health sector, questionable tender practices in the privatisation of national companies, and
similar issues.
70 The eight post-communist countries involved were the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.
71 Their internal weaknesses included under-developed electoral politics and civil society, an inefficient
economy, problems with efficiency, size, transparency and accountability of the public sector, various degrees
of ethnic nationalism, and the lack of local expertise to help the CEES countries meet the complex requirements
of EU membership. For a critical analysis of Eastern European enlargement, see G. Meardi, Social failures of
EU enlargement: a case of workers voting with their feet, London, Routledge, 2012. Daniel Vaughan-
Whitehead, EU enlargement versus social Europe? The uncertain future of the European social model,
Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2003.
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enlargement, which could not join the EU earlier as they were neutral states during the Cold
War and their specific domestic conditions prevented them from politically aligning with the
EU, or militarily with NATO. Later, as candidates for EU membership, the CEES needed to
harmonise their legislation with the acquis and align their policies with joint statements and
common declarations of the EU. Some of the potential benefits behind their motivation to join
the EU, other than a desire to ‘return to Europe’, included advantages from accessing Europe’s
largest free trade area; the EU’s special development funds; and benefiting from the EU’s
political clout on the international stage when speaking with one voice, such as on trade
negotiation matters and human rights issues with non-members. Individual CEES could never
be as effective internationally outside the EU framework, especially in discussions with other
regions.72
Similar motivations, especially regarding economic development, appear to have encouraged
Serbia under its first pro-EU government led by a Western-educated Prime Minister Zoran
Đinđić to aim for EU membership as his country’s foremost foreign policy goal.73 However,
due to Serbia’s particular domestic conditions and less than positive international image, it had
become much harder to convince other EU members to accept Serbia as a candidate for EU
membership until the country demonstrated a greater commitment to Europe. This process, for
instance, took eleven years from the time Serbia had installed its first democratic government
in January 2001 to the confirmation of Serbia’s candidature in 2012. Moreover, the time lag
between democratisation in the CEES and the formal opening of accession negotiations with
72 Political scientist Neill Nugent believed that the loss of status for Western European countries after the
Second World War was also an important incentive for their leaders to engage in economic integration in the
1950s, and political cooperation in the 1970s. N. Nugent, The government and politics of the European Union,
6th edn, Durham, Duke University Press, 2006, p. 21.
73 T. Radanović-Felberg, ‘Putovanje Srbije u Evropu na Đinđićevim metaforama’, Riječ, no. 1, 2009, p. 55. See
also the Đinđić Government’s key priorities outlined upon the formation of Serbia’s democratic government in
2001. Demokratska Stranka, ‘Exposé of Dr Zoran Đinđić’, 25 January 2001,
http://www.ds.org.rs/organizacija/96-english-categories/zoran-djindjic/13501-Expos-of-Dr-Zoran-Djindjic,
(accessed 1 October 2013).
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the EU was around eight years on average, whereas for Serbia, it took thirteen years.74 For
Croatia, which had a similar legacy to Serbia in terms of a shared socialist past and a reputation
of war crimes including during the Second World War, it is remarkable that the process of
negotiating and obtaining associate membership took significantly less time than it did for
Serbia (three years). Therefore, Croatia seems to have had an even stronger incentive to reform,
despite its own internal obstacles, as EU membership seemed to be more closely within its
reach than it was for the Serbian Government in the same period (2003). Serbia’s domestic
circumstances and weaker external incentives were thus key reasons why Serbia did not
progress as fast as Croatia towards EU accession.
Cultural explanations for Serbia’s delayed reforms
The second approach relates to Serbia’s inability, or the lack of political will, to deal effectively
and comprehensively with the Milošević era wartime legacy. This approach particularly
examines cultural obstacles to Serbia’s reform. It focuses on issues such as extreme
nationalism in contemporary Serbia, the ‘culture of denial’ of war crimes, infringements of
minority rights, and inadequate support for NGOs as key reasons for Serbia’s delayed EU
accession. The solution that this approach suggests is for Serbia to accept full responsibility for
crimes committed during the 1990s in its name, and come to terms with its violent past by
showing leadership and a constructive approach to its neighbours.
Some strands of this approach are connected with discourses on Europe’s identity formation
and the exclusionary idea of geographical and cultural boundaries of Europe. Non-EU
members, especially candidates in the Western Balkans, but also Turkey, are juxtaposed as
74 The EU initiated formal accession negotiations with the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia
and Cyprus in March 1998, and in October 1999 with Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania and
Slovakia.
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Europe’s ‘civilisational other’.75 Serbia is seen, according to this perspective, as an exceptional
case in European enlargement due to its recent history of violent conflict and extreme
nationalism. It is portrayed as a semi-reformed country that is politically unpredictable,
unstable, difficult to trust, economically weak and with contested sovereignty. These factors
make it less desirable as a potential EU member because its popularity as a potential member
has been low among EU citizens. Opponents of any further EU enlargement into the Western
Balkans have constructed narratives of this region’s, and in particular Serbia’s ‘backwardness’
and cultural inadequacy for EU membership. US historian Samuel Huntington noted in 1991
that ‘the prospects for democracy in Serbia appear dubious’, although during that year anti-
government protests in March were some of the biggest in Serbia during the Milošević era.76
Therefore, while structural conditions were certainly constraining the change from
authoritarianism to democracy in Serbia, the fact that liberal forces were on the streets in mass
protests meant that prospects for democracy did exist in Serbia. However, there was not enough
support from the EU in particular to assist with leadership change.
In the 1990s as Yugoslavia was unravelling, Huntington placed Serbia within Eastern or
‘Orthodox civilisation’ in his view of a ‘global clash of civilisations’.77 However, Serbian
intellectual elites have traditionally regarded themselves differently—as a bridge between
‘civilisations’, which was also congruent with socialist Yugoslavia’s foreign policy following
SFRJ’s expulsion from the Soviet bloc in 1948.78 In addition, Serbia’s religious character,
which was revived after the collapse of Yugoslav communism, is not much different from that
75 O. Anastasakis, ‘The Europeanization of the Balkans’, The Brown Journal of World Affairs, vol. 12, no. 1,
Summer/Fall 2005, p. 80.
76 S.P. Huntington, ‘Democracy’s third wave’, Journal of Democracy, vol. 2, no. 2, Spring 1991, p. 21.
77 S.P. Huntington, The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order, New York, Simon & Schuster,
2003, p. 138. Throughout history, Serbia has been involved in many wars with neighbouring Bulgaria, which is
also an Orthodox country. Therefore, there is little evidence that Serbia’s Orthodox religion has in any way pre-
determined Serbia’s foreign policy choices.
78 This event will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Two.
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of Greece, yet Greece has been a member of the EU since 1981, and Bulgaria and Romania,
also Orthodox countries, joined the EU in 2007.79 More religious Serbs tend to view their
country’s political relations with affinity to Russia, but also with absolute independence from
other Orthodox churches (particularly Russian and Greek).80 Serbian public opinion on foreign
policy remains divided between Europhiles and Russophiles.81 Serbian pro-EU elites (labelled
as ‘Evropejci’ in the Serbian media) tend to regard Serbia as part of the Western cultural
tradition.82 Both views inform and influence key political parties, their leaders and decisions
relating to Serbia’s foreign relations with the West, Russia and neighbouring states. Political
scientist Sabrina P. Ramet comments:
In the case of Yugoslavia, the dominant values underpinning each of the three
Yugoslavias were values hostile to the liberal project and, ultimately, conducive to
instability and decay.83
A former Polish President, Lech Wałęsa, similarly observed that Yugoslavia, as an ‘artificial
creation’, was maintained by repression.84 However, Sabrina Ramet’s overly generalised
79 Greece, Romania and Bulgaria are also members of NATO.
80 For an analysis of Russia’s foreign policy towards the Balkans, especially during the Balkan conflict of the
1990s, see J. Headley, Russia and the Balkans: foreign policy from Yeltsin to Putin, New York, Columbia
University Press, 2008.
81 Tanjug, ‘Srbi i dalje podeljeni na rusofile i evrofile’, 13 December 2013,
http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Drustvo/427052/Srbi-i-dalje-podeljeni-na-rusofile-i-evrofile, (accessed 8 January
2014).
82 Evropski Pokret Srbije, ‘Mirko Tepavac: “incorrigible European”’, October 2005,
http://www.emins.org/srpski/nepopravljivi-evropejac, (accessed 10 September 2013). Anti-EU advocates use
the term ‘Evropejci’ with accusatory connotations in a more negative linguistic context. Furthermore, it appears
that Albanian, Hungarian and Bosniak ethnic minorities within Serbia are generally in favour of Serbia’s
European integration. Andor Deli, an ethnic Hungarian from Vojvodina (who was previously a member of the
Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians political party, Savez vojvođanskih Mađara), was the first national of Serbia
(with a dual nationality from Hungary) to enter the European Parliament in 2014. Official website of Savez
vojvođanskih Mađara, ‘Intervju sa Andorom Delijem, poslanikom u Evropskom parlamentu’, 5 July 2014,
http://vmsz.org.rs/sr/vesti/interjuk/intervju-sa-andorom-delijem-poslanikom-u-evropskom-parlamentu,
(accessed 6 July 2014).
83 S.P. Ramet, The three Yugoslavias: state building and legitimation 1918–2005, Washington, Woodrow
Wilson Center Press, 2006, p. 11.
84 Nedeljnik, ‘Leh Valensa: SFRJ bila veštačka tvorevina’, Kurir, 12 June 2013, http://www.kurir-info.rs/leh-
valensa-sfrj-bila-vestacka-tvorevina-clanak-838187, (accessed 8 January 2014).
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approach does not adequately acknowledge the existence of liberal and pro-Western political
ideas in Serbia. Democrats in former Yugoslavia often did not receive adequate support from
abroad. Another weakness of the cultural approach is that it does not explain the shifts in
political views, by for example a democratic, pro-EU conservative party later becoming anti-
EU, such as the DSS, or an anti-EU politician converting to become a champion of Serbia’s
EU accession (for example, Serbia’s current Prime Minister, Aleksandar Vučić). Nationalism
is not an adequate explanation as the overall conservative stance by the DSS did not change
over the years, while its EU orientation did. Scholars of Balkan politics tend to use the terms:
‘nationalist’, ‘ultra-nationalist’, and ‘extreme-nationalist’ too loosely, often in the sense that
everyone who is against Serbia’s membership of the EU is a nationalist, which is misleading.85
Serbia’s, and previously, the socialist Yugoslavia’s predilection not to choose political and
military alignment with the West had been frequently misinterpreted as an anti-liberal policy
principally because the available explanations did not acknowledge the existence of alternative,
non-aligned ideational factors as part of Serbia’s political thinking. The inability to
acknowledge that Serbia has had a tradition of non-aligned ideas during its modern political
history could also be interpreted as a characterisation of any other idea that is not pro-EU as
being necessarily anti-liberal. If that logic was applied to Switzerland’s and Norway’s cases,
would their respective positions not to join the EU also be seen as anti-liberal in nature?
Cultural explanations for Serbia’s delayed EU accession would in that case claim that Serbia’s
weak democratic traditions would distinguish its ambivalent stance on EU accession
(particularly under a conservative leadership) from European countries with longer democratic
traditions. The Milošević regime, which encouraged Serbs to slide towards a fratricidal war in
85 In this thesis, the term ‘nationalist’ will be used to denote current or past ethno-particularist discourses, which
have been upheld by those citizens of former Yugoslavia who were for independent statehood of individual
republics and against the Yugoslav Government’s policies.
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former Yugoslavia during the 1990s and trumpeted the card of nationalism, undoubtedly
delayed the start of Serbia’s democratic reform, and its membership of the EU too. Under the
influence of the Milošević state propaganda many Serbs, especially those who hold anti-
Western views, continue to deny that Serbian armed forces were responsible for anywar crimes
during the 1990s.86 A culture of denial of war crimes was not specific to Serbia, as it also took
root in other regional countries.
Following the war in Croatia, many Croatian war crimes suspects, most notably Croatian
General Ante Gotovina, went into hiding, which was condemned in the West.87 Their
supporters staged protests against their arrest, including in diaspora communities, accusing the
Croatian Government of being anti-patriotic by pursuing war heroes who fought against Serbs
in Croatia’s Homeland War (Domovinski rat).88 Yet Croatia is today a member of the EU,
despite significant public support for extreme nationalist groups, many of which still invoke
symbols of the Croatian Nazi puppet state from the Second World War. Successive Croatian
Governments have managed to overcome the challenge of domestic scepticism towards the
EU, and meet many of the unpopular measures that had been requested by the EU (such as to
arrest the Croatian indictees wanted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia, ICTY). This was not because it had established democratic traditions for longer
(after all, Croatia belonged to the same larger territorial entities as Serbia from 1918 to 1941,
86 Ultra-nationalists also believed that Serbs were ‘innocent victims’ of Western ‘conspiracy’ and opportunistic
neighbours, who collectively wanted to destroy what was Europe’s fifth largest military power, socialist
Yugoslavia. These perceptions, which are perpetuated by right-wing political parties (such as SRS), contribute
to the anti-Western sentiment in the Serbian electorate. R. Kerr, ‘Lost in translation? Perceptions of the ICTY in
the former Yugoslavia’, in J.Gow, R. Kerr and Z. Pajić (eds), Prosecuting war crimes: lessons and legacies of
the International Criminal tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, New York, Routledge, 2014, p. 110.
87 ‘Croatian war crimes indictee sets conditions for surrender’, Southeast European Times, 8 October 2003,
http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2003/10/031008-SVETLA-
001, (accessed 15 May 2013).
88 R. Kerr, ‘Lost in translation?’, 2014, op. cit., p. 109. See also A. Roberts and T.G. Ash, Civil resistance and
power politics: the experience of non-violent action from Gandhi to the present, Oxford, Oxford University
Press, 1999.
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and from 1945 to 1990), but principally because for Croatia, EU membership was more
attainable than for Serbia. Political conditionality, which is discussed in the next section, has
been more complex for Serbia than for Croatia because of Serbia’s unresolved statehood issue
regarding Kosovo.
The regulative approach
The third approach addresses the role of external players, especially the EU, and its political
conditionality mechanisms. It posits that unclear diplomatic signalling from the EU does not
provide confidence in Serbia (as in other EU membership aspirants) that the EU is serious about
its admission, which in turn has slowed down reform. The influence of EU enlargement fatigue
and EU absorption capacity is also mentioned as a reason behind the EU’s mixed and
incoherent approach towards Serbia’s accession. This approach will be referred to in this thesis
as a regulative approach, as it views Europeanisation as a process of diffusion of EU standards
through political conditionality mechanisms.
For Anastasakis, the externally driven process of Europeanisation in Southeast Europe over the
past decade has been laden with many problems, in particular the ‘patronising nature of the
process’ and the lack of power by the recipient states to influence Brussels’ conditionality. In
Anastasakis’s view, this reflects the asymmetrical power balance in the relationship between
the EU, a regional hegemon, and smaller non-EU states in the Western Balkans.89 EU
conditions are often locally perceived as being imposed ‘by Brussels’, without paying
significant attention to the sensitivities of the local ethnic groups involved.90 The EU’s
89 Anastasakis, ‘The Europeanization of the Balkans’, 2005, op. cit., p. 82.
90 A. Rusila, ‘Serbia’s EU association is not a must’, Serbianna, 9 May 2011,
http://serbianna.com/analysis/archives/891, (accessed 19 March 2014).
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insistence on preserving a joint state after the Milošević era comprising Serbia and
Montenegro, despite the latter’s objections, is only one case where the proponents of this
approach say the EU has made mistakes in its increasingly interventionist approach to the
region’s domestic politics. The EU particularly insisted that authorities in Serbia, Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Croatia establish full cooperation with the ICTY. For Croatia, it also became
pivotal to resolve any outstanding bilateral disputes it had with any EU member, especially
Slovenia, before it could accede to the EU.
Apart from cooperation with the ICTY, Serbia’s sovereignty-related dilemma in its European
integration process related mostly to its former southern province of Kosovo and Metohija,
which was placed under international administration after Serbia’s conflict with NATO in
1999. This was evident after Kosovo proclaimed independence in February 2008, which
strained EU-Serbia relations. Several EU members encouraged this move, especially Germany,
the UK and Italy, believing Kosovo’s independence constituted the best way forward from a
tense situation that was threatening to become another security risk on the EU’s doorstep.
Serbia interpreted this move as a threat to its national sovereignty and a denial of statehood for
Kosovo Serbs, who wanted Kosovo to remain within Serbia.
By focusing its political and diplomatic energy on trying to prevent further recognition of
Kosovo’s independence by other EU and UN members, Serbia downgraded its political
relationship with Brussels and those EU members that recognised Kosovo’s independence.91
Serbia’s limited resources were thus drawn away from much-needed reforms. Kosovo’s
independence was interpreted by the DSS and the SRS as foreign interference from the EU in
91 Serbia’s approach to those EU countries that had recognised Kosovo’s independence resembled West
Germany’s foreign policy towards Yugoslavia, when in 1957, Bonn downgraded its diplomatic relations with
Belgrade because the Yugoslav Government formally recognised East Germany’s socialist regime.
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regional and Serbia’s domestic affairs.92 Therefore, political disagreements between Serbia and
key EU members over specific cases concerning Serbia’s domestic policy (the Hague
conditionality and Kosovo’s proclamation of independence) rather than issues related to
Serbian ‘cultural mentality’ were responsible for the delays to Serbia’s European integration.
The normative approach
This thesis puts forward an alternative explanation for Serbia’s delayed accession, dubbed here
as the normative approach. This approach holds that normative factors, which are linked with
particular normative conceptualisations of Serbia’s place in international politics, have caused
major interruptions to Serbia’s European integration processes, including in negotiations with
the EU. The concept of East/West bridging, which has historical origins in Serbian collective
memory (but which was institutionalised in socialist Yugoslavia) has hindered the ability of
Serbian democratic governments to express an unreserved commitment to Europe. This
approach will consider the role of Serbian collective memory. It regards EU enlargement and
accession negotiations towards a prospective EU membership to be highly normative and social
processes. According to this perspective, normative factors, such as the candidate state’s value-
system, are important for the EU when assessing new membership applications, especially the
solidarity principle with EU’s common policies and the social value of mutual trust. The
methodology used to evaluate the normative approach is explained below.
A socio-political norm of solidarity, which is referred to in the opening quote, represents the
‘glue’ of European integration. Without solidarity among EU members, institutional deepening
92 Beta, ‘Koštunica: nasilna nezavisnost KiM’, B92, 17 March 2013,
http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2013&mm=03&dd=17&nav_id=696106, (accessed 12 May
2013).
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and territorial widening would not have taken place. In the EU’s highest levels of decision-
making, solidarity is expressed through the principle of unanimity, where in many policy areas,
including enlargement, the consensus of all EU members is required before a proposal is
adopted to allow an applicant country to join the EU.93 By showing solidarity with the common
decisions agreed upon by EU members, including in the foreign policy domain, candidates for
EU membership need to demonstrate their commitment to EU values and the political will to
take on other commitments of EU membership.
Normative power is the ability to establish external influence with which norms and standards
of international relations can change, without using force or directly relying on material
resources.94 A useful example of this type of power is West Germany’s influence in changing
the formal norms of accession by arguing a special case for East Germany to be admitted into
the EU in 1990. East Germany’s absorption into the EU without undergoing a formal accession
process highlights the crucial role which West German leadership played in reassuring other
EU members about Germany’s ability to subsidise Germany’s less developed Eastern
regions.95 This also points to a situation in which changes in the domestic circumstances of one
key EU member state may impact on or change the existing norms of enlargement. In the case
of East Germany’s absorption into the EU, accession was allowed to proceed without formal
negotiations on EU membership. West Germany’s central role in the EU directly facilitated
93 The term ‘unanimity’ refers to decisions made by consensus. In the Council of the European Union (which is
also known as the Council of Ministers, or ‘the Council’), unanimity is a form of decision-making used on
sensitive issues, such as taxation, most areas of the common foreign and security policy, and enlargement.
Under unanimity rules, all members of the Council must agree on a proposal for it to be passed. Another form of
decision-making on less sensitive issues that are clearly defined by the Lisbon Treaty (in force since 1
December 2009) introduced to enable majority voting. For an overview of some of the changes which the
Lisbon Treaty had for the qualified majority voting, see S.C. Sieberson, ‘Inching toward EU Supranationalism?
Qualified majority voting and unanimity under the treaty of Lisbon’, Virginia Journal of International Law, vol.
50, no. 4, pp. 919–995.
94 M. Kovačević, ‘Akterstvo i moć Evropske Unije’, Department of Political Science, University of Belgrade,
Godišnjak, no. 7, June 2012, p. 160.
95 For further information, see D. Spence, Enlargement without accession: the EC’s response to German
unification, London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1991.
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East Germany’s accession in 1990 without a formal negotiation process, even though for over
forty years the two German republics existed as separate legal, political and economic entities.
East Germany’s membership of the EU as part of enlarged Germany is an example that EU
accession is a normative, political process. In that case it was heavily dependent on West
Germany’s ability to convince other EU members that they should change the existing rule
through diplomatic means without any use of force or overt threats. It is an example where EU
accession was a product of discursive persuasion, assurances and solidarity among EU
members who trusted West Germany that it would deliver on its promise to successfully
integrate East Germany into the EU.
The principles of solidarity, trust and informal diplomacy
There are three normative aspects, which this thesis will examine, influencing Serbia’s
European integration. Serbia’s obstacles to obtaining membership of the EU have not been
analysed through a combined analytical approach that includes social constructivism,
comparative method and discourse analysis, which is developed in this thesis. The first aspect
is the principle of solidarity that must exist between the EU and a candidate state before the
latter could be eligible to join the EU. The second one is the principle of trust, which also must
exist between the decision-makers in the EU and the government in the candidate state in order
to overcome differences arising in their negotiations on closer relations. The third one is the
principle of informal diplomacy, by which the EU seeks to build consensus with like-minded
elites in the candidate state. In Serbia, the third aspect became evident with the increase in the
EU’s engagement with political opposition parties and civil society during the Milošević era.
Craig Parsons, in his book How to map arguments in Political Science, has offered a useful
typology of the ‘logics of explanation of political action’, dividing them into four distinct
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categories: structural or material, institutional, ideational and psychological.96 Parson believes
that ideational approaches, including constructivism, seek to explain ‘what people do as a
function of the cognitive and/or affective elements that organise their thinking, and see these
elements as created by certain historical groups of people’.97 For Serbia, these ‘groups’ include
political and religious elites, who are included as a subject of analysis when examining EU-
Serbia relations in a broader historical context as it will be demonstrated in later chapters.
The social value of trust
The thesis will also examine the social value of trust, which is particularly important between
the EU and Serbia now that Serbia is a formal EU membership candidate. This value has not
been specifically examined in the literature on EU-Serbia relations, although there were passing
references to it as part of wider discussions on EU-Serbia’s lack of cooperation. The research
for this thesis has found that trust as a social norm constitutes a basic prerequisite for the
deepening of relations between the EU and Serbia, just as it was vital for the creation of the
EU in the 1950s. The Treaty of Paris of 18 April 1951 (which entered into force on 23 July
1952) inaugurated the Coal and Steel Community that put former industries of war under
common management to minimise the future risk of war breaking out between France and
(West) Germany. Its signatories included France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the
Netherlands and Luxembourg (Benelux), whose institutional cooperation laid the groundwork
for future enlargements, and whose cooperation was premised upon confidence-building and
trust-enhancing measures expressed through the fulfilment of common commitments.98
96 Parsons, How to map arguments in Political Science, op. cit., p. 12.
97 ibid.
98 Since 1957, the EU has experienced seven enlargement episodes. Enlargement occurred in 1973 (UK, Ireland
and Denmark), 1981 (Greece), 1986 (Portugal and Spain), 1995 (Austria, Finland and Sweden), 2004 (with ten
new members), 2007 (Bulgaria and Romania) and 2013 (Croatia).
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A better understanding of the normative and domestic challenges Serbia has faced in its
European integration process would provide any observer with a deeper appreciation of key
challenges to, and major opportunities for Serbia’s further progress towards EU accession.
Serbia’s policy responses to the EU have been historically influenced by its elite preferences
and ideologies. Since Kosovo’s independence proclamation, Serbia-EU relations have been
influenced by a growing number of public demands to restore Serbia’s East/West intermediary
position in international politics as an alternative to its successive governments’ generally EU-
oriented path. Its close relationship with Russia and attempts to improve political relations with
the NAM members have provided the Serbian Government with an alternative source of
funding as well as more flexibility in foreign policy.99 Hence, this thesis is investigating the
less frequently analysed normative, political nature of Serbia’s engagement with the EU, and
the role of domestic factors in Serbia’s European integration.
The principle of solidarity
As the opening quote suggests, the socio-political norm of solidarity among EU members has
been a unifying link that has encouraged states to further advance European integration,
including in the domain of the EU’s foreign policy. What has become an equally important
demonstration of solidarity between the candidate state and existing EU members, and the
indication of the candidate’s preparedness to join the EU, is the expectation of the EU that the
candidate shows solidarity with the commonly agreed positions (which is covered by Chapter
31 that is part of Serbia’s membership negotiations with the EU).100 Political scientist
99 This is because the loans it received from non-Western sources did not have the same type of tied EU
conditionality as the assistance from the EU.
100 Chapter 31 of the acquis presently states: ‘Applicant countries are required to progressively align with EU
statements, and to apply sanctions and restrictive measures when and where required.’ ibid. See also D. Lazea,
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Maximillian Rasch, who investigated voting coherence within the EU and with the candidate
and potential candidate countries on specific issues in the UN General Assembly (UNGA), has
found that as the prospect of the ten new members joining the EU became more tangible from
the year 2000, their voting coherence levels began to converge with the EU’s average. As these
countries were approaching the target date for accession of 2004, Rasch concluded that their
policy positions at the UNGA were more becoming ‘Europeanised’ and ‘adjusted to the EU
mainstream’.101
Another researcher investigating voting coherence, Elisabeth Johansson-Nogués, has found
that the end of the Cold War dramatically increased the convergence among EU members on
those UNGA resolutions that were adopted by vote.102 They may not have increased the EU
member states’ political complementarity on all issues, but their solidarity with common
positions was on the rise. Apart from the cessation of East/West tensions, which led to a shift
in focus on new policy areas away from nuclear issues, she attributed higher convergence levels
among EU members to their greater foreign policy coordination after the signing of the Treaty
on European Union, and after the creation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)
mechanism in 1993.103 Johansson-Nogués has argued that the West became a key reference
point for the CEES to which they could turn their transition in the fields of foreign and security
policy. The governments in the CEES therein increased their domestic popularity, as aligning
‘EU external relations: from non-intervention to political conditionality’, Central European Journal for
International and Security Studies, vol. 5, no. 3, 2011, p. 54.
101 M.B. Rasch, The European Union at the United Nations: the functioning and coherence of EU external
representation in a state-centric environment, Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008, p. 256.
102 Johansson-Nogués found that the percentage of unanimous votes by EU members on UNGA resolutions
jumped from 41.9 per cent in 1990 to 85.2 per cent in 1998. E. Johansson-Nogués, ‘The voting practice of the
fifteen in the UN General Assembly: convergence and divergence’, Observatori de Política Exterior Europea–
Working Paper, no. 54, January 2004, p. 6.
103 Johansson-Nogués also observed that ‘If the Union manages to coordinate the voices of all Fifteen, and in the
future more member states, the Union may be able to shape the global regime on a host of issues more
efficiently’. ibid., pp. 7–8.
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with the West appeared to demonstrate a decisive shift away from their communist past.104
While thirty-five chapters were a new element in the enlargement process, a bilateral dispute
between a candidate and existing member was not. This is known as the issue of problematic
partners in the history of European integration, which is closely related to the issue of trust
among states.105
The principle of trust
The issue of problematic partners between countries that generally have low levels of trust,
featured heavily in the decade leading up to the EU’s first enlargement. This enlargement
eventually occurred on 1 January 1973, increasing the EU’s membership from six to nine
members.106 In particular, what was perceived as a lack of trust between France (an existing
EU member) and Britain (a candidate state), led the French Government to reject the UK’s
successive membership applications twice in the 1960s (in 1963 and 1967).107 This in turn,
prompted the British Labor Government under Prime Minister Harold Wilson to turn to other
priorities, therefore reducing their own enthusiasm for joining the bloc in which one key
member was negatively predisposed towards it on ideological grounds.108 The UK’s
membership negotiations impasse, which lasted for almost a decade, was resolved eventually
104 E. Johansson-Nogués, ‘Returned to Europe? Central and East European member states at the heart of the
European Union’, in K.V. Laatikainen and K.E. Smith (eds), The European Union at the United Nations:
intersecting multilateralisms, Hampshire, Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, pp. 94.
105 See N.P. Ludlow, ‘Problematic partners: De Gaulle, Thatcher and their impact’, in E. Jones, A. Menon, and
S. Weatherill (eds), The Oxford handbook of the European Union, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012, pp.
206–218.
106 Denmark, Ireland and the UK joined the EU in 1973.
107 France believed that with British accession into the EU, US influence would increase in Europe, and its
leader, Charles de Gaulle, was opposed to that.
108 For a detailed discussion of the British negotiations to enter the EU, see N.P. Ludlow, The European
community and the crises of the 1960s; negotiating the Gaullist challenge, London, Routledge, 2006. C.
Nuenlist, A. Locher, G. Martin (eds), Globalizing de Gaulle: international perspectives on French foreign
policies 1958–1969, Plymouth, Lexington Books, 2010.
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with the passing of time and a change in domestic circumstances (leadership, discourses and
dominant elite-level perceptions) in both France and the UK.
The French-British example is a case of delayed enlargement that can occur when the lack of
trust in bilateral relations escalates into a dispute, or ideological confrontation between EU
members (one or more) and a candidate state. The issue of problematic partners can also have
a flow-on effect for the applications of other countries. In the middle of the French-British
dispute, the Dutch Government insisted that Ireland’s and Denmark’s membership applications
not be dealt with until the issue with the UK was firstly resolved.109 Moreover, in the early
1980s, the French opposition to Spanish and Portuguese membership applications resembled
its unconstructive stance towards the UK’s accession.110 While opposition by individual EU
members to specific candidates is part of the EU’s enlargement history, it remains important
how negotiation impasses are managed, and whether the solidarity principle has enough
political weight to prevail and convince the sceptics to reverse their position. Mediation
dynamics can be influenced by how well the applicant is regarded by other EU members.
Therefore, in the European integration framework, trust is a highly context-specific norm.111
As the British preferred ‘open and flexible Europe’, the French and Germans generally
preferred deeper institutional integration (‘deepening’) over enlargement (‘widening’). The
tension between widening and deepening of the EU is an old feature of European integration,
since:
109 N. Rollings, British business in the formative years of European integration, 1945–1973, New York,
Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 144.
110 N.P. Ludlow, ‘Hard-won but vital: EU Enlargement in historical perspective’, The Crisis of EU enlargement
special report, November 2013, London School of Economics, p. 13,
http://www.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/publications/reports/SR018.aspx, (accessed 7 February 2014).
111 C. Bicchieri, E. Xiao and R. Muldoon, ‘Trustworthiness is a social norm, but trusting is not’, Politics,
Philosophy & Economics, vol. 10, no. 2, 2011, p. 181.
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The British have always appeared to believe, most vociferously during Margaret
Thatcher’s premiership, that any enlargement is attractive because it will lead to a
weakening of the Union’s supranational elements and federal ambitions.112
The British have been generally supportive of further EU enlargement (even under
conservative governments) and sceptical of further EU’s institutional integration.113 Political
scientist David Allen observed that in order for the UK to accede to the EU, the Germans had
to pressure the French to ultimately accept the UK’s accession bid in the early 1970s after
Charles de Gaulle had left the French Presidency.114 However, it was principally the change in
domestic circumstances in France that enabled a new French policy to develop towards the
enlargement. De Gaulle certainly held a formidable ideological position on this issue, believing
American influence would increase in Europe if the UK were allowed to join the EU.115 The
French-British case of problematic partners and low leerls of trust demonstrates the key role
which EU leaders play as principal decision-makers in the enlargement process. Their personal
preferences, fractious relationships and specific ideological positions can affect the progress of
any new accessions, as the previous example of the UK’s delayed accession demonstrates.
Enlargement delays can thus result from the lack of trust between EU members and an
applicant state. Writing 1974, Hardev Singh Chopra observed that the lack of trust between
‘the Gaullist France and Britain was mutual and complete’.116 In an opinion poll conducted in
112 D. Allen, ‘Wider but weaker or the More the merrier? Enlargement and foreign policy cooperation in the
EC/EU’, in J. Redmond and G.R. Rosenthan (eds), The expanding European Union: past, present, future,
London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998, p. 108.




115 L. Warlouzet, ‘Charles de Gaulle’s idea of Europe: the lasting legacy’, Kontur, no. 19, p. 26.
116 H.S. Chopra, De Gaulle and European Unity, New Delhi, Shakti Malik Abhinav Publications, 1974, p. 210.
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Britain in 1966, the British public saw the US as their main ally, trusted India more than EU
members, and France—only slightly more than the USSR.117 In a low-trust bargaining
environment, it is unsurprising that the UK was unable to join the EU until a former French
Prime Minister, Georges Pompidou, who was in favour of further European integration,
became French President.118
Jan-Henrik Meyer has observed that trust in European integration rests on ‘the impression that
there is a common ground on fairness, of reliability and honesty reciprocity and equal burden
sharing’.119 In order to improve trust among its members, the EU enacted legal norms and
institutional practices, which obliged countries to cooperate more closely.120 Other observers,
including Urbano et al., have argued that in situations where no trust relationship is formed as
yet, social relations are often associated with uncertainty and vulnerability, and open to
opportunism. Methods to reduce that problem include higher levels of monitoring, which can
have an important role in regulating social relations where levels of trust between negotiating
parties are low. The less trust there is, the more control mechanisms are employed.121 Urbano
et al., however, did not mention the social opposition to monitoring or ‘screening’ that
conditionality can invoke. This occures as a result of a perception of ‘too much conditionality’
in the candidate state, which has been the case in Serbia. Domestic opposition to Serbia’s
117 H. Taylor and T. Raison, ‘Britain into Europe: general attitudes’, New Society, 23 June 1966, p. 8, cited in
H.S. Chopra, De Gaulle and European Unity, 1974, op. cit., pp. 210, 217.
118 On 1 December 1969, the French President Pompidou suggested to his colleagues from other five EU
members in The Hague to develop the European Economic Community further, through institutional deepening
and enlargement. Bulletin of the European Communities, ‘Statement by Georges Pompidou (The Hague, 1
December 1969)’, no. 2, Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, February
1970, pp. 33–35.
119 J.H. Meyer, ‘Tracing transnational communication in the European public sphere: the summit of the Hague
1969’, in W. Keiser, B. Leucht and M. Rassmusen (eds), The history of the European Union: origins of a trans–
and supranational policy 1950–1972, London, Routledge, 2009, p. 119.
120 The use of formal contracts (for instance, treaties and regulations in the context of European integration)
could mitigate low trust dynamics in social interactions, including among representatives. J. Urbano et al.,
‘Trust and normative control in multi-agent systems: an empirical study’, in J.B. Pérez et al. (eds), Highlights on
practical applications of agents and multi-agent systems, Heidelberg, Springer, 2012, p. 207.
121 ibid.
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European integration in part derives from local opposition to foreign influence, which is how
the monitoring of Serbian reforms by the European Commission has been perceived by some
sectors of Serbian society. For those who oppose Serbia’s EU membership negotiations, the
EU’s oversight of Serbia’s reforms through annual progress reports and by other means has
produced generally lower levels of trust among some Serbian citizens towards the EU. This
thesis has found that in situations in which less trust is present in the relationship between an
EU member and a candidate state, the issue of problematic partners can arise more frequently.
Key propositions and methodology
The distinguished scholar of EU foreign policy, Karen E. Smith, has called for more empirical
research into practical manifestations of the EU’s foreign policy in Southeast Europe where
countries remain divided between ‘insiders’ (EU members) and ‘outsiders’ (non-EU
members).122 Smith observed that excluding countries from EU membership in that region
‘could affect their domestic and foreign policies in ways not desired by the EU’.123 This may
be the case with Serbia too. Serbia’s close political and economic relationship with Russia, and
its growing trade and investment relationship with non-European countries (such as India,
China and the United Arab Emirates) might become problematic now that Serbia is a formal
candidate for EU membership.124 It will not be required of Serbia to immediately cease its
bilateral political and trade arrangements and free trade agreements with non-EU countries,
including Russia. However, before it signs the Accession Treaty with the EU, Serbia would
122 K.E. Smith, The making of EU foreign policy: the case of Eastern Europe, 2nd edn, Gordonsville, Palgrave
Macmillan, 2004, pp. 2; 201.
123 ibid., p. 201.
124 In 2011, Serbia’s two-way trade was almost two times higher with Iran than with Portugal ($58 million to
$28 million respectively). During the same period, Serbia’s two-way trade with India was $168 million, Turkey
$588 million, and slightly over $2.5 billion with Russia. In 2013, EU members accounted for 62.2 percent of
Serbia’s total value of two-way trade, which was $35.1 billion. Privredna Komora Srbije, ‘Privreda Srbije’,
http://www.pks.rs/PrivredaSrbije.aspx?id=0&, (accessed 12 May 2014).
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need to implement the acquis to the best of its ability, and the Serbian Government will
certainly need to revisit its bilateral partnerships and agreements with non-EU states.
The EU Commissioner for Enlargement, Olli Rehn, has observed that the Western Balkans is
where the Common Foreign and Security Policy ‘began’. He observed that the EU’s soft power
in that region has a potential to ‘transform its nearest neighbours into functioning democracies
and market economies’. He has cautioned that the EU’s soft power instruments would be tested
the most in the Balkans, and that the EU cannot afford for this area to become ‘a new ghetto’
inside Europe. Commissioner Rehn concluded that the EU’s transformational power depends
on the credibility of its promise to extend membership to the remaining Balkan countries in
return for major reforms.125 Smith maintains that the awareness of the EU’s Common Foreign
and Security Policy (CFSP) had, in fact, increased as a result of the ‘Yugoslav fiasco’, which
contention is linked to the argument that the EU did not respond appropriately to Yugoslavia’s
violent disintegration in the early 1990s.126
Studies of enlargement have generally had a ‘European level focus’, predominantly examining
EU institutional processes, which enabled enlargement to take place.127 Enlargement fatigue
has also featured in the literature on enlargement, including Serbia’s case, as political resistance
within the EU towards accepting new members, especially from the Balkans, grew during the
financial crisis in Europe. An understanding of EU power that is ‘both more hard-edged and
multi-faceted’ is missing in much of the contemporary literature on enlargement. Jeffrey
125 European Commissioner for Enlargement, Olli Rehn, ‘Enlargement as an instrument of the EU’s soft power’,
speech, 19 October 2007, europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-07-642_en.pdf?locale=en%3E, (accessed 13
March 2013).
126 Smith, The making of EU foreign policy, 2004, op. cit., p. 15. Critical views on the EU’s responses to the
disintegration of Yugoslavia will be discussed in further detail in Chapter Three.
127 J.R. Checkel, ‘Constructivist approaches to European integration’, Centre for European Studies, University of
Oslo Working Papers, no. 6, February 2006, p. 24.
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Checkel has suggested attempting to capture its institutional and productive dimensions, and
not only by analysing the ‘compulsive face of power (the ability of A to get B to do what B
otherwise would not do)’.128 This thesis will seek to capture these other dimensions of EU
power though the case study of EU-Serbia relations by analysing enlargement policy from the
perspective of the EU’s strategic and multitrack diplomacy—which includes official,
government-to-government level of engagement and the EU’s less formal linkages with civil
society and opposition parties in Serbia.129
Current academic research on enlargement does not sufficiently explain the social nature and
ideational premises of European integration, nor the influence on this process of the applicant
state’s dominant normative discourses and political attitudes. This would help in explaining
normative hurdles to further enlargement, not just material ones. Understanding better the key
normative structures of accession should improve our knowledge of contemporary political
events and debates surrounding accession, and possibly deepen our analysis of how these
obstacles might be overcome in the future.
Comparative examples will help to illuminate major discourses that have shaped the
development of Serbia’s accession, which is not a unique case in EU enlargement despite its
embodying a protracted process.130 This research does not seek to offer a linear, chronological
account of all events, treaties and agreements between Brussels and Belgrade since Tito’s
128 ibid., p. 22.
129 Multitrack diplomacy involves the pursuit of negotiation along several different tracks. Berrige and James
cite the example of a Swedish banker, Peter Castenfelt, who secured a secret deal to end NATO’s bombing of
Yugoslavia in 1999 with diplomatic support from Germany and Russia. R. Norton-Taylor, ‘Mystery Swede with
Kremlin links who helped end war’, The Guardian, 9 March 2000,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/mar/09/balkans (accessed 14 September 2013). G.R. Berridge and A.
James, A dictionary of diplomacy, 2nd edn, Hampshire, Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, p. 177.
130 Candidates during previous enlargement waves have each faced their own set of unique challenges before
accession, including but not limited to bilateral disputes (Croatia, Slovenia), unresolved border issues (Cyprus),
economic underdevelopment (Ireland, Spain and Portugal), nationalist discourses (Slovakia) and even civil unrest
(Greece).
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Yugoslavia and the EU formally established diplomatic relations in the late 1960s. It will
investigate ideational factors that have presented major hurdles for closer relations to be
developed between the EU and Serbia—which has already had some adverse consequences for
European integration of the Balkan region.
The differences between the 2004 enlargement and previous rounds inspired scholars to
analyse EU enlargement from alternative perspectives, as post-communist EU members
formed a very different group of candidates.131 Before the 2004 enlargement, rationalist
approaches dominated the study on European integration. Two dominant strands of rationalist
approaches were supranationalism and intergovernmentalism.132 Both emphasised the
geopolitical and economic nature of forthcoming Eastern enlargement and material nature of
enlargement, and how membership of the EU would impact the economies of ‘older’ EU
members. Intergovernmentalists believed that national governments as most important drivers
of enlargement policy. On the other hand, the proponents of supranationalism considered EU
institutions to be increasingly important and autonomous actors in driving the enlargement
agenda forward.
Rationalist perspectives were unable to explain, however, the social nature of enlargement, the
variation in processes and outcomes, and the ‘framing of issues before decisions were made
about them’.133 An alternative explanation that sought to answer policy variation in the
processes of EU enlargement was offered by constructivism. This normative approach
emphasised the ‘role of ideas, discourses and social interaction in shaping interests’;
131 S.S. Nello, ‘EU enlargement and theories of economic integration’, Department of Economic Policy, Finance
and Development (DEPFID) Working Papers, University of Siena, no. 9, 2010, p. 3.
132 T. Christiansen, ‘European integration and regional cooperation’, in J. Baylis and S. Smith (eds), The
Globalisation of world politics: an introduction to international relations, 3rd edn, New York, Oxford
University Press, 2004, p. 584.
133 ibid., p. 586.
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constructivists also wanted to show how the discourse of a ‘promise’ of membership to the
CEES ‘became a structural constraint that made it difficult, if not impossible, to propose
anything other than full EU membership’ to these states.134 If the EU did not meet that promise,
it would have been seen by the CEES as a weak actor that does not deliver on its policy
statements.
Supranationalist school of European integration
Proponents of a supranationalist perspective to European integration believed in the
supranational power of institutions; that supranational institutions can act as political actors or
agencies in their own right. Institutions are seen as providing structural conditions for driving
the integration process forward, and as giving institutional constraints on member states’
behaviour. The major focus for the proponents of supranationalist perspectives was the politics
above the level of states, with EU institutional structures and norms receiving most of their
attention.135 The main proponents of this view, according to Simon Hix, shared a common
belief that supranational institutions ‘exert a significant independent influence on institutional
and policy outcomes’, including enlargement.136
This perspective has tended to specifically focus on the role of formal accession norms in
enlargement. Hix noted that ‘decisions by the governments produce particular “path
dependencies” that invariably result in the further delegation of policy competences and powers
to the EU institutions’.137 This was probably even more the case after the EU assumed a legal
identity since the Lisbon Treaty’s entry into force. With the emergence of the European
134 ibid.
135 ibid. p. 584.
136 These scholars include Gary Marks, Paul Pierson, Alec Stone Sweet, Markus Jachtenfuchs and Beate Kohler-
Koch, among others. Cited in Hix, The political system of the European Union, 2005, op. cit., p. 16.
137 ibid., p. 17.
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External Action Service (EEAS), EU foreign policy towards Serbia, for instance, would have
from thereon be primarily executed through EEAS and its missions. Despite any change in the
EU members’ preferences towards a particular policy area, the EEAS would have proceeded
on the basis of pre-agreed norms. In other words, once common standards and steps for
accession have been agreed, the locked-in institutional policy processes would constrain EU
members to a certain extent.
Liberal intergovernmentalist school of European integration
Liberal intergovernmentalists believe that state preferences are not fixed as each new
government in the EU member states can have a different set of national priorities that can
change with internal changes in their domestic environment. According to this perspective,
state preferences could vary from issue to issue, meaning that any EU member may choose to
support integration in one policy area but not in another area because of internal policy
constraints. Leading political elites in EU members are, according to this perspective, primary
actors operating within the EU’s complex political system, driving or halting further
integration. Policy outcomes at the EU level are the products of ‘hard-won bargains and trade-
offs between the interests of the member states’.138 This perspective does not explain, however,
how political elites get to change their preferences and how deliberations are made when EU
members get to support a common EU position despite the fact that this position might go
against the declared national preferences of those very elites.
Moravchsik and Vachudova, who are exponents of liberal intergovernmentalism, have
observed that elites within existing EU members promoted Eastern enlargement because their
ruling elites considered it to be in their countries’ ‘long-term economic and geopolitical
138 ibid.
48
interest—particularly as compared to the uncertain and potentially catastrophic costs of being
left behind as others move forward’.139 According to this perspective, integration is primarily
driven by self-interested states, especially more powerful ones like Germany and the UK.
Integration is also understood as a series of ‘bargains’ among states that remain autonomous
decision-makers within the EU, which offers an institutional platform for inter-state
bargaining.140 The political scientist John McCormick argues that this type of bargaining
among political elites involved complex political ‘games’ (among nation states; EU institutions
and even directorates-general in the European Commission); and a search for compromise.141
Richard Baldwin has posited that ‘high politics is clearly the strongest force behind the EU’s
decision to enlarge eastward’.142 The Polish-British political scientist, Jan Zielonka, has argued
that Eastern enlargement in 2004 was a reflection of the EU member states’ pursuit of
geopolitical interests, rather than purely economic interests.143According to this perspective,
after the Soviet Union’s dissolution in the early 1990s the prospect of joining the EU offered
to the CEES an alternative foreign policy orientation further away from Moscow. Their
historical experiences of living under communist regimes with occasional military and political
interference from Moscow have prompted the CEES to seek a new framework for political and
economic modernisation. The EU offered practical advice and provided substantial aid to the
CEES in their democratisation efforts. The EU was also a key reference point for successive
governments in the CEES to legitimise their reform agendas to domestic audiences.
139 A. Moravcsik and M.A. Vachudova, op. cit., p. 43.
140 T. Christiansen, ‘European integration and regional cooperation’, 2004, op. cit., 586.
141 J. McCormick, The European Union: politics and policies, 4th edn, Boulder, Westview press, 2008, pp. 259–
260.
142 R.E. Baldwin, ‘The Eastern enlargement of the European Union’, European Economic Review, no. 39
(1995), pp. 474–481.
143 J. Zielonka, Europe as empire: the nature of the enlarged European Union, Oxford, Oxford University
Press, 2006, pp. 10–13.
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Constructivist approaches to European integration
This thesis considers that the EU’s Eastern enlargement in 2004 resulted from a negotiated
process in which there was an alignment of material interests and congruence in normative
frameworks of elites in both the EU member states and the CEES. These normative frameworks
could best be explained through constructivist methods of analysing international relations.
In 1989, Nicholas G. Onuf introduced constructivism for the first time in the study of
international relations and a new framework quickly presented a challenge to the emergence of
constructivism in the late 1980s.144 Its emergence coincided with democratic changes in the
CEES and a transformation in the international system more generally. The constructivist
critique of rationalist approaches ‘focused on the tendency of rationalist studies to privilege
decision-making over agenda-setting, and outcomes over process.’145 The social constructivist
research agenda analyses the framing of issues before decisions about them are made, and
outcomes reached.146Constructivism began to explain the social construction of norms in world
politics, and how this process affects state behaviour. Initially, constructivism was thought to
offer little guidance for developing concepts and methods of empirical research. More recently,
constructivists have undertaken empirical work, including on EU enlargement.147 However,
few research studies have examined the Cold War’s historical context and its impact on
domestic ideational structures in candidate states, which this thesis aims to address.
144 N.G. Onuf, World of our making, Columbia, University of South California Press, 1989.
145 T. Christiansen, ‘European integration and regional cooperation’, 2004, op. cit., p. 586.
146 ibid.
147 M. Finnemore and K. Sikkink, ‘Taking stock: the constructivist research program in International Relations
and Comparative Politics’, Annual Review of Political Science, no. 4, 2001, p. 391.
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Finnermore and Sikkink observed that constructivism’s distinctiveness lies in its theoretical
arguments, not in its empirical research strategies’.148 Key tenets of constructivism are:
 human interaction is shaped primarily by ideational factors, not simply material ones149
 the most important ideational factors are widely shared and referred to as ‘intersubjective’
beliefs, which are not reducible to individuals; and
 the sets of shared beliefs construct the interests and identities of purposive actors.150
Constructivists do not take ‘identities and interests for granted’; understanding the processes
by which these originate and change ‘has been a big part of the constructivist research
program’.151 For constructivists, understanding the constitution of norms is essential in
explaining how actors behave and ‘what causes political outcomes’.152 One of their main
contributions was the idea that state identity ‘fundamentally shapes’ its leaders’ preferences
and actions.153 Political elites as dominant norm entrepreneurs construct state identities ‘within
the social environment of international and domestic politics’.154 For this reason,
constructivists examine the influence of internal and external ideational factors on domestic
politics. This perspective is a departure from rationalist approaches which considered state
interests to be pre-determined by rational calculations rather than by the social nature of their
executioners.155 A political scientist, John G. Ruggie, observed:
Constructivists hold the view that the building blocks of international reality are
ideational as well as material; that ideational factors have normative as well as
148 ibid. p. 392.
149 Rationalists, unlike constructivists, view all interests as exclusively material, and strategic in nature.
150 ibid.
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instrumental dimensions; that they express not only individual but collective
intentionality; and that the meaning and significance of ideational factors are not
independent of time and place.156
Constructivists utilise methods which include interpretation, discourse analysis, structured
comparisons, interviews, participant observation and content analysis as their main research
tools to ‘capture intersubjective meanings’.157 This thesis will employ some of these methods.
Constructivists also believe that there is no objective knowledge about the world (Big truth)
but many smaller truths or sets of beliefs that are constructed and then disseminated by norms
entrepreneurs.158 These social actors include prominent political elites, institutional
communities, or smaller interest groups. Clifford J. Geertz examined the symbols which elites
use to promote cultural systems of social meanings, such as religion, proving that symbols are
a powerful tool to disseminate dominant sets of ideas in any human society.159 Peter
Katzenstein, who is regarded as the founder of constructivist approach to analysing
international relations, believed that
To understand the variety of policies pursued by societies toward other societies, it is
essential to understand the history of the societies involved, with their residues of
attitudes, practices, and expectations about their relationship to the world outside.160
156 J.G. Ruggie, cited in T. Christiansen, K.E. Jorgensen and A. Wiener, ‘The social construction of Europe’,
Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 6, no. 4, 1998, p. 530.
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Kazenstein’s philosophy was that ‘one cannot understand societies without understanding the
regional and global contexts within which they exist’.161 The relationship between the EU and
Serbia will be examined through elite-level relations, which will be limited to key moments in
their diplomatic relations and within a broader historical context. The term ‘elite’ in Serbia’s
case encompasses policy-makers, public servants, diplomatic representatives, major opposition
parties and civil society groups. Previous rounds of EU enlargement will be viewed as the
result of the EU’s plurilateral negotiations through inter- and intrastate bargaining, and through
the conceptual lenses of democracy promotion by the EU elites to post-Communist states,
which was accompanied by the use of economic incentives and soft power discourses.
Using constructivist methods in the analysis of EU-Serbia relations, this thesis advances three
main propositions. Firstly, Serbia’s European integration has been a highly subjective,
normative and social process. Subjective beliefs about Serbia’s place in international politics
have deeply influenced Serbia’s European integration process. Secondly, clashes of normative
assumptions between a candidate state and one or more EU members can generate instability,
hinder negotiations and delay future accessions. Thirdly, the changes in Serbia’s domestic
context have most profoundly influenced Serbia’s policy towards the EU, the EU’s responses
towards Serbia, and the level of their engagement.
This thesis will evaluate the formal accession criteria of enlargement (Chapter One), by tracing
the development of formal norms for enlargement into the Western Balkans, with a particular
emphasis on Serbia’s accession. It will also investigate informal processes of enlargement,
including the EU’s political dialogue with Serbia’s opposition. This thesis, therefore, will
highlight the role of domestic factors in Serbia’s EU accession process, and how major internal
161 ibid.
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changes in Serbia (including the regime change from authoritarianism to democracy in
particular) have impacted on its European integration processes.
The relevance of ‘informal institutions’ in European integration
Henry Farrell and Adrienne Héritier have examined the EU’s formal and informal institutions
in the context of co-decision procedures between European Parliament and the Council of
Ministers.162 Their definitions of formal/informal institutions will be drawn upon in this thesis.
They saw formal institutions as rules embedded in EU legislation, which ‘provides a basic
starting point for interaction between parties’ and comprises ‘written rules enforced by a third
party’; by contrast, informal institutions are those that ‘actors themselves enforce’.163 Certainly
in the context of enlargement, EU legislation provides an overarching framework for the
conduct of relations with non-members, outlining requirements for EU membership, but
informal institutions also play a role. They distinguished between organisational actors, who
represent ‘sets of actors united in pursuit of a common goal’, and institutions, which represent
‘sets of rules that structure social interaction’. Informal institutions, they wrote:
… may emerge from repeated [social] interactions and may have an important impact
on institutional outcomes. ... These informal institutions may be influenced by the
formal framework in which actors operate, but they will not be determined by this
framework.164
162 H. Farrell and A. Héritier, ‘Formal and informal institutions under co-decision: continuous constitution-
building in Europe’, Governance: an international journal of policy, administration, and institutions, vol. 16,
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Data collection methods
Research methods for the purposes of data collection include assessing primary and secondary
literature primarily in English and Serbian, and in other languages where required (as some
earlier EU documents were not available in English), relying on the author’s working
knowledge of German and Italian. The EU’s older documents were consulted through the
University of Pittsburgh’s Archive of European Integration and online databases of the
European Parliament, European Commission, Council of the European Union, the European
Council, Presidency of the Council web pages, EU member states official web pages,
Eurobarometer reports, and Eurostat.165 Other regularly consulted resources include the
European Commission’s progress reports and official statements by EU Commissioners and
the High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy; statements of the relevant bodies to
the United Nations and in the media. The participant observation method was used in several
cases where groups were involved, but all group members were fully aware of the author’s
presence for research purposes as regards this thesis.
NGO reports presented a useful critical angle, and often, an alternative view to the official
positions of government officials. Domestic political discourses in Serbia were examined
through fieldwork (semi-structured) interviews, Serbian European Integration Office (SEIO)
surveys regarding public attitudes to Serbia’s EU accession, and Gallup Balkan reports. Other
sources of information included parliamentary reports; print, audio and visual media sources;
press releases, and political party documents. This thesis will include the author’s analysis of
the perspectives of officials who were directly involved in Serbia’s pre-accession negotiations,
including through a participant observation method. Historical records analysis was undertaken
165 University of Pittsburgh, Archive of European integration, http://aei.pitt.edu/, (accessed 14 May 2013).
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with permission from relevant authorities, including the Historical Archives of Belgrade and
the National Archives of Australia.
Fieldwork research was conducted under ethics clearance guidelines. Four groups of
professionals were specifically targeted for interviews: officials (parliamentarians, the Serbian
Government employees, EU officials, and diplomats), influential academics in Serbia who
have published academic works on EU-Serbia relations, journalists, and NGOs that take part
in Serbia’s discourses on European integration. More than twenty interviews were conducted
where the participants agreed for the author of this thesis to identify them by their name or
position. In instances where interviewees did not want their names to be used, but agreed for
their general comments to be conveyed, their names will be omitted from the ‘List of
Interviewees’ (see Appendix Three) and their comments will appear only in footnotes as part
of additional information.  The specific set of interview questions is included at the end of this
thesis, as part of Appendix Three. The author of this thesis was careful that interviewees in
Serbia were from different political groups in order to ensure the diversity of views presented
in this thesis.
Thesis structure
This thesis has eight chapters, plus the Introduction, Conclusion and Appendices. Chapters are
mostly chronological, but also thematic when dealing with particular case studies.
Chapter One will address the evolution of the EU accession norms since the end of the Cold
War, in particular, the Copenhagen and Copenhagen Plus criteria for the Western Balkans. This
chapter will also provide further definitions of enlargement and European integration.
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Chapter Two will examine two particular sets of normative beliefs that still influence Serbian
contemporary political discourses regarding European integration. Analysing historical context
in the relationship between the EU and Serbia provides a basis for better understanding of
normative ideas that underpin its behaviour and political attitudes towards the EU. The chapter
aims to show that the content and quality of bilateral relationships between Yugoslavia and EU
members determined the speed with which their contractual agreements were able to be forged.
The concept of Serbia’s neutrality in foreign policy during the Cold War became a guiding
principle of Yugoslavia’s non-alignment, which is further explained in the first chapter. Since
the democratic change in October 2000, Serbian political elites have invoked these constructs
as a legitimising basis for political decisions in foreign policy when they wanted to distance
themselves from the EU.
This chapter will investigate how socio-political memory in a candidate state has come to
influence contemporary discourses on Serbia’s accession and perceptions about Serbia’s place
in regional (Balkan), European and world politics. It will argue that the idea of Serbia’s
strategic position as the ‘bridge’ between Oriental (East) and Occidental (West) great powers
was shaped by distinct historical experiences and a desire by its political elites to invoke social
constructs that reawaken certain popular feelings among the citizens of Serbia in order to gain
legitimacy. In order to explain this phenomenon, the first chapter will reference earlier
historical occurrences of the East/West bridging idea to show its historical reproduction and
continuing relevance. The second idea is one of national independence from foreign
interference, which has become a set of shared beliefs for the Serbs, and is positioned within a
broader discourse on nation-building. Yugoslavia’s foreign policy independence from both
Eastern and Western blocs is an ideational argument and a model advanced by the EU sceptics
in Serbia, which says that the country should remain permanently outside the EU to maintain
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its independence. Both sets of ideas influenced cooperation between the EU and Serbia (as a
central part of the former Yugoslavia) during the Cold War and the East/West division of
Europe.
Chapter Three will explore the period of confrontation between the EU and Serbia between
1991 and 1998, while the Kosovo conflict will be treated as a separate topic in the study of
Serbia’s accession and explored in more detail in Chapter Four. Whilst enlargement
proceeded elsewhere in the CEES, the conflict in the former Yugoslavia derailed reform in the
Western Balkans and made European borders less secure. It appears that the EU’s strict visa
regime against Serbia, which was maintained for almost a decade after Serbia became
democratic, was to a large extent influenced by the memory of conflict between Serbia and EU
members during the 1990s.
EU diplomacy towards wars in Croatia and Bosnia in particular has been severely criticised in
the literature. The swift recognition by Germany of Slovenia’s and Croatia’s independence
before an official EU position was properly formulated was widely seen as an example of a
truncated EU foreign policy in the 1990s, with a dominant Germany pursuing an independent
foreign policy from the EU. The Yugoslav conflicts weakened the EU’s credibility as a conflict
manager, and bitterly divided EU members over how best to respond to armed hostilities on its
borders which caused an influx of refugees into the EU.
The maturing of the EU’s foreign policy mechanisms and diplomatic service came about, in
part, as a response to wars in the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s. It was precisely this
period in EU history that specifically influenced the development of the Common Foreign and
Security Policy instruments, and fostered further political cooperation between member states.
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This period negatively affected normative conceptions about Serbia in the world, because of
its infamous military incursions in the immediate neighbourhood in the name of military
protection of one ethnic group against two others, which was antithetical to the EU’s founding
values. This is another reason for the study of enlargement in the context of the Western
Balkans, as this region’s experience has presented particular challenges to EU policy-making
for which new institutional, political and administrative solutions were required. In other
words, it could be argued that the historic changes in the geopolitical situation during the 1990s
(which was characterised by transformation and the disappearance from the global political
scene of the Soviet Union) helped promote deeper integration in the EU, despite differences in
opinion or policies among EU members towards individual candidates.
Chapter Five will explore the significance of Serbia’s regime change for EU-Serbia relations.
It will also investigate the Serbian Government’s rapprochement with the EU up to the
assassination of Prime Minister Đinđić in March 2003. It will explore the dual approach of the
EU towards the Serbian Government (coercive diplomacy) and pro-EU opposition to the
Milošević regime. The politics of conditionality affected the development of Serbia’s new
political parties (intra-party transformation) and thereby affected national electoral processes
and the domestic political situation in the Western Balkans. Contrary to the abundance of
scholarly writings about the EU’s widely perceived passivity generally in the face of violence
in the Balkans in the 1990s, the EU did resort to soft power diplomacy at the non-official level
to bring about a democratic breakthrough in Serbia/FRY. This aspect of EU diplomacy is also
confirmed by interviews with current and past EU and Serbian policy-makers.
Chapter Six will explore the EU-sceptic government of Vojislav Koštunica, and the cooling
of relations between the EU and Serbia during Koštunica’s era. During this time, Serbia-EU
59
relations were advanced, but then backslid several times due to increasing differences in
normative outlooks between the EU and the Serbian Government, which was moreover
internally divided and unstable.
Chapter Seven will examine the pro-EU government and Presidency of Boris Tadić, up to his
loss in the 2012 national elections. Normative closeness between Tadić’s government and EU
foreign policy enabled EU-Serbia dialogue to go forward. Milestones were achieved, such as
visa liberalisation for Serbia, which was seen as a major success, and Serbia’s formal status as
a candidate for EU membership, which opened up new collaboration opportunities.166
Chapter Eight will analyse the major breakthrough in EU-Serbia relations under the Serbian
coalition government (made up of the Progressives and the Socialists), the Brussels Agreement
reached by Serbia with Kosovo authorities under EU auspices in April 2013.167 The mediation
efforts by the EU to achieve this crucial result for confidence-building measures between
Serbia and Kosovo were recognised with the EU receiving a Nobel Peace Prize in 2012.168
166 For a full list of milestones in EU-Serbia relations, see Appendix Two.
167 The political party of the Progressives is called Srpska Napredna Stranka (SNS), and the party of the
Socialists is called Socijalistička Partija Srbije (SPS).
168 The Nobel Peace Committee observed: ‘In this time of economic and social unrest, the Norwegian Nobel
Committee wished to reward the EU's successful struggle for peace, reconciliation and for democracy and
human rights. … The Nobel Committee also believes that the question of EU membership is bolstering the
reconciliation process after the wars in the Balkan States’. The official website of the Nobel Prize, ‘The Nobel
peace prize 2012: European Union’, http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2012/eu-
facts.html, (accessed 12 October 2013).
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Conclusion
The EU’s enlargement policy has long relied on a set of shared ideas among the key players
involved in promoting enlargement. It was embedded within particular sets of ideas about
world order and the extension of Europe’s liberal identity to third-countries (non-EU
members). The Serbian accession case offers some lessons for the future planning of the EU’s
enlargement policy in the Western Balkans, and for the EU’s use of soft power globally. The
Introductory chapter of this thesis established the research design of this thesis and outlined the
main approaches in studying Serbia’s delayed accession. It also presented how data collection
was undertaken for this thesis, and which criteria was used to select the interviewees. It also
outlined the thesis structure, describing the main themes of each chapter.  It also provided
working definitions of the terms used to create the original conceptual framework, the
normative approach, which will be used in evaluating Serbia’s European integration.
The next chapter will provide an analysis of how did the accession process for the Western
Balkans states, including Serbia, become more comprehensive than it was the case during
previous accession rounds. Chapter One will also provide a working definition of ‘European
integration’ and ‘European enlargement’, and explain in which context these terms will be used
in this thesis. Outlining the evolution of the EU’s accession norms is necessary in order to
better understand the normative obstacles which Serbia has faced in its ambition to develop
closer relations with the EU.
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CHAPTER ONE
The evolution of EU accession norms: towards a special
criteria for the Western Balkans
Enlargement is ‘a key political process for international relations of Europe’, which occurs in
parallel to the process of institutional integration in the EU.169 It has been ‘a central and quasi-
permanent element of the EU’s history’.170 Scholar Andras Inotai cautioned that none of the
present members were able to prepare fully for membership before accession.171 Academic
Desmond Dinan noted that ‘the collapse of communism opened up a hitherto unimaginable
enlargement scenario’, by which European ‘neutrals’ (Austria, Finland and Sweden) no longer
faced any structural or political constraints to apply for EU membership.172 According to
Christiansen, the key features of enlargement are gradual processes of expansion of:
competencies, membership, majority vote and parliamentary powers.173As an important policy
area in the EU budget, enlargement required forward planning of expenditures.174 Normative
expectations and standards for EU members are part of European liberal identity, the value-
169 F. Schimmelfennig and U. Sedelmeier, ‘Theorizing EU enlargement: research focus, hypotheses, and the
state of research’, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 9, no. 4, August 2002, p. 500. The development of
enlargement as a norms-based policy process will be further discussed later on in this chapter.
170 D. Dinan, ‘The Commission and enlargement’, in J. Redmond and G.R. Rosenthan (eds), The expanding
European Union: past, present, future, London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998, pp. 20–21.
171 Prior to this enlargement round, the EU had to reform the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and strengthen
institutional capacities to enable enlargement to go forward. A. Inotai, ‘The CEECs: from the association
agreements to full membership’, in J. Redmond and G.R. Rosenthan (eds), The expanding European Union,
1998, op. cit., p. 165.
172 D. Dinan, Ever closer Union: an introduction to European integration, 3rd edn, Boulder, Lynner Rienne
Publishers, 2005, pp. 134–135. Emphasis by the Serbian anti-EU parties on the neutrality concept in the 2012
and 2014 elections indicates that for some, political divisions between Western and Eastern spheres of influence
have not disappeared.
173 T. Christiansen, ‘European integration and regional cooperation’, 2004, op. cit., p. 582.
174 One cost estimate of the EU’s largest single enlargement in 2004 was ‘€22 billion [of EU funds] devoted to
'pre-accession assistance' between 2000 and 2006 to countries that were joining. Enlargement archives,
‘Question and answers about the fifth enlargement (archived)’,
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/questions_and_answers/11-22_en.htm#costs, (accessed 1 February
2014).
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based identity of the EU that has played a key role in the enlargement processes.175
Enlargement, in this normative context, can be seen as an extension of EU power. As a
European Commission document notes:
Enlargement reflects the EU’s essence as a soft power, which has achieved more
through its gravitational pull than it could have been achieved by other means.176
In the post-Cold War era, the EU started to increasingly rely on its soft power instruments,
especially towards the post-communist states. Joseph Nye coined the term ‘soft power’ to
explain major shifts and diffusion of power in world politics after the Cold War.177 In his view,
the collapse of the Soviet Union as a superpower led to a greater diffusion of power globally.
It also led to a decrease in the effectiveness of hard or military power instruments, including
the use of coercion and military threats. Since power is a relationship, the ‘proof of power’
came to rely less on material resources and more on the ability to change the behaviour of
others without coercion. This method was seen as less costly and more efficient.178 The basis
for the EU’s soft power was found to be in the values it was promoting, as per the next citation:
The EU is above all a community of values. We are a family of democratic European
countries committed to working together for peace and freedom, prosperity and social
175 D. Lazea, ‘EU Enlargement towards Central and Eastern Europe: a social constructivist approach’, Paper
presented at the 10th Biennial Conference of the Australasian Association for Communist and Post-Communist
Studies (AACaPS) in Canberra, 3–4 February 2011, p. 2.
176 European Commission, ‘Enlargement strategy and main challenges 2006–2007’, Communication from the
Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, 8 November 2006, p. 2.
177 J.S. Nye, ‘Soft power’, Foreign Policy¸ no. 80, autumn 1990, pp. 153–171.
178 ibid., p. 155.
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justice, and we defend these values. We seek to deepen the solidarity between the
peoples of Europe, while respecting and preserving our diversity.179
Nye defined soft or co-optive power as ‘the ability of a state to structure a situation so that
other countries develop preferences or define their interests in ways consistent to its own’.180
If the culture and ideas of one international player were attractive, it was presupposed that
others would willingly follow them. Nye argued that soft power tended to arise from cultural
and ideological attraction. One shortcoming of this approach is that Nye was seeing nation
states as the primary actors in world politics, although he did recognise a growing importance
of institutions and non-state actors as new sources of power. He noted that in areas where the
EU acted as a unit, such as in trade, the effectiveness of its power was greater.181 In arenas
where EU members spoke with one voice the impact of EU policies (including enlargement
policy) was more substantial and had more transformational weight.
European integration
The term ‘European integration’ refers to gradual political, economic and social processes of
transformation from a socialist, collectivist state to a democratic country in transition.182 In this
multidimensional discourse regarding Europeanisation, the EU serves as the key reference
179 European Commission, (August 2013), Enlargement. Extending European values and standards to more
countries, p. 3, emphasis added, http://europa.eu/pol/pdf/flipbook/en/enlargement_en.pdf, (accessed 14
September 2013).
180 S. Nye Jr, ‘Soft power’, 1990, op. cit., p. 168.
181 ibid., p. 158.
182 Transformation is a broader concept than democratic transition. A country’s transformation from socialist
usually starts with the democratic breakthrough (the moment of the regime change), and includes the transition
and consolidation phases. Consolidation occurs when democracy has become ‘the only game in town’. J.J. Linz
and A. Stepan, Problems of democratic transition and consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and
post-communist Europe, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, pp. 5–6, 200, 454. For an opposing
view, according to which transition contains transformation but that transformation does not necessarily contain
transition in post-Communist societies, see S.P. Ramet, ‘Trajectories of post-communist transformation: myths
and rival theories about change in Central and Southeastern Europe’, Perceptions, vol. 18,  no. 2, Summer 2013,
pp. 62.
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point to the prospective candidate, and the prospect of EU membership becomes the main
driver for the latter’s domestic reform. Othon Anastasakis has rightly pointed out that
Europeanisation took a ‘new turn’ with the collapse of communism and came to be associated
with the EU’s enlargement to the East; as the concept was originally used to describe ‘more
balanced interaction among Western European states’, and ‘changes inside the European
Community itself and the adaptive capabilities of its member states’.183 The concept came to
signify the adaptation of formerly authoritarian states to the Western political and economic
models. The EU also introduced systematic Europeanisation processes for these countries,
before they could join the EU.
The evolution of EU accession norms in the post-Cold War period rested on deliberate choices
made by the leaders of EU member states to extend democracy to the CEES. Their accession
was a highly normative, socially constructed, negotiated and politically-driven process.
Political scientist Neill Nugent, who extensively researched the processes of post-war184
integration in Western Europe, has concluded that there was nothing pre-determined or
inevitable about these processes.185 He has found that national factors in the post-war era have,
in fact, determined the pace and structure of European integration; and included different
circumstances of Western European countries, and the needs and attitudes their leaders
expressed towards European integration.186 Nugent, furthermore, has observed that especially
since the EU’s first enlargement took place in 1973, political factors have been an important
183 Anastasakis, ‘The Europeanization of the Balkans’, 2005, op. cit., p. 78.
184 Post-war in this thesis refers to the late 1940s and 1950s era in Europe, following the conclusion of the
Second World War with the capitulation of Nazi Germany on the Western Front on 8 May 1945 and on the
Eastern Front in the early morning of 9 May 1945. The Second World War still occupies a special place in the
national historical memory of European peoples, including Serbs. It can influence more conservative political
views about who are ‘traditional enemies’ and ‘friendly states’. In Serbia, the conservatives particularly regard
Germany as the ‘traditional enemy’, while Britain, France and Russia are perceived as wartime allies from the
Second World War. However, the British and French participation in the 1999 bombardment of Yugoslavia by
the NATO alliance somewhat diminished public perceptions of these two countries as ‘friendly’.
185 Nugent, The government and politics of the European Union, 2006, op. cit., p. 13.
186 ibid., p. 23.
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factor in shaping the nature and pace of integration processes.187 Nugent’s observations could
also be applied to more recent enlargement rounds.
Eastern enlargement
Eastern enlargement presented new challenges to the study of European integration, as post-
communist states, which joined the EU in 2004, had very different historical experiences from
previous applicants for membership. The distinguished Estonian statesman and historian, Mart
Laar, observed that a ‘mental and moral connection’ to Western Europe is what kept the Central
and Eastern European peoples resilient in the face of the communist yoke. He noted:
Their wish to be accepted again by the West and to be recognised as an integral part of
Western cultural realm was a more substantial driving force in their development than
mere economic or political motivation could ever be.188
The EU was certainly the main promoter of democracy, economic liberalisation and European
standards to its post-communist neighbours, but not the only actor as the United States (US)
agencies, non-government organisations (NGOs) and Christian groups were also active in that
area.189 The EU’s past role in encouraging reforms in southern Europe was similarly important
prior to the accession of Greece in 1981, and Spain and Portugal in 1986, which shows the
continuity of its approach towards new accessions.190 The admittance in 1995 of Austria,
187 ibid., p. 21.
188 M. Laar, The power of freedom: Central and Eastern Europe after 1945, Brussels, Centre for European
Studies, 2010, p. 207.
189 The White House, ‘Fact sheet: the United States and Central and Eastern Europe: enduring Cooperation’, 3
June 2014, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/06/03/fact-sheet-united-states-and-central-and-
eastern-europe-enduring-coopera, (accessed 4 June 2014).
190 The European Community’s active role in democracy promotion in Eastern Europe was made possible due to
a political and economic vacuum left from a gradual removal of Soviet control from Eastern Europe. In this
process, the EU acted as an external guarantee of stability, and provided vital reform-oriented financial
assistance. Huntington, ‘Democracy’s third wave’, 1991, op. cit., p. 14.
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Finland and Sweden into the EU probably gave the CEES an additional impetus to modernise.
The admission of these countries into the EU also demonstrated to the aspirant EU members
that political will among EU leaders to expand the EU was real and tangible. The absorption
of the CEES into the EU highlights the significance of one important consideration when
examining the EU’s policy of enlargement, which is the capacity of the EU to admit new
members. The term ‘absorption capacity’ refers here primarily to the political agreement
among existing EU members to take in new members.191 In Serbia’s case, the EU’s absorption
capacity, as well as the separate issue of Serbia’s capacity to ‘absorb’ or adequately utilise EU
funds for further reform, are frequently seen as key challenges to its European integration.192
This thesis argues that normative factors rather than any material factors are primary
determinants of whether Serbia will be able to join the EU or not.
In 1984, one year before the Soviet Union’s reformist leader, Mikhail S. Gorbachev, became
the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, it was completely
unimaginable that two decades later, many formerly Eastern bloc countries would be members
of the EU, which was their ideological ‘rival’ during the Cold War.193 For the CEES countries,
the prospect of EU membership was the most significant motivating factor behind reform after
their internal democratic changes occurred after 1989. Their accession to the EU has been
popularly described as a ‘return to Europe’ in a normative sense, and as the EU’s most
successful foreign policy action after the Cold War.194 The leadership change in the CEES
191 The EU frequently used this term in its policy documents when referring to further accessions. For a critique
of this term, see Euractiv, ‘Analysis: just what is the EU’s “absorption capacity”’, Efficacité et Transparence
des Acteurs Européens (Euractiv), 10 October 2006, http://www.euractiv.com/enlargement/analysis-just-eu-
absorption-capacity/article-158638, (accessed 13 June 2013).
192 I. Knezević, Absorption capacity of Serbia for use of EU funds: practical lessons from Slovakia, The Pontis
Foundation and The Center for Democracy Foundation, Belgrade, July 2010.
193 At such time it would have also been inconceivable that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)
would be long gone from Europe’s political landscape after its relatively peaceful dissolution.
194 F. Schimmelfennig and H. Scholtz, ‘EU democracy promotion in the European neighbourhood’, European
Union Politics, vol. 9, no. 2, 2008, p. 188.
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enabled them to look to the EU as a model of peaceful regional integration and economic
success, which stood in sharp contrast to their experiences of living under repressive Soviet
satellite regimes.
The Copenhagen criteria
The European Council meeting at Copenhagen was a watershed moment for the EU’s
enlargement policy, representing the key reference point for all future accessions as it laid out
political, economic and legal accession criteria for future enlargement rounds of the EU—the
Copenhagen criteria.195 The Council of twelve EU members reached a historic decision at the
Copenhagen summit to formally open the door of accession to those politically neutral and
formerly socialist states that already had negotiated Europe Agreements with the EU or were
in the process of doing so.196 The agreements contained resolutions on ‘political dialogue,
obligations related to the narrowing of the gap between the association states and [EU’s]
legislative models’, and guidelines on cultural cooperation.197
The Presidency Conclusions of the summit specified that a candidate state (also known as an
‘associated country’) would need to satisfy political and economic membership conditions, and
bring domestic laws in line with the acquis through the process of legislative approximation.198
The political criterion encompassed ‘stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule
195 Europa, Summaries of EU legislation, ‘Glossary: accession criteria (Copenhagen criteria)’,
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/glossary/accession_criteria_copenhague_en.htm, (accessed 1 March
2014).
196 In 1993, twelve members of the EU included Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom.
197 Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, ‘Poland’s way to EU’, http://en.poland.gov.pl/Poland
per centE2 per cent80 per cent99s,way,to,UE,458.html, (accessed 1 February 2014).
198 European Union, ‘Conclusions of the Presidency: Copenhagen, June 21–22, 1993’, p. 13,
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/72921.pdf, (accessed 10 October
2013).
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of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities’.199 Moreover, the economic
criterion stipulated ‘existence of a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with
competitive pressure and market forces within the Union’.200 The third Copenhagen criterion
called on a candidate state to ‘take on obligations of membership, including adherence to the
aims of political, economic and monetary union’, for which it would need to develop relevant
capacities.201
The aims were, however, not specified, remaining deliberately vague. Furthermore, the EU’s
ability to absorb new members was also singled out at the summit. Integration capacity
necessitated that ‘enlargement would need to be supported by public opinion in member states
and the candidate’.202 The Copenhagen criteria emphasised, therefore, the political nature of
enlargement, for both the EU and candidate states.203 By specifically referring to public opinion
in the EU and candidate states, the Copenhagen criteria highlighted the importance for any
future accessions of democratic legitimacy and popular support.
It appears that in the lead-up to the Copenhagen summit, informal summitry and individual
contacts between the leaders of the CEES and the leaders of EU member states was crucial for
convincing all EU members to support the goals of Eastern enlargement at the summit.204 The
199 Europa, ‘Accession criteria (Copenhagen criteria)’,
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/glossary/accession_criteria_copenhague_en.htm, (accessed 12 October
2013).
200 ibid.
201 ‘Conclusions of the Presidency: Copenhagen June 21–22, 1993’, op. cit., emphasis added.
202 Europa, ‘The accession process for a new Member State’,
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/enlargement/ongoing_enlargement/l14536_en.htm, (accessed 10
October 2013).
203 G. Sasse, ‘EU conditionality and minority rights: translating the Copenhagen criterion into policy’, European
University Institute Working Paper, no. 16, 2005, p. 1, http://sar.org.ro/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/EU-
conditionality-and-minority-rights-Translating-Copenhagen-criterion-into-policy.pdf, (accessed 1 March 2014).
204 The principal goals behind the Eastern enlargement were the promotion of democracy, European standards
and free market economy to the CEES, and a normative desire of the EU to assert its liberal identity in Eastern
Europe, therein uniting its Western and Eastern parts. D. Lazea, ‘EU enlargement towards Central and Eastern
Europe: a Social Constructivist approach’, 2011, op. cit., pp. 4–8.
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Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs has noted that the diplomatic efforts of the so-called
Višegrad Group countries (comprising, in the early 1990s, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and
Poland) played a critical role before the Copenhagen summit in convincing the EU members
about the CEES’s willingness and necessity to join.205 Potential candidates have thus actively
contributed to the shaping of the EU’s common decisions on such an important policy area as
enlargement.206 Their diplomatic efforts were aided by relationship-building with key
supporters from inside the EU.
The most enthusiastic supporters of Eastern enlargement in the lead-up to the Copenhagen
summit included the Chancellor of Germany, Helmut Kohl; the Prime Minister of
Luxembourg, Jean-Claude Juncker (who is currently President-designate of the European
Commission), and the Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt. These influential politicians were in
frequent contact with the political leaders of the CEES, ‘helping to make their voices heard in
Europe’.207By comparison, the Serbian Government’s lobbying efforts were also vital before
the European Council granted it a formal candidature in March 2012.208 This could indicate
that more recent candidates, including Serbia, have learned some lessons from the previous EU
enlargement rounds, particularly from the Copenhagen summit that was extremely important
for the accession prospects of the CEES.209
205 Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, ‘Poland’s way to EU’, op. cit.
206 A country is considered a formal candidate once the European Council confirms the European Commission’s
positive opinion or avis regarding its candidacy.
207 M. Laar, The power of freedom, 2010, op. cit., p. 208.
208 European Council, ‘Serbia is granted EU candidate status’, press release, Brussels, 1 March 2012,
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/128445.pdf, (accessed 12 May 2013).
209 In an interview for this thesis with the Serbian Deputy Minister for European integration, he remarked that
Serbia is constantly learning from the accessions of the CEES, especially from regional neighbours including
Slovenia, and the Višegrad Group countries.
70
Furthermore, the centre-right European People’s Party (EPP) within the European Parliament
was among the strongest supporters of Eastern enlargement.210 Therefore, the CEES were, like
Serbia today, facing the issue of ‘ignorance and mistrust’, but the political support they
received from influential EU members assisted them in overcoming normative obstacles (from
within the EU) to their accession. Guided by the CEES’s experiences, it is likely that political
support for Serbia’s accession within key EU institutions, including in the European
Parliament, will be a significant determining factor influencing the EU’s decision whether or
not to admit Serbia once all chapters are closed. A long-standing policy of the EPP Group in
the European Parliament has been to support further enlargement in the Western Balkans.211
However, the Group’s responses to Serbia’s candidacy status in March 2012 were cautiously
optimistic. EPP Group Spokesman, György Schöpflin MEP from Hungary, has observed that
‘all candidate countries have to come to terms with their neighbours, therefore Serbia has to
confront Kosovo's independence and abandon its illusions’.212 While Cyprus did not ‘come to
terms’ with Turkey over the issue of Northern Cyprus at the time of its EU accession in 2004,
the MEP’s comments still indicate that as the largest party at the time in the European
Parliament, the EPP would not allow Serbia to enter the EU unless its stance on the Kosovo
issue was constructive and more flexible.213
210 The work of Hans Geert Poettering, the Chairman of the EPP in the European Parliament, was important in
gathering support among his colleagues for the accession of the CEES. Without such support, in Laar’s view, it
would have difficult to overcome ‘the barriers of ignorance and mistrust’, M. Laar, The power of freedom, 2010,
op. cit.
211 European People’s Party, ‘Enlargement and neighbourhood: South-Eastern and Eastern Europe, South
Caucasus’, European Parliament, http://www.eppgroup.eu/free-text/South-Eastern-and-Eastern-Europe per
cent2C-South-Caucasus?page=0 per cent2C0 per cent2C0 per cent2C0 per cent2C0 per cent2C3, (accessed 30
September 2013).
212 European People’s Party, ‘Serbian Enlargement Report adopted by the European Parliament’, European
Parliament, 29 March 2012, http://www.eppgroup.eu/press-release/Serbian-Enlargement-Report-adopted-by-
the-EP, (accessed 1 May 2013).
213 The EPP’s ongoing commitment to further enlargement in the Western Balkans was demonstrated in April
2014, when the EPP convened for the fourth time a debate between senior officials from Albania, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Kosovo and Serbia and European Parliament representatives on further enlargement. European
People’s Party, ‘Western Balkans: from stabilisation to accession’, European Parliament, 8 April 2014,
http://www.eppgroup.eu/event/Western-Balkans per cent3A-from-stabilisation-to-accession, (accessed 1 May
2014).
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After the Copenhagen summit, the legal basis for enlargement was strengthened with the entry
into force of the Treaty on the European Union (known as the Maastricht Treaty) in November
1993.214 Article 49 of the Maastricht Treaty stated that any European country that respects
democratic values of the EU could be eligible to join once it underwent a formal accession
process, which required the applicants to undertake a series of steps.215 Potential candidates are
required to submit an application to the EU stating their intention to seek EU membership.
Before the Council could reach any further decision on the candidacy, which is done
unanimously, the Council would need to consult the European Commission, and ‘ask the
European Parliament for a favourable opinion adopted by an absolute majority of its
members’.216 A country-specific program would then need to be agreed between EU members
and the candidate, and designated EU institutions would be tasked with overseeing the
program’s implementation. Article 49 was rather ‘vague’ and deliberately ‘short on detail’, as
it was formulated in such way as to allow for further evolution of the accession norms.217
The next defining moment in the historic evolution of EU accession criteria occurred at the
Madrid Council’s summit in late 1995, establishing the so-called Madrid criteria.218 The
Madrid summit outlined the importance of EU enlargement for European security and regional
economic interdependence.219 It also expanded the Copenhagen criteria by introducing the
214 This treaty was signed on 7 February 1992.
215 However, the Maastricht Treaty did not specify the geographical boundaries of Europe.
216 Europa, ‘The accession process for a new Member State’, op. cit.
217 N. Copeland, ‘EU accession procedure’, Library of the European Parliament, 26 March 2013, p. 2,
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/bibliotheque/briefing/2013/130437/LDM_BRI per cent282013 per
cent29130437_REV3_EN.pdf, (accessed 12 September 2013).
218 European Parliament, ‘Madrid European Council Presidency Conclusions’, 15–16 December 1995,
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/mad1_en.htm, (accessed 12 September 2013).
219 The meeting reaffirmed that ‘Enlargement is both a political necessity and a historic opportunity for Europe.
It will ensure the stability and security of the continent and will thus offer both the applicant States and the
current members of the Union new prospects for economic growth and general well-being’. European Council,
‘European Council, ‘Madrid: Presidency Conclusions’, 15–16 March 1995, Hellenic Resources Network,
http://www.hri.org/docs/madrid95/madr-c3.html, (accessed 12 September 2013).
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criterion of administrative capacities for the pre-accession process.220 It highlighted that
problems with meeting the accession criteria can result from weak administrative and
institutional capacities, which are rooted in the inefficient ‘administrative tradition’ of post-
communist states.221 By recognising that specific conditions in the CEES weakened their
accession prospects, the EU confirmed the importance of domestic factors for European
integration, as discussed earlier. The EU accredited the task of providing technical and
administrative assistance to the CEES to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD).222 Administrative and public sector reform is still weak in Serbia,
which is now an official candidate for EU membership, highlighting that in this area too
Serbia’s accession path has been similar in those aspects to the experiences of other CEES.
Additional criteria for the Western Balkans: the ‘Copenhagen Plus’
The EU regarded the situation in the Western Balkans after the wars in the 1990s as being
similar to the situation in Europe as a whole after the Second World War. Political scientist
Desmond Dinan observed that the EU advocated a similar solution to this post-conflict region:
economic and political integration of the Western Balkans ‘as the best means of promoting
peace, stability, and prosperity’; but in order to do so, Serbia needed to rebuild trust in its
neighbourhood by pursuing a policy of reconciliation, which was ‘an important element of the
integration process’, and a major assessment criterion in the Commission’s progress reports.223
220 The Madrid criteria highlighted the need for candidates to align their public administration systems and
policies with the principles found in the European Administrative Space (EAS). The European Policy Centre
defined EAS as the ‘evolutionary process of gradually increasing convergence between national administrative




222 The OECD’s Support for Improvement in Governance and Management (SIGMA) body published regular
assessments about the public governance/effectiveness of the public administration capacities in the candidate
states. The EU consulted these reports in conjunction with regular European Commission’s progress reports for
each candidate when making decisions about their progress.
223 D. Dinan, Ever closer Union, 2005, op. cit., pp. 532–533.
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Dinan also observed that the situation in the Western Balkans ‘will not be normal until Serbia,
historically the regional power and still a cultural beacon in Southeastern Europe, joins the
EU’.224 Because of the region’s specific conditions, the EU developed additional accession
criteria in 2000 for the countries in the Western Balkans, which are known as the Copenhagen
Plus criteria.
At the European Council meeting in Santa Maria de Feira (Portugal) in June 2000, the EU
decided that all states and entities from the Western Balkans were potential candidates for EU
membership. At that time, Serbia was still governed by Milošević’s autocratic regime, but its
pro-EU opposition was mobilising to oppose the SPS-led Serbian Government at the next
elections. The Presidency Conclusions signalled the EU’s political support for the latter:
A democratic, cooperative FRY living in peace with its neighbours will be a welcome
member of the European family of democratic nations. The European Council supports
the civil society initiatives as well as the democratic forces in Serbia in their struggle to
achieve this goal and urges them to stay united and reinforce their cooperation.225
This statement confirmed that the enlargement process was highly political in nature, and
normative. Similarly to the political support which democratic leaders in the CEES received a
decade earlier, the EU’s support for democracy-promotion in Serbia and Montenegro was a
sign that it was becoming more active in this area, as the EU’s support was a direct incentive
for leadership change in Serbia. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
estimated that between 1991 and 2004, the EU invested more than €6.4 billion to support
224 ibid.
225 European Parliament, ‘Santa Maria de Feira European Council: Presidency Conclusions’, 19–20 June 2000,
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/fei1_en.htm#V, (accessed 14 September 2013).
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democratic reform in the Western Balkans, from which over 2 billion went to support
democratisation efforts in Serbia and Montenegro.226
Following Serbia’s regime change in October 2000, the European Council meeting in Zagreb
in November 2000 confirmed that ‘the way is now open to all the countries of the region to
move closer to the European Union as part of the stabilisation and association process’, whereas
specifically for rump Yugoslavia:
The prospect of a stabilisation and association agreement is now established in
accordance with the invitation issued by the Council on 9 October 2000. A decision has
been taken to set up an "EU/FRY consultative task force".227
The EU then proposed ‘an individualised approach’ to all countries in the region, and
announced ‘a single Community aid programme’ for countries participating in the Stabilization
and Association Process—the Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Democratisation and
Stabilisation (CARDS) program to which the EU committed €4.65 billion over the six-year
period.228 The Zagreb meeting, therefore, formally confirmed that SAP would constitute an
overarching framework for the future accession processes in the Western Balkans.
In June 2003, the EU’s meeting with the Western Balkan states in Thessaloniki (Greece)
established that SAP would be intensified by the means of signing ‘European Partnerships’.
These agreements were comparable to the Europe Agreements, previously successfully
226 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD),’EBRD-EU cooperation in the Western
Balkans), 2005, p. 4, http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/research/brochures/balkans.pdf, (accessed 1 March 2014)





pursued with the CEES.229 The so-called Thessaloniki Declaration reaffirmed that the future of
the Western Balkans lies within the European Union. The Declaration emphasised a shared
normative commitment of Western Balkan states to the principles of democracy, rule of law,
market economy, international law including ‘inviolability of international borders’, regional
cooperation, and a shared commitment to ‘the objectives of economic and political union’.230
Again, the integration objectives were not specifically outlined. The Declaration affirmed the
historical continuity of the accession process and sustained relevance of the Copenhagen
criteria. It established that SAP’s annual review mechanism will be constituted by the European
Commission’s progress reports for each individual applicant.231 The Council also called for
closer coordination of national authorities in the Western Balkans with the ICTY, which
underscores the political nature of the enlargement process. The EU’s first security White
Paper, the European Security Strategy of December 2003, highlighted the EU’s commitment
to maintaining peace and stability in the Western Balkans.232 This signalled the EU’s greater
level of involvement in that region, which was welcomed by Serbia’s pro-democracy groups
but increasingly resisted by the nationalists.
In 2006, the EU introduced additional accession criteria, which candidate states saw as ‘an
unjustifiably restrictive policy’.233 The new enlargement strategy was based on the
consolidation of commitments, conditionality and communication.234 Critics particularly
objected to the EU’s stricter political conditionality, which had been, since Greece’s accession,
229 D. Dinan, Ever closer Union, 2005, op. cit., p. 533.
230 Europa, ‘EU-Western Balkans Summit Thessaloniki, Declaration’, 21 June 2003,
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PRES-03-163_en.htm (accessed 14 September 2013).
231 ibid.
232 European Commission, A Secure Europe in a Better World–European Security Strategy, 12 December 2003,
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf, (accessed 1 March 2014). For references to the
Western Balkans in this document, see pp. 1, 6, 8, 11 and 13.
233 B. Boettcher and G. Deuber, ‘Reports on European integration’, EU Monitor, no. 66, Deutsche Bank
Research, 12 May 2009, p. 7.
234 European Commission, ‘Enlargement strategy and main challenges 2006–2007’, op. cit., p. 5.
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the main policy tool by which the EU was assessing the applicant’s suitability and readiness to
join the bloc.235 Bargaining between the EU and candidates was to be based on a larger number
of chapters, with Croatia having had to conclude the highest number of chapters so far, thirty-
five in total. EU members were also given more powers to veto any chapter’s closure, which
in Croatia’s case, resulted in a delayed accession due to its disputes with Slovenia that involved
the EU’s mediation capacities.236
Conclusion
This chapter has provided a working definition of the key processes which this thesis is
exploring, European integration and enlargement. It presented an overview of the evolution of
EU accession norms since the end of the Cold War. The case study of Eastern enlargement was
evoked in order to demonstrate that a relatively quick opening of accession negotiations
between the EU and the CEES was the result of specific changes in Europe in the early 1990s,
and diplomatic efforts which the CEES put into overcoming scepticism by some EU members
about further enlargement. At the same time, the wars of Yugoslavia’s disintegration have
utterly delayed Serbia’s EU accession, leaving a particular memory of Serbia and its role in
regional politics. Examples provided in this chapter point to the fact that the EU’s diplomatic
235 D. Lazea, ‘EU external relations: from non-intervention to political conditionality’, Central European
Journal for International and Security Studies, vol. 5, no. 3, 2011, p. 54. During this process, not only material
achievements but also perceptions about the candidate state’s performance and commitments to the EU’s aims
and objectives have guided the process of decision-making of EU members on the former’s EU membership bid.
236 Croatia had a maritime border dispute with Slovenia between 2007 and 2009, and an administrative dispute
in 2012–13 from an issue dating back to socialist Yugoslavia’s dissolution. Both were resolved with EU
mediation, before Croatia joined the EU. The Esprit de corps of EU policy making, the principle of solidarity,
was at the forefront of the EU’s efforts to resolve Croatia’s last pre-accession hurdles. ‘Border dispute with
Slovenia delays Croatia EU entry talks’, Euractiv, 24 April 2009, http://www.euractiv.com/enlargement/border-
dispute-slovenia-delays-c-news-221682, (accessed 14 September 2013). B. Pavelić, ‘Slovenia pressured not to
delay Croatia’s EU accession’, Balkan Insight, 10 January 2013, http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/eu-
expects-slovenia-not-to-block-croatia, (accessed 14 September 2013).
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capacities expanded as a result of the ‘lessons’ it learned from the Yugoslav crisis, including
the need to support democratic opposition as an alternative to Serbia’s authoritarian regime.
The next chapter will present the historical context of EU-Serbia relations, when Serbia was
part of Yugoslavia. Gaining a better understanding of the obstacles which the Yugoslav
Government had faced in its relationship with the EU also increases our knowledge of the main
determinants behind their engagement, which will be investigated next.
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CHAPTER TWO
The legacy of Yugoslavia’s relations with integrating
Europe
The Yugoslav model was distinguished by its political decentralisation, non-alignment,
freedom to travel and market-oriented economic reforms. But for ordinary Yugoslavs,
better living standards measured in terms of the supply and quality of consumer goods,
including food, represented one of the most obvious differences between their lives and
those of their neighbours in the countries of the [Eastern] Bloc.237
This chapter will critically examine two normative constructs relating to Serbia’s and the
socialist Yugoslavia’s foreign policy: a concept of freedom of foreign policy action vis-à-vis
key centres of power to the East and to the West, and a discourse about socialist Yugoslavia
occupying a unique geo-political place between East and West following the principles of
political and military neutrality and peaceful co-existence among nations.238 As normative
constructs, these subjective ideas were diffused by prominent political and religious leaders
(who were ‘the norm entrepreneurs’ in the constructivist approach to foreign policy
analysis).239 Their persuasion and policies came to reflect a set of shared social understandings
about Serbia’s, as well as Yugoslavia’s unique position in world politics.
237 W. Bracewell, ‘Eating up Yugoslavia: cookbooks and consumption in Socialist Yugoslavia’, in P. Bren and
M. Neuburger (eds), Communism unwrapped: consumption in Cold War Eastern Europe, New York, Oxford
University Press, 2012, p. 171.
238 The idea of peaceful co-existence among states in the international system was certainly not Yugoslavia’s
invention. It can be traced to the US President, Woodrow Wilson’s address to the Congress, in which Wilson
called for ‘equality among the peoples of the world’, instead of ‘mastery’ by one group of nations over another.
Records of the United States Senate, National Archives, ‘President Wilson’s message to Congress’, 8 January
1918, http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?doc=62&page=transcript, (accessed 10 May 2013).
239 Persuasion is ‘the process by which agent’s action becomes social structure, ideas become norms, and the
subjective becomes the intersubjective’. R.A. Payne, ‘Persuasion, frames and norm construction’, European
Journal of International Relations, vol. 7, no. 1, 2001, p. 38.
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This chapter will, firstly, define Serbia’s ‘two freedoms’ idea, the political concepts of East
and West, as well as seek to demonstrate how these concepts came to be reproduced in Serbian
and Yugoslav politics.240 It will outline specific historical references as possible origins of this
idea, which contemporary Serbian political leaders invoke when wanting to distance
themselves from the EU’s political conditionality. By doing so, Serbian policy-makers are
seeking more flexibility in policy making, which is also connected to the two freedoms idea,
but also to the idea of indivisible sovereignty. It will, secondly, examine key events from
Yugoslavia’s political history when political neutrality became a guiding principle of foreign
relations. The policy of non-alignment, which had differentiated the country from all the
Soviet-bloc countries, effectively led Yugoslavia to open negotiations with the EU on a
comprehensive trade agreement with the EU as early as in the mid-1960s. The concept of
problematic partners will be further explored to demonstrate that Yugoslavia’s relationship
with the EU was connected to an improvement in its political relations with individual EU
member states, especially France and West Germany. Thirdly, this chapter will assess
Yugoslavia’s major agreements with the EU, in order to demonstrate, as suggested in the
opening quote, Yugoslavia’s geopolitical and domestic distinctiveness during the Cold War
period as a country that was keen to have a relationship with the West, at the same time as
advocating for socialism in the world. Fourthly, this chapter will show that political and
economic instability in Yugoslavia after Tito’s death in 1980 created conditions for the rise of
nationalism and opposition to Yugoslavism that preceded the wars of the Yugoslav
succession.241
240 For example, in February 2014, Serbian President Tomislav Nikolić said that membership of the EU is an
important strategic goal for Serbia, but that for his country it is equally important to have good and productive
relations with Russia. Tanjug, ‘Nikolić: važna nam EU, ali i Rusija’, 12 February 2014,
http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2014&mm=02&dd=12&nav_id=811381, (accessed 10 April
2014).
241 The next chapter will discuss how such a state of affairs impacted on Serbia’s neutrality idea and its
relationship with the West.
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The idea of ‘two freedoms’: independence and neutrality in
Serbian foreign policy
When discussing Serbian politics in the broader historical context, the terms ‘historical
consciousness’ and ‘collective memory’ relate to a sum of beliefs and historically reproduced
narratives that are shared among the members of one political community. These beliefs, which
are also promulgated by the political leaders of that community, influence how certain
historical events are remembered. This is far from being an ingrained ‘political culture’, or
‘civilisational trait’ among Serbs specifically, as the cultural proponents of Serbia’s delayed
EU accession would claim. These are ‘small truths’, subjective beliefs that have been
institutionalised during different historical periods, and disseminated by intellectuals, as well
as cultural and political elites. These perceptions about Serbia’s place in the world as a country
which should be independent, neutral and ultimately ‘free’ in its decisions, including on
international issues, have been inadequately explored in the literature on Serbia’s European
integration. They continue to influence today’s political discourses about Serbia’s foreign
policy in the world, as well as towards the EU specifically.
This thesis posits that these constructs, reproduced throughout different periods in Serbian
political history, are effectively incompatible with Serbia’s strategic goal to join the EU,
representing one of the key obstacles today to Serbia’s European integration. The
incompatibility stems from a clash with the EU’s regulations, as candidates like Serbia are
required under pre-accession political conditionality rules not to be politically neutral, but to
take a clear position and show solidarity in foreign policy with the EU’s commonly agreed
positions, including on major international issues. The ongoing relevance of Serbia’s neutrality
concept was demonstrated in early 2014, when Serbia refused to align with the EU’s common
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position on Russia, which involved introducing targeted sanctions.242 A former Serbian Prime
Minister and founding President of one of Serbia’s newest pro-EU opposition parties, Zoran
Živković of New Party (Nova Stranka, NS) argued that Serbia should introduce sanctions
against Russia in 2014 as a matter of ‘principle’.243 This principle refers to the EU’s informal
norm of solidarity with common decisions of the EU. The majority of commentators in Serbia
on this issue have, however, stated that Serbia reserves a ‘moral right’, has an ‘obligation’, and
is in a ‘special situation’ regarding Russia, a close trade partner, and for these reasons its
position towards the Russia-Ukraine conflict ‘should remain neutral’.244 Some of Serbia’s long-
held political beliefs and traditions might need to be renegotiated, or revisited before the
country will be able to join the EU. Socialist Yugoslavia, whilst professing neutrality in foreign
policy after its historic split with Stalin in 1948, was aligned on several major international
issues with policies of the Soviet Union, some of which have cost the Yugoslav Government
the opportunity to integrate deeper with the emerging EU, as this chapter will explain in more
detail later.
Serbia’s attachment to specific ideas about freedom have been socially and politically
constructed. This country has been long regarded as a political, military, social and cultural
crossroads between East and West. The word ‘Serbia’ has both Eastern and Western origins.
This word could derive from a Greek (‘Eastern’ heritage) word ‘Σέρβια’ (‘Servia’), meaning
‘land of the Serbs’. Another possible origin of ‘Serbia’ is from the Latin (‘Western’ heritage)
242 The economic attractions of South Stream energy project played a role in this decision too, as did the
political leanings of Serbia’s current pro-EU coalition.
243 Beta, ‘Živković za principijelno uvođenje sankcija Rusiji’, 12 May 2014,
http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Politika/464459/Zivkovic-za-principijelno-uvodjenje-sankcija-Rusiji, (accessed 13
May 2014).
244 I. Petrović, ‘Beograd između Brisela i Moskve’, 27 March 2014, http://www.dw.de/beograd-izme per centC4
per cent91u-brisela-i-moskve/a-17522890, (accessed 14 April 2014). By refusing to align itself with the EU
sanctions against Russia in 2014, Serbia risks being seen, once again, as an outsider in Europe.
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root ‘ser-‘, meaning to watch over or protect.245 The Balkans, a rugged mountain region in
Southeast Europe that has been inhabited since the 6th century by South Slavic tribes, including
Serbs, has always been ethnically mixed, religiously diverse and highly syncretic, but
politically divided.246 Principally because of Serbia’s unique geographical location, its political
leaders have always been aware of their country’s strategic position, and created the discourse
of neutrality and ‘East/West bridging’ to ensure Serbia’s national survival among big powers
with interests in the Balkan region.
Serbia’s political leaders cherish the idea of independence from foreign rule and influence,
which for the most part of Serbia’s medieval history was only an aspiration. People from Serbia
are described as still being suspicious of foreigners, and external influence.247 Serbian historian
and erstwhile liberal communist politician Latinka Perović observed that during Serbia’s
relatively short post-Ottoman history, the country was torn between East and West, or between
patriarchal and liberal views (with the former rejecting western influences and the latter
idolising them).248 This dualism continues to the present, with Serbia being divided between
the ‘Europhiles’ and the ‘Russophiles’. Serbia’s modern nation-building was influenced by its
elite-level discourses on national independence (freedom from external powers) and neutrality
(freedom in domestic and foreign policy decision-making).249 These two concepts are grouped
245 In recent decades, a group of scholars began to promote the view that Serbs and other Balkan groups, in
particular the Croats, came to Europe in the early Middle Ages from ancient Persia. M.A. Sepanlu, ‘Culture of
Iran: Croatians and cravats are of Iranian origin’, Iranian Chamber of Commerce, January 2002,
http://www.iranchamber.com/culture/articles/croatians_cravats_iranian_origin.php, (accessed 1 March 2014).
246 C. Iordachi, ‘The Ottoman Empire: syncretic nationalism and citizenship in the Balkans’, in T. Baycroft and
M. Hewitson (eds), What is a nation: Europe 1789–1914, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 120–151.
247 Kwintessential, ‘Intercultural Management–Serbia and Montenegro’,
http://www.kwintessential.co.uk/intercultural/management/serbia.html, (accessed 19 March 2014).
248 L. Perović, in N. Popov and D. Gojković (eds), The road to war in Serbia: trauma and catharsis, Budapest,
Central European University Press, 2000, p. 120.
249 W.S. Vucinich, Serbia between East and West: the events of 1903–1908, Stanford, Stanford University Press,
1954.
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here as an idea of two freedoms. Its continued relevance can be seen in contemporary political
discourses in Serbia.250
The two freedoms idea is linked to a belief that Serbia’s survival as an independent state relies
on strategic balancing between Eastern and Western centres of power. A frequently invoked
example of this attitude in Serbian political discourses comes from the medieval reign of
Serbian King Stefan the First Crowned, who secured his country’s autonomy in political and
religious affairs in 1219 through a balancing act and negotiations with the two major centres
of power at the time, Constantinople and Rome.  The resultant creation of an autocephalous
Serbian Orthodox Church, independent from Greek, Byzantine and Roman Catholic
influences, has been regarded by Serbian intellectuals as a model to follow.251 Therefore, the
normative construct of East/West bridging (Serbia connecting civilisations), as well as wedging
(Serbia at the crossroads of different civilisations), has a deep religious, cultural and political
resonance for Serbs as a political community.
The idea of Serbia occupying a unique religious, economic, cultural and political space between
East and West is associated with Stefan the First Crowned, and his subsequently canonised
250 In April 2012, the leader of Serbia’s largest opposition party, the Progressives (Srpska Napredna Stranka,
SNS), Tomislav Nikolić said that Serbia has ‘two doors’, one leading to the West, and the other leading to the
East. As President, he reiterated this position many times. RTS, ‘Nikolić: Srbija ka istoku i zapadu’, 6 April
2012, http://www.rts.rs/page/stories/sr/story/1950/Izbori+2012/1078006/Nikoli per centC4 per cent87 per
cent3A+Srbija+ka+istoku+i+zapadu.html, (accessed 1 December 2013). In conversations with then Opposition
politician Tomislav Nikolić and his colleagues during the election campaign, it was mentioned that Serbia’s
would first need to establish high-level dialogue with Kosovo before it could move closer towards the EU. This
was the official policy of SNS. Interview with an opposition politician Tomislav Nikolić, Belgrade, April 2012.
In previous fieldwork discussions with Nikolić, in January 2010, he had mentioned that the only way to improve
relations with the EU was for Serbia to adopt a more constructive approach to the Kosovo issue. Interview with
Opposition politician Tomislav Nikolić, Belgrade, January 2010.
251 J.V.A. Fine, The late Medieval Balkans: a critical survey from the late twelfth century to the Ottoman
conquest, Michigan, Michigan University Press, 2009, pp. 116–117. John Fine also observes that Serbia’s
religious independence initiated a close relationship between Church clerics and state affairs, a link that was
externally criticised and its significance grossly exaggerated during the conflict in the Balkans in the 1990s. The
Church’s role in state affairs increased after 2000. It has a high profile in negative campaigning against Serbia’s
EU accession, which it links to issues such as the rights of sexual minorities that most Orthodox Churches
oppose on moral grounds.
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brother, St Sava, who was Serbia’s leading negotiator with great powers.252 In 1221, St Sava
said to his peer:
The Orient thought that we are Occident, and Occident that we are Orient. Some of us
conceived wrongly our place in this struggle of influences, shouting: we are not one or
the other side, and others [claiming] that we are only one or the other! And we are, as I
say to you Irinej, conditioned by destiny to be Orient in the Occident and Occident in
the Orient.253
Two years earlier, in 1219, St Sava authored the oldest known constitution of Serbia,
commonly known as the Nomocanon (in Serbian, Savino zakonopravilo). This legal document
enabled Serbia to seek religious and political independence from the Byzantine Emperor and
the Patriarch of Constantinople by combining legal tenets from Roman (Western) and
Byzantine (Eastern) medieval legal traditions.254 Furthermore, King Stefan had previously
received a crown from the Roman Catholic Church in 1217, thereby establishing closer bonds
with Rome which was a major source of political and religious power emanating from the West.
By actively developing closer relations with both Rome and Constantinople, medieval Serbian
leaders managed to secure in the 13th century their religious and political independence from
two major centres of Christianity and power in Europe. The success of St Sava’s diplomatic
mission was probably in part responsible for the popularity of St Sava’s cult in Serbia’s
collective memory, especially during the Ottoman rule over Serbia that lasted for more than
252 Former prince Rastko Nemanjić, with the monastic name of Sava, was Serbia’s first Archbishop and founder
of the autocephalous Serbian Church.
253 G. Vilotić, ‘Reč na otvaranju izložbe’, Philosophical Faculty of the University of Novi Sad, 2007, freely
translated by the author, http://www.ff.uns.ac.rs/biblioteka/upoznaj_jednu_knjigu/karejskitipik/pozrec.htm,
(accessed 12 January 2013).
254 St Sava’s Nomocanon and its relevance to the notion of independence for the Serbian people can be observed
in its re-invocation in 1804 during Serbia’s First Uprising (Prvi Srpski Ustanak) against Ottoman rule, during
which it was temporarily introduced as legal code. P. Zorić, ‘The Nomocanon of St. Sava and legal transplants’,
Belgrade, Alan Watson Foundation, University of Belgrade School of Law, 2008, p. 6.
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four centuries.255 St Sava represented a reference point for various Serbian independence
movements during the Ottoman imperial rule in the Balkans, prompting the Ottomans to burn
his relics in 1594 as a punishment for defiance by the Serbs.256
Frequent re-invocations of St Sava’s legacy in contemporary Serbian discourses can be
observed among the conservative political parties in Serbia, as well as among those who oppose
Serbia’s European integration (‘EU sceptics’). Former Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav
Koštunica, who founded the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) as an opposition party to the
Milošević regime, invoked St Sava’s legacy in his book Why Serbia and not the European
Union, to justify his position on why Serbia should not join the EU and NATO. Koštunica
observed that the Serbian Orthodox Church was ‘the first, the oldest and always-present’
institution among the Serbian people, established by ‘a regent and his son’ (Dušan and Stefan
of the Nemanjić dynasty), adding:
There are those who believe that the year of Serbia’s entry into the EU and NATO
should be our Year Zero and that from that year on that we should calculate a time when
a ‘new [pro-European] Serbia’ was created. In this ‘calendar’, there would be no place
for the Serbian Orthodox Church.257
Ahead of the parliamentary elections in 2014, Koštunica linked Serbia’s European integration
to its loss of cultural and religious traditions, even language and the Cyrillic alphabet—which
255 Collective memory was distinct from personal memory, as it represented dominant discourses promulgated
by dominant elites in Serbian society that aimed to alter personal or group memories.
256 Following Serbia’s de facto independence from the Ottoman Empire when the former had become an
autonomous principality in 1829, features of the Nomocanon were incorporated into Serbia’s civil code of 1844.
This shows the historical continuity of the relevance of St Sava’s legacy into modern Serbian history. ibid.
257 V. Koštunica, Zašto Srbija a ne Evropska Unija, Belgrade, Fond Slobodan Jovanović, 2012, p. 41; the quote
is a free translation by the author of this thesis.
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is part of Serbia’s traditionalist or conservative understanding of national identity.258However,
Koštunica’s anti-EU position did not seem to resonate with the majority of Serbian voters, as
the DSS and the SRS—which is also anti-EU oriented—could not obtain any parliamentary
seats in the 2014 Serbian national parliamentary elections.259
The prominent Balkan historian, Stevan K. Pavlowitch, has observed that modern Serbian
nationalism was born out of opposition to foreign rule in the Balkans during the 19th century,
the Ottoman Empire in the South-East, and the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the North-West.260
Serbian political leaders would also strategically allude to St Sava’s mission in order to secure
popular support for revolts in seeking independence from foreign rule. Serbia’s East/West
balancing act led occasionally to major political crises, such as in 1903, when pro-Austrian
Serbian King Aleksandar Obrenović was massacred alongside his locally unpopular wife,
Queen Draga, by pro-Russian Serbian army officers in a military coup.261 Following the
transfer of royal power to the rival House of Karađorđević dynasty, Serbian foreign policy
changed from being pro-Austrian towards being Russophile.262 In response, many Western
European governments severed diplomatic relations with Serbia, accusing the new Serbian
leaders of barbarism.263 Therefore, the themes of East/West balancing which have existed for
258 Such an attitude is typical of many anti-EU or EU-sceptic parties within the EU as well, such as the French
Front National the Freedom Party of, Austria, the People’s Party of Denmark, Italy’s Lega Nord, the Greek Laos
Party, the Belgian Vlaams Belan, Bulgaria’s Ataka and the British National Party.
259 The author of this thesis would like to thank Dr. Robert F. Miller for making this observation in a telephone
conversation on 8 July 2014.
260 S.K. Pavlowitch, ‘Serbia, Montenegro and Yugoslavia’, in D. Đokić (ed.), Yugoslavism: histories of a failed
idea 1918–1992, London, Hurst & Company, 2003, p. 57.
261 A useful description of King Aleksandar Obrenović’s rule and assassination is provided by D.D. Milivojević,
The Serbian foreign policy between 1900 and 1908, unpublished thesis, The University of British Columbia
1959, pp. 33–61, https://circle.ubc.ca/bitstream/id/148978/UBC_1959_A8 per cent20M4 per cent20S3.pdf,
(accessed 1 November 2013).
262 Scholar Ernest Petrić observed that the interaction between domestic and foreign policy fields ‘is in practice
a continuous and bi-directional process of mutual influence. Changes in foreign policy as a result of internal
political change are sometimes far-reaching and rapid’, as was the case after Milošević’s overthrow in October
2000 which resulted in a ‘sudden and significant shift in Serbian foreign policy’. E. Petrić, Foreign Policy: from
conception to diplomatic practice, Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, 2013, p. 113.
263 Most West European countries, including Great Britain but not Austria, cut off diplomatic relations with
Serbia and regarded the regicide with repugnance. W.S. Vucinich, Serbia between East and West, 1954, p. 68.
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a long time in Serbia’s political history, predate Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, the two freedoms
idea obtained a new meaning during the Cold War.
Attachment to history in post-communist Europe
Turbulent historical events of the 20th century deeply affected the ways in which history was
viewed and talked about in Eastern European countries. Armed conflicts, especially the two
world wars, claimed millions of lives and inflicted huge material losses. This reinforced the
importance of historical memory for people in Eastern Europe and the Balkans, who continue
to exhibit very passionate views about history.264 In this thesis, the term ‘Eastern Europe’ refers
to the socialist countries in Central-East and South-East Europe that were an integral part of
the Soviet sphere of influence during the Cold War, therefore excluding Yugoslavia.265
The distinguished Marxist historian Eric Hobsbawm called the period in European history
between the outbreak of the First World War and the end of the Cold War ‘the age of
extremes’.266 Inter-state wars and civil discontent relating to the formation of new states
Similarly, after the assassination of Serbia’s democratic and pro-accession Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić in
2003, Serbian foreign policy gradually turned away from the EU under Vojislav Koštunica.
264 See, for example, T.D. Snyder, Bloodlands: Europe between Hitler and Stalin, Bodley Head, Basic Books,
2010, p. vii. The EU’s emphasis on shared European history and the elimination of stereotypes of traditional
allies and enemies has thus far assisted in the gradual alteration of nation-specific perspectives regarding major
wars during 20th century Europe. The construction of European identity, which is not the subject of this thesis, is
linked as a process to the creation of new narratives of peace and historical reconciliation, which is exactly how
the European integration began after the Second World War. This is precisely what the Serbian traditionalists
are resisting, the creation of new narratives, which they dismiss as the ‘foreign, ‘Western’ and ‘undesirable’.
These traditionalist views tend to be in minority. In April 2014, the results of a survey conducted in Serbia
showed that only 11 per cent of all interviewees (out of a total number of 1,216 interviewees) did not see
Serbia’s ‘approximation to the West’ as a positive thing. Ninamedia Research, ‘Život u Srbiji–izazovi i
mogućnosti’, Atlantic Council Serbia, 17 April 2014, p. 5,
http://www.atlanticcouncil.rs/attachments/article/176/Zapadne%20vrednosti%20u%20Srbiji%20-
%20istra++ivanje%20javnog%20mnjenja%20%5Brezultati%5D.pdf, (accessed 3 May 2014).
265 A political construct in the term ‘Eastern Europe’, which continues to be used in some academic cirlces and
the media, can have pejorative connotations to emphasise a lower level of economic development in the CEES
in comparison with the rest of the EU.
266 E.J. Hobsbawm, Age of extremes: the short twentieth century, 1914–1991, London, Michael Joseph, 1994.
For the Balkan Peninsula, the age of extreme ideologies lasted until Serbia’s change of leadership in October
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affected the balance of power in the Balkans. It was in this geographical space that two large
European land empires (Habsburg and Ottoman) had collided with indigenous ambitions for
national self-determination, drawing imperial Russia and Britain into the conflict.267 The
removal from the Balkans of foreign imperial rule by the Habsburg and the Ottomans after the
First World War allowed for the creation of a first country where southern Slavs (Slovenes,
Croats and Serbs, Slav Macedonians and Montenegrins) lived together in a pan-Slavic state.
While, as Hobsbawm remarked, Western academics tend to be ignorant of the important
historical background to the key political events of the 20th century, especially in Eastern
Europe, scholars from formerly socialist countries tend, on the contrary, to carry ‘too much
memory’ when dealing with their nations’ past.268
East, West and Balkans: historical perceptions as social constructs
A distinction between ‘an abstract East’ and West, which ‘juxtaposes societies that coexisted
but were opposed for political, religious or cultural reasons’, can be traced back to antiquity.269
Ancient Greeks regarded, on the one hand, peoples living to their East (especially Persians)
and those living on the Balkan Peninsula as violent and anti-democratic. In the ancient Greek
city-state of Athens, democracy as a system of ‘rule by the people’ was introduced by the
Athenian leader Cleisthenes in 507 B.C.; it was a domain reserved for political deliberation by
2000. This was the last state in Southeast Europe to overthrow an authoritarian government, and commit itself to
democratic transformation.
267 Balkan is associated with a Turkish expression meaning ‘wooded mountain range’. Tom Gallagher has
observed that the topology of this area made foreign invasion relatively easy while the mountain ranges
separated different peoples. This contributed to the fragmentation of political power, including for communities
of the same linguistic or religious origins (such as Serbs and Montenegrins). T. Gallagher, ‘To be or not to be
Balkan? Romania’s quest for self-definition’, in S.R. Graubard (ed), New Europe for the old? New Jersey,
Transaction Publishers, 1999, p. 64.
268 Hobsbawm, Age of extremes, 1994, op. cit., p. 3.
269 M. Todorova, Imagining the Balkans, New York, Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 11; 13–15. During the
Middle Ages ‘religious’ was frequently associated with ‘political’, as notable members of religious hierarchy
also held positions of power and decision-making in political affairs.
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free, native and adult men (therefore, excluding slaves, foreigners and women).270 The southern
lands of the Balkan Peninsula where ancient Greeks lived were portrayed in their literary
works, on the other hand, as an anchor of Western cultural civilisation, democracy, and as a
legitimate source of knowledge about the outside world.271 Images of the Balkans as a violent
place, and of peoples from the Balkans as having ‘barbaric’ or conflict-prone nature thus have
ancient roots in the literary works of their neighbours. These negative images of the Balkans
have been reproduced in the early 20th century, for instance, in German literarary texts.272
For many centuries, the differences between ‘East’ and ‘West’ were not only political but also
religious. Religious leaders in Rome believed that Eastern lands, which were geographically
and ‘culturally’ remote and situated in Egypt and Anatolia, were associated with the Christian
Orthodoxy and the Byzantine Empire; and that the Catholic countries were the core political
and religious centre of power in international relations.273However, as scholar Maria Todorova
observed, the Byzantine Empire was, after the fall of Western Roman Empire, the main
reference point for Christianity for several centuries.274 The Byzantine Empire, ironically,
regarded the European lands to its West to be an area of barbarity and crudeness.275 Historical
variations in the meanings of ‘East’ and ‘West’ demonstrate that these terms have been
politically and socially constructed and reproduced in various forms throughout European
history. This can be also said for Serbia, which was regarded among Western European
270 ‘Ancient Greek democracy’, History.com, 2010, http://www.history.com/topics/ancient-history/ancient-
greece-democracy, (accessed 9 May 2014).
271 See, for example, ancient texts on the Persian wars by Herodotus that were written entirely from the Hellenic
perspective. For further reading, see T.J. Dunbabin, Greeks and their eastern neighbours, London, Society for
the Promotion of Hellenic Studies, 1957.
272 For a useful demonstration of this point, see a study of cartoons on Serbia and the Balkans which were
originally published in different German-language newspapers from 1903 to 1918, M. Ristović, Crni Petar i
balkanski razbojnici: Balkan i Srbija u nemačkim satiričnim časopisima (1903–1918), 2nd edn, Belgrade,
Čigoja, 2011.




political elites as a part of ‘Turkey-in-Europe’ for more than four hundred years —which was
a term used for territories under the Ottoman rule in Southeast Europe.276 Since the Ottoman
Empire and Catholic countries had a long history of conflict on European soil, Serbia, as an
administrative unit within the Ottoman Empire, was also regarded in negative light. Serbia was
described as a culturally backward and traditional or Oriental place by infrequent Western
travellers due to its shared political history with the Ottoman Empire.277 The Balkan region,
including Serbia, was regarded by many Western Europeans as Near East, rather than as
European.278 The lower level of industrialisation in the Balkans is sometimes also invoked to
demonstrate how backward this region has been in comparison with the more industrialised
West.
In a broader sense, the terms ‘East’ and ‘West’ can also refer to the dichotomy between Islam
(regarded as an Eastern religion) and Christianity (regarded by Romans as a ‘Western’
religion). In the age of colonialism, especially in the 19th century (being the period of vastest
European colonial expansion) the Orient was associated with European colonies in Asia, while
the Occident was associated with the racial superiority and cultural dominance of Western
European civilisation. This worldview in particular was criticised by the Marxists and others
as Eurocentric in nature, and as a justification by Western European colonial countries in their
search for overseas markets to ‘exploit’.279 Some scholars today use a similar line of argument
regarding Eastern enlargement of the EU. In their view, the EU’s expansion to the East
276 M. Glenny, The Balkans: nationalism, war and the great powers, 1804–1999, New York, Viking, 1999, p.
xxiii. Glenny also observes that the term ‘Balkan Peninsula’ was coined by the German geographer, Johann
August Zeune, in 1808. ibid., p. xxii.
277 N. Berber, Unveiling Bosnia-Herzegovina in British travel literature, Pisa, Pisa University Press, 2010.
278 For medieval images of the Balkans and Serbia, see W. Miller, Travels and politics in the Near East,
London, T. F. Unwin, 1898, p. 141. G. M. Mackenzie, Travels in the Slavonic Province of Turkey-in-Europe,
vol. 2, London, Daldy, Isbister & Company, 1877, pp. 15, 24. B. Jezernik, Wild Europe: the Balkans in the gaze
of Western travellers, London, Saqi, 2004. R.D. Kaplan, Balkan ghosts: a journey through history, New York,
St. Martin’s, 1993.
279 M. Todorova, Imagining the Balkans, 2009, op. cit., pp. 15–16.
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produced even more inequality between ‘old’ (EU-15) and ‘new’ EU members, resulting in
various kinds of ‘exploitation’ of the CEES and their citizens as providers of cheap labour for
Western European companies.280
Researcher Maria Tetovska has found that negative images of the Balkans were portrayed in
the missionary anthropological texts from the 18th and 19th century.281 Those literary works
characterised the Balkans as an ‘inferior’ cultural and political space, in part ‘on the basis of
its Eastern Orthodoxy from the angle of the Western, particularly Protestant, branch of the
church’.282 Eastern Orthodoxy was in those texts presented as ‘primitive, infantile, at an early
stage of civilisation’, which was juxtaposed with the ‘sophisticated, rational, advanced
West’.283 People of the Balkans were judged as ‘backward, deficient and static’ on the basis of
their religion, even though their religious sentiment played a key role in the wars for
independence during the 19th century.284 Similar views of the Balkans were expressed in the
German press in the early 20th century, which demonstrates a historical continuity of political
perceptions of that region, including of Serbia.285 These are precisely the kind of arguments,
stereotypes and ideational constructs that opponents in the EU to Serbia’s membership employ
when arguing against Serbia’s deeper European integration on normative grounds.
280 A.M. Cirtautas, ‘The European Union’s Eastern enlargement: state-building or empire-building?’, Wilson
Center, transcript of a presentation, 6 November 2002, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/265-the-
european-unions-eastern-enlargement-state-building-or-empire-building, (accessed 12 November 2013). S.
Engel-Di Mauro, ‘Capitalist expansionism, imperialism, and the European Union’, State of Nature, Winter
2006, http://www.stateofnature.org/?p=5384#sthash.wbqAz2SH.dpuf, (accessed 12 November 2013). For an
opposing view, see K. Barysch, ‘East versus West? The European economic and social model after
enlargement’, Progressive Politics, vol. 4, no. 3, January 2006, pp. 6–13.
281 M. Tetovska, Fitting the Balkans: the image of the Balkans in American culture in the long 19th century,
unpublished PhD thesis, Temple University, 2006, p. xx.
282 ibid., p. xxxii.
283 ibid., p. 55.
284 ibid., p. 59–60.
285 Ristović, Crni Petar i balkanski razbojnici, 2011, op. cit., pp. 65–66.
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As Yugoslavia was disintegrating in the early 1990s, negative images of Serbia and the Balkans
resurfaced, and the term ‘balkanization’ was revived to describe the political fragmentation of
a territorial unit into smaller units that are hostile towards each other.286 After the First World
War, the ‘East’ was, in the European context, associated with Russia, and during the Cold
War—with the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence. The term ‘West’ during the Cold War
primarily referred to the US-led military alliance, NATO. After the Cold War, the ‘East’ was
associated with the former Soviet bloc countries, while the ‘West’ generally referred to the
Western liberal democracies.287 As political constructs, these terms are still present in the
academic literature, although EU politics today is much more complex than during the Cold
War, in part due to the Eastern enlargement.
A Balkan expert, Misha Glenny, accurately observed that Western reflections on the Balkans
since the latter half of the 19th century have generally failed to consider the impact of the West
on the region; experts are often too quick to attribute ‘an essentialist interpretation’ of the
Balkans as a place of ‘ancient hatreds’ between various ethnic groups who have lived there for
centuries.288 However, as Glenny suggests, the influence of great powers on the Balkans has
contributed substantially to the history of this region being torn between different centres of
power.289Membership of the EU represents today a dividing line between the Balkan countries.
By belonging to the EU some Balkan states, as EU members, gain opportunities that allow
them to pursue a deeper integration with the EU by directly participating in EU policy-making.
286 S.G. Meštrović, The Balkanization of the West: the confluence of Postmodernism and Postcommunism,
London, Routledge, 1994, p. viii. The term ‘balkanization’ has been applied since the Balkan conflict to other
regions, especially the Middle East. M. Silverberg, ‘Op-Ed: the Balkanization of Syria’, Arutz Sheva, 28
October 2013, http://www.israelnationalnews.com/Articles/Article.aspx/14024#.U6qcRfmSyUU, (accessed 12
December 2013).
287 For a discussion about perceptions of east-west divide in the EU, see V. Pop, ‘EU's east-west divide shifts on
US and Russia’, EU Observer, 9 September 2009, http://euobserver.com/foreign/28636, (accessed 14 May
2013).
288 Glenny, The Balkans, 1999, op. cit., p. xxiv.
289 ibid., p. xxv.
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These opportunities, notably mobility of goods, people and capital, are not available to non-
EU members in the Balkans, which are linked to the EU through a pre-accession process. Only
by including the entire Balkan region into the EU would this dividing line be erased, but for
that to occur, the promise of EU membership to the remaining states in the Balkans would need
to be substantiated with more EU involvement.
Defining Yugoslavia and its relationship with the West
The following quote summarises how many observers saw Yugoslavia:
During its whole existence, Yugoslavia was a respected country, which had diplomatic
relations with almost all states of the world. Rarely feared by its neighbours, it was
often busily engaged in promoting reconciliation in the Balkans and, relative to its
moderate size and modest economic resources, was a beneficent, constructive factor in
European politics.290
The term ‘Yugoslavia’ literally means ‘the land of the South Slavs’, jug meaning south in
several South Slavic languages.291 During the 20th century, there were three states named
Yugoslavia: royal, interwar Yugoslavia (1918–1941), which was officially called the Kingdom
of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes until 1929; post-war or socialist Yugoslavia (1945–1991), which
had two official names after 1945, and a ‘rump Yugoslavia’ or the third Yugoslavia (FRY),
which was effectively composed of Serbia and Montenegro.292 The creation of the first
290 A. Đilas, ‘Funeral Oration for Yugoslavia’, in D. Đokić (ed.), Yugoslavism, 2003, op. cit., p. 325.
291 For a useful explanation about the Yugoslav idea and its key proponents before 1918, see D. Rusinow, ‘The
Yugoslav idea before Yugoslavia’, in D. Đokić (ed.), Yugoslavism, 2003, op. cit., pp. 11–26.
292 Between 1945 and 1963, the state was known as the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia, under its
Constitution of 1946. In 1963, the country’s name was officially changed to the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia. The third Yugoslavia (1992–2002) became known as the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro
(2003–2006), which ceased to exist in June 2006, after Montenegrins voted for independence in a referendum.
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Yugoslavia had evolved out of a political idea in the 19th century. Habsburg and Balkan
historian Dennison Rusinow has noted that the idea of Yugoslavia was ‘a century-old aspiration
which held that the South Slav peoples should be united in one state’.293 The Yugoslav idea
was ‘among the integrating national ideas that marked Europe’s 19th century’, which emerged
at the same time as other European nations (Italy, Germany) were being constructed through
political integration of previously autonomous territorial units. In intellectual circles,
Yugoslavism was understood ‘as an attempt to create a united South Slav state that would rest
on two pillars, freedom and equality’.294 Here again one can discern the re-emergence of the
freedom idea, to which many groups in the Balkans commonly aspired.
Political sociologist Connie Robinson observed that, as a discourse, Yugoslavism had ‘framed
political action and cultural initiatives for much of the 19th century and early 20th century’ for
South Slavs.295 Yugoslavism as a normative construct came to prominence with the Illyrian
movement led by the Croatian linguist, Ljudevit Gaj in the Habsburg Monarchy in the 1830s.
Gaj and his supporters demanded political autonomy for the South Slavs from the Habsburgs,
either through unification with Serbia or by following an independent path.296 Influential
religious leaders, such as Croat Bishop Josip Juraj Strossmayer and Canon Franjo Rački,
supported Yugoslavism. They encouraged the creation of various cultural institutions (such as
the Yugoslav Academy at Zagreb), which advocated the cultural and spiritual unification of
South Slavic peoples, including linguistic unity, within a ‘federalised Habsburg Empire’.297
The Yugoslav parliamentary group in the Austrian Parliament, called the Yugoslav Club, was
293 D. Rusinow, The Yugoslav experiment, op. cit., p. xiii.
294 Lj. Trgovčević, ‘South Slav intellectuals and the creation of Yugoslavia’, pp. 222–237, in Dejan Đokić (ed.),
Yugoslavism, 2003, op. cit., p. 236.
295 C. Robinson, ‘Yugoslavism in the early 20th century: the politics of the Yugoslav Committee’, in New
Perspectives on Yugoslavia: key issues and controversies, Dejan Đokić and James Ker-Lindsay (eds), London,
Routledge, 2011, p. 10.
296 Serbia formally became an autonomous principality within the Ottoman Empire in 1830.
297 I. Banac, The national question in Yugoslavia: origins, history, politics, New York, Cornell University Press,
1984, pp. 89–90.
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also active in raising awareness of this aspiration by the Habsburgs, who saw in Serbia a source
of threat.298 The Austro-Hungarian Empire formally annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina in October
1908, triggering resentment among the local peoples especially Serbs.299 Yugoslavism was a
narrative that conflicted with particularist ethno-nationalist discourses, which maintained that
different South Slavic groups (Slovenes, Serbs and Croats) should be in separate states based
on their ethnicity.300
The first or Royalist Yugoslavia came into existence as the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and
Slovenes upon its proclamation in Belgrade on 1 December 1918 by mutual agreement of key
political leaders of these three dominant ethnic groups.301 It was created through the
‘amalgamation of the previously independent kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro with
sizeable fragments of the former Habsburg, Ottoman and Venetian empires’.302 Petar I
Karađorđević was its head of state until 1921 when his son, Aleksandar I, took the throne. The
country changed its name to Yugoslavia in 1929 to symbolise the national unity of its
constituent nations, and its centralised government. In 1929, therefore, the idea of Yugoslavism
became an official name for a multi-national state in the Balkans that was united under the
Serbian leadership, which some ethnic groups increasingly saw as being hegemonic. Since the
first Yugoslavia’s creation, there was always a conflict between the ‘nationalist and
298 This group was composed of ‘23 Slovenes, 12 Croats and 2 Serbs’, under the chairmanship of the Slovenian
cleric Anton Korosec. K.St. Pavlowitch, ‘The First World War and the unification of Yugoslavia’, in D. Đokić
(ed.), Yugoslavism, 2003, op. cit., p. 32, footnote 6.
299 The First World War was triggered when a 17-year old Bosnian Serb, Gavrilo Princip, executed a murder
plot (with other members of the underground Black Hand organisation) to kill the Archduke Franz Ferdinand of
Austria. For an overview of different historical interpretations regarding the origins of the First World War, see
I.M. Massey, ‘The Diplomatic origins of the First World War’, Royal Institute of International Affairs, vol. 25,
no. 2, 1949, pp. 182–191. A lot of reviews of the causes of the First World War have appeared recently. See, for
instance, M. MacMillan, The War that ended peace: the road to 1914, New York, Random House, 2013.
300 The key obstacle to the ethno-particularist notion of state building was the ethnic plurality of the Western
Balkans.  Ethno-particularist ideas are also known as ‘Greater Serbia’ and ‘Greater Croatia’ paradigms that
surfaced in the context of civil wars that replaced Yugoslavism as the dominant idea of political organisation in
Yugoslavia by the early 1990s.
301 Royalist Yugoslavia was ethnically mixed, and included, apart from South Slavs, Albanians, Hungarians,
Jews, Russians, Germans, and other ethnic and religious groups.
302 Kosta St. Pavlowitch, op. cit.
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integrationalist’ political elements.303 Political movements that were advancing anti-Yugoslav
ideas became active at home and abroad, challenging the newly created unitary state.
Pawlowitch comments that the ‘Yugoslavicizing’ policies of Aleksandar I were perceived by
many Croats in particular as a ‘way of implementing the Serbian centralism, if not
hegemony’.304 These perceptions were, in part, responsible for the assassination of the
Yugoslav leader in 1934 by Croatian and Bulgarian nationalists during an official visit to
France.
The Yugoslav Government declared military and political neutrality as the Second World War
broke out in 1939. By 1941, royalist Yugoslavia was surrounded from all sides by the Axis
powers and Nazi-controlled puppet regimes: Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria to the north and
east; Austria in the west, and Albania under the control of Fascist Italy in the south. Under
intense pressure from Germany, the Cvetković–Maček Yugoslav Government signed the so-
called tripartite pact with the Axis powers in Vienna on 25 March 1941, which meant that
royalist Yugoslavia had effectively sided with the Nazis.305 Prince Pavle Karađorđević of
Yugoslavia, who apparently harboured territorial ambitions against Greece, possibly regarded
the pact as an opportunity to advance these ambitions, but he also misjudged public sentiment
in Serbia.306 The Tripartite pact divided the country along ethnic and political lines, with many
Croats supporting the Axis powers and many Serbs rejecting the pact.307 Large anti-German
303 R. Väyrynen, ‘Preventive action: failure in Yugoslavia’, in Michael Pugh (ed.), The UN, peace and force,
London, Frank Cass & Company Ltd., 1997, p. 30.
304 S.K. Pavlowitch, ‘Serbia, Montenegro and Yugoslavia’, 2003, op. cit., p. 63.
305 Vienna, as the former capital of the Habsburg Empire, has had a particularly negative image in the collective
memory for Serbs. The location of the signing ceremony with Nazi Germany had thus only reinforced the
negative feelings of the Serbs towards the Nazis and Germany as a country. Both Austria and Germany had been
Serbia’s major national enemies during the First World War.
306 E.L. Presseisen, ‘Prelude to “Barbarossa”: Germany and the Balkans, 1940–1941’, Journal of Modern
History, vol. 32, no. 4, December 1960, p. 364.
307 Mass demonstrations broke out in protest across Serbia with the celebrated slogan ‘Bolje rat nego pakt, Bolje
grob nego rob’, which meant that Serbs believed it was ‘better to be in a war than have the pact’ with the Nazis,
and that it was ‘better’ to die than live under a puppet regime. Thus the idea of national independence, once
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demonstrations erupted in Belgrade after the pact was signed. A group of pro-Western
Yugoslav military officers, which received some support from the British Government, staged
a successful coup d’état on 27 March 1941.308 They replaced the Yugoslav regent with a 17-
year old Petar II Karađorđević, who was proclaimed fit to govern despite being underage. Nazi
Germany’s leader, Adolf Hitler, regarded the Belgrade coup as a personal insult and an
unacceptable act of defiance, and pledged to destroy Yugoslavia as a national and territorial
unit.309
In response to the Belgrade coup and without issuing a formal declaration of war, the Axis
powers attacked Serbia on 6 April 1941 from several neighbouring countries. Under the
leadership of an Austrian commander, Alexander Lohr, a series of ‘carpet bombing’ attacks
commenced the campaign, which was followed by a ground invasion. Codenamed ‘Operation
Retribution’, this military operation targeted major strategic, military, political and cultural
establishments, including the Serbian National Library (1832–1941), destroying over 350,000
books and 500,000 unique manuscripts.310 The attacks in 1941, which came after the Axis
powers had already bombed Warsaw, Rotterdam and London, claimed many thousands of lives
in Yugoslavia and destroyed much of Yugoslavia’s pre-war institutions and infrastructure.311
The same day the Nazis attacked Yugoslavia and Greece, royalist Yugoslavia signed a treaty
again, resurfaced in Serbia’s political history as a legitimising force used by the elites (in this case, military and
political dissident leaders). Their actions caused a major reorientation of Serbia’s foreign policy.
308 D.A.T. Stafford, ‘SOE and British involvement in the Belgrade Coup d'État of March 1941’, Slavic Review,
vol. 36, no. 3, September 1977, p. 403.
309 V. Dedijer, ’Sur l'armistice germano-yougoslave’, Revue d'histoire de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale, vol. 6,
no. 23, July 1956, p. 3. The proponents of anti-EU discourses in Serbia today believe that by joining the EU,
Serbia would cease to exist both as a national and territorial unit.
310 B92, ‘Serbia marks anniversary of Nazi bombing of Belgrade’, 6 April 2011,
http://www.b92.net/eng/news/society.php?yyyy=2011&mm=04&dd=06&nav_id=73650, (accessed 7 December
2013).
311 J.R. Lampe, ‘The two Yugoslavias as economic unions’, in Dejan Đokić (ed.), Yugoslavism, 2003, op. cit., p.
189.
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of non-aggression and friendship with the Soviet Union.312 Royalist Yugoslavia capitulated on
17 April 1941, after which it was partitioned among the Axis states, which created pro-Nazi
puppet regimes on its former territory (Map 2, Appendix 2). In late April 1941, German-
occupied Serbia came under a military government, in response to which two resistance groups
sprung up with opposing resistance ideas, the monarchist loyalist Četnici (singular: ‘Četnik’)
and the communist-led Partizani. While the former, under Colonel Dragoljub “Draža”
Mihailović, sought to sabotage German military activities but avoided direct attacks as for
every Nazi killed, one hundred civilians would be executed in occupied territories. The
Partizani, under the leadership of Josip Broz Tito, called for a large uprising against the
Germans and ambushed their troops directly.313
In Serbia’s collective memory, the most notorious regime created by the Nazi dismemberment
of pre-war Yugoslavia was the puppet Nazi state of Croatia (Nezavisna Država Hrvatska,
NDH).314 The support of the British Government and other Allied nations (in particular,
Russia’s Red Army) was crucial to the Partisans’ success and the national liberation of the
formerly royalist Yugoslav lands in 1944–45.315 Tito emerged as a leading figure in the
Partisans’ anti-Axis resistance struggle, eventually securing vital British support for his combat
312 ‘Nazis bomb Belgrade’, The Straits Times, 6 April 1941, p. 1. Average estimates of civilian deaths in these
week-long attacks on Belgrade range from over 2,000 to 5,000. During the subsequent German occupation of
Belgrade, nearly 50,000 of its citizens died. The City of Belgrade, ‘The capital of Serbia and Yugoslavia’,
http://www.beograd.rs/cms/view.php?id=201259, (accessed 7 December 2013).
313 In the Serbian town of Kragujevac, over 5,000 school children, their teachers and other civilians were
executed as a punishment for Serbian resistance activities.
314 The NDH period is remembered for the extreme atrocities committed against the Serbs, Jews, Roma people
(gypsies) and political opponents of the puppet pro-Nazi Croatian regime. The four years of Axis occupation in
Yugoslavia and resultant civil war among the partisan guerrillas, Nazis and ethno-nationalist armed groups have
left a scar in the collective memories of all Balkan populations. Crimes committed by the Nazis and their
supporters were later cited as a justification by the communist authorities for the expulsion from Yugoslavia of
hundreds of thousands of Germans, Italian and Bulgarians. These justifications were made use of again when
the communists set about eliminating anti-communist opposition. This ethnic cleansing was a forbidden topic in
Titoist Yugoslavia. See J. Tomašević, The Chetniks: war and revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945, Chicago,
Stanford University Press, 1975. Z. Janjetović, ‘The disappearance of the Germans from Yugoslavia: expulsion
or emigration’, Society for Serbian-German Cooperation, 1991.
315 M.C. Wheeler, Britain and the war for Yugoslavia 1941–45, Columbia, Columbia University Press, 1980.
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units in late 1943.316 Britain previously supported the Četnici, who were anti-communist and
loyal to the young Serbian King who had fled to Britain after Germany invaded Yugoslavia
and Greece in April 1941. Historian Stephen A. Hart has estimated that out of approximately
1.7 million dead from royalist Yugoslavia, ‘one million were caused by Yugoslav killing
Yugoslav’.317
The Partisans’ appeals for unity among all ethnic groups who had lived in the first Yugoslavia
received wider social appeal than competing ethno-nationalist discourses, although they also
used coercion against their ideological opponents. After the war, the Yugoslav communists
exploited for their own political purposes their reputation of being a ‘national liberation
movement’ as a key element in socialist Yugoslavia’s state-building project. Carefully selected
war experiences and stories of partisan ‘heroism’ during the war were contrasted with
nationalist Četnik or Ustaše ‘betrayals’, which were frequently invoked by the communists to
justify the Yugoslav Government’s repressive actions.318 As political murders were amongst
many supressed topics in socialist Yugoslavia, an accurate estimate of Yugoslavia’s political
casualties may never be known.319
Some suggest that the creation of Yugoslavia, as an externally-supported project, was
constructed upon a distorted narrative of the Second World War, which hid the truth about the
316 In 1939, Tito became the Secretary-General of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia.
317 S.A. Hart, ‘Partisans: war in the Balkans 1941–1945’, British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), 17 February
2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/partisan_fighters_01.shtml, (accessed 14 May 2013).
318 The author of this thesis does not seek to equate Četnik and Ustaše groups, but to show that for the
communists, all nationalist alternatives were eroding the legitimacy of their state-building project.
319 New mass graves are frequently discovered on the territories of former Yugoslavia. See G. Gurrin, ‘Gassed
to death: 300 victims of Yugoslavia’s communist regime found in mass grave’, 11 March 2009, MailOnline,
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1160708/300-victims-Yugoslavias-communist-regime-mass-
grave.html, (accessed 10 January 2013).
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civilian victims in order to gather popular support for Yugoslavism.320 Rather than emphasising
a common European tragedy, this perspective is internally-focused. It reinvokes the memory
of heavy Serbian wartime losses and victimhood, which have a particularly strong emotive
resonance among Serbs. This topic might, at first glance, seem to be unrelated to Serbia’s
European integration. But the perspectives that emphasise victimhood and suffering by the
Serbs due to foreign occupation are also linked to the political resistance to the idea of Serbia
joining the EU. Boško Obradović, one of the leaders of the right-wing nationalist Dveri Srpske
political party, said that the first task of Serbs today should consist of an ‘intra-Serbian
integration’, advancing the idea that all Serbs should live in one state, including Serbs from
Kosovo and from the Serbian administered area in Bosnia-Herzegovina, known as Republika
Srpska.321 This perspective also emphasises Serbia’s traditional alliance with Russia, and
promotes a strong anti-NATO rhetoric.322
The Yugoslav League of Communists ultimately succeeded in building the second Yugoslavia
through a narrative of ‘Brotherhood and Unity’ (Bratstvo i jedinstvo), reinforced especially in
the early years by widespread and severe repression.323 This narrative differs from the principle
320 ‘Dušan Bastašić: Najveća bitka za očuvanje sjećanja o genocidu–vodi se protiv Srba’, 24 June 2011,
http://jadovno.com/en-lat-352/articles/dusan-bastasic-najveca-bitka-za-ocuvanje-sjecanja-o-genocidu-vodi-se-
protiv-srba-lat.html#.U6zWNvmSyUU, (accessed 10 January 2013).
321 B. Obradović, Srpski zavet: srpsko nacionalno pitanja danas, Srpski Sabor Dveri, 2nd edn, 2008, p. 15. This
political party calls itself ‘Movement for life of Serbia’, although it was registered as a political party before it
was to take part in Serbia’s parliamentary elections in 2012. Although Dveri Srpske did not gain parliamentary
representation at the national level, it is now represented in the Assembly of the Autonomous Province of
Vojvodina, and at the municipal level. Tanjug, ‘Dveri Movement submits list for March elections’, 12 February
2014, http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2014&mm=02&dd=12&nav_id=89308, (accessed 19
November 2013).
322 Tanjug, ‘Dveri: Novi saziv Skupštine Srbije je NATO parlament’, 17 March 2014,
http://www.rtv.rs/sr_lat/politika/dveri-novi-saziv-skupstine-srbije-je-nato-parlament_470674.html, (accessed 19
April 2014). N. Čabrić, ‘Serbia’s right-wingers dream of nationalist resurgence’, 20 May 2013,
http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/serbia-s-right-wingers-dream-of-nationalist-resurgence, (accessed 19
November 2013). It might be noted that Putin’s Russia is now advancing a very similar idea that all Russians
should have the right to be united in one state, by forceful actions if necessary.
323 Communist narratives were promoted through print material, radio, public speeches, and also through
commissioned films. For the spread of Yugoslavism as a new national narrative through movies, see P. Levi,
Disintegration in frames: aesthetics and ideology in the Yugoslav and post-Yugoslav cinema, Chicago, Stanford
University Press, 2007, p. 80.
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of pan-Slavism, which has been at various times promoted by the Russians.324 ‘Brotherhood
and Unity’ was officially sanctioned by the Partisans in November 1943 during the second
session of the Anti-Fascist Assembly of the National Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ).325 It
became the guiding principle of state-building in the second Yugoslavia. The Yalta conference
in 1945 confirmed AVNOJ’s place as a temporary Parliament for the second Yugoslavia, until
the new Yugoslav Constitution was enacted in 1946.326 As the Western European countries
were embarking on European integration by establishing their first supranational institution,
the European Coal and Steel Community in July 1952, Yugoslavia’s narrative of ‘Brotherhood
and Unity’ among South Slavs also had the integrationist focus. This is why some scholars
compare the EU’s integration project with Yugoslavia’s state-building.327 Eurosceptics,
including in Serbia, often draw parallels between Yugoslavia and the EU when discussing
obstacles to the EU’s integration project in the times of economic recession.328
The one-sided reporting of complex events that occurred during the Second World War in the
Balkans is evident in the pro-communist reporting in the official newspaper Borba, as well as
Serbia’s oldest newspaper Politika, which the author of this thesis examined at the Historical
Archives of Belgrade, in June 2012. These newspapers, for example, featured on the front
pages the names of prominent local ‘enemies of the state’ who had been executed. These
324 Pan-Slavism is linked to the idea of political unity among all Slavic peoples (rather than South Slavs only).
325 This AVNOJ session included non-communists as well as partisans under Tito, who were a key resistance
group during the Second World War operating on the territories of the first Yugoslavia. AVNOJ was declared to
be the legislative authority for the liberated territories, especially after Tito’s Partisans received support from the
Allied powers (US, UK, and USSR) in December 1943.
326 The Yalta Conference, February 1945, The Avalon project, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/yalta.asp,
(accessed 10 January 2013).
327 See, for example, E. Hadas, ‘EU has to choose its model: Italy or Yugoslavia’, Reuters, 28 May 2010,
http://blogs.reuters.com/breakingviews/2010/05/28/eu-has-to-choose-its-model-italy-or-yugoslavia/, (accessed
12 November 2013).
328 M. Ehl, ‘The EU will end up like Yugoslavia, and other Slovenian reflections’, Transitions Online, 2 July
2013, http://www.tol.org/client/article/23845-the-eu-will-end-up-like-yugoslavia-and-other-slovenian-
reflections.html, (accessed 12 November 2013). See also M. Pantelić, ‘Will the EU end up like Yugoslavia’,
VoxEurop, 5 January 2012, http://www.voxeurop.eu/en/content/article/1359201-will-eu-end-yugoslavia,
(accessed 12 November 2013).
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included priests, academics, artists and whoever else was accused of being anti-communist.
One article from the daily Borba in April 1945 attempted to draw differences between the first
and second Yugoslavia:
The main differences in foreign policy between old and new Yugoslavia lies in the fact
that in royalist Yugoslavia there was a gap between foreign policy action and popular
demands; now [in socialist Yugoslavia] there is an absolute national agreement with
the foreign policy activities of the Yugoslav national government. The key aim of
Yugoslavs in the foreign policy domain is: close friendship with all people who are
fighting with us to eliminate fascism and are ready to respect the democratic and
national rights of Yugoslavs; above all, [we aim towards] brotherly relations with all
Slavs, with the big and powerful USSR.329
One can discern from this quote the influence of Soviet-style pan-Slavism and the USSR in
general on the Yugoslav Government. This rhetoric profoundly changed and moved more
towards Yugoslavism after Tito’s parting with Stalin’s policies in 1948, which will be
discussed in the next section. The Yugoslav communists linked Yugoslavia’s state-building
with their anti-fascist struggle in public statements, thereby claiming a greater degree of
popular legitimacy from the first Yugoslavia. 330 Despite the fact that Yugoslavia received
significant Western aid for war-recovery efforts, for ideological reasons it presented itself as
Moscow’s closest ally in 1945, as the excerpt above suggests. This is why a political conflict
between the two communist leaders, Stalin and Tito, certainly caught many scholars by surprise
three years later, when Yugoslavia was expelled from the Soviet bloc in June 1948 due to a
329 B. Ziherl, ‘Dve spoljne politike’, Borba, Komunist, vol. 10, no. 93, , 16 April 1945, p. 2. This newspaper was
accessed in the Historical Archives of Belgrade during the author’s fieldwork in April/May 2012.
330 J.B. Allcock, Explaining Yugoslavia, London, C. Hurst & Co. Publishers, 2000, p. 3.
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falling-out with the USSR. This paved the way for Yugoslavia’s ‘alternative’ foreign policy in
the global balance of power, which it saw as being split between two main spheres of influence:
the US-led Western bloc, and the USSR-led Eastern bloc (‘the Soviet bloc’).331 Understanding
this position is essential in order to obtain a deeper insight into elite-level sectors of Serbian
society which still advocate Serbia’s independence from global centres of power.
Yugoslavia’s unique foreign policy in divided Europe
The uniqueness of Yugoslavia’s foreign policy in divided Europe was based on the principle
of its neutrality in international relations and political independence from the two superpowers,
the Soviet Union and the US. This was particularly manifested by Yugoslavia’s split with the
Soviet bloc, and the Yugoslavia-West Germany tensions of 1957–1968, which prevented
Yugoslavia from developing closer relations with the EU. The principles of neutrality and
independence were demonstrated by Yugoslavia’s key role in founding the NAM. The
Yugoslav Government also supported pro-independence movements in the Third World
against the interests of West European countries. Yugoslavia also had a unique role as a labour
exporter to Western Europe, which differentiated it from other CEES. These issues will be
examined further in the next several sections.
331 Members of the Soviet bloc were also members of the Warsaw Pact, which included apart from the Soviet
Union, Albania (which withdrew in 1968), the German Democratic Republic (which withdrew in 1990),
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. In the end after decades of armed confrontation, the
Warsaw Pact’s only military operation in Europe was the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, in which Albania
and Romania did not participate. The Warsaw Pact formally ceased to exist in 1991 after democratic changes
swept Eastern Europe, resulting in regime changes in the CEES which turned towards the EU and away from
Moscow.
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Tito’s break with Stalin in 1948
After the initial period of national consolidation, Yugoslavia became more independent from
Moscow’s influence following the celebrated Yugoslav-Soviet split in June 1948 when
Yugoslavia was expelled from the Cominform in Bucharest, which for Yugoslavia raised the
fear of a foreign invasion. Stalin perceived Tito’s self-confidence and growing popularity after
the Second World War as ‘an affront to his authority and an obstacle to his policy towards the
West’, in part because of Tito’s support for a large Balkan federation of states that could have
included Albania, Bulgaria and parts of Greece.332 Tito’s variant of socialism with workers’
self-management principles was seen as divisive not only in other socialist countries but in
communist parties in Western Europe, such as in the UK, causing factional splits.333
Following Yugoslavia’s political split with the Soviet bloc in 1948, Yugoslavia began to
oppose the USSR’s policy in the Balkans.334 The Soviets’ hostile position increased
Yugoslavia’s economic isolation whilst contributing to the worsening of Yugoslavia’s regional
relationships, especially with Albania.335 This ran contrary to the British Government’s policy
that extended support to the Greek Government. It also ran contrary to the Soviet Union’s
wishes, which had rejected the Yugoslav idea of uniting South Slavs (including Bulgarians)
332 W. Smaldone, European Socialism: a concise history with documents, United States, Rowman & Littlefield
Publishers, 2013, p. 227.
333 Only the Communist Party of Australia openly supported Tito’s leadership of the Communist Party of
Yugoslavia (CPY) amongst all Western communist parties. M.B. Brown, Yugoslavia, the lost country: from Tito
to Milošević, London, Merlin Press, 2005, p. 90. A same observation was made by P. Deery and N. Redfern,
‘No lasting peace? Labor, Communism and the Cominform: Australia and Great Britain, 1945–50’, Labour
History, no. 88, May, 2005, pp. 63–86.
334 Furthermore, according to the so-called Percentages Agreement, Churchill and Stalin nominally agreed in
October 1944 to divide Eastern Europe into spheres of influence, with Yugoslavia being divided in half. A.
Resis, ‘The Churchill-Stalin Secret “Percentages” Agreement on the Balkans, Moscow, October 1944’, The
American Historical Review, vol. 83, no. 2, April 1978, pp. 368–387.
335 Prior to the split Tito and Stalin were close to sealing a deal with Albanian leaders to station several military
units there during the Greek civil war (March 1946–October 1949), in which Yugoslavia supported the
rebellious Greek communists. J. Perović, ‘The Tito–Stalin split: a reassessment in light of new evidence’,
Journal of Cold War Studies, vol. 9, no. 2, 2007, p. 34.
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and Albanians into a larger territorial unit at the expense of Northern Greece. At the same time,
the Soviets did not wish to risk a conflict with the West over Yugoslavia’s policy in the
Balkans, which Stalin feared could have led to its achieving regional hegemony if the
unification plan went ahead. Using new evidence from the Soviet archives, scholar Jeronim
Perović attributes the split not to ideological differences in pursuing different paths to
socialism, as many of Yugoslavia’s official historians had claimed, but to Yugoslavia’s
increase in leverage over its neighbours:
To Stalin’s dismay … Tito continued to pursue an expansionist foreign policy agenda
toward Yugoslavia’s neighbours, especially Albania, against Moscow’s stern advice at
a time when Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe as a whole was hardening.336
Yugoslavia’s split with the Soviet bloc improved the image of the Yugoslav Government in
the West. As Dennis Hupchick has observed:
The majority of westerners had little knowledge of, or interest in, Balkan affairs beyond
a rudimentary, generalised, and frequently oversimplified awareness of assorted cold
war-related situations: Yugoslavia was a ‘good’ communist country ever since Marshal
Josip Tito broke with Joseph Stalin in 1948 and mixed capitalism with socialism.337
Tito’s foreign policy was henceforth based on tactical balancing between the two
superpowers.338 The Soviets were so alarmed by the Yugoslav model of an independent path
336 ibid.
337 D.P. Hupchick, The Balkans: from Constantinople to communism, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, p.
xii.
338 Yugoslavia’s wartime hero and leader of the partisan anti-Nazi guerrilla movement, Josip Broz Tito, was one
of the creators of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and its first Secretary-General. InSerbia Network
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to socialism and the possibility of this model spreading to neighbouring countries that they
eliminated many prominent politicians in Eastern Europe whom they accused of the crime of
‘Titoism’ (most notably Albanian K. Xoxe, Hungarian L. Rajk, and Bulgarian T. Kostov).339
Tito managed to maintain the independence of Yugoslav socialism from ‘both Soviet
Communism and Western capitalism by establishing political and economic relations with
sympathetic regimes’.340 As one of the founders of an alternative organisation of non-aligned
states, which numbered over 100 members in the 1970s, Tito’s brand of internationalism also
raised suspicions in the eyes of the West as he also supported the anti-colonial struggles of
many Non-Aligned Movement’s members against the political and economic interests of
Britain, Belgium, the Netherlands, France and Italy in Africa, Middle East and Asia.
Political scientist Branislav Radeljić notes that ‘apart from being a trading partner and labour
exporter, Yugoslavia did not enjoy much EU attention prior to the actual outbreak of
Yugoslavia’s demise’ in the 1990s. Radeljić attributes a ‘fraught and difficult to define’ state
of affairs between the EU and Yugoslavia to ‘diplomatic ignorance’ of Western diplomats
beyond Yugoslavia’s capital, and their perceived ‘lack of interest, understanding and
knowledge regarding Yugoslavia’s domestic problems and ethnic fragility’.341 From the
author’s own research of consulting archival sources, it appears that Western diplomats were
well aware of Yugoslavia’s diversity, including differences between individual Republics, as
well as the economic discrepancy between Serbia’s Northern (Vojvodina) and Southern
(Kosovo and Metohija) autonomous provinces.342 In addition, anti-Yugoslav ‘terrorist’
movements were active across Western and Northern Europe and as far as Australia in the
Foundation, ‘Back in “SFRJ Tito” Time’, 23 October 2013, http://inserbia.info/news/2013/10/back-in-SFRJ-
tito-time-exclusive-photos/, (accessed 1 December 2013).
339 W. Smaldone, European socialism, 2013, op. cit.
340 Brown, Yugoslavia, the lost country, 2005, op. cit, p. 111.
341 Radeljić, Europe and the collapse of Yugoslavia, 2012, op. cit., pp. 24; 42–43.
342 Research of de-classified documents in the National Archives of Australia, August 2012.
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1960s and 1970s. Their political activism demonstrated to the Western governments the
complexity of Yugoslavia’s internal politics.
As this chapter’s opening quote suggested, the Yugoslav nationals generally enjoyed more
personal freedoms than others in the Soviet bloc, but only since the late 1950s and only those
who were not assessed by the state security organs to be political dissidents. On the domestic
front, Mirko Tepavac suggests that although Tito had broken with Stalin’s international
politics, in the early years since the split Tito had not deserted Stalin’s political methods,
including collectivisation, nationalisation of private holdings, and rapid industrialisation and
urbanisation built on unpaid labour.343 One particularly characteristic similarity in domestic
policy between the Soviets and Tito was the elimination of political alternatives. But whereas
over time, Tito began to relax his domestic policies, Moscow remained very sensitive to any
signs of domestic liberalisation in ‘fraternal’ socialist countries.
As if not to allow other socialist countries to follow Tito’s example, the Soviet Union led
military incursions into Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 to crack down on
reformist trends.344 The elimination of political opposition in socialist countries more broadly,
including in Yugoslavia, caused an inestimable number of victims.345 A recently formed
Commission of experts in Serbia estimates that at least 52,000 people were killed in Serbia
alone between 1944–45 and 1953.346 Anti-Yugoslav narratives, promoting self-determination
343 M. Tepavac, ‘Tito: 1945–1980’, in J.Udovički and J. Ridgeway (eds), Burn this house: the making and
unmaking of Yugoslavia, Durham, Duke University Press, 2000, p. 67. Tepavac was historian and onetime
liberally-inclined communist and foreign minister of Yugoslavia.
344 US Department of State, Office of the Historian, ‘Milestones: 1961–1968: Soviet invasion of
Czechoslovakia, 1968’, http://history.state.gov/milestones/1961-1968/soviet-invasion-czechoslavkia, (accessed
1 March 2014).
345 For a critical reflection of communist crimes, see S. Courtois (ed.), The black book of communism: crimes,
terror, repression, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1999.
346 Balkan Transitional Justice, ‘Exposing the secret crimes of communism in Serbia’, Balkan Insight, 9
September 2013, http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/serbia-still-unaware-of-communist-era-crimes,
(accessed 1 November 2013).
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(such as during the so-called ‘Croatian Spring’ of nationalist sentiment in 1971) were
strengthened by external support from diasporas as far as in Canada and Australia. The
Yugoslav diplomatic, consular and trade missions became a target of militant attacks and
expressions of anti-Yugoslav protest in the active diaspora communities.347 The notorious
Yugoslav security organs kept many of these groups in check, including by assassinations on
foreign soil, which only increased their opposition to Yugoslavism.
Although political pluralism, nationalism and the Soviet brand of Communism were all banned
in Yugoslavia, some social pluralism was allowed as the citizens could form apolitical clubs.348
Yugoslavia’s Vice-President and long-time chief of Yugoslavia’s the State Security
Administration or secret police (Uprava državne bezbednosti, UDBA), Aleksandar Ranković,
became an opponent of Tito’s moves towards decentralisation. Ranković’s policies were also
not viewed with much sympathy in the West during his time in power (1946–1966), especially
his central role in purges against Kosovo Albanians.349 Following Ranković’s dismissal by Tito
in 1966 after a wire-tapping affair, the reformist leaders in other republics rose to prominence,
stirring the sensitive question of ethnic nationalism.350
347 Radeljić writes about the influence of diasporas on the intellectual thinking of Croatian and Slovenian
nationalists in SFRY, an influence that increased after Tito’s death. Radeljić, Europe and the collapse of
Yugoslavia, 2012, op. cit., pp. 95–120. For transnational linkages of anti-Yugoslav movements, see V.C.
Peisker, ‘“Ethnic” and “cosmopolitan” transnationalism: two cohorts of Croatian immigrants in Australia’,
Transnationalizam i identitet, migracijske i etničke teme, vol. 22, no. 3, 2006, pp. 211–230.
348 These included, for example, various sports-based clubs, and Jewish clubs. E. Kerenji, ‘Jewish citizens of
socialist Yugoslavia: politics of Jewish identity in a socialist state, 1944–1974’, unpublished PhD thesis,
University of Michigan, 2008, p. 279. For information about youth clubs in Yugoslavia, see M. Peljhan,
‘Lecture: March 31, 2003’, in J. Budney and A. Blackwell (eds), Unboxed: engagements in social space,
Ontario, Bonanza Printing, 2005, p. 100.
349 Ranković’s ideas also influenced at the time a young communist, Slobodan Milošević. The influence was
visible after he assumed leadership of the Serbian League of Communists in May 1986. For more discussion
about ideational influences on Milošević’s policy on Kosovo, see L.J. Cohen, Serpent in the bosom: the rise and
fall of Slobodan Milošević, Boulder, Westview Press, 2002.
350 The wire-tapping incident occurred when it became known that Yugoslavia’s secret service agency, UDBA,
was wiretapping senior officials, including Tito’s offices and possibly, bedroom. Former US Foreign Service
officer, Luois Sell, has observed that Ranković’s removal was diminished levels of control by the Yugoslav
security services over the the military, which was ‘traditionally one of key levers of communist civilian control
over the military’. More broadly, it led to a major liberalisation of the domestic regime as well as further freeing
of people movements in and out of the country and increased Western influence. L. Sell, Slobodan Milošević
and the destruction of Yugoslavia, Durham, Duke University Press, 2002, p. 21.
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A specialist on national minorities in Yugoslavia, Jill Irvine, observed that ethnic tensions
particularly increased in Croatia in the late 1960s and early 1970s to the point that some Serbian
and Croatian communities were arming and readying themselves for violent confrontation.351
Tito personally intervened in the Croatian Spring to stop nationalist trends in Croatia, removing
reformists from influential positions and imprisoning others, including Franjo Tuđman who
later was to assume the Presidency of Croatia and a principal political role in its war for
independence from Yugoslavia. Irvine rightly points out that the period of reformist trends
during the Croatian Spring and the political turmoil that its events generated (including Tito’s
heavy-handed response) shaped ‘the political perceptions and actions of both the leaders and
the public in Croatia twenty years later’.352
Similarly, for the Serbs in Croatia the events of the Croatian Spring were remembered as a time
of sharp reduction in the role of Serbs in Croatian political life.353 Twenty years later, Serbs in
Croatia were driven by a similar sense of insecurity and fear of marginalisation, when they
resorted to similar methods as the Croatian Spring, by seizing greater autonomy for themselves.
This attitude by the Serb minority towards the anti-Yugoslav and nationalist Croatian
leadership proved to be disastrous for Serb-Croat relations. This demonstrates that national
discourses and collective memories, including those the Yugoslav era, constitute extremely
important mobilising factors for political action by ethnic groups from that region, including
Serbs.
351 J. Irvine, ‘The Croatian Spring and the dissolution of Yugoslavia’, in L.J. Cohen and J. Dragović-Soso (eds),
State collapse in Southeastern Europe: new perspectives on Yugoslavia’s disintegration, West Lafayette, Purdue
University Press, 2008, p. 168.
352 ibid, p. 149.
353 ibid, p. 158.
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The principle of non-alignment
Non-alignment during the Cold War was ‘the principle of avoidance of affiliation with either
the Soviet bloc or the Atlantic alliance, while affirming an active presence in foreign policy
through the Non-Aligned Movement’.354 According to Boris Kanzleiter, the Indian Prime
Minister Jawaharlal Nehru probably coined this term in 1954.355 However, in her unofficial
biography, Tito’s widow, Jovanka Broz, claimed that this idea was originally hers, dating back
to an international conference of the Third World countries in 1955. She was considered to be
a high-risk individual by the Yugoslav security services and held under house arrest for decades
after socialist Yugoslavia’s disintegration without being formally charged with anything. In
2013, Jovanka Broz said to her unofficial biographer, Serbian journalist Žarko Jokanović:
The Non-Aligned Movement was my idea. It emerged when we [she and Tito] were in
Indonesia, at the Bandung conference … Then I said to Tito, in front of Nehru: ‘Why
are you only complaining about the two blocs? Why don’t you create something new
yourselves? Let’s form something together, something third, like a wedge between
those two superpowers’. … After hearing that, Nehru saluted my idea, saying that I was
right. Everything went into that direction thereafter, and the NAM was formed. 356
Historian Mark Almond’s findings lend some weight to Jovanka Broz’s statement. Almond
observed in 1994 in his seminal work, Europe’s backyard war: the war in the Balkans, that at
the Bandung conference in Indonesia Tito had laid the foundations of a new movement, NAM,
354 Ramet, The Three Yugoslavias, 2006, op. cit., p. xxi.
355 B. Kanzleiter, ‘Yugoslavia, formation of the non-aligned movement’, in I. Ness (ed.), The international
encyclopedia of revolution and protest, 2009, Blackwell Reference Online,
http://www.revolutionprotestencyclopedia.com/public/book.html?id=g9781405184649_yr2012_978140518464
9, (accessed 8 March 2014).
356 Ž. Jokanović, Jovanka Broz–Moj život moja istina, 2nd edn, Belgrade, Blic, 2013, pp. 49–50.
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to provide Yugoslavia’s support to newly independent Third World states, such as India.357 At
the Bandung conference, twenty-nine Asian, Middle East and African nations plus Yugoslavia
(as the only representative of a European socialist state) met to discuss decolonisation.358 Tito
became increasingly supportive of foreign policy positions of non-Western countries, including
Egypt during the Suez crisis in 1956. This attitude put him at odds with the British and the
French Governments, leading to a downgrade in Yugoslavia’s relationship with Western
European countries during the period when the EU was being formed.359
NAM was officially inaugurated in Belgrade in 1961, which was an endorsement and
diplomatic triumph for Tito’s independent foreign policy on the international stage. In 1961,
Yugoslavia joined the Eurovision Song Contest (ESC). According to Dean Vuletić, Yugoslavia
was the only socialist country from Eastern Europe to take part in this Western European
cultural event.360 Vuletić sees Yugoslavia’s participation in the ESC as an expression of its
non-aligned position in Europe during the Cold War, and as an attempt to reaffirm its cultural
and political independence from the USSR.361 In response, the Eastern bloc created a song
contest of its own, the Intervision, which was, however, short-lived (1977–1980).362 Stalin’s
357 M. Almond, Europe's backyard war: the war in the Balkans, London, William Heinemann Ltd., 1994, p.
160.
358 Western European states, including EU members, supported the military actions of the French, Dutch and
other West European armies against pro-independence groups during a decolonisation wave immediately after
the end of the Second World War. Examples include the French-Algerian war 1954–62, in which Yugoslavia
supported the Algerians, and the Indonesian war of Independence against the Dutch 1945–49, which in part
instigated Tito and Sukarno’s amity. W. Mausbach, ‘European perspectives on the war in Vietnam’, German
Historical Institute Bulletin, no. 30, spring 2002, pp. 71–86.
359 National Archives of Australia, ‘Yugoslavia, foreign policy, general’, A1838, 73/1/1, part one.
360 Finland, which was a neutral country during the Cold War, also began its participation in the ESC in 1961.
European Broadcasting Union, ‘Eurovision Song Contest 1961’, http://www.eurovision.tv/page/history/by-
year/contest?event=278, (accessed 1 May 2014).
361 Other Eastern European countries entered this contest after the fall of their socialist governments in 1989–90.
D Vuletić, ‘The socialist star: Yugoslavia, Cold War politics and the Eurovision Song Contest’, in I.R. and R.D.
Tobin (eds), A song for Europe: popular music and politics in the Eurovision Song Contest, Burlington,
Ashgate, 2007, p. 84.
362 At a time of rising tensions over Ukraine between Russia and the EU and the West generally, the Intervision
was revived as a concept in May 2014. It is due to run in October 2014 with participants from the Shanghai
Cooperation Organisation and Russia-aligned former Soviet states.
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death in 1953 did not prevent Moscow seeing Yugoslavia and Tito as a nuisance, despite some
improvement in bilateral relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia.363
The first commercial agreements with the EU
Yugoslavia was Southeast Europe’s first socialist country to enter into commercial relations
with the EU.364 Its member states were able to invest in Yugoslav companies after a change in
Yugoslav regulations in 1967. However, the breakdown in Yugoslavia’s relationship with West
Germany in 1957 derailed any effort to forge a closer political relationship with the EU. By
claiming a ‘special status’ in world politics, Tito’s Yugoslavia was attempting to reassert its
growing confidence and independent status from the USSR. But President Tito’s worldview
often clashed with the geopolitical interests of former colonial powers. Yugoslavia directly
aided pro-independence movements from North Africa to Southeast Asia, including by sending
them limited technical and military assistance. This was a practice also pursued by Soviet
satellites and the People’s Republic of China, which meant that Yugoslavia could have been
following the Soviet bloc’s common line on decolonisation despite Tito’s break with Stalin.365
Some Western countries indeed saw it that way.
363 Yugoslavia challenged the political order of the Soviet Union in Europe, with the Moscow leadership falsely
accusing, for example, anti-Soviet protagonists in the Hungarian uprising of 1956 as ‘Tito’s spies’. The Soviets
used the same argument for convicting political opponents within the Soviet Union for the crimes of Titoism,
which referred to any divergence from the USSR’s policies. The Soviet leader Khrushchev visited Yugoslavia in
1955 and 1963, but the USSR did not succeed in its attempt to lure Tito back into its orbit. W. Taubman,
Khrushchev: the man and his era, London, Simon & Schuster Inc., 2004, pp. 267–270, 608–609.
364 The only other socialist country from Central-East and Southeast Europe with which the EU concluded a
trade agreement in the 1960s was Poland. European Parliament, Monthly Bulletin of European Documentation,
no. 11, November 1965, p. 92.
365 A.M. Weisburd, Use of force: the practice of states since World War II, Pennsylvania, Penn State University
Press, 1997, p. 74.
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Yugoslavia was a founding nation of the UN, having signed the UN Charter on 26 June 1945
at the San Francisco conference.366 In the UN’s De-colonization Committee, Yugoslavia was
active in representing the Third World, through which President Tito hoped to extend his own
brand of socialism in the world. By siding with Third World countries, Yugoslavia often
distanced itself from Western European countries. During the 1950s and 1960s decolonisation
wave, this became somewhat problematic for relations with Western Europe, as Yugoslavia
was often acting against the interests of the former colonial powers in the UN. Despite having
received significant post-war recovery aid from the West, Yugoslavia was eager to show its
independence from the West in foreign policy. Another example of this was a decision to
recognise the East German Government in 1957, which led to a cessation of political relations
with West Germany. This caused a delay in its effort to improve its political and economic
relations with the West after the split with the Soviet bloc.
Problematic partner: France
During Charles De Gaulle’s French Presidency (1959–1969) Yugoslavia had an ambivalent
relationship with France, despite the fact that the Yugoslav partisans and the French army were
allies during the Second World War. However, the French feared that ‘the communist deluge
could easily spread to France and Italy, with their strong Communist parties’, and after that to
other European countries.367 This is why France was a supporter of Yugoslavia’s split from the
Soviet bloc. The West was also worried that if the Soviet Union attacked Yugoslavia, this could
be a trigger for another war in Europe. They were eager to extend support to Tito to make that
366 Yugoslavia ratified the UN Charter on 19 October 1945. United Nations Treaty Collection, Historical
information, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/HistoricalInfo.aspx?#"Yugoslavia (former)", (accessed 1 May 2013).
367 J. Tomašević, Contemporary Yugoslavia, Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1969, p. 169.
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less likely. This also provided a chance of ‘penetrating into the world behind the Iron
Curtain’.368
Decisions by Yugoslavia’s governing communist clique to, for example, assist armed
independence movements in Africa, Asia and Latin America against French, Italian, Dutch or
Belgian armies after the Second World War was justified by symbolically connecting this
situation of the liberation fighters to Yugoslav experiences of living under foreign occupation
during the Second World War. On 18 January 1958, a Yugoslav freighter Sloveniawas forcibly
searched by French warships off the Algerian coast because it was suspected of transporting
weapons to anti-French rebel groups. After the arms were unloaded the vessel was allowed to
proceed on its voyage, but the Yugoslav authorities lodged a protest with the French
Government.369 Yugoslavia then recognised the Provisional Government of the Algerian
Republic in February 1962, whereupon France withdrew its Ambassador to Yugoslavia in
response. France and the UK criticised Yugoslavia’s support to rebel movements in Third
World colonies. Gradually, however, Yugoslav-French relations improved with the signing of
the agreements on cultural cooperation (1964) and Scientific and Technical Cooperation
(1966).
By 1967, France had changed its position on Israel, which brought it closer to Yugoslavia’s
position on the Arab-Israeli War of 1967 (the Six-Day War). On 13 June 1967, Yugoslavia
broke off diplomatic relations with Israel and declared its support for Arab countries. This
followed a similar move previously undertaken by the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and
Bulgaria on 10 June, and Poland and Hungary on 12 June 1967. This meant that on some
368 Lj. Dimić, ‘Historiography on the Cold War in Yugoslavia: from ideology to science’, Cold War History,
vol. 8, no. 2, 2008, p. 288.
369 Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, London, 15–22 March 1958, p. 16080.
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international issues, Yugoslavia’s position was closer to that of position adopted by the Soviet
bloc countries. After Yugoslavia’s bilateral relationship improved with France, the Yugoslav
Government was able to move forward to formalise its relationship with the EU. But West
Germany became another problematic partner for the Yugoslavs, as the German Chancellor
Konrad Adenauer and Tito held opposing views on the issue of recognition of East Germany.
Problematic partner: West Germany
After Stalin’s death in 1953, Tito and his foreign minister, Koča Popović, started to build more
amicable relationships with the Soviet bloc countries, but it needed to prove to them first that
it was not a puppet to the West.370 On 28 June 1956, West Germany’s Foreign Minister
Heinrich von Brentano warned it would consider it an unfriendly act for any country to
recognise East Germany’s statehood and that it would punish any country to do so (under the
so-called Hallstein doctrine). Following President Tito’s visit to Moscow in June 1957,
Yugoslavia decided to establish official diplomatic relations with the East German Government
on 15 October 1957, a decision fiercely opposed by West Germany. This made Yugoslavia
Europe’s last communist country to do so.371 In response, West Germany severed diplomatic
ties with Yugoslavia on 19 October 1957, fearing similar recognition moves by other non-
Soviet bloc countries. Bonn’s decision of November 1957 to keep a consulate in Zagreb open
reflected West Germany’s ‘extensive interests in the Yugoslav republic of Croatia’.372
370 Popović was Yugoslavia’s foreign minister from 1953 to 1965. The author of this thesis examined the
collection of his notes which he left in legacy to Historical Archives of Belgrade. For his role in the project of
Yugoslavism, see W. Deakin, ‘Obituary: Koča Popović’, The Independent, 31 October 1992,
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/obituary-koca-popovic-1560672.html, (accessed 14 May 2013).
371 Reuters, ‘Tito recognises East Germany’, The Glasgow Herald, 15 October 1957, p. 8.
372 Yugoslavia also maintained its consulates in Hamburg and Munich. W.G. Gray, Germany's Cold War: the
global campaign to isolate East Germany, 1949–1969, 2003, pp. 59; 85; 266, footnote 142.
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Yugoslavia responded by calling the West German position ‘a unilateral, arbitrary and hostile
act’, but the US, France and Britain also conveyed to the Yugoslav authorities their countries’
displeasure with Yugoslavia’s position and expressed support for West Germany’s position.373
France agreed to represent West Germany’s interests in Yugoslavia, while Sweden agreed to
represent the Yugoslav Government’s interests in West Germany. President Tito had possibly
yielded to Soviet pressure to recognise East Germany before the November 1957 Moscow
conference, at which Yugoslavia (without Tito being present in person) also signed the Peace
Manifesto, thereby endorsing ‘Soviet policy in the Middle East and elsewhere’.374
Diplomatic friction between Bonn and Belgrade represented a major hurdle for closer EU-
Yugoslav relations, which in the late 1950s and early 1960s did not seem to be a priority for
either side as the EU was focused on internal consolidation and Yugoslavia on building the
NAM. Only with a change of leadership in West Germany was Tito able to resume dialogue
on improving political relations.375 From 23 to 29 January 1968, talks were held in Belgrade
directly between West Germany and Yugoslavia with a final agreement to resume diplomatic
relations. West German-Yugoslav economic negotiations on a ‘new long-term trade and
payments agreement, economic and technical cooperation, tourism, transport and Yugoslavia’s
relations with the European Economic Community’ concluded in Bonn on 26 January, with a
final agreement to resume diplomatic relations announced on 31 January 1968.376
Only after diplomatic relations with West Germany were re-established, was the Yugoslav
leadership able to advance economic and technical cooperation with Brussels. This included
373 Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, London, 19–26 October 1957, p. 15816.
374 Taubman, Khrushchev: the man and his era, 2004, op. cit., p. 735.
375 The Hallstein doctrine was made obsolete after the election in 1969 and Chancellor Willy Brandt’s new
Ostpolitik that relied on a softer approach towards East Germany.
376 Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, London, 17–24 February 1968, p. 22540.
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the start of official dialogue following the posting of Yugoslavia’s Ambassador to Brussels in
1968, the first from any European socialist state. Talks on closer relations with the European
Economic Community were held simultaneously during the delegation’s meeting in
Yugoslavia in January 1968. This demonstrates that the diplomatic relationship between
Belgrade and Brussels was heavily conditional upon the improvement of relations between
Yugoslavia and individual EU members, especially those with whom the Yugoslav leadership
disagreed over important external policy questions.
There was a personal dimension to Yugoslavia’s restart with West Germany, which is
attributed to Tito’s amicable relationship with West Germany’s foreign minister, Willy Brandt
(Vice-Chancellor and Minister for Foreign Affairs from December 1966 to October 1969), who
after the elections of 1969 became the Chancellor of Germany. Tito respected Foreign Minister
Willy Brandt as the anti-Nazi activist, and their conversations were said to be very long and
deep, which was rare for Tito when meeting a foreign minister of any Western country.377
Internal politics of Yugoslavia: further liberalisation
The dismissal of the hard-line member of Tito’s top ruling circle, Serb Aleksandar Ranković,
in 1966 also opened new pathways towards cooperation with foreign governments that gave in
turn more prominence to more moderate Yugoslav communists. In addition, Yugoslavia’s
open-borders policy and the encouragement of Central and West European tourism to the
coastal areas from 1967 onwards also contributed to Yugoslavia’s image being more of a
‘benign’ socialist state. In January 1967, Yugoslavia became the first socialist country to
377 ‘Tito confers with Brandt to end tour’, Toledo Blade, 12 October 1970, p. 26,
http://news.google.com/newspapers?id=8CYxAAAAIBAJ&sjid=0gEEAAAAIBAJ&pg=7078 per
cent2C4628020, (accessed 1 December 2013).
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abolish visa requirements and open borders with most Western countries. As Yugoslavia was
becoming more open towards Western countries, trade with EU members was increasing and
it demanded greater access for its agricultural goods (including beef) to the Common Market
countries. By late 1960s, there were Western cultural products and press freely available in
Yugoslavia, which was a huge contrast with the Soviet bloc.
The Soviet military incursion into Czechoslovakia into 1968 greatly alarmed the Titoist
leadership and was an important external motivating factor behind the leadership’s decision to
improve its economic relations with Western Europe. At the same time, the EU was integrating
its economies further: by July 1968, EU member states had established a common external
tariff and removed internal quota restrictions.378 They also created an industrial customs union
in 1968.379 As the EU was becoming a large free-trade area in Europe, Yugoslavia possibly
also sought to obtain economic benefits for itself by embarking on negotiating a commercial
accord with the EU, at the same time as launching a diplomatic effort to improve relations with
West Germany.
Another sign of liberalisation in Yugoslavia was the sending of temporary workers
(‘Gastarbeiter’) to Western Europe in the 1960s. As John Besemeres has noted, the ‘Yugoslav
Gastarbeiter phenomenon was one without parallel in the Socialist world’.380 One of
Yugoslavia’s policies to tackle the rising unemployment in certain regions was to send, through
official government agencies, large numbers of Yugoslav guest workers to Western European
378 J. McCormick, The European Union: politics and policies, Boulder, Westview Press, 4th edn, 2008, p. 69.
379 Decision-making institutions in the EU were streamlined in April 1965 with the so-called Merger Treaty. It
came into force on 1 July 1967, bringing three distinct institutions (Euratom, European Economic Community
and European Coal and Steel Community) into a single institutional structure, establishing a single Council and
a single Commission for the European Communities.
380 J.F. Besemeres, Socialist population politics: the political implications of demographic trends in the USSR
and Eastern Europe, New York, M.E. Sharpe Inc., 1980, p. 163.
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countries (in particular, to West Germany) to undertake unskilled work. The idea behind these
policies was that upon the completion of labour requirements, guest workers would eventually
return to Yugoslavia, but in reality, many stayed on to live in Western Europe.381 Labour
migration from Yugoslavia to Western Europe undoubtedly influenced international
perceptions about Yugoslavia as a more open socialist country. Yugoslavia also had extradition
treaties in place with several Western countries, which were used as a means of controlling
émigré dissidents.
While political life was greatly liberalised during the 1960s, vigorous anti-government political
dissent continued to be discouraged and suppressed in Yugoslavia, often with lengthy
imprisonment and physical torture. Given Yugoslavia’s fairly open borders, it was common for
political dissidents to flee to neighbouring Western countries, with Paris, Milan, London and
Vienna becoming hubs for anti-Yugoslav activities. Dissident sentiment peaked in Yugoslavia
in the early 1970s with the Croatian Spring, after which there was a crackdown on nationalist
sentiment in all republics. European capitals were also targeted by Yugoslav intelligence
services looking for émigré dissidents, which caused uncomfortable political issues between
Yugoslavia and EU members, which were rarely publicly mentioned.382
Liberalisation had also led to greater turbulence within Yugoslavia’s ethnic communities, in
particular on issues of representation in local government and education. Yugoslavia’s
constitutional revisions of 1974 gave Bosniaks the status of a nationality and autonomous
republic status to two provinces in Serbia. This followed mass riots in 1968 in Kosovo where
381 According to the official Serbian Communist Party meeting notes, which the author found in the Historical
Archives of Belgrade during fieldwork in April/May 2012, the Yugoslav Government started to lose profits it
was receiving for each worker sent to West Germany with a growing number of undeclared guest workers going
through private channels to work in Germany.
382 ‘Balkan Vendetta’, Time, 21 November 1969, vol. 94, no. 21, p. 48.
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Kosovo Albanians demanded better representation in government. The changes also facilitated
greater linkages between Yugoslav republics and autonomous provinces with other countries;
Kosovo Albanians were allowed for the first time to travel to Albania.383 However, as in
Croatia, any decision that were seen as too liberal were reined in by Tito. The Slovenian Prime
Minister Stane Kavčić was ousted in 1974 for allegedly ‘attempting to make Slovenia an
economic appendage of Western Europe’.384
Nonetheless, following the constitutional changes, Slovenia and Croatia started to cooperate
more closely with their non-communist neighbours in an informal arrangement known as
Alpen-Adria, which began around 1978. This low-key forum connected Slovenian and
Croatian regions with two western regions of Hungary, five in Austria, four in Italy and Bavaria
from the Federal Republic of Germany.385 The physical proximity of these two republics to
Austria and Italy facilitated closer regional exchanges, and the incentive of economic
opportunities. The influence of the two EU members increased in Slovenia and Croatia through
television and radio reporting, which are among the main instruments of soft power. This
development could have strengthened the independence aspirations of more liberal Slovenes
and Croatians, which will be discussed in the next chapter.
Key agreements between Yugoslavia and the EU
Exploratory exchanges towards establishing a commercial accord between the EU and
Yugoslavia dated to 1965, but no agreement could be formalised without Germany’s consent.
383 This development was also enabled by an improvement in bilateral relations between socialist Albania and
Yugoslavia.
384 Z.T. Irwin, ‘Yugoslavia’s foreign policy and Southeastern Europe’, in P.S. Shoup (ed.), Problems of Balkan
security: Southeastern Europe in the 1990s, Washington DC, The Wilson Center Press, 1990, p. 158.
385 C. Cviić, ‘The background and implications of the domestic scene in Yugoslavia’, in P.S. Shoup (ed.),
Problems of Balkan security, 1990, op. cit., p. 95.
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The European Commission discussed matters of a technical nature with Yugoslav counterparts
in 1965 and 1967. The two sides explored the scope for sector-specific trade agreement in order
to improve economic exchanges. Following these encounters, the Committee of Permanent
Representatives put forward to the Commission, in collaboration with the Commission’s staff,
a proposal regarding the establishment of a non-discriminatory commercial accord with
Yugoslavia.
The commercial relations between the EU and Yugoslavia were regulated by five-year
agreements. Closer economic exchanges came about as a result of Yugoslavia’s economic
reforms, which allowed for some foreign investment in Yugoslav state companies operating
under the Yugoslav workers’ self-management principles, which made Yugoslavia exceptional
among all other socialist countries at the time.386 EU members reserved the right to place certain
restrictions on the cotton textiles imports from Yugoslavia, certain agricultural products (such
as beef) and primary materials. On 2 December 1967 the EU and Yugoslavia signed a
Declaration on Bilateral relations.387 Political scientist and currently Serbia’s lead negotiator
on agreements with the EU, Tanja Mišćević, has noted that the Declaration was the first
agreement with a socialist government that the EU signed, even though the treaty of Rome (of
1957) had allowed for such a development.388 The Declaration established a framework of
negotiations for closer economic relations between the EU and Yugoslavia after a formal
relationship was established.
386 The Yugoslav economic system was said to offer a middle-way between capitalism and Soviet central
planning. S. Estrin, ‘Yugoslavia: the case of self-managing market socialism’, Journal of Economic
Perspectives, vol. 5, no. 4, autumn1991, p. 187.
387 In 1967, Yugoslavia became the world’s first socialist state to legislate for foreign investment in the form of
joint enterprises. B. Magaš, The destruction of Yugoslavia: tracking the break-up 1980–92, London, Verso
Press, 1993. For a critical review of this book, see M.B. Brown, ‘The war in Yugoslavia and the debt burden: a
comment’, Capital & Class, vol. 17, no. 2, Summer 1993, pp. 147–160.
388 T. Mišćević, Pridruživanje Evropskoj Uniji, Službeni Glasnik Press, Belgrade, 2009, p. 171.
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The first three-year non-preferential trade agreement between Yugoslavia and the EU was
signed in Brussels on 19 March 1970, entering into force on 1 May 1970. During the 1970s,
bilateral trade expanded further, especially in the sheep and goat meat trade.389 From 1 July
1971, Yugoslavia was included in the preferential trading scheme of the EU, which was aimed
at increasing economic development in industrialising countries, including Yugoslavia, by
granting them preferential trade measures. These agreements carried political weight as their
existence demonstrated that genuine political will existed on both sides towards developing
closer relations. By comparison, the CEES did not sign similar agreements with the EU until
more than a decade later. Therefore, the contractual basis for closer relations with the EU and
Yugoslavia was put in place in December 1967 and it lasted until the outbreak of conflict in
the former Yugoslavia. On 27 April 1973, the EU-Yugoslavia trade agreement was briefly
extended until 30 September that year to allow negotiations for a new agreement to be
completed.
A new five-year trade agreement was signed in Brussels on 26 June 1973, with effect from 1
October. At the same time ‘the Community informed the Yugoslav Government by letter of its
readiness to have an exchange of views on the question of Yugoslav workers in the nine
Community countries’.390 The agreement provided for maintaining most-favoured-nation
status for Yugoslavia, and more liberal tariff arrangements in several sectors, including free
trade in industrial goods (except for cotton textiles).391 In March 1974, ministerial meetings
were established as well as meetings of the Joint Committee. In the textiles sector, Yugoslavia
389 D. Lopandić, ‘The Development of Bilateral Relations between the State Union of Serbia and
Montenegro/the Republic of Serbia with the European Union’, Agora Without Frontiers, vol. 12, no. 2, 2006,
pp. 84–91.
390 Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, London, 6–12 August 1973, p. 26027.
391 In the agricultural field, Yugoslavia secured a ‘no tariff’ concession on its pig meat exports to the EU. An
additional feature in the agreement was the inclusion of an ‘evolutionary clause’ under which further evolution
of trade relations was possible under existing arrangements. Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, London, 6–12
August 1973, p. 26027.
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concluded a bilateral agreement with the Community in 1976 under the Multifibre
Arrangement. On 2 December 1976, the two sides delivered a Joint Declaration, which
expressed the ‘desire of the two parties to strengthen, deepen and diversify their relations’; it
was followed by the Council decision to extend ordinary loans from the European Investment
Bank to Yugoslavia—which appeared to be another sign of improving relations and mutual
trust.392
According to a European Commission document, the 1976 Joint Declaration provided a
blueprint for the strengthening of relations during the next decade.393 The Commission opened
a delegation in Belgrade at the end of 1980, twelve years after the Yugoslav mission to the EU
was established in Brussels. In February that year, the European Parliament passed a resolution
on relations between the EU and Yugoslavia. On 25 February 1980, a Cooperation Agreement
was signed between Belgrade and Brussels, regulating cooperation in the areas of finance,
trade, agriculture, primary industries, transport, tourism, science and technology as well as
social affairs.  With this agreement the EU pledged to increase technical aid to Yugoslavia. The
First Financial Protocol covering science cooperation and political dialogue followed. Another
bilateral agreement was signed on 2 April 1980 which entered into force on 1 April 1983.394
This agreement was part of the Mediterranean agreements of the EU, which included trade
preferences, and covered areas such as ‘transport, industrial development, foreign investment,
energy, environmental protection, tourism, agriculture and others, and a specified special
Financial Protocol’.395 It signalled a significant deepening of relations between Yugoslavia and
392 European Commission, ‘EEC-Yugoslavia relations’, Information memo, Brussels, November 1977,
http://aei.pitt.edu/30607/1/P_109_77.pdf, (accessed 1 December 2013).
393 European Commission, ‘European Community and Yugoslavia’, July 1988, Brussels, p. 1.
394 The agreement which was named Cooperation Agreement between the European Economic Community and
the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, was terminated on 26 May 1992. Dutch Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, ‘Treaties’, http://www.minbuza.nl/en/Key_Topics/Treaties/Search_the_Treaty_Database?isn=000630,
(accessed 1 December 2013).
395 D. Lopandić, ‘The Development of Bilateral Relations between the State Union of Serbia and
Montenegro/the Republic of Serbia with the European Union’, 2006, op. cit., p. 85.
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the EU. The President of the Commission, Jacques Delors, also visited Yugoslavia in late July
1987. His visit seemed like a sign of maturity in political cooperation between the EU and
Yugoslavia, and distracted the EU’s attention from the deepening political and economic crisis
in Yugoslavia.396
In 1988, the EU held the first ‘political dialogue’ with Yugoslavia which was chaired by
Greece.397 The special relationship Yugoslavia had with the EU, in comparison to other
socialist countries, led many to believe that the country would be the first socialist state to join
the EU. Some scholars argued that the EU should have opened its membership doors to allow
Yugoslavia to become its 13th member.398 They believed that Yugoslavia had all the necessary
preconditions to take on the burden of membership and absorption of the acquis. A call for
Yugoslavia to become the 13th member state came too late to guarantee Yugoslavia’s survival
as a federation, or its smooth transition to democracy.399 Ultimately, the wars of Yugoslav
disintegration, which developed rapidly, completely overwhelmed the EU’s crisis management
capacities. EU members also failed to speak with one voice regarding the crisis in Yugoslavia.
The EU policy towards the conflict in the Balkans will be discussed in the next chapter.
Conclusion
This chapter analysed EU-Yugoslavia’s relations through a thematic examination of East/West
historical narratives and Yugoslavia’s unique foreign policy of neutrality during the Cold War.
One could derive several key lessons from it about Serbia’s relationship with the EU today.
396 European Commission, ‘European Community and Yugoslavia’, op. cit., p. 13.
397 M. Braniff, Integrating the Balkans: conflict resolution and the impact of EU expansion, London, I.B.Tauris
& Co, 2011, p. 50.
398 M.M. Getter, ‘Yugoslavia and the European Economic Community: is a merger feasible’, Journal of
International Law, vol. 11, pp. 789–810. C. Adebahr, ‘If Yugoslavia were an EU Member’, 13 December 2013,
IP Journal, https://ip-journal.dgap.org/en/blog/eye-europe/if-yugoslavia-were-eu-member, (accessed 12 January
2014).
399 See for instance, D. Jović, ‘The disintegration of Yugoslavia: a critical review of explanatory approaches’,
European Journal of Social Theory, vol. 4, no. 1, 2001, pp. 101–120.
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One of the lessons from the Yugoslav period is that fractious political relations between
Yugoslavia and individual EU members impeded Yugoslavia’s bilateral relationship with the
EU, including the signing of trade agreements. The success of Serbia’s ongoing accession talks
with the EU will depend on the quality of the Serbian official relations with individual EU
members. Serbia can maintain with all twenty-eight EU members. Any major unresolved
differences between Serbia and any EU member, particularly Germany, the Netherlands,
Croatia, Hungary and Romania, just like with West Germany and France in the 1950s and
1960s, have the potential to derail any progress in Serbia’s accession. Furthermore, discourses
on national and absolute sovereignty and independence from foreign influence are likely to
present challenges to Serbia’s European integration. Some of these normative ideas will
certainly need to be renegotiated if Serbia wants to actually join the EU—a goal which
challenges Serbia’s absolute sovereignty idea. The next chapter will examine this concept as
well as the normative legacy from the wars of Yugoslav succession which influence more
immediately perceptions of Serbia in the EU and of the EU in Serbia today.400
400 C. Koulouri (ed.), Clio in the Balkans: the politics of history education, Center for democracy and




Shifting away from Europe: Yugoslavia’s violent
dissolution
The peoples of the Balkans deserve the chance to leave their tragic past behind. The
nations that have done so earlier owe it to their sense of humanity, their dignity, and
peace of conscience to help the fragile nations in the region overcome their present
predicament and transform the bloody Balkans of yesterday into the Southeastern
Europe of the future.401
This chapter will outline key political narratives from the Milošević period in Serbian politics,
which were closely connected to the events surrounding Yugoslavia’s disintegration. These
narratives still present normative obstacles to Serbia’s European integration. Key political
changes in the early 1990s in Slovenia and Croatia will be outlined, which preceded their
independence declarations. This period was characterised by the rise in anti-EU and anti-
Western discourses in Serbia (particularly, the perceptions of Serbian victimhood, injustice and
mistreatment by the West). These political narratives were propagated by dominant political
elites (the Socialist Party of Serbia, the Serbian Radical Party and the Yugoslav Left coalition),
including through state media and selectivity in reporting on the wars of Yugoslavia’s
disintegration. Anti-Western narratives, which were advanced by the Milošević regime,
continue to influence political attitudes in Serbia about European integration, as noted by a
prominent Serbian expert on EU affairs, Tanja Mišćević.402
401 L. Tindemans et. al., Unfinished peace: report of the International Commission on the Balkans, Aspen
Institute Berlin, Washington, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1996, pp. xxiv; 174.
402 Mišćević observed that memory of the wars of Yugoslavia’s disintegration still influence foreign policies of
some EU member states towards Serbia. Email correspondence with Tanja Mišćević, July 2010.
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The chapter will also assess the EU’s piecemeal responses to the unfolding political crisis in
Yugoslavia that led to the wars. It will seek to evaluate the key differences between the EU’s
slow and ineffective policy responses to the crisis in Croatia (which paved the way for an even
bigger crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina), and vigorous diplomatic efforts of three EU members,
who successfully negotiated the end of war in Slovenia. One of the major consequences of the
Yugoslav dissolution was the formation of a negative image of Serbia in the EU (particularly
among those who oppose Serbia’s EU accession), and the creation of a negative,
‘interventionist’ image of the EU in Serbia (particularly among the nationalists). The wars left
Serbia’s administrative capacities in turmoil (which the structuralist view emphasises),
encouraging also the rise in ethno-particularist discourses (which the cultural view
emphasises).
This chapter argues that among a major normative consequence of the wars for Serbia was the
emergence of pro-EU and anti-EU narratives, which was highly unusual given that Yugoslavia
did not regard the EU as its ideological ‘enemy’ during the Cold War. This development
signalled that Serbia’s new political elites were, towards the late 1980s, moving away from the
‘neutrality’ in foreign policy and ‘East/West bridging’ principles towards adopting an anti-
Western normative platform and diplomatic posturing which resembled more the USSR’s
attitudes towards the West generally rather than the Yugoslav foreign policy. During Serbia’s
international isolation during the 1990s, the national state-sponsored propaganda generated a
negative image of the West, including of the EU, among ruling political elites and many
citizens. This discourse also emphasised the Serbian victimhood idea in relation to the West.
The second discourse of Serbia’s ‘return to Europe’ was being advanced by pro-reformists
politicians, who later became the main drivers of Serbia’s European integration.
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Yugoslavia’s legitimacy crisis following Tito’s death
President Tito died on 4 May 1980, during the Soviet Union’s intervention in Afghanistan,
which was a cause of concern among the Western nations for the safety of Yugoslavia.403
Dozens of world leaders from both aligned and non-aligned countries descended upon Belgrade
for Tito’s funeral, held on 8 May. His funeral was, in an ideational sense, a requiem for
Yugoslavism. Domestically, Tito was the unifying link between the Yugoslav republics and
the chief mediator in their disputes. Yugoslavia established an annual rotating Presidency
between representatives from the constituent republics, which resembled the EU’s rotating
presidency arrangement, with the crucial difference that the Yugoslav system lost public
support and legitimacy, especially outside Serbia. Tito’s death opened up public space for anti-
Yugoslav dissent, which was seen through the rise of dissident culture (including the
emergence of a popular anti-communist Slovenian magazine Mladina, and new rock music
bands in the mid-1980s whose lyrics openly defied socialism).404 The influence of foundational
narratives of ‘Brotherhood and Unity’ had lost its appeal to many Yugoslav citizens, especially
as economic troubles hit all Yugoslav regions hard, albeit unequally.405 Widespread discontent
about the lack of economic opportunities in Yugoslavia, as well as a desire for greater levels
of political participation, were the causes underpinning the Kosovo Albanian riots in 1981.406
403 D.K. Willis, ‘Yugoslavia without Tito tempts hungry Soviet bear’, The Christian Science Monitor, 6 May
1980, http://www.csmonitor.com/1980/0506/050632.html, (accessed 1 May 2014).
404 Yugoslav rock ‘n’ roll after Tito’s death ‘came to embody … the gap between a Second World War
generation and the children of the Cold War, and the idea that all Yugoslav peoples were not the same.’
(emphasis in the original) P. Liotta, ‘Malthus, mayhem and the myth of Yugoslavia’, New Balkan Politics, no. 5,
2003, http://www.newbalkanpolitics.org.mk/item/Malthus,-Mayhem-and-the-Myth-of-Yugoslavia, (accessed 1
March 2014). See also J. Feffer, ‘Bands like Laibach a powerful amplifier of former Yugoslav social
discontent’, Foreign policy in focus, 17 April 2013,
http://fpif.org/bands_like_laibach_a_powerful_amplifier_of_former_yugoslav_social_discontent/, (accessed 1
March 2014).
405 The results of Yugoslavia’s Kraigher Commission in 1983 provided a pessimistic assessment of SFRY’s
economy, urging economic reforms. Its recommendations were, however, never realised. V. Meier, Yugoslavia:
a history of its demise, New York, Routledge, 1995, p. 13.
406 Kosovo was among the least developed regions in Yugoslavia, with unemployment of over 35 per cent by
1990. Economic discontent was fuelled by rising political demands for self-determination, which were in part
inspired by intensifying contacts between Kosovo Albanians and the population in neighbouring Albania after
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As the economic situation in Yugoslavia deteriorated, and foreign debt grew immensely, social
discontent increased in all Yugoslav republics. As Yugoslavia’s foreign debt hit $25 billion by
1985, the Yugoslav dinar plunged from 15 to 1,370 to the US dollar, and inflation exceeded
300 per cent per annum.407 One viewpoint (also structuralist) holds that the economic decline
of Yugoslavia was a precursor to its political disintegration.408 Slovenia and Croatia widely
blamed the crisis on the authorities in Belgrade (which was both Yugoslavia’s and Serbia’s
capital) for their economic troubles, and refused to provide dues to the Yugoslav Development
Fund any longer (which subsidised Yugoslavia’s poorer regions). This situation became a
fertile ground for ethno-particularist narratives to develop, and fill the vacuum left by the
diminished public legitimacy of Yugoslavism. The new Croatian and Slovenian leaders
regarded as the best solution from the economic crisis to seek withdrawal from the federal state,
whilst turning towards the EU.
Attempting to mitigate poor economic performance, Yugoslavia increasingly directed its trade
towards the West. The year 1987 can be used as a reference point for the closest economic
relations between the two, as about 75 per cent of total Yugoslav exports was directed to EU
members ($18.5 billion out of $25 billion).409 Closer ties were also evident from three protocols
on financial cooperation (loans financed by the European Investment Bank), two of which only
entered into force in 1982 and 1988 respectively. The third one later lapsed with the
the 1974 Yugoslav constitution permitted travel to Albania. Mass protests in 1981 represented ‘a late-flowering
national revival’ for Kosovo Albanians. Glenny, The Balkans, 1999, op. cit., p. 624.
407 By 1990, the biggest income inequality gap existed between the republics, as it ranged from about four per
cent in Slovenia to about thirty-eight per cent in Kosovo. M.P. Boduszyński, Regime change in Yugoslav
successor states: divergent paths towards a new Europe, Baltimore, The John Hopkins University Press, 2010,
pp. 65–68. The dollar ($) values in this thesis refer to the US dollar.
408 Economic factors involved in SFRY’s collapse, such as debt crisis, are discussed by Glenny, The Balkans,
1999, op. cit., p. 625; P.H. Liotta, ‘Paradigm lost: Yugoslav self-management and the economics of disaster’,
Balkanologie, vol. 5, no. 1–2, December 2001, pp. 84–91. S. Woodward, Balkan tragedy: chaos and dissolution
after the Cold War, Washington DC, Brookings Institution, 1995.
409 Mišćević, Pridruživanje Evropskoj Uniji, 2009, op. cit., p. 173.
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disintegration of Yugoslavia. In 1987, with the accession of Spain and Portugal into the EU,
the 1980 agreement on trade liberalisation between the EU and Yugoslavia was widened to
include the reduction of customs levies for some Yugoslav exports.410
A contributing factor to the widespread social dissatisfaction in Yugoslavia was the federal
government’s adoption of a harsh economic restructuring program and unpopular austerity
measures, which were demanded by the Paris and the London Clubs of creditors and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF).411 Many people in Yugoslavia criticised falling living
standards and rising inflation. Unable to effectively pay off its rising foreign debt, the Yugoslav
leadership began to remove some economic autonomy from the republics. This caused further
alienation amongst citizens towards the federal authorities, as many of them began to blame
‘Belgrade’ for declining living standards, rising unemployment, food and supplies shortages,
and tough economic times. It was precisely in the late 1980s that a communist politician turned
Serb nationalist demagogue, Slobodan Milošević, rose to power. His rhetoric raised alarm bells
in Western European capitals, but perhaps not loudly enough for the EU to become involved
in conflict prevention. The EU’s external attention was predominantly focused on fast-
unfolding events in Eastern Europe, and the Balkans once again was relegated to the periphery
of its interest. Some MEPs such as, for example, German politician Doris Pack, claimed that
they were even warning the European Commission in 1990 that Yugoslavia faced the
possibility of dissolution, but that nobody took their concerns very seriously.412
410 The protocol specified that the first phase of cooperation was concluded on 30 June 1985, and called for a
new framework on economic relations.
411 R. Weissenbacher, ‘Serbia: thug of war’, Institute for Studies in Political Economy, February 2007,
http://www.ipe.or.at/index.php?author_id=1, (accessed 1 December 2012). M. Chossudovsky, The globalization
of poverty: impacts of IMF and World Bank reforms, London, Zed Books, 1997. Magaš, The destruction of
Yugoslavia, 1993, op. cit., p. 96.
412 M. Braniff, Integrating the Balkans: conflict resolution and the impact of EU expansion, London, I.B. Tauris,
2011, p. 96; D. Pack, ‘Kukavičko ponašanje Zapada’, Međunarodni znanstveni skup “Jugoistočna Evropa
1918–1995”, http://www.camo.ch/kukavicko_ponasanje_zapada.htm, (accessed 12 January 2014).
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Yugoslavia’s statehood crisis
The first multiparty elections in the Yugoslav republics brought pro-independence politicians
to power in Croatia and Slovenia, who advocated new political arrangements in their republics.
In Montenegro and Serbia, the first multiparty elections resulted in an electoral victory for the
pro-Yugoslav unionists (Momir Bulatović and Slobodan Milošević respectively), who were
determined to preserve the Yugoslav federation even by force. Bosnia-Herzegovina, the most
ethnically mixed and politically fragile republic, was divided, on the one hand, between
Bosniaks and Croats who wanted independence, and on the other hand Serbs who wanted to
remain in a common state with Serbia. During political negotiations among the republics in
1990, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia supported a compromise deal that would give the
six republics independence in all areas except for defence, foreign policy and economy.413
Croatia and Slovenia saw it as a humiliating proposal, opting instead for independence.
While Serbs and Montenegrins in 1991 sought assistance from Russia to preserve Yugoslavia’s
federal boundaries, Moscow could not provide it as Russia was itself undergoing political
transformation.414 At the same time as Russia’s new leadership was seeking rapprochement
with the West, Serbian leaders became the ideological opponents of the West. Russia only
provided limited support to Serbia in international forums, and its role, which is generally
413 S. Mesić, The demise of Yugoslavia: a political memoir, Budapest, Central European University Press, 2004,
p. 12.
414 Researcher Andrew Konitzer observed how Yugoslav National Army (YNA) officials went to Moscow to
seek military assistance in 1991 but returned empty-handed as Russia was domestically embroiled in its
problems, which were related to the USSR’s dissolution.  The YNA was predominantly under the Serbian
Government control. A. Konitzer, ‘Serbia between East and West: bratstvo, balancing and business on Europe’s
frontier’, Working Paper, The National Council for Eurasian and East European Research, University of
Washington, 2008, p. 9.
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viewed in positive terms in Serbia, was in fact marginal in this conflict, both in terms of
mediation and financial or military support for Serbia and Montenegro.415
The Bosnian war’s disputed legacy has also divided the three ethnic groups involved (Bosniak,
Croat and Serb) and their political leaders, especially over the causes of the war and its effects
on political structures in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Ever since the war’s end with the Dayton Peace
Agreement in 1995, the region’s non-government organisations (NGOs) and human rights
bodies have been calling for a better show of leadership by all sides to more effectively address
the unresolved issues of war crimes, refugee return, property rights and compensation
claims.416
The crisis in Slovenia
Slovenian intellectuals began to openly debate ideas about self-determination in the late 1980s.
Perceived as scandalous at the time, ‘Contributions to the Slovenian National Program’ was
published in the 57th edition of Nova Revija (a dissident cultural publication) in January 1987,
which was a Slovenian response to rising centralist tendencies within the League of
Communists.417 The Polish trade union-led political and social transformation in 1988–89 was
an inspiration for the Slovenian anti-communist opposition in the lead-up to the republic’s first
direct and multiparty elections.418 These elections took place on 8 April 1990, in which fourteen
415 For this reason, amongst others, Russia’s role in the wars of Yugoslavia’s succession is generally viewed as
positive among Serbs, even though Russia supported all relevant UNSC resolutions endorsing independence for
Croatia, Slovenia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Russia’s alliance with Serbia is often exaggerated by Serbia’s anti-
EU activists, who are reaching out to Russia in their quest for an alternative foreign policy orientation (away
from Brussels) for Serbia today.
416 The political, economic and social consequences of the war are still being addressed by the international
donor community in the region. See, for example, donors from the Western Balkans Investment Network,
http://www.wbif.eu/EC,+IFIs+and+bilateral+donors, (accessed 1 May 2013).
417 D. Rupel, ‘Twenty-five years of democratic development (from Nova Revija to the centre-right government
of Janez Janša)’, Slovene Studies, vol. 27, no. 1–2, 2005, p. 45.
418 ibid.
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political parties vied for parliamentary representation. A pro-independence democratic
coalition obtained the majority of parliamentary seats, 126 out of 240. A leader of that coalition,
Lojze Peterle (who was also President of the largest coalition party among seven) was
appointed as Slovenian Prime Minister in May 1990, and France Bučar was elected President.
An official Slovenian Government document notes:
The most important ministries entrusted with organising Slovenia’s independence
process were allocated to members of the Slovenian Democratic Party: Dr Dimitrij
Rupel (Foreign Minister), Janez Janša (Defence) and Igor Bavčar (Internal Affairs).419
On 6 December 1990, Uradni list recalled Article 2104(2) of the Plebiscite on the Sovereignty
and Independence of the Republic of Slovenia Act (adopted on 21 November 1990). That
article stated that the establishment of an independent Slovenian state (based on the principle
of self-determination) was not a hostile act directed against anyone.420 This could have been
intended as a signal of reassurance to the YNA, since it was widely believed that the
proclamation of independence would be opposed by the Serbian and Montenegrin anti-
independence leaderships.421 The clash of irreconcilable political perspectives, involving pro-
independence and anti-independence narratives, led to Yugoslavia’s political disintegration,
which was a precursor to its territorial division. This highlights the importance of closely
examining narratives and mainstream political discourses in candidate states for EU
membership, which assist also in identifying major trends in EU-Serbia relations.
419 Republic of Slovenia, ‘First multiparty elections of 1990’,
http://www.ukom.gov.si/en/media_relations/background_information/elections/elections_in_slovenia_in_2002/t
he_first_multiparty_elections_of_1990/, (accessed 14 March 2014).
420 Plebiscite on the Sovereignty and Independence of the Republic of Slovenia Act, Uradni list, vol. 47, no. 44,
p. 2034, 6 December 1990, http://www.uradni-list.si/dl/vip_akti/1990-02-2102.pdf, (accessed 14 March 2014).
421 In a meeting with a foreign ambassador on 16 January 1991, three weeks after the referendum, Milošević
raised his concerns about Slovenian independence. ‘Timeline with chronological index: the Milošević trial in
context’, in T.W. Waters (ed.), The Milošević trial: an autopsy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 494.
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The overwhelming majority of voters in Slovenia (88.2 per cent) supported independence in a
referendum held on 23 December.422 The official result was announced on 26 December 1990.
This date has been celebrated ever since as a Slovenian national holiday (Independence and
Unity Day).423Domestic legislative processes mandated the Slovenian Government to proclaim
independence within six months, which occurred on 25 June 1991, the same day as Croatia
also proclaimed independence. Slovenia’s independence proclamation was a precursor to
armed clashes on 27 June 1991 between Slovenia’s security forces and the Yugoslav National
Army. The regional implications surrounding this conflict were immediate. As a precautionary
measure, the Austrian military, for the first time in its post-war history, invoked a military
defence law that stationed several battalions along its 130 km border with Slovenia. On the eve
of its attack on Slovenia, the Yugoslav military breached Austrian airspace and Austria—an
EU candidate—contemplated national mobilisation.424
During the Slovenian crisis, Croatia’s Prime Minister Stjepan “Stipe” Mesić was elected
Yugoslav President on 30 June 1991. In his memoirs, Mesić described the period of the
Slovenian crisis as a time of paralysis for the federal Presidency powers, whose powers were
blocked by the YNA and Milošević’s inner circle.425 The internationally-mediated Brioni
Agreement (with the involvement of Italian, Dutch and Luxembourg foreign ministers), which
will be discussed later on in this chapter, ended the Ten Day Slovenian war on 8 July 1991. It
422 Republic of Slovenia (December 2000), ‘26 December: Independence Day and anniversary of the plebiscite’,
http://www.ukom.gov.si/en/media_relations/background_information/history_national_events/26_december_ind
ependence_day_and_anniversary_of_the_plebiscite/, (accessed 14 March 2014).
423 M. Albreht, ‘Plebiscit o samostojnost—čas največje politične enotnosti’, Delo, 13 December 2011,
http://www.delo.si/novice/politika/plebiscit-o-samostojnosti-cas-najvecje-politicne-enotnosti.html, (accessed 14
March 2014).
424 Austrian army website, ‘Sicherungseinsatz 1991—das LWSR53 an der jugoslawischen Grenze‘, vol. 322, no.
4, 2011, http://www.bmlv.gv.at/truppendienst/ausgaben/artikel.php?id=1179, (accessed 14 March 2014).
425 S. Mesić, The Demise of Yugoslavia: a political memoir, Budapest, Central European University Press, 2004,
p. 10. For his account of the Slovenian crisis, see also pp. 81–85; 110; 150; 154.
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paved the way for the YNA’s formal withdrawal from Slovenia on 25 October 1991.426 The
relatively short duration of the conflict in Slovenia is widely seen as being due to its ethnic
homogeneity, and the EU’s high-level involvement in peace initiatives.
In early July 1991, the European Community froze arms sales and financial aid to Yugoslavia.
A considerable internal debate took place within the EU at that time about whether to recognise
Slovenian and Croatian independence, with France supporting the anti-recognition position,
and Germany advocating recognition. French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas said that
recognition of the ‘rebel republics would throw oil on the flames’, and that independence of
Yugoslav republics would become a precedent for other cases in Europe.427 It remains unclear
whether EU countries that supported the independence proclamations by Slovenia and Croatia,
especially Germany, were aware of the grave risks to regional security that would follow from
international recognition without some resolution first of the big problems of potential ethnic
disputes and related anxieties.
The EU officially recognised the independence of the Republic of Slovenia in January 1992
and signed a Co-operation Agreement that entered into force in September 1993. Slovenia
applied for EU membership in 1996 after signing a Europe Agreement, while official
negotiations lasted between 1998 and 2002.428 Slovenia became an EU member state on 1 May
426 The departure of Yugoslav troops from Slovenia after more than four decades of Yugoslavia resembled the
Soviet army leaving Eastern Europe after the Soviet Union’s collapse. The Slovenian war veterans
commemorate 25 October each year as the rememberance day, whereby a narrative of struggle for achieving
Slovenian independence is reinforced. S.Vasović-Mekina, ‘Obeležen odlazak vojnika JNA’, 26 October 2008,
http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/Svet/Obelezen-odlazak-vojnika-JNA.lt.html, (accessed 14 March 2014).
427 A. Riding, ‘European Community freezes arms sales and aid’, New York Times, 6 July 1991,
http://www.nytimes.com/1991/07/06/world/conflict-in-yugoslavia-european-community-freezes-arms-sales-
and-aid.html, (accessed 12 August 2013).
428 The Slovenian negotiating team secured over €500,000 in EU funding for structural and technical assistance
only for the period of 2004–06. Negotiating Team of the Republic of Slovenia for the Accession to the European
Union (December 2002), ‘Negotiations on the Accession of the Republic of Slovenia to the  European Union
Completed:  presentation and assessment of the financial package’,
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2004, being the first country from the former Yugoslavia to do so.429 Its relatively smooth
passage to EU membership again reflected the absence of major ethnic conflicts within the
country, its small size and relatively highly developed economy. Its skilled diplomats and
politicians negotiated Slovenia’s entry into the EU together with the CEES in 2004—three
years ahead of Bulgaria and Romania, and nine years ahead of Croatia.
Outbreak of the crisis in Croatia
In Croatia, ethnic tensions erupted in May 1990 when the Croatian soccer team Dinamo played
a match in Zagreb against the Serbian Red Star team, which ended in violence between fans
and police.430 During the same period, Croatia’s first multiparty elections in April–May 1990
brought to power a pro-independence political party (Croatian Democratic Union). Franjo
Tuđman, Croatia’s ethno-nationalist demagogue, became Croatia’s President.431 A referendum
on independence in Croatia on 19 May 1991 was boycotted by the large Serbian minority, but
the rest of Croatia’s population favoured independence. According to the 1991 Yugoslav
national census, Serbs comprised twelve per cent of Croatia’s population, or approximately
580,000 people.432 Serbian community leaders in Croatia held a separate referendum on 12
May in which they chose to secede from Croatia. Scholar Jonathan Wheatley observes that in
http://www.arhiv.svrez.gov.si/fileadmin/svez.gov.si/pageuploads/docs/slovenia_accession_to_the_EU/Negotiati
ons_on_the_Accession.pdf, (accessed 14 March 2014).
429 Republic of Slovenia, ‘Archive: Slovenian accession to the EU’,
http://www.arhiv.svrez.gov.si/en/areas_of_work/archive_slovenias_accession_to_the_eu/, (accessed 14 March
2014).
430 I. Đorđević, ‘Twenty years later:  an anthropological analysis of the media narratives about a never ended
football game’, Glasnik Ethnografskog Instituta SANU, vol. 60, no. 2, 2012, pp. 201–216. For the continuing
significance of this match two decades later, see D. Ripley, ‘Croatia v Serbia: duo clash for first time since war’,
The Daily Mail, 22 March 2013, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sport/football/article-2297037/Croatia-Serbia-
clash-time-Yugoslav-war-1-500-police-deployed-despite-ban-away-fans.html, (accessed 14 March 2014).
431 S.E. Atkins, Holocaust denial as an international movement, Westport, Praeger Publishers, 2009, p. 139.
432 J. Šedo, ‘The party politics in Croatia’, in V. Stojarová and P. Emerson (eds), Party politics in the Western
Balkans, Oxon, Routledge, 2010, p. 73. After the war in Croatia, that figure declined to less than five per cent of
Croatia’s population. In 2001, there were 201,603 registered Serbs in Croatia (4.5 per cent), out of a total
population of 4.44 million in Croatia. Croatian Bureau of Statistics, ‘Stanovništvo prema narodnosti, po
gradovima/opčinama’, Census 2001,
http://www.dzs.hr/Hrv/censuses/Census2001/Popis/H01_02_02/H01_02_02.html, (accessed 12 February 2014).
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divided societies, such as Croatia’s, a referendum was a political tool used by the dominant
group to promote its hegemony claims.433
With the first multiparty elections across Yugoslavia, nationalist symbols used by different
ethnic groups were not interpreted uniformly by their rivals. The most controversial symbols
included the Croatian red and white chequered flag of the wartime Ustaša regime in Croatia
(which became the official Croatian flag after the constitutional changes of December 1990),
and a three-finger salute used by Serbs. These symbols were banned during Yugoslavia as they
appeared to be a sign of national disobedience and extreme nationalism, opposing the dominant
national discourse of ‘Brotherhood and Unity’. Both controversial symbols were interpreted,
from the perception of each other’s ethnic group, through the framework of extreme
nationalism. Researcher Francis Tapon observed:
Given the tense situation, using checkered design was a tactless and provocative move
[by the Croatian Government] given the Second World War history.434
The use of three-finger salute (tri prsta) by Serbs also invoked uneasy feelings among other
ethnic groups, as they regarded it to be an invocation of aggressive Serbian nationalism.435
Scholar Anamaria Dutceac Segesten noted that the symbol of tri prsta had deeper historical
roots in the Serbian national tradition. The symbol denoted the Holy Trinity and thus
symbolised the Serbian Christian Orthodox identity.436 In Central European tradition, the same
433 J. Wheatley, ‘The disruptive potential of direct democracy in deeply divided societies’, in W. Marxer (ed.),
Direct Democracy and Minorities, Wiesbaden, Springer VS, 2012, p. 67.
434 F. Tapon, The hidden Europe: what Eastern Europeans can teach us, India, Thomson Press, 2012, p. 328.
435 For an overview of some major negative connotations associated with tri prsta, see Cosmo Garvin, ‘Vlade’s
three-finger salute’, 30 January 2003, http://www.newsreview.com/sacramento/vlades-three-finger-
salute/content?oid=14137, (accessed 14 March 2014).
436 A.D. Segesten, Myth, identity and conflict: a comparative analysis of Romanian and Serbian textbooks,
Lanham, Lexington Books, 2011, pp. 143, 145, 158.
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gesture was used for centuries as heraldic charge when swearing an oath (the Schwurhand).
However, because Četnici and the Serbian militia groups during the wars of Yugoslav
succession used tri prsta, this gesture became regarded as a symbol of extreme nationalism, in
just the same way as Serbs saw the Croatian chequered flag.
As inter-ethnic relations in Croatia rapidly deteriorated between ethnic Croats and Serbs, the
NGOHuman Rights Watch observed that in 1990, many Serbs in Croatia reported intimidation
and job dismissals on the basis of their nationality. They also protested the ban, which was
introduced in 1990 by the pro-independence Croatian Government, on the official use of the
Cyrillic alphabet.437 Thousands of Serbs became internally displaced following armed clashes
between the Croatian republican security forces and Serbian minority militia forces. This
conflict triggered a military intervention by the Yugoslav National Army in August 1991,
which was not impartial in this conflict, and supported Serbs.
Changing domestic context in Serbia
A major normative consequence of Yugoslavia’s dissolution, which is still important for EU-
Serbia relations today, was the rise of ethno-particularistic narratives as mainstream political
discourses. In Serbia, these narratives were promoted by the new socialist elite. The Socialist
Party of Serbia (SPS) was formed during Yugoslavia’s dissolution in 1990. Its founder
Slobodan Milošević, a former communist bureaucrat who turned Serbian nationalist, became
the head of the Serbian regional communist Party in May 1986. In January 1988, Milošević
engineered the ousting of his former mentor, Ivan Stambolić, who was Serbia’s President. It is
now widely believed that Milošević was involved in Stambolić’s disappearance and murder in
437 Human Rights Watch, ‘Yugoslavia—human rights abuses in the Croatian conflict’, 31 August 1991,
http://www.hrw.org/reports/pdfs/y/yugoslav/yugo918.pdf, (accessed 14 March 2014).
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2000. It has been described as the ‘most significant political murder of the late Milošević era’,
and tied to speculation that the US was allegedly ‘grooming’ Stambolić as a possible successor
to Milošević in mid-2000 when he was reported as missing.438
After Milošević became Serbia’s President in 1989 and founded the SPS in July 1990, the idea
of centralised Yugoslavism became the Serbian republic’s main policy.439 Centralised
Yugoslavism advocated the preservation of federal government, which clashed with the idea
of independent statehood for Croats, Slovenes, Bosniaks and other ethnic groups (Slav
Macedonians and Kosovo Albanians). Serbian communities living outside Serbia
predominantly supported centralised Yugoslavism.440 Proponents of self-determination
seemed to be acutely aware of momentous political changes sweeping Eastern Europe after the
Polish Spring protests in 1988, and the EU’s new policy towards Eastern Europe.441 They were
thus partly inspired by wider geopolitical developments, and started to develop a ‘return to
Europe’ discourse—which, in 2000, also inspired Serbian pro-democracy activists.
Dominant narratives of the 1990s period impact on the perceptions of the EU in Serbia, and
are associated with negative images of Serbia in the EU. Lecheler and De Vreese found that
attitudes in the EU towards Serbia are still ‘suffering from the country’s role in the Balkan
conflicts’, despite Serbia’s central position in the Western Balkans, whose ‘membership
438 I. Traynor, ‘Obituary: Ivan Stambolić’, The Guardian, 1 April 2003,
http://www.theguardian.com/news/2003/apr/01/guardianobituaries.balkans, (accessed 1 March 2014).
439 ‘Slobodan Milošević’, The Independent, 13 March 2006,
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/obituaries/slobodan-Milošević-469744.html, (accessed 1 March 2014).
440 Milošević’s opposition to self-determination was so entrenched that he even suggested in 1992 a union with
Greece, a non-Slavonic nation. Reuters, ‘Serbia calls for confederation with Greece’, 4 July 1992,
http://www.serbia-hellas.com/articles/confederation.html, (accessed 1 December 2013).
441 For a list of academic publications on the ‘Polish Spring’, see Z. Nakhoda, ‘Solidarność (Solidarity) brings
down the communist government of Poland, 1988–89’, Global Nonviolent action database, 10 September 2011,
http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/solidarno-solidarity-brings-down-communist-government-poland-
1988-89, (accessed 1 March 2014).
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process exemplified future enlargement rounds’.442 Dominant sets of ideas for ethno-
particularistic narrative proponents in Serbia in the 1990s include narratives of Serbian
victimhood as well as denial that Serbs committed war crimes.443 Macdonald argues that
‘'Greater Serbian and Greater Croatian ambitions were premised on the need to protect one’s
fellow co-nationals throughout the region when Yugoslavia was in the final stages of life’.444
Furthermore, he observes that both sides portrayed Bosniaks as ‘the vanguard of a dangerous
Islamic conspiracy’, resorting to ‘orientalist discourses to assert their false claims’.445
However, the victimhood discourse generated by the biggest casualty group of the Bosnian
War, the Bosniaks, attracted international financial and military support, especially from
Muslim countries and Islamic NGOs.446 According to scholar Elissa Helms, narratives of
victimhood, particularly in gendered terms, emerged as a particularly powerful vehicle of
nationalism for some Bosniak groups in the post-conflict period.447
The narrative of Serbian victimhood during the wars of Yugoslavia’s succession was, in part,
influenced by Milošević-era propaganda, which only highlighted Serbian war victims, for
example during Radio Television Serbia’s (RTS) peak television news hour on Channel One.448
After the propaganda machine orchestrated by the Milošević regime refused to recognise the
442 S. Lecheler and C.H. De Vreese, ‘Framing Serbia: the effects of news framing on public support for EU
enlargement’, European Political Science Review, vol. 2, no. 1, 2010, p. 74.
443 The victimhood narrative was also present among the Croatians as well as Bosniaks and Albanians. For
Croatian victimhood narratives, see D.B. Macdonald, Balkan Holocausts: Serbian and Croatian victim centered
propaganda and the war in Yugoslavia, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2003.
444 ibid., p. 245.
445 ibid., p. 244.
446 M.R. Gordon, ‘Iran said to send arms to Bosnians’, 10 September 1992, New York Times,
http://www.nytimes.com/1992/09/10/world/iran-said-to-send-arms-to-bosnians.html, (accessed 1 March 2014).
447 E. Helms, Innocence and victimhood: gender, nation, and women’s activism in post-war Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Wisconsin, The University of Wisconsin Press, 2013, p. 4. See also pp. 120–157.
448 The screening of this program became a rallying point for anti-government protests.
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Serbian democratic opposition’s electoral success in the 1996 local elections, people protested
en masse against Channel One’s biased reporting.449 A foreign observer commented:
An extremely popular way of displaying dissent in the Winter Protest [November 1996–
February 1997] was called ‘Noise is in fashion’ (‘Buka u modi’); every evening at
7.30pm, hundreds of thousands of people drowned out the main evening news report
on state TV with an outburst of noise from their living rooms and balconies.450
This was the time when the European Commission started to devise a new strategy of
engagement with the anti-Milošević opposition in Serbia, which culminated several years later
in the ‘Energy for Democracy’ program.451 The physical presence of a large number of refugees
in Serbia from the conflict areas, many of whom were affected by the war, further swayed
public opinion in Serbia against the independence of other republics. Therefore, anti-
independence and ethno-particularistic narratives, but also reformist and anti-Milošević
narratives have all influenced the conceptual lenses through which Serbian political elites and
many Serbian citizens have remembered the wars of Yugoslav succession.452
449 For a useful analysis of Serbia’s 1996 elections, see V. Goati, ‘Novembarski izbori 1996—smisao i efekti’,
Republika, no. 155–56, 1–31 January 1997, http://www.yurope.com/zines/republika/arhiva/97/155/155-29.html,
(accessed 14 June 2013).
450 S. Jansen, ‘Victims, underdogs and rebels: discursive practices of resistance in Serbian protest’, Critique of
Anthropology, vol. 20, no. 4, 2000, pp. 393–419; p. 399. The Winter Protest erupted in Serbia’s major urban
centres after the democratic opposition coalition wielded victory in the first post-Dayton elections in 1996, which
the Milošević regime invalidated, prompting hundreds of thousands of Serbs to go to the streets and protest.
451 Interview with Edgar Thielmann (EU Fellow of the Centre for European Studies, Australian National
University) who coordinated the European Commission’s ‘Energy for Democracy’ program for Serbia, April
2013, Canberra.
452 Stokes used this term. G. Stokes, ‘Independence and the fate of minorities 1991–92’, in C. Ingrao and T.A.
Emmert (eds), Confronting the Yugoslav controversies: a scholar’s initiative, Washington DC, United States
Institute of Peace Press, p. 83.
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The disintegration of Yugoslavia
The Balkan conflict during the 1990s is widely regarded as Europe’s worst single episode of
violence since the Second World War.453 Political decisions by the leaders in five former
Yugoslav republics to take up violence were influenced by ethno-particularist narratives of
exclusion. The Slovenes, Croats and Bosniaks held opposing views to those of Serbs and
Montenegrins regarding the future of the Yugoslav federation. Nationalist political leaders
often invoked their own ethnic group’s traumatic experiences during the Second World War
that resonated well with their voters, whose fears were exploited to justify their leaders’
political decisions. While religious differences existed among quarrelling parties, the role of
these differences in the conflict was frequently overemphasised as ‘many commentators …
failed to recognise the degree to which resurgent local nationalisms brought about and then
often used religious revival rather than the other way around’.454
What was once a bold and non-aligned country, Yugoslavia became economically and
politically so exhausted and internally discordant by the mid-1980s that ultra-nationalist and/or
pro-independence narratives started to fill its political spaces. Glenny observes the rise in
propaganda of extremist organisations that ‘swamped the public arena with instrumentalised
historical memories’.455 In Serbia this was manifested by the invocation of stories regarding
Serbian victims in the Ustaše-run Croatia (NDH, 1941–1944), a very sensitive topic among
Serbs.456 The growth of nationalist sentiment in Serbia predated this war: a leaked draft 1986
453 As a recent historical event, it continues to define this region in academic works. It influences perceptions
and policy-making in former Yugoslav republics towards their neighbours, of Serbia towards the EU and of EU
members, especially Germany, Austria, Hungary and the Netherlands, towards Serbia.
454 W.L. McBride, Philosophical reflections on the changes in Eastern Europe, Oxford, Rowman & Littlefield
Publishers, 1999, p. 112.
455 Glenny, The Balkans, 1999, op. cit., p. 629.
456 Michael Freund, ‘Time to confront Croatia’s hidden Holocaust’, 30 May 2013, The Jerusalem Post,
http://www.jpost.com/Magazine/Opinion/Time-to-confront-Croatias-hidden-Holocaust-314896 (accessed 1
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memorandum from one of Serbia’s oldest scholarly institutions (established in 1841), the
Serbian Academy of Science and Arts, was widely seen as evidence of rising Serbian ultra-
nationalism under Milošević.457
The self-determination idea resonated among those citizens who did not identify with
Yugoslavism, which tended to be much more vigorously promoted by Serbian intellectuals.
These incompatible perspectives clashed on the battlefield when the Yugoslav National Army
engaged Slovenian Territorial Defence forces on 27 June 1991, two days after Slovenia
declared independence during Milan Kučan’s presidency. Croatia also declared independence
on 25 June in what appeared to be a coordinated move with Slovenia.458 The Slovenian ‘Ten-
day War’ marked the start of the wars of Yugoslav succession. It turned global public opinion
against Serbia, whose military intervention in the secessionist republics (often carried out by
ostensibly shared federal institutions, especially the Yugoslav National Army) was compared
to the Soviet Union’s interventions in the CEES during the Cold War.459
A missed opportunity: the ‘Hour of Europe’
In the years before the deterioration of the internal security situation in Yugoslavia, it appears
that financial and economic relations were the chief focus of meetings between the Yugoslav
Government and EU institutions. In November 1989, EU and Yugoslavia agreed to ‘anticipate
the negotiation of a new financial protocol’; the EU also agreed to extend technical assistance
March 2014). See also Emily Greble, Sarajevo 1941–1945: Muslims, Christians, and Jews in Hitler's Europe,
Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2011, p. 101.
457 Glenny, The Balkans, 1999, op. cit., p. 627.
458 The FYROM declared independence in September 1991, and Bosnia-Herzegovina in December 1991. The
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), consisting of Serbia and Montenegro, was established in April 1992.
Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Slovenia became UN members in May 1992, and the FYROM in April 1993.
459 For more information on the role of the Yugoslav National Army in the Balkan conflict, see M. Hadžić,
Jugoslovenska Narodna Agonija, Belgrade, Centre for Civil-Military Relations, 2004.
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to certain Yugoslav economic sectors and ‘examine the possibility of Yugoslavia’s
participation in the EU programs’.460 On 7 February 1990, Yugoslavia applied for membership
of another European institution, the Council of Europe.461 At the request of the Yugoslav
Government, the EU even agreed to review bilateral relations. In September 1990, the Council
decided to extend to Yugoslavia the program of aid for economic reconstruction (Phare), which
was an economic development program that the EU originally created for Poland and
Hungary.462 On 18 December 1990, the EU–Yugoslavia Ministerial Cooperation Council
adopted a decision to advance their bilateral cooperation.463 This indicates that the EU
supported, at that stage, the maintaining of Yugoslavia’s federal state, even though it had
already become clear by that stage that the Slovenian and Croatian republican governments
were campaigning for independence, including in the European Parliament.464
Criticism of the EU’s responses to the Yugoslav crisis in 1990–91 focuses mainly on the
incoherence of its foreign policy, its slow response and the tendency by key EU members,
especially Germany, to act autonomously without collective consent or coordination.465 The
failure to provide a coherent response meant that the political will in the EU to make more
effort towards conflict prevention and effective crisis mediation was weak. The EU mediators
were initially advocating preservation of the Yugoslav federation, as self-determination claims
and nationalism were initially seen as ideas that went against the philosophy of deeper
460 Council of Europe, European Yearbook 1989, vol. 37, Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1991, p. 100.
461 G. Adinolfi (ed.), European Yearbook 1990, Council of Europe, vol.  38, Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1992,
p. 205.
462 ibid., pp. 15; 20, 30.
463 Radeljić, Europe and the Collapse of Yugoslavia, 2012, op. cit., pp. 225–26.
464 M. Klemenčič, ‘The International Community and the FRY/Belligerents, 1989–1997’, in C.W. Ingrao and
T.A. Emmert (eds), Confronting the Yugoslav controversies, 2013, op. cit., p. 162.
465 The first attempt by EU members to coordinate their foreign policies was the European Political Cooperation
(EPC) arrangement. EPC was introduced in 1970 and lasted until November 1993, when it was replaced by the
EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy pillar. The CFSP is still very much a work in progress.
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European integration.466 In the circumstances, this approach quickly became overtaken by
events in Yugoslavia.
James Gow observes that the EU attempted to mediate between quarrelling republics not
because of its sense of regional responsibility, but for reasons of its own security. Yugoslavia
was, by then, the main maritime and land communications bridge between two EU members,
Italy and Greece. Yugoslavia also benefited from the EU’s financial assistance schemes before
the conflict.467 Financial leverage was erroneously believed to be a strong enough deterrent to
dissuade Milošević and his inner circle from using the federal army against the republican
governments seeking self-determination.
Given its severity, it seems bizarre that the deteriorating security situation in former Yugoslavia
was discussed only as a minor item at the meeting of European Council in Luxembourg on 28–
29 June 1991.468 This meeting took place during the week in which Slovenia and Croatia
proclaimed independence (25 June), to which the federal army responded with force on the eve
of the Luxembourg summit (27 June). On 23 June 1991, the EU pre-emptively suspended
dialogue with Slovenian and Croatian leaders as both republics were preparing to proclaim
independence.469 On 24 June 1991, the EU signed with the federal Yugoslav Government a
five-year loan of almost $1 billion. The Luxembourg summit also ‘took note of the fact that,
on behalf of the Twelve [EU members], Luxembourg has invoked the emergency mechanism
in the CSCE framework in view of the extreme gravity of the situation in Yugoslavia’, which
466 J. Gow, ‘Security and democracy: the EU in central and eastern Europe’, in K. Henderson (ed.), Back to
Europe: Central and Eastern Europe and the European Union, London, University College London Press,
1998, pp. 20–33; p. 22.
467 ibid.
468 See ‘European Council conclusions’, European Council Luxembourg, 28–29 June 1991,
http://www.european-council.europa.eu/media/848602/1991_june_-_luxembourg__eng_.pdf (accessed 1 March
2014).
469 J. Glaurdić, The Hour of Europe: Western powers and the breakup of Yugoslavia, London, Yale University
Press, 2011, p. 170.
146
was the first time for the European Political Cooperation that this mechanism was invoked.470
The EU leaders also reached a consensus, in principle, to create a peace monitoring mission
for the Balkans.
On 3 July 1991 at a meeting in Prague, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
(CSCE) approved the European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM). The ECMM
helped to promote deeper policy institutionalisation and coordination among EU states.
However, its mandate was weakened by an incoherent EU foreign policy. Raimo Väyrynen has
observed that the CSCE was unable to stop violence in Yugoslavia because of its under-
developed conflict prevention mechanisms. He noted that the EU’s and US’s political will to
deal with ‘out of area’ conflicts, such as in Yugoslavia, was too weak; the CSCE’s main focus
was on the EU’s Eastern border, and on integrating the CEES into Europe’s political (EU) and
security (NATO) institutions.471 The CSCE helped to promote deeper policy
institutionalisation and coordination among EU states. However, its mandate was weakened by
the incoherence of EU foreign policy.472
Germany’s threat to rapidly recognise Croatian and Slovenian independence did not help in
overcoming disunity inside the EU. Sonia Lucarelli recalls that on 4 July Germany proposed a
meeting of the Council of Ministers at The Hague to discuss independence as the optimal
solution to the Yugoslav crisis. However, the French resisted this proposal.473 At the UN, the
French, British and Belgian proposals for a UN intervention in the Yugoslav crisis were
470 European Council Luxembourg, 28–29 June 1991, op. cit., p. 15.
471 Väyrynen, ‘Preventive action: failure in Yugoslavia’, 1997, op. cit., p. 28.
472 The break-up of Yugoslavia was also of particular concern to Greece for its own, domestic reasons. Greece
opposed Macedonia’s international recognition under its constitutional name, the Republic of Macedonia,
lobbying hard that the country be eventually recognised only as ‘the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’,
which Skoplje regarded as an act of provocation.
473 S. Lucarelli, Europe and the breakup of Yugoslavia: a political failure in search of a scholarly explanation,
The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2000, p. 125.
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rejected by Russia and China, both veto-wielding members of the UNSC. This situation in EU
policy-making was exploited in the Balkans by all major parties to the conflict, who started
searching for support outside the EU, which made the wars of Yugoslavia’s succession even
more complex.474
Following the proclamation of independence by Slovenia and Croatia, the eminent strategic
historian Lawrence Freedman criticised the Western insistence on preserving the Yugoslav
federation:
By stressing national unity above all else the international community is making civil
war more likely. … Divorce is messy and unpleasant. But it is preferable to domestic
violence.475
Europe’s leaders felt that the Yugoslav challenge gave them an opportunity to demonstrate
their capacity to solve the continent’s problems. The Foreign Affairs Minister of Luxembourg
and President of the EU Council, Jacques Poos, helped negotiate the Brioni Agreement. On his
way to the negotiating table, Poos declared that ‘the hour of Europe has dawned’, presumably
hoping that EU’s diplomatic crisis management capacities would preclude the need for US
military involvement. The US Secretary of State, James Baker, not long afterwards announced
that ‘We [the US] have no dog in this fight’. 476
474 See the forthcoming publication, Debating the end of Yugoslavia, F. Bieber, A. Galijaš and R. Archer (eds),
Centre for Southeast European Studies, University of Graz, Austria, October 2014.
475 Cited by Glaurdić, The Hour of Europe, 2011, op. cit., p. 171.
476 Quoted by G. Lundestad, The United States and Western Europe since 1945: From "Empire" by Invitation to
transatlantic drift, New York, Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 240.
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While the European institutions undertook numerous initiatives, they did not solve the
problems and the phrase ‘the hour of Europe’ was to become notorious. In September 1991,
the Council of Europe’s organs suspended cooperation with Yugoslavia as per resolution 969.
Austria, then temporary member of UNSC, called for a UN peacekeeping mission in
Yugoslavia, and the chair of UNSC, France, proposed an arms embargo (which lasted from
September 1991 until June 1996, following the implementation of the Dayton peace
agreement).477 The end of the conflict was made possible only with the US’s military
involvement while the EU could not reconcile its differences until the Dayton Accords that
ended the wars of Yugoslav succession in December 1995.
In December 1991, twelve EC foreign ministers expressed a political commitment to recognise
Croatian and Slovenian independence, pending findings of the Badinter Commission about the
aspirant states’ observance of the requisite criteria.478 During the same month, EFTA foreign
ministers announced that ‘they consider the ongoing conflict in Yugoslavia as a tragedy to the
population of that country’.479 This declaration suggested that the conflict in SFRJ was being
viewed among EU’s regional partners in EFTA, among which were official EU membership
candidates such as Austria, as an internal political issue. EFTA Council previously decided at
a meeting on 14 November 1991 to suspend all forms of cooperation with SFRJ, after having
reviewed bilateral ties since May.480 The EU also cut off all technical support and exploratory
talks on a free trade agreement with Yugoslavia, cancelling the establishment of a development
fund for SFRJ (with an agreed sum in April 1990 of $100 million to support the development
477 M. Bromley, United Nations arms embargoes, their impact on arms flows and target behaviour case study:
Former Yugoslavia, 1991–96, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 2007, p. 2,
http://books.sipri.org/files/misc/UNAE/SIPRI07UNAEYug.pdf, (accessed 1 March 2014).
478 T.G. Weiss and A. Pasic, ‘Dealing with the displacement and suffering caused by Yugoslavia’s wars’, in R.
Cohen and F.M. Deng  (eds), The forsaken people: case studies of the internally displaced, Washington DC,
The Brookings Institution, 1998, pp. 175–231; p. 193.
479 Council of Europe, European Yearbook 1991, vol. 39, Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1993, p. 14.
480 ibid., pp. 12; 16.
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of market economy in Yugoslavia).481 In January 1992, all EFTA members recognised Croatian
and Slovenian independence.
It was widely assumed that the wars of Yugoslav succession caught the EU and world leaders
by surprise. This position has been in recent years contested by scholars, including Glaurdić
and Radeljić, who have examined the Balkan conflict in light of new evidence. Radeljić also
observes how the EU ignored early warning signs of SFRJ’s potentially violent disintegration
in 1990. These included reports from the Austrian politicians who were aware and had been
publicly warning about the prospect of Yugoslavia’s violent disintegration that fell on deaf ears
of the EU members.482 This shows that there had to be at least a rudimentary awareness present
in the EU’s foreign policy circles what the increasing tensions in the Balkans might mean for
regional and European security.
Internal divisions among member states over whether to preserve the Yugoslav federation, or
to provide full diplomatic support for self-determination of individual republics, certainly
crippled a common EU response and adversely affected the peace mission of the EU’s leading
peace negotiator, Lord Carrington. As NATO’s former Secretary-General (1984–88),
Carrington would have received regular strategic NATO assessments about the deteriorating
situation in Yugoslavia during his time in office. Glaurdić quotes a NATO strategic assessment
of March 1987 which posited that Yugoslavia’s deep economic and social divides could
escalate into a ‘lebanonisation or super-balkanisation’ of SFRJ.483 In 1991, Carrington became
a lead negotiator in the Peace Conference that ended the war in Slovenia, but did not succeed
in convincing Milošević to agree to a peace plan that would result in a peaceful separation for
481 ibid., p. 16.
482 Radeljić, Europe and the Collapse of Yugoslavia, 2012, op. cit., pp. 130–33. Austria was not an EU member
until 1995.
483 Glaurdić, The hour of Europe, 2011, op. cit., p. 19.
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Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.484 Lord Carrington resigned from this role in April 1992 as
the conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina were under way.485 Carrington’s ambition to
negotiate a ceasefire in Croatia, as he initially secured guarantees from the Croatian
Government that rebel Serbs would not be attacked—which was an empty promise.
The European Commission’s attention during the second Delors Commission (1989–1992) was
consumed by intra-EU affairs, including consolidation of the Single European Act that came
into force in 1987, preparations for the Maastricht treaty summit in 1992, and EU enlargement
to the East. The primary diplomatic focus of the EU was on the Soviet Union’s decline after
the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, Germany’s reunification in 1990, East Germany’s European
integration, and the first Gulf War. Former Dutch Finance Minister, Frans Andriessen, from
the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) party was Vice-President and Commissioner
responsible for External relations and trade policy at the outbreak of inter-ethnic hostilities in
former Yugoslavia. From 1992 to 1994 during the third Delors Commission, another CDA
party member, Hans Van den Broek, assumed the Commissioner’s Portfolio for External
relations and enlargement.486 Van den Broek was the chief negotiator in the EU-brokered
Brioni Agreement, who successfully negotiated that the Slovenian war would end on condition
that the independence proclamation be frozen for three months.
Van den Broek proposed changes to Yugoslavia’s internal borders along ethnic lines. The
rejection of this proposal by eleven other EU foreign ministers was described by former UK
484 The only pro-independence republic against which Milošević did not wage war was FYROM. But spillover
effects from the Yugoslav wars in FYROM made this country a hub for a range of illegal criminal activities,
including weapons smuggling, especially in the lead-up to the Kosovo conflict.
485 B. Crossette, ‘Europe’s envoy in Yugoslav crisis quits’, 26 August 1992, New York Times,
http://www.nytimes.com/1992/08/26/world/europe-s-envoy-in-yugoslav-crisis-quits.html, (accessed 1 March
2014).
486 Van den Broek served as Dutch foreign affairs minister from 1982 to 1993.
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Foreign Secretary Lord Owen as one of the greatest missed opportunities of the EU’s
diplomatic effort in containing the Balkan conflict.487 In his personal reflections on the Brioni
Agreement, Van den Broek noted that after his diplomatic mission, nobody in the EU any
longer believed in the preservation of Yugoslav unity. The EU still demanded a joint agreement
on the distribution of property of all six republics as a condition for recognising the declared
independence.488 After Slovenia and Croatia declared independence on 8 October 1991 for the
second time (the EU had previously negotiated with them a three-month delay), EU members
agreed on 19 December, under intense pressure from Germany, to recognise their independence
within one month. ‘The tragic and violent further disintegration of former Yugoslavia also left
deep marks in the Netherlands’, Van den Broek concluded.489
Prior to the start of inter-ethnic hostilities in Yugoslavia, there was awareness among Western
academics that home-grown problems within Yugoslavia were assuming a potentially
dangerous character. Many observations about the looming crisis relied on observations from
regional reporting, including the Slovenian press in which anti-Yugoslav discourses were
prevalent. A collection of academic contributions in 1990 clearly outlined possible scenarios
of Yugoslavia’s dissolution.490 However, awareness among regional academic experts was
obviously not reflected on the EU level during 1990. As EU institutions were focused on the
changes on the EU’s Eastern borders, they still fell short of extending to Yugoslavia an offer
of an association agreement, which could have, potentially, averted the conflict.491
487 J.M.O. Sharp, Honest broker or perfidious albion? British policy in former Yugoslavia, London, Institute for
Public Policy Research, 1997, p. 11.
488 H. Van der Broeck, ‘My personal memories of the turbulent Dutch Presidency of the European Community
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In line with the arguments that emphasise Serbia’s non-readiness to join the EU on the basis of
institutional weaknesses, John Lampe similarly suggested that the ‘historical Balkan legacy’ of
slow reform has generated economic sluggishness in Yugoslavia, which encouraged
authoritarianism. According to this perspective, authoritarian tendencies in Yugoslavia derived
support from ‘narrow nationalism’, which loomed as a major threat to long-term regional
security and peaceful inter-ethnic co-existence.492 Misha Glenny notes that the ‘conundrum’
that lay at the heart of Yugoslavia’s national question related to the status of Croats as a
minority in Yugoslavia, and the status of the Serbs as a minority in Croatia.493 According to
this perspective, the unresolved ‘ethnic question’ was the underlying cause of Yugoslavia’s
disintegration. Ramet noted that the failure of the three Yugoslavias’ state-building projects,
especially in the absence of political legitimation from all major ethnic groups, was an
underlying cause for conflict.494 This thesis adds to the debate by developing the idea that
competing narratives of statehood, nationality, national sovereignty, coupled with different
levels of democratisation between the Yugoslav republics and Slovenia’s and Croatia’s ‘return
to Europe’ discourses, constitute the principal causes behind Yugoslavia’s disintegration.
The Croat-Serb rivalry and competing victimhood narratives
The victimhood narratives by various ethnic groups in Yugoslavia strengthened the nationalist
discourses. Serbs in Croatia displayed an antagonistic attitude towards Croatia’s new
leadership led by former Yugoslav army general and nationalist dissident, Franjo Tuđman. In
advocating self-determination for Croatia, Tuđman sometimes used language that seemed to
492 J.R. Lampe, ‘Southeastern Europe and the legacy of insecurity’, in P. Shoup and G. Hoffman (eds), Problems
of Balkan security: Southeastern Europe in the 1990s, 1990, op. cit., pp. 27–29.
493 Glenny, The Balkans, 1999, op. cit., p. 591.
494 Ramet, The three Yugoslavias, 2006, op. cit., pp. 338–89. Z. Đinđić, Jugoslavija kao nedovršena država,
Novi Sad, Književna Zajednica Novog Sada, 1988.
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recall pro-Nazi and anti-Semitic attitudes from Croatia’s Ustaše-led puppet state during the
Second World War.495 Tuđman’s Croatian Democratic Union party won the republican April–
May 1990 elections on anti-Yugoslavism platform, and Tuđman subsequently became Croatian
President. At the level of ethnic politics two trends were occurring in parallel: Croatia’s
unilateral separation from Yugoslavia, and the Serbian minority’s attempted unilateral
secession from Croatia. Bromley argues that the Yugoslav wars were caused by two such
interlinked factors:
First, attempts by Slovenia, Croatia and, later, Bosnia and Herzegovina to secede from
the SFRJ and corresponding efforts by Serbia to halt that process. Second, attempts by
externally supported ethnic minorities within the breakaway republics to secede from
the new states.496
In August 1990, the Serbs in Croatia proclaimed Krajina to be an autonomous region, and in
April 1991 declared its secession from Croatia and foreshadowed its possible annexation to
Serbia. Meanwhile, Croatia adopted a new Constitution in December 1990. However, by April
1991 conflict had broken out between the Croatian territorial defence forces and Serbs from
Krajina, and Milošević sent in the federal army to support Serbs in Croatia. In May, the Croats
voted in a referendum (mostly boycotted by the Serbs) to separate from the SFRJ, and declared
independence on 25 June 1991. The conflict was in full swing by August 1991.  The war is
viewed in Croatia as a liberation from the Serbian hegemony in Yugoslavia (hence the name
Domovinski odbrambeni rat, the Homeland defence war). Croatian Serbs saw it as a direct
threat to their ethnic group’s survival. The conflict seemed to fulfil the prediction of one of
495 S. Kinzer, ‘Pro-Nazi rulers’ legacy still lingers for Croatia’, New York Times, 31 October 1993,
http://www.nytimes.com/1993/10/31/world/pro-nazi-rulers-legacy-still-lingers-for-croatia.html, (accessed 1
May 2013).
496 Bromley, United Nations arms embargoes, 2007, op. cit.
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Tito’s closest colleagues, Stane Dolanc after the 1968 student protests in Kosovo, when he
warned of ‘the danger of the growth of other kinds of nationalisms’ in the SFRJ.497
DuringOperation Storm in August 1995, led by the Croatian military with the logistical support
of a private US company L-3 MPRI, it is estimated that over 200,000 Serbs were driven out of
their homes and a further 2,000 are presumed dead or missing.498 This event from the Croatian
War remains a particularly sensitive bilateral issue between Serbia and Croatia. Graphic images
of a convoy of refugees entering Serbia with minimal supplies in overcrowded vehicles are
reprinted every year at the August commemoration of the exodus.499 These images help
reinvoke the collective memory of the war, whilst strengthening the perceptions of Serbian
victimhood and a tendency to blame external actors but not the Serbian Government for the
outbreak of the conflict, and crimes such as ethnic cleansing.
In the future negotiating rounds with the EU, unresolved issues between Croatia and Serbia
have a potential to delay Serbia’s accession negotiations.500 A dispute between Croatia and
Serbia over several Danubian islands has not attracted as much attention as their genocide case
before the International Court of Justice.501 In 2001, however, several scholars drew attention
497 D. Binder, ‘One storm has passed but others are gathering in Yugoslavia’, New York Times, 19 April 1981, p.
4.
498 F. Švarm, ‘The culture of remembrance, the fall of Krajina—the legalisation of ethnic cleansing’, Vreme, 22
November 2012, http://www.vreme.com/cms/view.php?id=1084227 (accessed 1 May 2013). Jutarnji List,
‘Serbs request damages from US company for Operation Storm’, B92, 7 September 2012,
http://www.b92.net/eng/news/crimes.php?yyyy=2012&mm=09&dd=07&nav_id=82126 (accessed 1 May 2013).
499 Milošević did not allow the Serbian refugee convoy to stop in Belgrade, instructing them to resettle instead in
Kosovo and Vojvodina. Police allowed some voluntary NGOs to distribute humanitarian supplies to the passing
convoy as they guarded all major exits from the highway in order to prevent the convoy from stopping. Personal
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500 In 2013, 41,762 people in Serbia were registered as ‘refugees’ from Croatia, some of whom have not
resolved property and citizenship issues in Croatia. Central Intelligence Agency, ‘Serbia’, The World Factbook,
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to the disputed islands.502Although this dispute is low on the bilateral agenda between Belgrade
and Zagreb, as in the case of Croatia’s accession and the border issue it had with Slovenia
during accession negotiations, Zagreb might decide to raise this issue with Serbia further down
the track of Serbia’ negotiations with the EU. This move would, in turn, risk delaying Serbia’s
negotiations with the EU. Victimhood narratives by both Serbs and Croats, which are linked
with their perceptions of the Balkan conflict, are also likely to resurface in such a scenario.
The exodus of several hundred thousand Serbs from Croatia became a rallying point for
Serbia’s right-wing groups. Images of refugee convoys that were kilometres long were, during
the war with Croatia, were also used for propaganda purposes by theMilošević regime to attract
more combat volunteers. However, the refugee crisis was also a symbol of humanitarian
disaster and a looming security risk for the EU, as many refugees sought resettlement in the
West, especially in EU member states.503 In Serbia’s victimhood discourses, Operation Storm
is cited as the example in which the ‘West’ was apparently ‘biased’ against Serbs, and that for
this reason, Serbia should maintain its ‘neutrality’ and abandon European integration.504
In a surprise move, in November 2013, the ICTY Appeals Court overturned the 2011
convictions of former Croatian generals Ante Gotovina and Mladen Markač, for crimes their
troops committed against Serbs during military actions, including Operation Storm, in which
502 These river islands are known as Vukovar island, Šarengrad island and Hagel island. Mladen Klemenčić and
Clive H. Schofield, ‘War and Peace on the Danube: the evolution of the Croatia-Serbia boundary’, Boundary &
Territory Briefing, vol. 3, no. 3, 2001, p. 19.
503 T. Hundley, ‘House by house, Croatia shuts the door on Serb refugees’, 12 August 1997, Chicago Tribune,
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1997-08-12/news/9708120215_1_croatian-government-krajina-serbs,
(accessed 1 May 2013).
504 A Serbian politician Dragan Marković “Palma”, the president of Jedinstvena Srbija political party, said in
2012 that Croatia should not be allowed to join the EU because of ‘Croatia’s national celebration’ of the
Operation Storm, which he called ‘an act of genocide’ against Serbs in Croatia. Tanjug, ‘Marković: Hrvatskoj
zbog genocida zabraniti ulazak u EU’, 4 August 2012, Blic, http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Politika/336449/Markovic-
Hrvatskoj-zbog-genocida-zabraniti-ulazak-u-EU, (accessed 12 May 2013). This example shows how differently
Serbia and Crotia view the events during the Operation Storm.
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hundreds of thousands of Serbs were ethnically cleansed.505 The ICTY’s surprise judgement
divided the five judges of the ICTY’s Appeals Court, with two out of five judges opposing the
verdict, and Presiding Judge Theodor Meron (among the three in majority) even provided a
separate opinion.506 The verdict also created ‘a gap in Serbia’s and Croatia’s historical
narratives’.507 The acquittal of Croatian generals, who were the leaders of controversial military
onslaught against Serbs, was perceived by many Serbs to be a demonstration of bias against
Serbs by the ICTY.508 These perceptions at the discursive level still serve to legitimise Serbian
victimhood narratives, heightening perceptions about Serbian ‘otherness’ or remoteness from
the West, and high levels of mistrust in the instruments and forums of international justice.
The ethnically divided city of Vukovar became a symbol of humanitarian disaster, but also a
reference point for Croatian nationalists. This place is where the conflict in Croatia officially
began on 25 August 1991, six weeks before the nine-month siege of Dubrovnik was initiated
by the Montenegrin armed forces.509 In Vukovar, the Yugoslav army overran the city, killing
505 Human Rights Watch, ‘World report 2013: Croatia’, http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2013/country-
chapters/croatia, (accessed 1 March 2014). While a number of Croatian army members have been sentenced in
Croatia, the absence of international convictions against high-ranking military leader Gotovina and other former
non-Serb war crimes indictees was received in Serbia as a ‘proof’ of the ICTY’s anti-Serbian bias.
506 ICTY, ‘Judgement: Case No. IT-06-90-A’, 16 November 2012,
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/gotovina/acjug/en/121116_judgement.pdf, (accessed 1 May 2013).
507 R. Nakarada, ‘Acquittal of Gotovina and Markač: s blow to the Serbian and
Croatian reconciliation process’, Utrecht Journal for International and European Law Merkourios, vol. 29, no.
76, November 2013, p. 102.
508 BBC, ‘How Croatia’s Ante Gotovina’s past caught up with him’, 15 April 2011,
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-13038812, (accessed 1 March 2014).
509 Montenegro’s prime minister during the siege of Dubrovnik was 29-year old Milo Đukanović, who referred
to the siege as the ‘war for peace’. Just as Russian President Vladimir Putin, who has moved in-between the two
roles of Russia’s President and Prime Minister, Đukanović was Montenegro’s Prime Minister from 1991 to
1998; President of Montenegro from 1998 to 2002; Prime Minister of Montenegro from 2003 to 2006, and from
2008 to 2010. He has been Montenegro’s prime minister since December 2012. In 1997, Đukanović denounced
Milošević’s politics, a move which granted him some Western support. In 2000, Đukanović apologised for the
siege of Dubrovnik, but has never been charged for ordering Montenegro’s military offensive against
Dubrovnik. Đukanović’s alleged role in regional criminal activities still tarnish Montenegro’s EU bid. L.
MacKean and M. Jones, ‘Documents tarnish Montenegro’s EU bid’, 29 May 2012,
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-18237811 (accessed 1 May 2014). M. Patručić, ‘St. Nikola Island front




hundreds of civilians and driving out many thousands. The coastal Croatian town of Dubrovnik
has become, like Vukovar, a symbol of humanitarian disaster, despite the fact that its Old Town
was classified as a world heritage site and still heavily shelled.510 Serbia’s current Minister for
Foreign Affairs, Ivica Dačić, became in July 2014 the first and only Serbian politician ever to
have publicly condemned the siege of Dubrovnik. The Croatian Minister for Foreign Affairs
Vesna Pusić described Dačić’s statement as ‘yet another evidence of dramatic changes’ of
inter-state relations in the Western Balkans in recent years.511
According to scholar Srđa Pavlović, the siege and a naval blockade of Dubrovnik by the
Yugoslav National Army ‘helped redefine the perception of the conflict in the former
Yugoslavia’, as international public opinion turned against the Milošević regime.512 Many
international observers, including members of the ECMM, had access to Dubrovnik during the
siege, and they documented the conflict. The EU (within the framework of the ECMM)
unsuccessfully tried to mediate in peace talks between the Yugoslav and Croatian armies to
stop the conflict. The ECMM was briefly suspended after five EU observers (Italian and French
nationals) were killed in January 1992 when the Yugoslav forces gunned down a helicopter in
which they were. Eight days after this incident, on 15 January 1992, the EU recognised Croatia
and Slovenia as independent states.
The victimhood narratives adopted by the Croats and Serbs following the Balkan conflict still
mention the aforementioned battles as key reference points to justify various forms of
nationalism and even discrimination against ‘the other’, seeing as a ‘historical’ enemy. In
510 Tapon, op. cit., p. 327.
511 Danas, ‘Dačić osudio napade na Dubrovnik, Pusić ga hvali’, 12 July 2014, http://danas.net.hr/hrvatska/dacic-
osudio-napade-na-dubrovnik-pusic-ga-hvali, (accessed 13 July 2014).
512 S. Pavlović, ‘Reckoning: The 1991 Siege of Dubrovnik and the Consequences of the War for Peace’, Spaces
of Identity, vol. 5, no. 1, 2005, http://www.yorku.ca/soi/_Vol_5_1/_HTML/Pavlovic.html, (accessed 1 May
2014).
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2013, City Council of Vukovar decided to grant special status to its territory for the victims of
‘Homeland defence war’ (the term used in Croatia), and banned the dual use of the Serbian
alphabet and language in the municipality. Some Croats from Vukovar believed that if the local
authorities were to grant equal language rights to the Serbian minority in Vukovar this would
be a symbol of giving in to a former enemy in war.513 This is an example of how the political
legacy of recent wars continues to influence policy-making in the Western Balkans, even at the
local level. For both Serbia and Croatia, the treatment of their citizens is an important
consideration of bilateral relations.
EU sanctions as a coercive diplomatic strategy
The EU introduced sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) as a coercive
instrument of its foreign policy in an attempt to limit the conflict. Council Regulations (EEC
1432/92 and 2656/92) implemented UN sanctions restricting trade and financial dealings of
EU members with the FRY and with Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. In April 1993,
the EU introduced further restrictive economic sanctions.514 One interviewee for this thesis,
Professor Slobodan Samardžić, said that the EU sanctions adversely affected academic life in
Serbia, as universities could not obtain overseas material (including journals, new textbooks et
al.) and had to rely on outdated textbooks from the communist era for teaching.515 The US
sanctions were introduced in 1991, and were strengthened by additional measures in 1992 and
513 RTS, ‘Ćirilica i zvanično proterana iz Vukovara’, 7 November 2013,
http://www.rts.rs/page/stories/sr/story/11/Region/1435961/ per centC4 per cent86irilica+i+zvani per centC4 per
cent8Dno+proterana+iz+Vukovara.html (accessed 1 May 2013).
514 Official Journal of the European Communities, ‘Council regulation no. 990/93 of 26 April 1993 concerning
trade between the European Economic Community and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro)’, 28 April 1993, pp. 14–16, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:1993:102:0014:0016:EN:PDF, (accessed 1 May 2013).
515 Interview with Slobodan Samardžić, academic and Member of Parliament, Belgrade, July 2010.
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1994.516 The effectiveness of the sanctions was greatly reduced as they were not applied
coherently and their objectives and strategies were in constant flux (from the objective to put
pressure on Milošević, to a strategy of offering concessions to Milošević).517 In the view of
Clara Portela, EU sanctions against Yugoslavia had a mixed record, and they were not as
effective as the EU had originally hoped.518
International sanctions prohibiting the supply of arms to the region in 1991 established
structures of informal alliances and preference-formation, including within the EU, and the rise
of smuggling networks. Branković suggests that the sanctions actually empowered and
enriched the ruling elite in Serbia.519 Despite the sanctions, the Serbian Government sourced
highly sought after oil and other goods (including military equipment) through illegal channels
in neighbouring states and the ports in Montenegro. These items had to pass through adjacent
countries and waterways, including of EU member states, to reach the parties involved in the
conflict.520 Regional smuggling networks that were created during the 1990s to circumvent
international sanctions still present a security risk for EU members, as the transnational
criminal enterprises that were established during the 1990s in Serbia continued to operate
internationally.521
516 UN mandatory sanctions were introduced by UNSCR 713 on 25 September 1991, which lasted until 1
October 1996, text of which is available at http://www.nato.int/ifor/un/u910925a.htm (accessed 1 May 2013).
The US measures were enacted in addition to the UN arms trade and transfer embargo against FRY.
517 S.J. Stedman, ‘The former Yugoslavia’, in R. Haas (ed.), Economic sanctions and American diplomacy,
Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1998, pp. 178, 186.
518 C. Portela, European Union sanctions and foreign policy: when and why do they work, London, Routledge,
2009, pp. 61–63.
519 S. Branković, ‘The Yugoslav “Left” parties: continuities of communist tradition in the Milošević era’, in A.
Bozóki and J.T. Ishiyama (eds), The communist successor parties of Central and Eastern Europe, New York,
M. E. Sharpe, 2002, p. 220.
520 The three major warring parties, Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks, developed extensive informal linkages with
external actors in order to source highly-sought military equipment and other goods during the arms embargo.
521 For example, Darko Šarić, a Serbian underground figure who was arrested earlier this year, led a
transnational criminal network that ‘smuggled drugs from Latin America to the Balkans and EU countries’. M.
Poznatov, ‘Serbian police arrest high-profile drug lord’, Euractiv, 19 March 2014,
http://www.euractiv.com/enlargement/serbian-police-arrests-high-prof-news-534232, (accessed 14 May 2014).
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During the Yugoslav wars, Serbia had access to a large arsenal of the Yugoslav federal army,
which gave it a considerable advantage over rival groups at the onset of the conflict.522 Despite
international sanctions (UN, US and EU sanctioning measures), Milošević’s regime subsidised
the war effort through corrupt banking schemes that had established links in Cyprus and many
other countries.523 US reports indicated that in the period 1993–1995 alone, Croatia imported
$308 million worth of weapons, first from Eastern Bloc countries, then from Argentina and
Western arms producers; these reports also estimated that the value of imported weapons in
Bosnia between 1994 and 1995 was between $500–800 million.524 During the same period, it
is estimated that between 20,000 and 30,000 small arms were trafficked by Albanians from
Kosovo and surrounding areas.525
In October 1996, the UN suspended sanctions against FRY, stating that these sanctions were,
apart from humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping, ‘the only strategic instrument of the
United Nations to contain the conflict and restore peace and security in the region, not involving
the use of armed force’.526 In April 1997, the EU granted FRY a preferential trade status. By
mid-May 1997, the European Commission approved a humanitarian aid package for Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Croatia and FRY (comprised of Serbia and Montenegro) worth approximately
522 Z.T. Irwin, ‘Yugoslavia’s foreign policy and Southeast Europe’, in Paul S. Shoup (ed.), Problems of Balkan
security. Southeastern Europe in the 1990s, Washington DC, The Wilson Center Press, 1990, p. 158.
523 BBC news, ‘Cyprus helps trace Milošević millions’, 13 March 2001,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1218177.stm (accessed 10 March 2013). The links between Milošević-era
elite and organised crime networks are analysed by Tim Judah, ‘Analysis: Gangsters' paradise lost’, 2 November
2000, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1003770.stm (accessed 1 November 2013).
524 Marko Hajdinjak (2002), ‘Smuggling in Southeast Europe: the Yugoslav wars and the development of
regional criminal networks in the Balkans’, Smuggling in Southeast Europe report, no. 10, Sofia, Center for the
Study of Democracy, pp. 10, 11.
525 Debbie Hillier and Brian Wood, Shattered lives: the case for tough international arms control, Amnesty
International and Oxfam International, 2003, pp. 16; 46.
526 United Nations Security Council, ‘Letter dated 24 Seotember 1996 from the Chairman of the Security
Council Committee established pursuant to Resolution 724 (1991) concerning Yugoslavia addressed to the
President of the Security Council’, 24 September 1996, p. 3,
http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/sanctions/s96776.pdf (accessed 14 May 2014).
A chronology of the UN sanctions against FRY is also available in this document.
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$111 million.527 However, as the situation in Kosovo was deteriorating, the EU reinstated
sanctions in December 1997 against the Milošević regime.528
In the West, the Balkan conflict during the 1990s was generally blamed on Milošević’s regime
and his policy of asserting Serbian hegemony over other republics in which Serbs lived. His
policies were often compared to Hitler’s actions during the Second World War, although such
a comparison also reflects bias by those who framed it in this way due to many historical
inaccuracies that distinguish Serbia’s war actions from the actions of Nazi Germany. For their
war efforts, ethnic Croats managed to secure US support and diplomatic backing from
Germany, Italy and Denmark, which were among the first states to recognise Slovenia and
Croatia as independent states. After the Bosnian conflict started in 1992, Bosniaks, under the
leadership of the anti-Yugoslav activist, Alija Izetbegović, resorted to his extensive linkages in
the Muslim world. Izetbegović managed to secure the support from mujahedin fighters, whose
alleged war crimes have not been prosecuted to this day.529A widely-held perception of Serbian
war crimes against the Bosniaks, in particular in the town of Srebrenica, had practical
manifestation in several Muslim countries after the Yugoslav wars, as Serbs (just as the
nationals of Israel) were not welcomed in Malaysia.530
527 European Commission, ‘Ex-Yugoslavia: European Commission approves humanitarian aid package worth
ECU 98 million’, press release, Brussels, 15 May 1997, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-97-410_en.htm
(accessed 10 May 2013).
528 F. Trix, ‘Kosovar Albanians between a rock and a hard place’, in Sabrina P. Ramet and Vjeran Pavlaković
(eds), Serbia since 1989: politics and society under Milošević and after, Seattle, University of Washington
Press, 2005, p. 329.
529 J. Pomfret, ‘Bosnia’s Muslims dodged embargo’, 22 September 1996, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/inatl/longterm/bosvote/front.htm (accessed 1 December 2013).
530 Diplomatic relations between Serbia (as part of the State Union) and Malaysia resumed in January 2003,
more than two years since the regime change in Serbia. Only in 2009, due to Serbian Foreign Minister Vuk
Jeremić’s efforts, Malaysia simplified visa requirements for Serbian nationals. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Republic of Serbia, ‘Bilateralni odnosi: Malezija’, http://www.mfa.gov.rs/sr/index.php/spoljna-
politika/bilateralni-odnosi/117-bilateralni-odnosi/11490-malezija?lang=lat, (accessed 13 October 2013). The
Hague Justice Portal, ‘Srebrenica in summary’, 7 August 2008,
http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/index.php?id=9564 (accessed 1 December 2013).
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Consequences of Yugoslavia’s dissolution
Apart from securing a diplomatic victory for self-determination proponents in the West, the
immediate consequences of Yugoslavia’s violent disintegration included huge material
destruction, more than one hundred thousand casualties, a displacement of millions,
environmental degradation, the presence of landmines and NATO’s usage depleted uranium in
Bosnia-Herzegovina that was only uncovered a decade later.531 In 2013, Croatia, as the EU’s
28th member state, introduced a land mines issue to the EU, which became a topic of concern
to Members of the European Parliament.532 This shows how the legacy of Yugoslav wars is
still relevant for European politicians. Key consequences of the war also included: negative
images of the Balkans and Serbia in particular; competing perceptions by rival ethnic groups
regarding the conflict; the evolution of the EU’s crisis response mechanisms, and the
emergence of liberal, anti-Milošević discourses in Serbia.533 These normative ideas continue
to influence the decisions made by EU and Serbian policy-makers whose normative
frameworks and memories of the Yugoslav wars can influence decisions about Serbia’s
European integration.
531 Figures for the total number of deaths in the wars of Yugoslav dissolution remain disputed. They range from
140,000 to 200,000 for the period of 1991–1995 for all ethnic groups, out of SFRY’s total population of 22.8
million in 1990. People also died from injury after the conflict (for example, from landmines). Displacement
figures are also not fixed, and for the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina alone, more than 2 million people were
displaced during the conflict. United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, ‘The
Conflicts’, http://www.icty.org/sid/322 (accessed 10 January 2013). For Bosnia, see D. Sito-Sucic and M.
Robinson, ‘After years of toil, book names Bosnian war dead’, 15 February 2013, Reuters,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/15/us-bosnia-dead-idUSBRE91E0J220130215, (accessed 10 May
2013). For information about the use of depleted uranium by NATO in Bosnia-Herzegovina, see United Nations
Environmental Programme, Depleted Uranium in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Post-Conflict Environmental
Assessment (March 2003),
http://www.unep.org/disastersandconflicts/Publications/DepletedUraniumPublications/tabid/54722/Default.aspx
, (accessed 10 May 2013).
532 B. Borzan MEP, ‘Parliamentary questions: landmines in Croatia’, European Parliament, 22 August 2013,
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+WQ+E-2013-
009611+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=da (accessed 10 May 2014).
533 Proponents of democratic discourses included the founders of the Democratic Party in 1989. These
intellectuals included Zoran Đinđić, Dragoljub Mićunović, Ljubomir Tadić (father of President Boris Tadić),
Desimir Tošić, Kosta Čavoški and Vojislav Koštunica.
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Bad name for the Balkans
Violence in the Balkans during the 1990s put the very word ‘Balkans’ into disrepute. Bideleux
and Jeffries argue that, in writing about the conflict, Western scholars resorted to ‘cultural,
religious, national, and ethnic caricatures’ and stereotyping of the supposed ‘behaviour’,
‘conduct’, ‘mentalities’, ‘attitudes’, ‘syndromes’ and ‘mindsets’ of the peoples of the Balkan
Peninsula’. In their opinion, this was not so much deliberate as out of laziness, arrogance and
ignorance, deflecting attention from the larger roles that ‘Western powers plus Russia and
Austria’ have played in ‘reconstructing the human and social geography’ of the Balkans for
many centuries.534
The Balkan conflict perpetuated impressions of the Balkans and Serbia more specifically as
the anti-European other. It ‘gave’ the peoples of Yugoslavia, especially the Serbs, a negative
image. The Milošević era in Serbian politics generated more negative stereotypes about Serbia,
depicted in the popular literature as the ‘villain of the Balkans’; a ‘Balkan powder keg’; and a
new Nazi Germany, and an extreme nationalist state. US historian Samuel Huntington saw it
as a place of primordial and extreme nationalist hatreds, and archaic passions, and Serbs as an
ethnic group that sought to impose its own religious and territorial supremacy over
neighbouring communities. Ethnic groups in the Balkans, and particularly the Serbs, were
presented in the European press during the 1990s as the antithesis to everything European
supposedly stood for: civilised, post-national, tolerant and cooperative, orderly and values-
based. This perception continues to exist among European voters, who have increased their
opposition to Serbia’s EU entry since 2008, as will be discussed in the later chapters. In Serbia,
it is still widely believed that nationalism in breakaway republics was the principal cause of
534 R. Bideleux and I. Jeffries, The Balkans: a post-communist history, New York, Routledge, 2007, p. xi.
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the conflict, rather than the Yugoslav National Army’s military response to the independence
proclamations by Slovenia and Croatia.
Evolution of the EU’s crisis response instruments
The Yugoslav wars adversely affected the EU, with large numbers of refugees pouring into the
EU countries. The arrival of thousands of refugees seeking asylum in Austria, Germany, Italy
and other European states imposed significant costs on the national governments of EU
members.  It also put additional pressure on the local authorities that were in charge of
accommodating those new arrivals whose status was unclear.535 The Yugoslav conflict
presented a security challenge for EU member states, as their territory was used by the three
parties to the conflict (Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks) as a transit point for the smuggling of
military equipment and foreign fighters, and for other transnational criminal activities (such as
money laundering) used to finance war efforts. At the time of the Yugoslav crisis, the EU had
its own share of internal security problems with an unresolved territorial dispute in Northern
Ireland, and activities by pro-independence groups in Spain. The Cyprus issue was also often
on the EU agenda, especially since Greece joined the EU in 1981. Its neighbourhood policy
was turned towards newly independent states, to many of which the EU offered the prospect
of membership, which was not offered to Yugoslavia. Despite other (economic) steps to bring
Yugoslavia closer to the EU’s orbit, the conflict that erupted in former Yugoslavia
demonstrated that Serbia was still far from sharing the EU’s normative framework of peaceful
co-existence and democratic values.
535 Many of the refugees that came to the EU and other European countries were eventually resettled in third
countries, such as Australia, with many also returning to the Balkans after the conflict. Some asylum seekers,
including Roma people, were repatriated under re-admission agreements signed between EU members (such as
Germany) with Balkan states. A minority succeeded in obtaining permit rights to stay in the EU.
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The wars in the Balkans in the 1990s, according to Douglas Webber, negatively affected
European integration by lengthening the ‘time horizons in which former Yugoslav states could
aspire to join the EU’, and prevented the EU’s expansion in Southeast Europe.536 While the
Yugoslav wars demonstrated the EU’s inability to act coherently as a single actor in foreign
policy domain, its CFSP instruments gradually evolved as a result of the conflict in the Balkans.
The EU’s failure to adequately respond to Yugoslavia’s violent disintegration helped it to later
improve its approach to inter-ethnic disputes, for example, in its development of a
comprehensive program which aimed to increase trust and build confidence between rival
factions in Northern Ireland.537
The rise of liberal democrats in Serbia
The period between 1991 and 1998 was a difficult period for anyone opposing the Milošević
regime or supporting the West in Serbia. Opponents of the Milošević regime ranged from
ethno-nationalists (the Serbian Renewal Party, led by Vuk Drašković), anti-communist
conservatives (the Democratic Party of Serbia, led by Vojislav Koštunica), to pro-EU
politicians (for instance, Zoran Đinđić and Boris Tadić of the Democratic Party). Serbia’s
opposition parties were disunited, but also engaged in an informal dialogue with the EU
through personal contacts, embassies of the EU member states and representatives from the
536 D. Webber, ‘The Context of EU-ASEAN relations: trials and tribulations of regionalism in post-Cold War
Europe and Asia’, in D. Novotny and C. Portela (eds), EU-ASEAN Relations in the 21st Century: Strategic
Partnership in the Making, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, p. 13.
537 One of the ways in which the EU addressed the Northern Ireland issue was through the special initiative
called the Peace Program, a ‘distinctive EU structural funds program’. European Commission, ‘Northern
Ireland: the Peace Program’, http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/activity/ireland/index_en.cfm, (accessed 1
March 2014). One of the key objectives of this initiative is to ‘build cohesion’ and promote reconciliation




European Commission.538 An example of this collaboration will be discussed in the next
chapter.
Serbian pro-Yugoslav intellectuals and Milošević-aligned political elites specifically targeted
Western-leaning politicians, university professors, journalists and prominent individuals for
their links with the West and criticism of the governing regime.539Articles and archival footage
from the Serbian media (both state-controlled and independent news outlets, such as B92) are
witness to the memory of the first half of the 1990s which was associated with the world’s
worst hyperinflation, a lack of basic goods in supermarkets and international isolation,
including in academic life.540 Culturally, it was marked with the advent of ‘turbo folk culture’
(a strand of music that was used for propaganda purposes by Milošević’s supporters).541
References to these social issues are still found in anti-EU discourses in Serbia, representing
another obstacle for closer relations between the EU and Serbia through their influence on
political attitudes among the Serbian people.542
Politically, there was a clear divide that emerged in Serbia during this period between pro and
anti-government protesters. Serbian opposition was certainly not united, but mass student-led
protests were common throughout this decade, the significance of which will be explored in
538 Personal interviews with the Serbian Ambassador, Canberra, 2012.
539 Some political murders specifically targeted critics of the Milošević regime.
540 Thayer Watkins, ‘The worst episode of hyperinflation in history: Yugoslavia 1993–94’,
http://www.rogershermansociety.org/yugoslavia.htm (accessed 18 July 2013).
541 Bozic-Roberson, Agneza. ‘Words before the war: Milosević’s use of mass media band rhetoric to provoke
ethnopolitical conflict in former Yugoslavia’, East European Quarterly, vol. 38, no. 4, pp. 395–408. ‘Serbia
state TV apologises for Milosevic-era propaganda’, The Guardian, 24 May 2011,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/may/24/serbia-state-tv-apologises-propaganda (accessed 18 July
2013).
542 It is difficult to directly measure the influence which anti-EU groups have on Serbia’s European integration
process. The public prominence of their ideas can be observed in the media content (including social media),
public protests and targeted campaigns against what they regard as ‘European’ as opposed to traditional
‘Serbian’ values. Their representatives also label Serbian politicians as traitors or foreign stooges. By doing so,
they also seek to reinvoke a debate on the need to preserve Serbia’s political and military neutrality, and
intensify cooperation with Russia, as an ‘alternative’ to pro-EU course of the Serbian Government.
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the next chapter. The historical legacy of the Milošević period is also marked by the emergence
and consolidation of criminal structures in the Balkans, some closely related to state organs in
Serbia, such as the Interior Ministry and Defence Department. This goes beyond corruption,
which many authors cite as a key challenge for full integration of the Balkans into the EU. The
close links between transnational organised crime networks from the 1990s can be seen in the
re-emergence of these structures in the business and political sphere. The political assassination
of the Serbian Prime Minister, Zoran Đinđić, in 2003 was carried out by people who, were
during the 1990s, were part of the state security structures. The legacy of the wars of the 1990s
is still debated on the Serbian political scene, including in accession discourses, with the
question of war crimes generating opposition to Serbia’s potential entry into the EU.
Conclusion
In summary, this chapter investigated Milošević’s period in Serbian politics, which coincided
with the break in formal relations between Serbia and the EU. The discursive legacy from this
era continues to influence political views in Serbian contemporary politics, both in the
nationalist and liberal camps. The chapter described how several factors contributed to the lack
of cohesive action by the EU towards the Yugoslav crisis, including the lack of unity amongst
EU members and the EU’s under-developed CFSP mechanisms. Serbia’s international
isolation during the 1990s opened the way for particularistic interpretations of Serbian
nationalist mythology to be redefined and used for propaganda purposes. The Serbian
Government’s support for the maintenance of the status quo (the Yugoslav centralist idea) was
used to justify Serbia’s military role in the region. This led to the emergence of narratives of
Serbian regional hegemony (‘Greater Serbia’), which was supported by Serbian right-wing
groups but rejected by all of its neighbours.
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Yugoslavia’s violent disintegration deeply influenced the development of the EU’s CFSP
instruments, leading to the evolution of EU crisis management capabilities and early warning
mechanisms, as in the case of Northern Ireland’s program for reconciliation. The Balkan
conflict reignited negative perceptions of the Balkans, and presented serious security
challenges to the EU. The next chapter will investigate the conflict between the Milošević
regime and NATO over Kosovo. In this period, a dialogue developed between Serbia’s pro-




Serbia’s confrontation with the West: the Kosovo war
The Kosovo problem needs to be understood in terms of its history as a contested
territory, claimed with equal fervour by Serbs and Albanians. The more recent past is
notable for the failure of the Yugoslav authorities to address the problem effectively
following the Second World War.543
In 1999, Kosovo, a small territory in Southeast Europe with around two million inhabitants
(the vast majority of whom were ethnic Albanian by the time of Yugoslavia’s disintegration in
the early 1990s), became a major focus for the UNSC and EU. The Yugoslav Government’s
repressive policies towards Albanian separatism in Kosovo and its border regions in Southern
Serbia drew widespread condemnation.544 EU members saw Milošević’s militaristic approach
to separatism in Kosovo as a major threat to regional security in the Western Balkans.
Dannreuther described the ‘problem’ of Kosovo as one of the most ‘divisive dilemmas and
contradictions in contemporary international relations’, which involved a clash of
incommensurable nationalisms and competing historical claims.545 A prominent German
sociologist, Ulrich Beck, stated in 1999:
543 UK Parliament, House of Commons, Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, ‘Kosovo: history of the crisis’,
Memorandum by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 20 April 2000, http://www.parliament.the-stationery-
office.co.uk/pa/cm199900/cmselect/cmfaff/28/9111803.htm (accessed 1 December 2013).
544 The number of people actually killed during this phase of the conflict, from 1997 to NATO’s intervention in
March 1999, remains disputed. Estimates range from several hundred to several thousands, with as many
estimated missing.
545 Dannreuther, ‘War in Kosovo’, 2001, op. cit., p. 12.
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Kosovo could be our military euro, creating a political and defence identity for the EU
in the same way as the euro is the expression of economic and financial integration.546
Beck’s comments reflected the public sentiment in Germany, and the political inclinations of
many European leaders. However, instead of uniting the EU members, it created divisions
amongst them. Not every EU member supported a military offensive against another sovereign
nation in Europe, which was facing a crisis of legitimacy and credibility due to Serbia’s forced
displacement of Albanian civilians during the Kosovo conflict.547
This chapter seeks to explain the importance of Kosovo-related discourses and
Albanian/Serbian historical political discourses, which all impacted on Serbia’s European
integration. It will aim to contextualise normative ideas that have translated into informal
political structures and widely held belief systems, which continue to impact political attitudes
and EU decisions regarding successive enlargement rounds in the Western Balkans (after
Croatia’s EU accession in July 2013).548 The start of NATO’s intervention against the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) on 24 March 1999 provided a trigger for larger-scale ethnic
cleansing (in the form of forcible expulsion from places of residence) and human rights abuses
by the federal security services and Kosovo Albanian armed insurgents during and after the
546 Ulrich Beck, cited by R. Cohen, ‘Crisis in the Balkans: the Europeans in uniting over Kosovo—a new sense
of identity’, New York Times, 28 April 1999, http://www.nytimes.com/1999/04/28/world/crisis-balkans-
europeans-uniting-over-kosovo-new-sense-identity.html (accessed 1 December 2013).
547 The Kosovo conflict could be compared to the conflict that was raging between the Sri Lankan military and
the Tamil resistance. The response by the Sri Lankan Government was similar to the Serbian Government’s
militaristic approach to a territorial and inter-ethnic dispute, but the Sri Lankan situation did not trigger an
external military intervention. Neville Ladduwahetty wrote about similarities between the situation in Kosovo
and the Sri Lankan situation. N. Ladduwahetty, ‘Kosovo’s Independence and Sri Lanka’, 26 February 2008,
http://www.protectsrilanka.nz.wb.gs/Archives.html#Section3230992 (accessed 12 March 2013).
548 Orešković argues that the accession of the remaining Western Balkan countries to the EU ‘should be
understood not as enlargement, but as a consolidation of what is already European territory, given the fact that
the area in question is relatively small and surrounded by EU member states, not to mention the fact that the
region is of vital strategic significance to the European Union’. L. Orešković, ‘Croatia and the EU: revisiting the
conditionality principle’, Huffington Post, 18 March 2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/luka-
oreskovic/croatia-and-the-eu-accession_b_4974793.html (accessed 19 March 2014).
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war.549 Two discourses that have influenced this conflict are Albanian and Serbian victimhood
narratives, which underlay and reinforced the nationalist attitudes on both sides in opposition
to one another, actively promoted by political, intellectual and diaspora elites. A deeper
analysis of the Kosovo issue is necessary to better understand the ideational structures that
influence the ongoing EU-mediated negotiations between Albanians and Serbs. The role of the
Albanian national question in SFRJ will be discussed in the context of state responses to
Albanian demands for more autonomy and self-determination.
Kosovo as a contested space
The opening quote is suggestive of the highly emotional and symbolic nature of the Kosovo
conflict between Albanians and Serbs, whose dispute is sometimes compared to the
Palestinian-Jewish struggle over the status of Jerusalem within present-day Israel.550 Pavković
called it ‘Kosovo/Kosova—a land of conflicting myths’.551 This multiethnic region is contested
as a geographical, religious, cultural and political space between the two largest communities
inhabiting it, Albanians and Serbs, whose ancestors have co-existed there for centuries. As
argued in the previous chapter, historical interpretations of past events are part of national
identity and collective consciousness. These factors as well as grievances over mistreatment
549 During the NATO military campaign, hundreds of thousands of Albanians crossed into Albania and
FYROM. Prior to the war, in 1998, it was estimated that tens of thousands of Albanian civilians were displaced
as a result of the KLA’s conflict with the Serbian security organs.
550 Serbia’s political and religious leaders have described Kosovo as ‘Serbia’s Jerusalem’. For a religious view,
see, Tanjug, ‘Kosovo is Serbian Jerusalem, Patriarch Says’, 29 June 2012, The Orthodox Church media
network, http://theorthodoxchurch.info/blog/news/2012/06/kosovo-is-serbian-jerusalem-patriarch-says/
(accessed 1 December 2013). For political views, see Der Spiegel, ‘Serbian foreign minister Vuk Jeremić:
Kosovo 'Is Our Jerusalem'’, 31 May 2010, http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/serbian-foreign-minister-
vuk-jeremic-kosovo-is-our-jerusalem-a-697725.html (accessed 1 December 2012).
551 A. Pavković, ‘Kosovo/Kosova: a land of conflicting myths’, in Waller, M., Drezov, K., and Gökay B. (eds),
Kosovo: the politics of delusion, London, Frank Cass Publishers, 2001, pp. 3–10.
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have served as key elements in the construction of ethno-particularistic narratives of Kosovo
Albanians and Serbs.552
The international commentators have also tended to describe the Kosovo issue in dichotomist
terms. Observers of the Albanian-Serbian dichotomy tend to exhibit a predilection for one of
these group’s political stance. They would support the claim that their chosen group had
primordial or historical rights to Kosovo more than the other group. To justify this position,
they would cite their chosen group’s longer period spent in the area, archaeological evidence,
and monuments, moral and even ‘divine’ (God-given) rights. A quote below demonstrates this
point. Elsie stated in 2004:
Kosova is many things to many people. It is now a free country longing for formal
political independence after decades of unrelenting oppression under the Serb yoke, an
ethnically Albanian territory since the beginning of time.553
Elsie imitates Albanian nationalist discourse first formulated by the nineteenth-century
nationalist movement, the League of Prizren. The League submitted an eighteen-page
memorandum (with a list of political demands for self-determination) to the British mission at
the Congress of Berlin in June 1878.554A part of the League’s submission to the 1878 Congress
of Berlin read:
552 The role and perspectives of Kosovo’s other ethnic minorities in this conflict (such as Romani, Gorani,
Turkic, Jewish, Ashkali and Egyptian), dominated by Albanian and Serbian dichotomist discourses, are
generally left out of academic debates on this subject.
553 R. Elsie, Historical Dictionary of Kosova, Lanham, Scarecrow Press, 2004, p. 1; emphasis added.
554 R. Elsie, ‘1878 The Resolutions of the League of Prizren’,
http://www.albanianhistory.net/texts19_2/AH1878_2.html (accessed 1 March 2014), emphasis added.
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To annex to Montenegro or to any other Slav state, countries inhabited ab antiquo by
Albanians who differ essentially in their language, in their origin, in their customs, in
their traditions, and in their religion, would be not only a crying injustice, but further
an impolitic act, which cannot fail to cause complaints, discontent and sanguinary
conflicts.555
The historical continuity of the discourses advanced by this movement can be observed in
contemporary commentary. In 2012, Kosovo’s Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi said on the
occasion of the 134th anniversary marking the founding of the League of Prizren:
By decision of the San Stefano Treaty, after the withdrawal of the Ottoman Empire
from the Balkans, most Albanian lands, divided in Ottoman Vilayets, were unjustly
given to neighbouring states: Serbia, Montenegro and Greece. At the Congress of
Berlin, the historic injustice was deepened when the Great Powers decided, without
considering the will of the Albanian people, to implement partition. In this manner,
Albanians were presented with three threats: territorial fragmentation, assimilation and
physical extinction. On 10 June, 1878, representatives of all Albanian areas gathered
here in Prizren and created a political, military and executive organization, the Albanian
League of Prizren, which would oppose the fragmentation of Albanian lands with all
means.556
The reproduction of ‘historical injustice’, mistreatment of Kosovo Albanians, and their political
goal for achieving self-determination still influences the political thinking and attitudes of
555 G. Warrander and V. Knaus, Kosovo, Guilford, The Globe Pequot Press, 2007, p. 202, emphasis added.
556 Republic of Kosovo, Office of the Prime Minister, ‘Speech by the Prime Minister of the Republic of Kosovo,
Hashim Thaçi, at the ceremony of the marking of the 134th anniversary of the Albanian League of Prizren’, 10
June 2012, emphasis added, http://www.kryeministri-ks.net/?page=2,9,2919, (accessed 1 March 2014).
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Kosovo Albanian politicians, just as Serbian victimhood narratives affect decision-makers in
Serbia. This phenomenon underscores that normative factors, especially collective memory of
one political community and its historical consciousness as promoted by dominant political
elites, exert an important if under-analysed influence on regional discourses and policy-making
towards external powers, especially the EU.557
For Serbs, on the other hand, Kosovo is regarded as a holy land from their folk poetry,
compulsory reading in the primary school curriculum in Serbia. The so-called Kosovo cycle of
epic poems describes in emotive terms Serbia’s historic defeat, the Kosovo battle of 1389
fought between Serbs and Ottomans. This battle was represented in many different ways
through literary and art works (one of the most famous being the Kosovo Maiden epic poem
and Uroš Predić’s painting of 1919 on this theme). For many Serbs, Kosovo signifies a historic
loss of national independence, first in the late 14th century, and also in the early 21st century
after Kosovo proclaimed independence.558 Therefore, the dichotomy of Albanian-Serbian
‘primordial’ claims to Kosovo as a territory and place of living and belonging to was socially
and politically constructed. As Judah points out, Serbs and Albanians have tended to
‘manipulate’ statistics to their own advantage to assert their group’s rights over the future of
Kosovo, instead of focusing on finding the best way forward to peacefully live side-by-side.559
557 Kosovo Albanians are pro-EU and pro-Western in general, as they see the West as partners in the process of
realising their main political goal of independent statehood. Several public places in Priština today carry the
names of US presidents, which is a sign of the gratitude by Kosovo Albanians for political support they received
from many Western countries to achieve independence.
558 The ‘Kosovo Maiden’ epic poem, http://home.earthlink.net/~markdlew/SerbEpic/maiden.htm, (accessed 1
March 2014). ‘Kosovski ciklus narodnih epskih pesama’, 28 March 2013, http://www.artnit.net/pero/item/409-
kosovski-ciklus-narodnih-epskih-pesama.html, (accessed 1 March 2014). Some Serbian media during the 1990s
tended to frame Albanian calls for self-determination and independence through the cultural lenses of the
Ottoman Turks’ invasion of Serbia in the 14th century, which was used to justify the government’s repression
against Albanians.
559 T. Judah, The Serbs: history, myth, and the destruction of Yugoslavia, 2nd edn, Yale, Yale University Press,
2000, p. 152.
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Albanians, including those living in Kosovo, claim descent from the ancient Illyrians who are
presumed to have lived in Europe around four millennia ago.560 They call themselves
‘shqiptarë’, meaning ‘sons of eagles’, and their country ‘Shqipëria’.561 Interestingly, a two-
headed eagle is the national insignia also for Serbs, although with different colours and
symbolisms attached to the eagle’s representation on the flag. The Albanian language is
considered to be Indo-European, but is quite different to the Slavic languages in the
surrounding territories.562 A desire to bring all Albanians together in one state was formulated
by the Albanian nationalist movement, the League of Prizren, to the Congress of Berlin in
1878.563 For many Albanians living in the three successive Yugoslavias, the harsh policing
approach by Yugoslav and Serbian security services was a key impetus behind strengthening
their push for self-determination. Bayraktar recalls the slogan coined by Albanian nationalist
Vasa Efendi to overcome religious differences among Albanians: ‘The religion of Albanians
is Albanianism’, which became the ‘pillar-stone upon which Albanian identity was
constructed.’564 According to Albanian historians, the name ‘Kosovo’ derives from ‘an Illyrian
root Kasa, which means valley’.565
Serbs, on the other hand, claim that the name of Kosovo, Serbia’s heartland, derives from
‘Kos’, meaning blackbird in Serbian. This mountainous and resource-rich territory is held
560 Some researchers believe Albanians may derive from Dacian and Thracian tribes. For an overview of the
debate on the origins of Albanians, see A. Madgearu, The wars of the Balkan Peninsula: their medieval origins,
Plymouth, Scarecrow Press, 2008, pp. 150–151.
561 Encyclopaedia Britannica, ‘Albania’, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/12472/Albania, (accessed
1 December 2012).
562 U.B. Bayraktar, ‘Mythifying the Albanians: a historiographical discussion on Vasa Efendi’s “Albania and the
Albanians”’, Balkanologie, vol. 13, no. 1–2, December 2011, http://balkanologie.revues.org/2272#ftn5,
(accessed 1 December 2012).
563 For an overview of the 19th century Albanian nationalist movement, see Stavro Skendi (1953), ‘Beginnings
of Albanian nationalist and autonomous trends: the Albanian League, 1878-1881’, Association for Slavic, East
European, and Eurasian Studies, vol. 12, no. 2, Apr., 1953, pp. 219–232.
564 Bayraktar, ‘Mythifying the Albanians’, December 2011, op. cit.
565 S. Naqvi, ‘Independence for Kosovo: secession or self-determination?’, ORF Discourse, vol.3  no. 5,
Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi, August 2008, p. 1,
http://www.observerindia.com/cms/export/orfonline/modules/orfpapers/attachments/ORF-
Discourse_1220258376193.PDF (accessed 17 March 2014).
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dearly in the collective memory as it fell within the borders of the first Serbian Kingdom.
Kosovo is home to the medieval Serbian heritage with centres of learning and monasteries
commissioned by Serbian rulers in the 13th century (many of which were heavily damaged after
1997).566 In Kosovo Field (‘Kosovo Polje’), the Ottomans beheaded the Serbian leader,
popularly known as Tsar Lazar, during the battles of 1389 known as the ‘Destruction of the
Serbs’.567 His martyrdom is still revived as a symbol of resistance among Serbs, including by
right-wing groups opposing Serbia’s European integration.568 Positioned as a mythical or
sacred place between East and West, Islam and Christianity, the ethno-centric narratives
constructed by Albanians and Serbs have, therefore, by and large marginalised each other’s
competing claims to political rule that was seen as a manifestation of the ethnic supremacy of
one group over the other during different historical periods.
Explaining Albanian-Serbian political dichotomy on Kosovo
Political discourses, including those of a dichotomist nature, are not pre-determined or given.569
They are historically conditioned, socially and politically constructed, multiplied and
reaffirmed through the activities of local political, intellectual, religious and economic leaders,
and other eminent individuals or groups. Those inherently social agents are involved in the
horizontal (societal-level) and vertical (state-level) processes of knowledge creation,
566 Ž. Rakočević, ‘Decenija od pogroma na Kosmetu 17. marta 2004: zlo je uništilo život i svetinje’, 16 March
2014, http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/Drustvo/Zlo-je-unistilo-zivot-i-svetinje.lt.html, (accessed 17 March 2014).
567 A. Pagden, Worlds at war: the 2,500-year struggle between East and West, New York, Oxford University
Press, 2008, p. 210.
568 The patron saint of 1389 (a nationalist, right-wing movement in Serbia which is campaigning against
Serbia’s European integration) is St. Lazar’s Day. The author of this thesis observed ahead of the Serbian 2012
parliamentary elections print material (stickers and posters) of this group, strategically placed on the interior of
public buses in Belgrade, with a slogan ‘No to the EU’ and ‘Alliance with Russia’. Srpski Narodni Pokret 1389,
http://www.1389.org.rs/onama.html, (accessed 4 June 2014).
569 Dichotomist refers in this case to two distinct sets of narratives created by social actors in opposition to one
another. They may share similar characteristics (such as ideas of victimhood, marginalisation, oppression and
trauma) and methods (violence, propaganda, assertion of supremacy of the validity of ‘Big or smaller Truths’,
and alliance-seeking to impose a dominant normative set of assumptions over rival viewpoints).
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dissemination and institutionalisation. These processes can occur through government agencies
(for instance, by enactment of legal norms), religious authorities, non-state actors (that apply
pressure on the governing elites) and media organisations—all of which influence voters and
public opinion. Socially-constructed sets of narratives form distinct discourses, such as those
found in opposition to Serbia’s EU accession. These kind of dominant discourses have shaped
attitudes towards the Kosovo issue. The Albanian-Serbian dichotomy influenced decision-
makers, individual or group preference-formation, processes of deliberation and formal
negotiations on complex intra-state (domestic) or inter-state (international) issues, such as the
status of Kosovo after NATO’s intervention in 1999 or on the rights of ethnic minorities living
there. This dichotomy was also internalised within SFRJ and later FRY, and externalised
through the creation of support groups worldwide for Kosovo’s independence.
Many Western observers, the NATO and the majority of EU countries (23 out of 28) dispute
Serbian claims to Kosovo and support the Albanian position. The Albanians are viewed as the
overwhelmingly dominant group demographically (roughly comprising 90 per cent of
Kosovo’s population in 1999), and the Serbs as discredited by successive attempts by the
Milošević regime to suppress by violence Albanian demands for restored autonomy, and
increasingly for independence. In Serbian academia, a reverse trend can be observed through
Serbian narratives of victimhood and legal tenure sustained over centuries.
This thesis views the Albanian-Serbian conflict in Kosovo, which erupted into an armed
irredentist struggle several years before the Kosovo war, not as an inevitable consequence of
SFRJ’s policies, but as a failure of Albanian and Serbian community leaders, principally at the
local level, to adopt the principles of power-sharing. State leaders in the three Yugoslavias have
equally failed to recognise both major groups’ rights and desire to participate in governing over
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this contested, impoverished and now even ecologically contaminated space. After
Yugoslavia’s disintegration, a political contest was waged in Kosovo between two dominant
and competing discourses, both of which aimed to assert the supremacy of one perspective over
its ‘undesirable other’. The ‘Other’ for Albanians and Serbs alike was portrayed in violent,
marginalising and de-humanising terms, as villains, assailants and evil people.570 Increasing
self-determination demands by Kosovo Albanians, like in the previous cases of Slovenia and
Croatia in 1991, continued to present a dilemma for European governments after the Dayton
Accords brought the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina into stabilisation mode after 1995.
Some Western commentators saw Kosovo as a new battlefield between the East (epitomised
by Russia in this case) and the West (US/EU/NATO and their allies).571 Political leaders in
other areas where sovereignty was contested between different ethnic groups, such as the
secessionist leader of Georgia’s Abkhazia region, looked at the Kosovo model as one to
emulate.572 The circumstances surrounding Kosovo’s independence were invoked in March
2014 during Crimea’s referendum for independence.573 The EU and the US reject Russia’s
comparison of Crimea to Kosovo.574 This example is a manifestation of how Kosovo’s
dichotomist discourses have affected political discourses in other regions. The Kosovo conflict
brought into international spotlight a myriad of questions regarding international law,
570 P. Kola, The search for Greater Albania, London, C. Hurst & Co., 2003, p. 12.
571 P. Reynolds, ‘East-West divide over Kosovo move’, 17 February 2008,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7249317.stm (accessed 1 March 2014).
572 Sergei Bagapsh, political leader of Abkhazia in 2008, quoted in N. Marković, ‘Behind the scenes of the
Russia-Georgia conflict’, 17 September 2008, Parliamentary Library of Australia,
http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/BN/0809/R
ussiaGeorgiaConflict, (accessed 1 December 2012).
573 ‘The Economist explains whether secession in Crimea would be legal’, Economist, 12 March 2014,
http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2014/03/economist-explains-10, (accessed 15 March
2014).
574 L. Karadaku, ‘EU rejects Crimea-Kosovo comparisons’, Southeast European Times, 14 March 2014,
http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2014/03/14/feature-01,
(accessed 15 March 2014).
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sovereignty, self-determination, and the position of ethnic minorities with opposing normative
frameworks and statehood claims.
Kosovo/Kosova: identities constructed through ‘appellation’
The dichotomist nature of Albanian-Serbian conflict can be observed through the official
designations of this contested territory. The Yugoslav 1946 Constitution confirmed the name
Kosovo–Metohija (‘Kosovo i Metohija’), or ‘Kosmet’. In 1968, the Yugoslav Government
introduced the designation of ‘Kosovo’, following additional amendments to the revised 1963
constitution.575 This move was a concession to demands by Kosovo Albanians for more
autonomy. It was an important symbolic act in the series of affirmative programs introduced
after violent student demonstrations engulfed Kosovo in November 1968. The name ‘Kosovo’
was confirmed by the federal Yugoslav 1974 Constitution that gave more rights and powers to
Kosovo’s regional and local authorities.
The word ‘Metohija’, which derives from Greek and means ‘monastic estates’, was officially
reintroduced in the updated Serbian Constitution of March 1989, which restricted Kosovo’s
autonomy. In May 1990, Belgrade took direct control over Kosovo, which led to dissolution of
the provincial assembly and regional executive council.576 Successive Serbian Governments
have again, since 1990, used the term ‘Kosmet’ to describe the region from Serbia’s centralised
perspective, while Albanians used the word ‘Kosova’. ‘Kosmet’ emphasises Kosovo’s
Christian legacy and in particular, Serbian attachment to its religious heritage in Kosovo.577
575 Rusinow, The Yugoslav experiment, 1977, op. cit., p. 288.
576 M. Klemenčič and M. Žagar, The former Yugoslavia's diverse peoples: a reference sourcebook, Santa
Barbara, ABC Clio, 2004, p. 366.
577 K. Mihailović, ‘Kosovo–Metohija: past, present, future’, Papers presented at the international Scholarly
Meeting held at the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, Belgrade, Belgrade, Serbian Academy of Science
and Arts, 16–18 March 2006, p. 116. Some Albanians are also Christian, including Orthodox, but the majority
of Kosovo Albanians are non-practicing Muslims.
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The word ‘Kosova’ was frequently used by academics who supported Kosovo Albanian
demands for independent statehood.578 It emphasises the Albanian cultural heritage in that
region. The appellation for this contested space is part of popular narratives which have, over
the years, informed policy positions on the Albanian-Serbian conflict. These discourses also
encouraged the reproduction of different historical perspectives about the conflict (such as
through discussions about historical rights or one group’s dominant rule in the region). They
lend support to dominance/subordination discourses advanced by both groups, but without
providing an inclusive solution that would address the needs of both groups equally.
Serbian victimhood narratives
The official position of the Serbian Orthodox (SO) Church became anti-EU oriented, especially
after the NATO intervention in 1999. Following the withdrawal of the Serbian army from
Kosovo, with a mass population move of Kosovo Serbs northwards, the SO Church lost
unhindered access to its property in Kosovo. Much of the SO Church’s monastic property in
Kosovo was damaged in reprisal attacks, especially when over thirty of the SO Church’s
parishes and buildings were attacked during the Kosovo Albanian riots in 2004. One parish
lodged a lawsuit against Italy, Germany, France and the UK before the European Court of
Human Rights in Strasbourg for allegedly failing to protect the SO Church’s property from
indiscriminate attacks.579 The Serbian Orthodox graveyards have also been desecrated.580 The
Serbian Government in January 2014 referred to Kosovo as ‘Europe’s last apartheid’, primarily
578 Some examples are J. Pettifer, Kosova Express: a journey in wartime, London, C. Hurst & Co, 2005. M.
Motes, Kosova-Kosovo: prelude to war 1966–1999, Florida, Redland Press Inc., 1998.
579 BBC, ‘Serbian church sues over Kosovo’, 9 December 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4083005.stm,
(accessed 15 March 2014). This lawsuit was retracted in July 2005. ‘SPC povukla tužbu protiv EU’, Beta, 6 July
2005,
http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2005&mm=07&dd=06&nav_category=12&nav_id=172140,
(accessed 15 March 2014).
580 Time magazin Srbija, ‘Oskrnavljeni srpski grobovi na Kosovu i Metohiji’, 21 January 2013,
http://www.time.rs/cluster/5dc4ef4982/kosovska-policija-cuva-srpska-groblja.html, (accessed 15 March 2014).
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because many Orthodox Serbs were prevented from attending church services in Kosovo
without an armed escort.581 Segregation between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs in Northern
Kosovo especially remains a serious problem. Victimhood narratives are frequently used by
more radical members of both ethnic groups to justify physical attacks on the ‘Other’. The
attacks on Serbian religious property in Kosovo are another manifestation of the lack of trust
between the two communities.
The political role of the SO Church in Serbia’s European integration process has been a
complicating factor for Serbia’s dialogue with the EU. The SO Church influences public
attitudes regarding Serbia’s EU accession, and conservative political parties, such as the DSS
and Dveri Srpske. The SO Church issued a statement in 2011:
Membership of the EU is a positive ambition which can be justified by geopolitical,
economic and civilizational reasons. But if the abandonment of Kosovo–Metohija,
indirectly or under pressure, whatever be the case, is the price to pay for membership
in that alliance … then [Serbia] should openly and honourably give up its candidacy
and seek other models for its future in a multipolar world order.582
In a comparative case from neighbouring Bosnia-Herzegovina, in 2013 all gathered religious
leaders except for the SO Church’s representatives signed a joint declaration supporting
Bosnia-Herzegovina’s ambition to join the EU.583 The absence of an official endorsement from
581 Tanjug, ‘Vulin: Last Europe's apartheid holds ground in Kosovo’, 6 January 2014,
http://www.tanjug.rs/news/112214/vulin--last-europes-apartheid-holds-ground-in-kosovo.htm, (accessed 1
March 2014).
582 The translation is author’s own. ‘SPC poručila Tadiću i Vladi: Odustanite od himere EU ako je cijena
Kosovo’, 2 December 2011, Pobjeda, http://www.pobjeda.me/2011/12/02/spc-porucila-Tadiću-i-vladi-
odustanite-od-eu-ako-je-cijena-kosovo/#.UyZiV61WF9A, (accessed 15 March 2014).
583 Two priests of the Serbian Orthodox Church were observers at this gathering. Radio Televizija Srbije,
‘Verski lideri za BiH u Evropskoj Uniji’, 10 June 2013,
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the SO Church was probably linked to the complex political situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
which is politically divided between the Croat-Bosniak federation and the Serb-dominated
Republika Srpska. This also demonstrated the SO Church’s sceptical attitude towards the
EU.584 Klaus Buchenau observed that there are two currents within the SO Church: the ‘anti-
Westerners’ who reject Western values, and moderates who nominally accept dialogue with
the West.585 The SO Church plays an important normative role in Serbian discourses on
Kosovo, in part because its property and clergy were directly affected and religious leaders
displaced in the aftermath of the Kosovo war.
The Serbian victimhood narratives in Kosovo have been reinforced with graphic footage of the
attacks on the SO Church’s religious symbols and tombstones by Albanians. A similar narrative
can be seen from the SO Church’s position after 1968, when its representatives started to
document damages inflicted on its medieval property in Kosovo. The Serbian religious leaders
viewed vandalism inflicted against the SO Church’s property during the 1968 riots through the
prism of dichotomy, expressing concern for religious architectural property through narratives
of ‘ethnic alterity’.586
http://www.rts.rs/page/stories/sr/story/11/Region/1339912/Verski+lideri+za+BiH+u+Evropskoj+Uniji.html,
(accessed 15 March 2014).
584 The Jewish Community’s endorsement of this document put into spotlight the SO Church’s position.
585 Value, according to Buchenau, is an abstract notion of what one finds desirable, but in order to be understood
in a political context, values need to be interpreted. In Buchenau’s view, the debate on pro- and anti-Western
values in post-communist Serbia has been more polarised than in other Balkan countries because of Serbia’s
confrontation with Western states during the 1990s, especially over Kosovo. K. Buchenau, ‘Orthodox values
and modern necessities: Serbian Orthodox clergy and laypeople on democracy, human rights, transition and
globalisation‘, in O. Listhaug, S.P. Ramet, and D. Dulić (eds), Civic and uncivic values: Serbia in the post-
Milošević era, Budapest, Central European University Press, 2011, p. 113.
586 ibid. The same narratives emerged during riots in 1981 and demonstrations in 1989. Bardos suggests that
local church hierarchs in Kosovo since the 1999 war have been internally divided over how best to deal with the
international presence and Kosovo Albanian authorities in the province. G.N. Bardos, ‘Patriarchal Orthodox
Church of Serbia’, in J.A. McGuckin (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Eastern Orthodox Christianity, vol. 2, 2011, p.
569.
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In November 1968, Albanian students of the then recently established branch of Belgrade
University in Priština demonstrated with slogans ‘Down with colonialism in Kosovo’, and ‘We
want a republic’, with protests becoming violent and spreading into the Albanian populated
areas in Macedonia (today’s FYROM).587 Amongst other things, protestors demanded the
removal of ‘Metohija’ from the province’s official name; the right to fly the Albanian flag, and
the establishment of an independent university with teaching in Albanian language. The
Serbian parliament adopted a new constitution for Kosovo in January 1969, allowing for the
establishment of more cultural and educational institutions. Kosovo was also given the right
(together with Vojvodina) to be represented in the federal parliament.588 Despite these
concessions, the policy of repression by the Yugoslav security organs continued in Kosovo,
creating a vicious cycle of mutual distrust, violence and hatred between Albanians and Serbs.
The Albanian national question within Serbia
Political and normative differences in Kosovo between Albanians and Yugoslav/Serbian
institutions pre-date the creation of socialist Yugoslavia. During the Second World War, Hitler
separated Kosovo from Serbia and annexed it to Albania under the supervision of the Italian
Fascist regime (as per Map 2 in Appendix One). Many anti-fascists from Kosovo were
summarily executed during the Second World War by occupying armies and collaborators.
When the partisans reclaimed Kosovo, they were accused of killing many prominent
Albanians, especially those they accused of being ‘fascist collaborators’. Collective memory
of these purges was one reason for which Kosovo Albanians were against Yugoslavism. It is
important to note that the Yugoslav Government did not exclusively target ethnic Albanians,
587 A. Herscher, Violence taking place: the architecture of the Kosovo conflict, Stanford, Stanford University
Press, 2010, p. 53.
588 ibid., p. 54.
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but all individuals and groups whom they regarded as opponents of Yugoslavia’s communist
establishment. Like other peoples in Yugoslavia, Albanians were also subjected to forced
collectivisation between 1945 and 1953, a policy which was eventually abandoned but not
without increasing Albanian normative opposition to the Yugoslav state.589
During SFRJ, defining moments for the Albanian self-determination discourse were the
Yugoslav Government’s purges after the Second World War; dismissal of SFRJ’s security
services head, the ethnic Serb Aleksandar Ranković (who was extremely unpopular among the
Albanians); rapprochement between SFRJ and Albania after USSR’s incursion into
Czechoslovakia in 1968; the Albanian riots of 1968, 1981 and 1989; and the emergence of
Kosovo Albanian armed insurgency with transnational linkages. These developments
influenced the creation of dichotomist discourses between Albanians and Serbs in the 1990s,
hardening their respective leaders’ positions towards each other. Political compromise between
these groups has proven to be unsustainable without external security guarantees, and this still
remains the case.590
The memory of communist repression in Kosovo has influenced Albanian resistance many
decades after the Second World War. Family histories and experiences of living under
Communism have left a profound mark on Albanian intellectuals, especially since ethno-
particularistic narratives were banned in SFRJ during Tito’s life. Poet and political leader
Ibrahim Rugova, regarded by many Kosovo Albanians as ‘Father of the Nation’, had victims
of Communist crimes among his closest family circle.591 His father and paternal grandfather
589 Kola, The search for Greater Albania, 2003, op. cit., p. 105.
590 This is why the EU has taken a more active role in recent years and invested in confidence-building measures
at the higest level between Belgrade and Priština.
591 In 1988, Rugova was elected chairman of the influential Kosovo Writers’ Union (KWU). As one of the most
prominent Kosovo Albanian intellectuals, he initially advocated for Albanian self-determination through
peaceful means.
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were reportedly killed by the Yugoslav Communists in January 1945.592 In 1989, Rugova
established the Democratic League of Kosovo in response to Milošević’s increasing anti-
Albanian policies. He organised a system of parallel educational, health and local government
facilities, which, according to The Guardian, were paid for by the Albanian diaspora living in
the West. Rugova also organised the government-in-exile for Kosovo Albanians that shifted
between West European capitals, while spending most of his time in neighbouring Albania,
laying the groundwork for a broader resistance movement.593
The repressive methods used by the highly centralised bureaucratic structures in all three
Yugoslavias did not quell Kosovo Albanian discontent, which after the 1960s spilled over into
open demands for greater autonomy, and from the 1990s, into campaigns for independence
including by violent means, which translated into secession. According to Pavković and Radan,
secession is ‘an assertion of the superiority of both territorial sovereignty and national
determination principles over any other political or ethical principles of political
organisation’.594 Secession discourses were strengthened by Albanian perceptions of
victimhood and marginalisation by the Serbian state and religious authorities.
The top-down measures taken by government in the successive Yugoslavian systems seemed
to further aggravate the animosity between Albanians and Serbs at the local level. One of the
key top-down measures was to allow a greater number of Kosovo Albanians to work in the
public sector and local administration in Kosovo after autonomous status was conferred to it in
592 ‘Obituary: Ibrahim Rugova’, The Guardian, 23 January 2006,
http://www.theguardian.com/news/2006/jan/23/guardianobituaries.balkans (accessed 15 March 2014).
593 ibid.
594 A. Pavković and P. Radan, ‘In pursuit of sovereignty and self-determination: peoples, states and secession in
the international order’, Macquarie Law Journal, vol. 3, 2003, p. 7.
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the 1974 Constitution.595 Official policies rarely involved a broader inter-cultural dialogue
towards finding better understanding and accommodation between the Albanians and Serbs.
Due to their distinctive cultural and linguistic identity, and their unfulfilled political aspirations,
the majority of Kosovo Albanians did not support Yugoslavism. For economic and political
reasons, many dissatisfied Kosovo Albanians emigrated overseas and after 1974 they were also
able to travel to Albania to access education and imbibe political influences in Albanian.
Vickers also points out that the security services put pressure on the Yugoslav Albanians to
emigrate overseas between 1954 and 1966 some 235,000 Albanians left Yugoslavia for the
West. 596
The Albanian minority as part of Yugoslavia’s ‘ethnic question’
Vickers observes that a turning point in the ‘status and role’ of Albanians in Yugoslavia came
with the dismissal of the heir-apparent to Tito and Vice-President of SFRJ’s League of
Communists, Aleksandar ‘Leka’ Ranković, whose removal from the political scene in 1966
emboldened Kosovo Albanians to demand more rights and a greater degree of autonomy.597 In
Yugoslavia at that time, Kosovo Albanians were treated as a ‘nationality’ rather than as a
‘nation’—a policy which they regarded as unjust.598 As the head of Yugoslavia’s secret police
(UDBA), Ranković was considered responsible for, amongst other things, the campaign to
confiscate weapons from Albanians in 1956. Those who resisted were severely punished by
Yugoslavia’s security organs.599 The surprise dismissal of Ranković in 1966, the third most
595 The majority of Albanians in the late 1970s and 1980s also chose to boycott the national census in
Yugoslavia as a form of social protest, which today makes any numerical assessment of this region more
difficult.
596 M. Vickers, The Albanians: a modern history, New York, I.B. Tauris, 2006, p. 191.
597 ibid.
598 P. Shoup, ‘Yugoslavia’s national minorities under communism’, Slavic Review, vol. 22, no. 1 (March 1963),
pp. 64–84; p. 72.
599 In late 1944 and early 1945, Kosovo Albanians rebelled against the partisans, assassinating Miladin Popović,
‘then acting party leader for Kosovo and Metohija’. For this reason, the Yugoslav state viewed the situation in
187
important figure in Yugoslavia, was hailed by the West and Kosovo Albanians as a sign of
liberalisation, but met with displeasure by Serbs who feared reprisal attacks in Kosovo.600 A
de-classified Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) report from 5 August 1966 described
Ranković’s dismissal as SFRJ’s biggest single crisis since the split with the USSR in 1948; the
report also signalled this was possibly a premeditated move and not merely an inter-factional
struggle by Yugoslav communists, as Tito described it in one speech.601
An ethnic Serb, Ranković aroused deep suspicion amongst Croats, Bosniaks and Slovenes. In
Vickers’ view, militant Albanian nationalism was fuelled by a greater awareness of their
national rights after Tito offered them concessions.602 Kosovo Albanians were emboldened by
it in the lead-up to mass protests in Kosovo in 1968.  They demanded a republican status for
Kosovo, while a minority also called for unification with Albania. Ranković’s dismissal paved
the way for Tirana’s closer relations with Belgrade, as Albania saw Yugoslavia after the Soviet
invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 as a possible partner.603
After the mass protests by Kosovo Albanians in 1968, Tito said that Kosovo ‘should become
the concern of Yugoslavia as a whole’.604 However, despite the increased concern, Kosovo
remained the poorest region in SFRJ. Kosovo Albanians started to develop more intensive
Kosovo in the war’s aftermath as a security problem, to which secret police responded with force. A tough-
handed approach to Kosovo Albanians did little to solicit their allegiance to the state. Shoup recalls that ‘there
are no census figures that give a completely accurate account of their numbers’, as many of them boycotted the
national census in an act of social protest. Their unfulfilled social, economic and political grievances and
continued repressive treatment by the state strengthened their resistance to the Yugoslav Government’s policies.
ibid., pp. 64, 71.
600 For an in-depth analysis of this development in Yugoslav politics, see R.V. Burks, ‘The removal of
Ranković; an early interpretation of the July Yugoslav Party plenum’, California, RAND Corporation, August
1966.
601 Current Intelligence Weekly Summary, ‘Special report: Yugoslavia, the fall of Ranković’, 5 August 1966, p.
3. http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_0000720786.pdf, (accessed 9
June 2013).
602 Vickers, The Albanians, 2006, op. cit., p. 192.
603 ibid., p. 193.
604 R.F. Staar, Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, 4th edn, New York, Hoover Press, 1984, p. 239.
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linkages with Albania after revised domestic regulations allowed them to travel to Albania.
While Serbian and Albanian ethno-nationalist and victimhood narratives were generally
forbidden and discouraged when Tito was alive, they re-emerged more openly in public
discourses after Tito’s death in 1980, as part of the general decline of Yugoslav state
socialism.605 The leaked 1986 draft ‘Memorandum on the Serbian national question’ by the
Serbian Academy of Science and the Arts revived discourses of Serbian victimhood supported
by influential intellectuals such as Dobrica Ćosić.606Meanwhile, Albanians under Rugova were
organising clandestine organisations as a symbol of defiance against official policies, while
Rugova adhered to a pragmatic doctrine of non-violence. This change in approach provided a
fertile ground for the development of an armed resistance campaign in the form of the Kosovo
Liberation Army (KLA), which will be described in the next section.
Armed rebellion by Kosovo Albanians
In response to the deeply unpopular policy by the Serbian Government of abolishing Kosovo’s
regional autonomy, Kosovo Albanians proclaimed independence in September 1991. They
called their new legal code the Kačanik Constitution.607 The Serbian Government responded to
this development with further repression, mass arrests and by abolishing many Albanian
cultural institutions.608 In a so-called ‘Christmas warning’, US President George Bush Senior
responded to the deteriorating political situation in Kosovo in 1992 by stating
605 Pavković, ‘Kosovo/Kosova: a land of conflicting myths’, 2001, op. cit., pp. 7; 10, endnote 2.
606 N. Miller, The Nonconformists: culture, politics, and nationalism in a Serbian intellectual circles, 1944–
1991, Budapest, Central European University Press, 2007, p. 193.
607 This proclamation received little international recognition, with Albania at the helm of diplomatic efforts to
recognise Kosovo’s independence. M. Klemenčič and M. Žagar, The former Yugoslavia's diverse peoples, 2004,
op. cit., p. 330.
608 BBC, ‘Timeline: Kosovo’, 24 January 2012,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_profiles/3550401.stm, (accessed 17 March 2014).
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In the event of conflict in Kosovo caused by Serbian action, the United States will be
prepared to employ military force against the Serbians in Kosovo and in Serbia
proper.609
Until the mid-1990s, Kosovo Albanians pursued the strategy of a largely passive resistance,
although violent clashes were sporadically occurring between Serbs and Kosovo Albanians,
which were supressed by the state security organs. By 1996–97, the resistance escalated into
an armed rebellion against the Serbian Government as there was no real attempt to engage in
dialogue.610 While the EU put significant diplomatic efforts in post-conflict reconstruction in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, there was no effort to mediate any dialogue between Serbs and Kosovo
Albanians before the situation dramatically escalated. This was probably because the EU and
the US were focusing their attention to aiding pro-democracy groups in Serbia, rather than
attempting to engage with the Milošević regime. This ‘Western’ strategy backfired as it gave
Milošević a free hand in Kosovo, which in turn encouraged Kosovo Albanians to develop a
sophisticated transnational network of support for their armed resistance cause that aimed at
securing independence. Scholars Branson and Doder comment:
By 1997, the newly formed Kosovo Liberation Army had started the struggle which,
for the most part, meant warfare in the shadows, ambush, assassination, murder, and
torture, leaving in its wake a trail of destroyed towns, burned villages, and wrecked
609 The US reiterated its warning to Milošević in 1993 and in 1998. US President George Bush in a letter to
Slobodan Milošević, then Serbian President, 25 December 1992, quoted in New York Times, ‘Crisis in the
Balkans: statements of United States policy on Kosovo’, 18 April 1999,
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/04/18/world/crisis-in-the-balkans-statements-of-united-states-policy-on-
kosovo.html, (accessed 17 March 2014).
610 A document from the Security Council Report observes that in February 1996, ‘KLA began to claim credit
for a number of violent acts such as the killing of several Serbian officials and policemen’, as well as ‘ethnic
Albanians who were considered to be collaborators with the Serbian Government’. Security Council Report,
http ‘Chronology of events: Kosovo’, regularly updated,
www.securitycouncilreport.org/chronology/kosovo.php?page=all&print=true, (accessed 30 June 2014).
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families. A year later, the guerrilla activities had reached significant proportions and
elicited brutal Serb countermeasures.611
In January 1997, an Albanian journalist Fehim Rexhepi observed shortly after the Dean of
Serbian University in Priština Radivoje Papović was assassinated that there was ‘a widespread
belief’ among Kosovo Albanians that the Serbian Government was responsible for all security
issues in Kosovo. He added that if this assassination had ‘Albanian roots’, then the first cycle
of violence in Kosovo was closed, and the next one could promise to be only more deadly.612
In 1998, the KLA began to attack civilian targets in Kosovo, including émigré Serbs (thousands
of whom were refugees from the 1991–95 wars and were seen by Kosovo Albanians as part of
the Milošević regime’s plan to alter the ethnic balance in Kosovo) and against those Kosovo
Albanians who the KLA identified as ‘traitors’.613
As an unofficial ‘KLA historian’ (whose book relied on close association with former KLA
commanders) Henry H. Perritt attributed the success of KLA tactics to the low likelihood of
defection, held in check by ‘strong Albanian cultural bonds’, even if the KLA rebels were
captured. He also observed that KLA attacks on civilians were inconsistent with the ‘historic
Albanian culture of resistance’, in particular the aims of the resistance manifesto of 1919 (‘the
Program of the Albanian General Uprising of spring 1919 in the Dukagjini Plateau’). He
concluded that both the ‘Serbian incompetence’ and ‘KLA success’ in triggering Western
intervention kept violence at ‘lower levels of the violence continuum’, and claims that if NATO
did not intervene in 1999, the KLA was ready to resort to suicide bombing tactics—which
611 L. Branson and D. Doder, Milošević: portrait of a tyrant, New York, Free Press, 1999, p. 7.
612 F. Rexhepi, 17 January 1997, ‘Srpki-albanski ćor-sokak’,
http://www.aimpress.ch/dyn/pubs/archive/data/199701/70117-004-pubs-pri.htm (accessed 1 December 2013).
613 J.V. Selm, ‘Introduction’, in Joanne van Selm (ed.), Kosovo’s refugees in the European Union, London,
Pinter, pp. 4–5.
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probably would not have received positive press coverage in the West.614 The main political
goal for Kosovo Albanians during the armed clashes with the Serbian security forces was
independence, which was the primary object of the KLA’s armed resistance and the main
subject of their discussions with Western leaders. The KLA rebels, who were interviewed by
Armend R. Bekaj, regarded the Serbian Government’s rule in Kosovo as an ‘oppressive and
colonialist system’, and saw themselves as NATO’s ‘ground force’ once the conflict invited
Western intervention.615
The year 1998 was also a turning point for international mediation efforts to resolve the Kosovo
crisis by peaceful means. UN Security Council resolution 1160 of March 1998 imposed
economic and arms trade sanctions against Yugoslavia because it was deemed that the military
actions against the KLA and associated civilians could result in a widespread ethnic cleansing
campaign.616 Recent historical memory of the siege of Sarajevo, the Srebrenica genocide
(which the Serbian Parliament still views as a massacre rather than a genocide) and the
Rwandan genocide in Africa influenced international institutional responses towards the
Kosovo emergency.617 Milošević met Albanian leader Rugova in mid-May 1998 in a last-
minute international effort to prevent the NATO offensive, which was averted only
temporarily.
614 H.H. Perritt Jr., Kosovo Liberation Army: the inside story of an insurgency, Chicago, University of Illinois
Press, 2008, pp. 68–69.
615 A.R. Bekaj, ‘The KLA and the Kosovo war: from intra-state conflict to independent country’, Berghof
Transition Series, no. 8, Berghof Conflict Research, Berlin, 2010, pp. 9; 25.
616 The text of this resolution of 31 March 1998 is available at: http://www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/u980331a.htm,
(accessed 1 December 2012).
617 A librarian from the UN Library in New York observed that during 1998–99 many UN countries examined
the UN’s historical documents on the Kosovo ‘problem’, especially dating back to the era of the League of
Nations, to see how the Kosovo problem was being dealt with during earlier historical periods. Interview with
UN Library staff, April 2010, UN headquarters, New York.
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The EU responded to the crisis in FRY by implementing UN sanctions and imposing additional
sanctioning measures. On 6 July 1998, US and Russian diplomatic representatives launched
the Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission (KOM) ‘to observe and report on the general
freedom of movement and security conditions throughout Kosovo’.618 On 23 September 1998,
UNSCR1199 called for a ceasefire between the Serbian security forces and the KLA.619
Military action was averted after US Ambassador Richard Holbrooke reached an agreement
with Milošević on 12 October 1998 to implement the resolution. A US Senator and former
Republican presidential nominee, Bob Dole, noted in December 1998:
One New Year’s resolution America should make is to solve the decade-long problem
of Milošević. Serbia is the last dictatorship in Europe. If we get tough with Milošević,
Serbia could be Europe’s newest democracy by the year 2000.620
The failure of peace talks at Rambouillet in February 1999 demonstrated the inability of the
EU to resolve problems in its neighbourhood peacefully, without assistance from the US as in
the case of the ending of Bosnian war.621
The EU’s targeted sanctions against the FRY were intended to induce a change in behaviour
by ‘parties in Serbia’ who were held responsible for ‘wrongful, unacceptable, illegal or
618 US Department of State, ‘Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission’, 8 July 1998, http://1997-
2001.state.gov/www/regions/eur/fs_980708_kom.html, (accessed 1 May 2013).
619 UN Security Council resolution 1199, http://www.david-morrison.org.uk/scrs/1998-1199.pdf (accessed 1
May 2013). For a US report of 22 October 1998 regarding Serbia’s compliance, see US Department of State,
‘Serb Compliance with September 23 UN Security Council Resolution 1199’, 22 October 1988, http://1997-
2001.state.gov/www/regions/eur/rpt_current_serbcomp.html, (accessed 1 May 2013).
620 B. Dole, ‘In 1999, get tough with Milošević’, 31 December 1998, Los Angeles Times,
http://articles.latimes.com/1998/dec/31/local/me-59277, (accessed 1 March 2014). Zoran Đinđić, a Serbian
Opposition leader of Alliance for Change described Serbia in similar terms during the mass protests in 1999 as
‘the last dictatorship in Europe’ that he promised to ‘crush’. Cable News Network (CNN), ‘Slobodan Milošević:
making the most of the worst’, 2000, http://edition.cnn.com/fyi/school.tools/profiles/Milošević/index.story.html,
(accessed 1 March 2014).
621 M. Weller, ‘The Rambouillet conference on Kosovo’, International Affairs, vol. 75, no. 2, pp. 211–251,
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/International per cent20Affairs/Blanket per cent20File,
per cent20Import/inta069.pdf, (accessed 1 May 2013).
193
reprehensible behaviour’ in Kosovo.622 EU sanctions included an arms embargo, travel
restrictions, an oil embargo, and financial sanctions. The European Council meeting in Vienna
on 11–12 December 1998 referred to ‘full and immediate compliance by both sides’ and
observance of ‘UNSC Resolutions 1160, 1199, 1203 and 1207 in order to achieve a peaceful
settlement’ over the Kosovo crisis.623 The language employed in the Presidency Conclusions
following this meeting made it clear that the ‘future status of Kosovo’ was the main issue at
stake. This document highlighted the EU’s political efforts through envoy, Wolfgang
Petritsch’s work, to ‘support the political process, to contribute to humanitarian efforts and …
assist reconstruction in Kosovo, including through a donors conference’.624 Whilst not
specifically asking for Kosovo’s independence, the tone of this document made it clear that the
future of Kosovo was to be in the hands of international community, rather than Belgrade.
Furthermore, this document underscored EU support to the pro-reform government of
Montenegro under a new leader. In February 1998, the pro-EU and anti-Milošević candidate,
Milo Đukanović, became Montenegro’s President, defeating Milošević’s key Montenegrin
ally, Momir Bulatović in the republican elections held in October 1997.625 LeBor notes that
Bulatović was well-known for his ‘servile obedience’ to Milošević.626 Bulatović’s major act of
disobedience was public support for Lord Carrington’s peace proposals in 1991–92 (under the
EU auspices) while he was a member of the FRY’s Supreme Defence Council. The Carrington
622 A.W. De Vries, ‘European Union sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from 1998 to 2000: a
special exercise in targeting’, in D. Cortright, G.A. Lopez (eds), Smart sanctions: targeting economic Statecraft,
Plymouth, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2002, p. 87.
623 European Council, ‘Presidency Conclusions’, Vienna, 11–12 December 1998,
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/00300-R1.EN8.htm, (accessed 1 May
2013).
624 ibid.
625 Bulatović, who in 1988 became President of the League of Communists of Montenegro, emerged as a key
supporter of Milošević’s policies towards Kosovo and the breakaway republics in the wars of Yugoslav
dissolution. He was Montenegro’s President from December 1990 to January 1998. His loyalty to Milošević
after the electoral defeat at republican presidential elections was ‘rewarded’ with the prime ministerial position
in the federal government in May 1998—a post which he held until Serbia’s regime change in October 2000.
626 A. LeBor, Milošević: A Biography, New Haven, Yale University Press, 2004, p. 195.
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plan sought to end the wars of Yugoslavia’s disintegration, and pledged millions of dollars in
aid to the Montenegrin economy.627 Following a smear campaign against him, Bulatović
retracted his acceptance of the plan and turned his support again to Milošević’s policies,
including on Kosovo. His electoral defeat in Montenegro allowed for the EU to develop a
different approach to democratic reforms in the republic. Finally, the document stressed the
significance of conditionality in the ‘framework of the EU’s regional approach’ to the Western
Balkans—which became the chief EU policy tool towards this region after the Kosovo war.
The NATO intervention
The operation by NATO against the Milošević regime was conducted around the same time as
NATO’s 50th anniversary (April 1999), and the new Strategic Concept was being prepared for
the Alliance.628 The operation against FRY was known as ‘Merciful Angel’ in Serbia, ‘Noble
Anvil’ in the US (also dubbed ‘Madeline’s War’), and Operation Allied Force in official NATO
documents. It was ‘the most intense and sustained military operation to have been conducted
in Europe’ since the end of the Second World War.629 It ‘illuminated’ how the US would in the
future approach the art of war in the 21st century.630 There was much debate at the time about
the legality of NATO intervention against FRY without a clear authorisation from the
UNSC.631 An international commission for the prevention of conflict highlighted the need for
more effective diplomatic efforts in dealing similar conflict in the future:
627 ibid., pp. 195; 202.
628 NATO, ‘The Alliance's Strategic Concept’, 24 April 1999,
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27433.htm, (accessed 12 April 2014).
629 RAND Corporation, ‘Operation Allied Force: lessons for the future’, Research brief, no. 75, 2001,
http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB75/index1.html, (accessed 1 May 2013).
630 US Secretary of Defence William S. Cohen, quoted by M.W. Lamb Sr, ‘Operation Allied Force: golden
nuggets for future campaigns’, Maxwell Paper, no. 27, Alabama, Air University Press, 2002, p. 1.
631 The Kosovo conflict led to a new approach in conflict prevention, ‘the Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P). H.
Kriege, The Kosovo conflict and international law: an analytical documentation 1974–1999, Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 2001, p. xxxviii.
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In Kosovo, almost any kind of preventive activity–whether it involved more effective
preventive diplomacy, or the earlier and sharper application of coercive preventive
measures like the credible threat of ground-level military action–would have had to be
cheaper than the $46 billion the international community is estimated to have
committed … in fighting the war and following up with peace-keeping and
reconstruction.632
The significance of the NATO intervention, without an explicit authorisation from the UNSC,
to deploy offensive military force has been debated at some length, including within NATO
structures. Discussions centred on the consequences for international law and selectivity in
usage of the humanitarian intervention principle, which was invoked as a key normative
argument for NATO intervention, to protect Kosovo Albanian civilians from Serbian state
repression. Rapporteur Arthur Paecht from the Civilian Affairs Committee of the NATO
Parliamentary Assembly wondered whether the European countries would be ‘… so concerned
about Kosovo if it were not on their doorstep and had not involved the risk of an enormous
influx of refugees and of setting the region ablaze’.633 These were seen to be legitimate security
reasons behind NATO’s intervention. Paecht also drew a distinction between this large–scale
intervention that lasted without break for 78 days, and previous limited NATO air strikes in
Bosnia-Herzegovina (in 1994–95) against Serbian military units.
632 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to protect, Ottawa,
International Development Research Centre, 2001, p. 71.
633 A. Paecht (General Rapporteur), ‘Kosovo as a precedent: towards a reform of the Security Council?’,
International Law and humanitarian intervention, Civilian Affairs Committee draft report, NATO Parliamentary
Assembly, 16 September 1999, http://www.nato-pa.int/archivedpub/comrep/1999/as244cc-e.asp, (accessed 1
May 2013).
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Rapporteur Paecht referred to the NATO Secretary General, Javier Solana’s press release
which was delivered on the evening before the bombing campaign began, announcing the
executive order to attack the FRY.634 Amongst other things, Solana declared that the intent
behind the bombing campaign was to prevent ‘further humanitarian catastrophe’ in Kosovo, as
the Serbian Government expelled hundreds of thousands of Albanians from their homes in an
act of ethnic cleansing. Solana said that another objective was ‘to support the political aims of
the international community’.635 Solana was also careful to point out that NATO had ‘no
quarrel with the people of Yugoslavia who for too long have been isolated in Europe because
of the policies of their government’.636 This position was reiterated in the European Council’s
Presidency Conclusions document following the summit on 24–25 March in Berlin:
Our policy is directed neither against the Yugoslav or Serb population nor against the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or the Republic of Serbia. It is directed against the
irresponsible Yugoslav leadership under President Milošević. … We would like to end
the isolation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in Europe. But for this to happen,
Milošević must choose the path of peace in Kosovo and the path of reform and
democratisation, including freedom of the media in the whole of Yugoslavia. 637
634 At the same time in Serbia, official TV channels were screening popular Latin American soap operas, which
is a testimony to the bizarre and contradictory nature of this conflict. The decision to downplay news about
Solana’s executive order to attack the FRY was part of the regime’s propaganda strategy, as the citizens of Serbia
(the majority of whom did not have access to the satellite TV) were kept in the dark about the nature and scale of
the NATO’s offensive. Some international commentators made parallels between the NATO intervention and
Serbia’s military tactics which resembled the partisan military strategy against the Nazis in the 1940s. B. Kemper,
‘Stubborn Serbs hunker down for long NATO fight’, Sun Sentinel, 14 April 1999, http://articles.sun-
sentinel.com/1999-04-14/news/9904131132_1_nato-bombs-nato-planes-serbs (accessed 13 May 2013).
635 J. Solana (NATO Secretary General), ‘Press Statement by Dr. Javier Solana, Secretary General of NATO’,
NATO Press Release 1999, 23 March 1999, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-040e.htm, (accessed 1 May
2013).
636 ibid.
637 European Council, ‘Berlin: Presidency Conclusions’, 24–25 March 1999,
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/ACFB2.html, (accessed 11 December
2013).
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This document put the sole blame for NATO’s intervention on the refusal by Milošević to sign
the Rambouillet agreement, continued attacks against Albanian civilians and greater military
and police presence in Kosovo, ‘exceeding the ceilings set out in the Holbrooke-Milošević
agreement of 12 October 1998’.638 Therefore, even though not all EU members initially agreed
to support NATO’s military intervention against FRY, the Presidency Conclusions on the eve
of the bombing campaign indicate that there was some degree of shared understanding among
EU members whose policy predilection was for a NATO presence in Serbia to ‘guarantee …
fundamental European values, i.e. respect for human rights and the rights of minorities,
international law, democratic institutions and the inviolability of borders’.639 However, by
generally agreeing to a military action that had ultimately led to the irreversible changes of
borders in the Western Balkans, the EU members had thereby sanctioned a new order to emerge
in that region. Such state of affairs still represents a source of bitter regional political contention
between Serbia and the EU, and between Serbia and many of its neighbours.
Prolonged military action by the world’s most powerful military alliance, NATO, against the
FRY in 1999 was the first time in history that this organisation had unilaterally attacked a
638 ibid. On 18 March 1999, the Rambouillet Accords were signed by the Albanian side but were rejected by
Milošević, who claimed that there were ‘no direct talks’ between Serbs and Albanians at Rambouillet.
‘Document: Milošević's rejection of Rambouillet ‘Accords’’, 22 March 1999, Emperor’s Clothes,
http://emperors-clothes.com/docs/rambouillet-milosevic.htm (accessed 15 July 2013). For the Serbian side, the
military annex of the proposed peace agreement at Rambouillet was seen as being similar to the ultimatum made
by Austria-Hungary, the rejection of which was the casus belli for its declaration of war against Serbia in July
1914. In a parliamentary report tabled for the British Parliament, Professor Elizabeth Roberts observed that the
proposal by the Contact Group at Rambouille led to station NATO troops in Kosovo ‘was outrageous, bearing in
mind that Yugoslavia is a country where it had been a constitutional offence, under the Tito constitution, and
since 1971 actually, to accept the presence of foreign forces on Yugoslav soil’. This report is a useful reference
for the Rambouillet peace discussions, the failure of which was the casus belli for NATO’s offensive against the
third Yugoslavia on 24 March 1999. House of Commons, ‘Select Committee on Foreign Affairs—Fourth
Report: Kosovo’, Session 1999–2000,
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199900/cmselect/cmfaff/28/2809.htm (accessed on 12 March
2013). For a useful overview of the composition of the Albanian and Serbian delegations, see ‘Dan kada je
propao “Rambuje”, a Srbija dobila NATO bombe’, 21 February 2014, Telegraf,
http://www.telegraf.rs/vesti/politika/958642-dan-kada-je-propao-rambuje-a-srbija-dobila-nato-bombe-video
(accessed 1 November 2013).
639 Berlin European Council, ‘Presidency Conclusions’, op. cit.
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sovereign European nation that did not pose a direct security threat to any of its members.640
NATO’s military intervention was a violation of the NATO Charter (1949), which stipulates
that NATO members should ‘refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of
force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations’.641A serious incident
between the West and new East, Russia, occurred on 12 June 1999 in a stand-off between
NATO forces and the Russian military at Priština airport, in what appeared to be a dispute over
post-conflict peacekeeping arrangements in Kosovo.642
The issue of mainstream political participation for Albanians in Serbia was not resolved with
Kosovo’s de facto separation from the Serbian Government’s control after the war with NATO
in 1999. In municipalities with majority Albanian populations in the border areas with Kosovo,
such as in the Preševo Valley, a new insurgency group, the Albanian National Army (ANA)
began attacking police stations in pursuit of independence. In 2000–01 armed clashes occurred
between a new wave of insurgency and Serbian police forces, which was defused with NATO
assistance. Almost simultaneously, conflict erupted in the neighbouring FYROM, which ended
with the internationally-mediated Ohrid Agreement that granted the Albanians more rights, and
a bigger role in national power-sharing.643 The uncertain political status of the remaining
Albanian areas in Serbia might also present future challenges for Serbia’s European integration,
as the majority of areas having boycotted elections, including most recently the Serbian
parliamentary elections on 16 March 2014.
640 Article 5 of the NATO Treaty stipulates that an attack on any NATO member would justify the use of force
in self-defence and that other NATO members would be able to militarily assist until the UN Security Council
‘has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security’. NATO, ‘NATO
Treaty, 4 April 1949’, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm, (accessed 1 November
2013).
641 ibid.
642 P. Wintour, ‘Russian and British troops in tense Pristina stand-off’, The Guardian, 13 June 1999,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/1999/jun/13/balkans5, (accessed 19 September 2013).
643 The text of the Ohrid Agreement of 13 August 2001 is available at: http://www.ucd.ie/ibis/filestore/Ohrid per
cent20Framework per cent20Agreement.pdf, (accessed 1 December 2012).
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The Kosovo war narratives and Serbia’s European integration
The head of European Union section within the Serbian Ministry for Foreign Affairs observed
in 2010 that the Kosovo issue, which had by then become the main priority for Serbian
diplomats, overstretched Serbia’s scarce diplomatic resources, diverting the government’s
attention away from reforms required for European integration.644 The Serbian Government
approached the issue of Kosovo’s independence by insisting that Kosovo should be preserved
within the territorial borders of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro.645 At the same time,
Kosovo Albanians were irked by the international community’s failure to provide a long-term
solution and certainty regarding the province’s final status. Escalating tensions between
Kosovo Albanians and Serbs indirectly led to an outbreak of violence, which the Serbian
Government refers to as the ‘March pogrom’.646
On 16 March 2004, Kosovo Albanian veterans from three key ‘war associations’ organised
mass demonstrations with the assistance of two minor political parties, during which
approximately 18,000 Kosovo Albanians protested against the arrest of former KLA leaders
on war crimes charges.647 On 17–18 March 2004, widespread riots involving approximately
51,000 Kosovo Albanians resulted in nineteen deaths and the setting ablaze of over 550 homes
and 27 Serbian Orthodox monasteries. Over 4,100 Serbs, Roma and Ashkali people were
internally displaced. Human Rights Watch described this event as the ‘biggest security test’ for
644 Interview with Nikola Lukić, Director of EU section, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Republic of Serbia,
January 2010.
645 S.E. Meyer, ‘Kosovo—a way forward’, 20 March 2012, Transconflict,
http://www.transconflict.com/2012/03/kosovo-a-way-forward-203/ (accessed 1 May 2013).
646 The term ‘pogrom’ was originally used to describe attacks on Jews in the Russian Empire, for example, the
Warsaw Pogrom. This word is now used when referring to a violent demonstration that is aimed at persecuting
an ethnic or religious group, usually a minority in a specific area.
647 United Nations, ‘Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in
Kosovo (S/2004/348)’, 30 April 2004, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2004/348,
(accessed 1 April 2013).
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NATO and UN police since the 1999 conflict, which ‘failed catastrophically to protect
minorities during the widespread rioting’.648 UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan said that the
attacks were an act of organised and premeditated violence—a position which was also taken
by the EU.649 The US commander of NATO’s forces for Southern Europe, Admiral Gregory
Johnson, said that attacks against ethnic minorities in Kosovo during 2004 amounted to ethnic
cleansing.650 As a result, the trust between ethnic Albanians and members of minority groups
in Kosovo reached their lowest point. In response to the violence in Kosovo, anti-Albanian and
anti-Muslim riots broke out in Belgrade and Niš, and two mosques were set ablaze. The lack
of direct negotiations between Belgrade and Priština has made the role of international actors
in Kosovo even more important. The violent riots caused further polarisation between Serbs
and Albanians, and made the task of the Contact Group much more difficult.651
The first substantial effort to initiate high-level dialogue on Kosovo’s status between Albanians
and Serbs came about in 2006 during Koštunica’s government. The UN appointed former
Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari as Special Envoy for the Future Status Process for Kosovo,
which the UNSC approved on 10 November 2005.652 The first direct leaders’ summit was held
in Vienna in July 2006 after several months of intense preparations. Prime Minister Koštunica
did not back off from his position relating to the substantive autonomy proposal for Kosovo,
which was categorically rejected by the Kosovo Albanian side.653 The Minority Rights report
648 Human Rights Watch, ‘Kosovo: Failure of NATO, UN to Protect Minorities’, 27 July 2004,
http://www.hrw.org/news/2004/07/26/kosovo-failure-nato-un-protect-minorities (accessed 13 December 2013).
649 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, op. cit.
650 Reuters, ‘NATO sees specter of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo’, Balkan Peace, 19 March 2004,
http://www.balkanpeace.org/index.php?index=article&articleid=11232, (accessed 13 December 2013).
651 The Contact Group was first established in response to the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992. It was
reactivated in 2004 following the violence of 17–18 March 2004 in Kosovo.
652 United Nations News Service, ‘Secretary-General appoints former President Martti Ahtisaati of Finland as
Special Envoy for future status process for Kosovo’, 15 November 2005,
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/sga955.doc.htm, (accessed 1 May 2013).
653 I. Traynor, ‘Serbia and Kosovo in independence talks’, The Guardian, 24 July 2006,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/jul/24/balkans (accessed 1 May 2013).
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found in 2006 that ‘nowhere in Europe is there such segregation as in Kosovo’.654 In March
2007, Ahtisaari delivered to the UNSC his final report on Kosovo in which he proposed
independence for Kosovo as the best way forward out of a situation that was threatening to
become a ‘frozen conflict’ in Europe.655 Politicians in Belgrade maintained that Nobel Peace
Laureate Ahtisaari held pro-Albanian views, but this was to be expected as his policy
suggestion ran contrary to their ambition to preserve Kosovo as a region within Serbia.
EU enlargement necessitates good neighbourly relations and in that way, demonstration of a
potential candidate state’s willingness to contribute to regional stability. The policy of aid
conditionality was applied Serbia and Kosovo to stimulate the leaders of both sides to engage
in dialogue. The EU’s 2005 enlargement strategy paper stated:
The opening of status discussions is a challenge for the entire region, and for the
international community. The strong commitment of all parties to a multi-ethnic, stable
and democratic Kosovo will be essential to achieve a sustainable settlement that
reinforces the security and stability of the region, and to ensure its further progress
towards the EU.656
This document emphasises the security dimension of the Kosovo issue for the EU. Although
remaining ‘status neutral’, the EU institutions actively supported the development of
654 C. Baldwin, ‘Minority rights in Kosovo under international rule‘, Minority Rights Group International, July
2006, http://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/training/material/docs/KR/KR_Material/MRGKosovoReport.pdf, (accessed
15 March 2014).
655 H.H. Perritt, The road to independence for Kosovo: a chronicle of the Ahtisaari plan, New York, Cambridge
University Press, 2010. V. Džihić and H. Kramer, ‘Kosovo After Independence: is the EU’s EULEX mission
delivering on its promises?’, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, International Policy Analysis, July 2009, p. 3.
656 European Commission, ‘2005 enlargement strategy paper’, Communication from the Commission to the
European Parliament and the Council, Brussels, 9 November 2005, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=en&numdoc=505DC0561,
(accessed 11 May 2013).
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indigenous structures of governance and legal institutions in Kosovo. The EU shared the
burden of responsibility together with the UN in a state-building project.657
The UN Security Council Resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999 (the day the Kosovo war ended)
provided a blueprint for international activities in Kosovo. Point eleven states that aims of the
international civil presence there, amongst others, are:
 ‘organising and overseeing the development of provisional institutions for democratic and
autonomous self-government pending a political settlement, including the holding of
elections’; and
 ‘transferring, as these institutions are established, its administrative responsibilities while
overseeing and supporting the consolidation of Kosovo’s local provisional institutions and
other peace-building activities’.658
Therefore, although UNSCR 1244 did not pre–determine Kosovo’s future status, it laid the
groundwork for the emergence of new, autonomous or indigenous institutions. Albanians
interpreted it as a sign of a new national beginning. Serbs, on the other hand, interpreted it as
an act of acknowledgement of the FRY’s sovereignty over Kosovo.
Moreover, the Kosovo issue slowed down EU widening in the Western Balkans and hampered
Serbia’s accession prospects, as most interviewees also noted. The security situation has not
been resolved as yet in this territory either. Kosovo became an international protectorate under
657 One former UN employee, who was working in Kosovo in 2000 and chose not to be identified, observed that
Kosovo’s legal traffic code was initially modelled upon a regional one from Australian states. Informal meeting
for the purposes of this research in Canberra, August 2010.
658 United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), ‘United Nations Resolution 1244’,
http://www.unmikonline.org/Pages/1244.aspx, (accessed 1 December 2012).
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multi-national supervision. The UN, NATO and the EU shared the burden of guaranteeing
stability in this region, but, in March 2004, thousands of remaining Serbs were still driven out
of their homes despite an international presence.659 Kosovo Albanians, supported by the US,
Germany and France amongst others, autonomously declared independence from Serbia on 17
February 2008, generating violent protests in Serbia that were widely reported in the
international press.660 Ever since, Kosovo-Serbia relations have been a permanent issue for EU
institutions tasked with overseeing enlargement policy towards the Western Balkans.661
Battle for recognition of Kosovo’s independence
In June 2013 Egypt became the 100th nation to officially recognise Kosovo’s independence
declared autonomously on 17 February 2008.662 By comparison, more than 100 nations have
recognised Macedonia under its constitutional name (Republic of Macedonia), but the ongoing
name dispute issue between the FYROM and Greece has prevented the former from joining
NATO, and slowed down its EU accession. Thus, unresolved bilateral disputes in the Balkans
have already had adverse consequences for this area’s integration in the Euro-Atlantic military
(NATO) and political (EU) structures.  Kosovo cannot attain a UN seat as Russia, China and
five EU me\mbers, continue to oppose its independence.663 Germany is Kosovo’s largest
659 K. Sengupta, ‘Burnt-out Serbs driven into exodus from Kosovo’, The Independent, 21 March 2004,
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/burntout-serbs-driven-into-exodus-from-kosovo-
6172294.html, (accessed 15 December 2013). March 17 is regarded as the ‘Black Day’ for Kosovo Serbs, as
many Serbs saw the violent protests in Kosovo that occurred on that date as amounting to ethnic cleansing. U.
Mrdić, ‘17. mart: Šest godina od etničkog čišćenja’, Pečat, 17 March 2010, http://www.pecat.co.rs/2010/03/17-
mart-sest-godina-od-etnickog-ciscenja/ (accessed 15 December 2013).
660 Chapter Six will discuss this event in further detail, and the reactions by the Serbian Government under
Vojislav Koštunica’s leadership.
661 Interview with a European Commission staff member in Serbia, 2011.
662 F. Bytyci, ‘Kosovo says now recognized by 100 countries’, 26 June 2013, Reuters,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/26/us-kosovo-egypt-recognition-
idUSBRE95P19M20130626?feedType=RSS&feedName=worldNews, (accessed 1 August 2013).
663 ‘UN membership door closed for Kosovo–Moscow’, Russia Today, 1 August 2010,
http://rt.com/politics/churkin-kosovo-un-resolution/ (accessed 1 March 2014).
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overseas development donor and most important trading partner in the EU.664 Germany’s
Federal Foreign Office described their relations as ‘privileged’ partnership.665 Given this
relationship, Serbia’s uncompromising position that Kosovo is part of Serbian territory (under
the 2007 constitution) makes accession negotiations with the EU particularly problematic.
Most Serbian political parties, except for most notably the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) led
by Serbia’s former Deputy Prime Minister Čedomir Jovanović (2003–2004), agreed that
Kosovo should remain under the Serbian Government’s jurisdiction.666 However they,
disagreed on the methods to preserve this position. The Serbian Government established the
Ministry for Kosovo in 2007 in a move which signalled the seriousness of the Kosovo
independence issue for the Serbian Government.667 The SO Church published, in 2008, a
‘Memorandum on Kosovo’, in which it reaffirmed the region’s historical, religious and socio-
cultural meaning as Serbia’s heartland, and opposed the government’s policy on Kosovo which
the Church saw as being too lenient.668 Social pressures on the Serbian Government to preserve
Kosovo within Serbia has become a vehicle for dissatisfaction against the government policies
in other domains, and a method of expressing anti-EU sentiment. The Kosovo recognition issue
has also generated policy cleavages among EU members with regard to Serbia’s EU accession.
664 Kosovo runs a trade deficit with Germany. Its imports from Germany in 2012 were worth EUR 153 million,
while exports to Germany were worth EUR 16.7 million. Federal Foreign Office, Germany, ‘Kosovo’, updated
March 2014, http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Aussenpolitik/Laender/Laenderinfos/01-
Nodes/Kosovo_node.html (accessed 12 March 2014).
665 Since 1999, Germany appropriated ‘more than EUR 420 million’ for diverse projects in Kosovo. Germany is
the second largest donor of foreign aid to Kosovo after the US. ibid.
666 Jovanović’s position on Kosovo was reported in Newsweek in 2005 when he decided to split from the
Democratic Party (DP) and form the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). R. Nordland, ‘Now what? Dayton 10
years later’, Newsweek, first published 12 April 2005, updated 13 March 2010, http://www.newsweek.com/now-
what-dayton-10-years-later-113837 (accessed 1 December 2012).
667 The Ministry for Kosovo was downgraded to a Chancellery after the change of government in 2012.
668 Serbian Orthodox Church, ‘Memorandum on Kosovo–Metohija’, http://www.spc.rs/old/Vesti-
2003/08/memorandum-e.html, (accessed 1 December 2012).
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EU officials noted that the EU did not want to have ‘another Cyprus’ with contested
sovereignty in their ranks.669 Doris Pack, a German MEP, said in 2012:
An unresolved Kosovo-Serbia problem will mean there will be no hope of Serbian
membership either. We accepted Cyprus with this problem, and it will never happen
again.670
A similar position was expressed by Ulrike Lunacek, European Parliament reporter for Kosovo,
in January 2014.671 These signals from the EU’s only directly elected institution, the European
Parliament, which has a say on the accession of prospective members, have sent a clear
message to the Serbian Government about what the majority of EU states and political groups
in the European Parliament expected it to do—resolve the Kosovo issue.
Conclusion
This chapter has argued that Albanian and Serbian dichotomist discourses characterise most
academic writings on Kosovo, with victimhood narratives being instrumentally used by
supporters as well as opponents of Kosovo’s independence. This chapter also attempted to
show that the Albanian national question was viewed first as an ‘ethnic problem’ (alongside
other unresolved ethnic issues) in the SFRJ, and as a national or Yugoslav problem after violent
protests in 1968. The Kosovo issue then became a ‘Serbian state problem’ in the 1980s, with
669 The recognition of Kosovo’s independence resembled the China-Taiwan diplomatic scrabble, with non-
Western members of the UN Security Council supporting Serbia’s position, as well as five EU members (Cyprus,
Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain).
670 ‘Should Kosovo join the European Union’, 5 July 2012, Debating Europe,
http://www.debatingeurope.eu/2012/07/05/should-kosovo-join-the-eu/#.UyPSnfmSxIA, (accessed 1 December
2012).




government structures adopting a heavy-handed approach, to which Kosovo Albanians
responded with defiance, armed resistance and their first proclamation of independence. The
wars of Yugoslav succession turned global attention away from the brewing crisis in Kosovo,
which erupted as soon as the Dayton Agreement was sealed. This agreement addressed ethnic
conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but not the conflict within Serbian state boundaries.
The NATO intervention in 1999 and the Kosovo Albanian de facto separation from Serbia later
that year spurred the rise of new types of domestic opposition in Serbia towards Kosovo’s
independence, the Serbian state and the EU. Anti-EU discourses increased after the NATO
intervention as part of a broader phenomenon of anti-Western sentiment, as will be discussed
in later chapters. The Kosovo war left traumatic consequences for all those who experienced
it, resulting in one nationalist perspective that tends to equate Serbia’s EU accession
negotiations with ‘siding’ with the NATO intervention in Serbia. After the Kosovo conflict,
new political actors emerged on the Serbian political scene, including the resistance movement
Otpor, which grew into the largest opposition force to the Milošević regime. The EU’s
engagement with Serbia’s opposition groups was, as the next chapter will argue, one of the
most successful foreign policy decisions made by Brussels towards the situation in FRY.
For the EU, the Kosovo war exposed a lack of consensus and the failure of diplomacy to prevent
further violence in Kosovo, or the bombing campaign itself. The consequences of this war are
still being felt in Kosovo.672 The narratives of the Albanian-Serbian conflict are still being
advanced by supporters of both groups. Ethnic segregation, underdevelopment and continued
violence against ‘new’ ethnic minorities now presents another litmus test for EU policy-
672 BBC, ‘Depleted uranium 'threatens Balkan cancer epidemic'’, 30 July 1999,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/408122.stm (accessed 1 March 2014). Deutsche Welle, ‘Uranium risks
haunt Kosovo survivors’, 13 November 2012, http://www.dw.de/uranium-risks-haunt-kosovo-survivors/a-
16366645-0 (accessed 1 March 2014).
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makers, including on transitional justice issues.673 Low levels of trust, which have generally
characterised Albanian-Serbian relations, have improved in recent years at the highest level
due, in part, to the EU’s high-level mediation efforts (including personal dedication to this
cause by EU foreign policy chief, Catherine Ashton). However, if the prospect of EU
membership is delayed further, it is possible that discourses of victimhood, hostility and
‘othering’ will resurface at the highest level between Serbs and Kosovo Albanians, making
regional security in the Western Balkans, once again, a European problem.
673 The first steps to address these crimes were made under international pressure. E. Peci, ‘Kosovo Liberation
Army fighters jailed for war crimes’, Balkan Insight, 7 June 2013,




A paradigm shift towards the EU after Serbia’s regime
change
This chapter will explore dominant political narratives in Serbia following the 78-day NATO
bombardment, and their significance for EU-Serbia relations. As argued in Chapters Three and
Four, the main normative trends that emerged in Serbia during the 1990s included, on the one
hand, the rise of anti-Western political attitudes and strong Serbian victimhood discourses. On
the other hand, there was an emergence of liberal and pro-EU narratives, demonstrated through
anti-Milošević political activities by the Serbian opposition and student groups. These
contrasting discourses profoundly affected how Serbia’s relationship with the EU was regarded
among the Serbian political elites and voters at election times, especially in 2000, which was a
crucial year for Serbia’s democratic changes. The anti-Western discourses in particular have,
after Serbia’s regime change in October 2000, presented a normative challenge to the efforts
of Serbian policy-makers to establish a constructive relationship with the EU. These normative
factors made the creation of Serbia’s ‘new’ foreign policy after 2000 more complex. Its
orientation heavily depended upon a comprehensive external worldview (Weltanschauung) of
Serbian governing political elites.674
The political weight and presence of these divergent perspectives demonstrate that the EU
accession is a highly context-dependent, normative issue for any applicant state, including
Serbia. Anti-Western perspectives contributed to the sentiment of mistrust that had already
been present among EU and Serbian political elites prior to the NATO intervention. These
674 According to an interviewee from the Serbian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, this vital institution that
implements and, to a large extent, influences Serbian foreign policy is divided among ‘Europhiles’ and
‘Europhobes’. The former generally favour Serbia’s EU accession over closer relationship with Russia, and the
latter preferring the opposite approach, or neutrality in foreign policy. Nikola Lukić, Director of EU section,
Serbian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, interview in Belgrade, 2011.
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discourses continue to influence many Serbian voters, especially who oppose Serbia’s further
European integration. The reason for this, according to one perspective, is that the Serbian
population is not adequately informed about the extent of benefits that its potential membership
in the EU could generate. For their part, the communication strategy of the EU and the Serbian
government to raise awareness of these benefits has been only partially effective.675
This chapter will examine the EU’s differentiated diplomatic approach towards the Milošević
regime, as opposed to the one pursued towards the pro-EU democratic opposition of Serbia
(DOS).676 This approach involved the EU’s coercive democracy at the Track 1 level, and
providing financial and political support to Serbian opposition groups (including DOS) in what
appeared to be with some form of coordination with the US Government as well.677 The third
part will discuss a resumption of official diplomatic relations between the EU and Serbia/FRY.
This breakthrough occurred because of a change of leadership in Belgrade, while the political
leadership in Podgorica (the capital of Montenegro) was already pro-EU oriented (since 1998).
The EU also became a mediator in creating a loose state union of the two republics during the
Đinđić Government, which was bitterly resented by the Federal level of government (under
FRY President Vojislav Koštunica) that had ceased to exist by 2003. The chapter concludes
with a discussion of various international reactions to the Serbian Prime Minister’s
assassination in March 2003.  Many EU policy-makers at the time, who were also personal
friends of Đinđić, in the aftermath of his murder started to question Serbia’s commitment to
675 Annual opinion polls in Serbia, conducted by the Serbian European Integration Office (SEIO) since 2002,
show that the majority of respondents in annual surveys feel that they are not adequately informed about the EU.
Republic of Serbia, ‘European orientation of the Serbian citizens: trends’, SEIO, December 2013,
http://www.seio.gov.rs/upload/documents/nacionalna_dokumenta/istrazivanja_javnog_mnjenja/mnjenje_decem
bar_13.pdf, (accessed 8 May 2014).
676 The DOS coalition was formed in 2000 from the remnants of Zajedno (Together) coalition. Members of
Zajedno bloc, which was led by Zoran Đinđić (DS), Vuk Drašković (SPO), Vesna Pešić (GSS) and Vojislav
Koštunica (DSS), won in the 1996 local elections in over 40 shires and in most of Belgrade’s electoral units,
which was the first major defeat of the pro-Milošević bloc in Serbia.
677 These terms will be defined later on in this chapter.
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European integration and the overall objectives as well as performance of the Serbian
Government.678 Đinđić’s assassination left many in the EU with an uneasy feeling about
Serbia’s unresolved political heritage from the 1990s (including the pervasive influence of the
transnational organised crime and war profiteers). It reduced trust between the EU and Serbia,
which became particularly manifest during Koštunica’s prime ministership.
Political discourses in Serbia following the NATO intervention
Mainstream political discourses in Serbia during 1999 and 2000 were characterised by the rise
in anti-Western and anti-EU sentiment because of NATO’s military intervention.679 During the
same period in Serbia, anti-Milošević political narratives increased. This was displayed through
discourses of a Serbian student protest group Otpor and the opposition politicians. Negative
perceptions of the West (including of the EU) in Serbia increased among ordinary citizens and
not only nationalist political groups, as many observers would claim. In part, this was due to
the psychological impact of the bombing, highly visible and widespread infrastructural
damage, and civilian deaths or collateral damage from the NATO bombing that was much
publicised in the Serbian media and diaspora communities. The so-called ‘collective trauma’
from the Kosovo conflict, or deep social shock because of the conflict that was taking place in
Serbia, was especially evident in local political discourses.680
678 For domestic responses in Serbia to the murder of its PM, see J. Greenberg, ‘“Goodbye Serbian Kennedy”:
Zoran and the new democratic masculinity in Serbia’, East European Politics and Societies, vol. 20, no. 1, 2006,
pp. 126–151.
679 Anti-American sentiment in particular was observed in Serbia even in 2014—almost 15 years since the
NATO bombing. United States Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, ‘Serbia 2014: crime and
safety report’, 14 February 2014, www.osac.gov/pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=15156, (accessed 1
March 2014).
680 While the consequences of the wars of Yugoslavia’s disintegration were certainly felt in Serbia, the territory
of which was physically unaffected during the Croatian and Bosnian wars, the NATO bombing was experienced
first-hand and its impact was much more immediate.
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Anti-Western discourses are still reasserted at the times of annual commemoration of the
NATO intervention at the bombed sites.681 Images of Serbia’s damaged architecture have ever
since been used as a rallying point for anti-EU and anti-NATO campaigners in Serbia,
including by political parties who would prefer Serbia to forge closer alliance with Russia
instead of continuing with European integration.682 Until 2013, a Ministry of Defence building
that was heavily damaged during the NATO bombardment in 1999 was completely visible
from the main entrance of the Serbian Ministry for Foreign Affairs. One interviewee noted that
morale in the Ministry was often low and the mood was increasingly anti-American, and
wondered if the building across the road had something to do with that.683
Political pressure on the Serbian Government increased after more than 100,000 Serb civilians
from Kosovo who were displaced across the country after NATO troops were stationed in
Kosovo following UNSCR 1244 that provided the basis for a peace agreement.684 At the same
time, hundreds of thousands of Kosovo Albanians who have previously been displaced into
neighbouring countries returned to Kosovo, which became an international protectorate after
the Yugoslav security forces withdrew. Dannreuther argues that Milošević’s intent to stir an
Albanian refugee crisis in neighbouring countries during the NATO intervention by ethnically
cleansing Kosovo Albanians backfired as it strengthened the solidarity of NATO allies and
681 H. Fawkes, ‘Scars of NATO bombing still pain Serbs’, BBC, 24 March 2009,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7960116.stm, (accessed 1 March 2014).
682 One of these parties is Dveri Srpske, which was registered as a political party ahead of 2012 elections. The
Belgrade Forum for a World of Equals, led by a Russophile former FRY Minister for Foreign Affairs Zivadin
Jovanovic, opened a photographic exhibition at the main convention centre in Belgrade in March 2014
showcasing ‘humanitarian, economic and environmental consequences’ of NATO intervention. This suggests
the continuity of political discourses that emerged as a result of the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia. N. Clark,
‘Belgrade calls for a world of equals’, Russia Today, 26 March 2014, http://rt.com/op-edge/anniversary-of-nato-
aggression-yugoslavia-393/, (accessed 1 April 2014).
683 Interview with Serbian Ministry for Foreign Affairs employee from the UN section who asked not to be
mentioned by name, Belgrade, April 2012.
684 A New York Times journalist and author estimated that at least 125,000 out of 200,000 ethnic Serb civilians
were driven out from Kosovo after the NATO bombing stopped. The majority of them were prevented from
returning to their homes, and reprisal attacks, including from gangs from Northern Albania that also arrived in
Kosovo with NATO troops, were frequent. D. Rohde, ‘Kosovo Seething’, Foreign Affairs, May–June 2000, pp.
70; 73–74; 76.
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resolve of Western powers to be more involved in Kosovo’s post-conflict peace building.685 A
narrative of collective rather than an individualised guilt for violence has characterised the
situation between Serbs and Albanians after the Kosovo war. This sentiment was in part driven
by the relatively low number of successful prosecutions for individual war crimes on both sides,
and it was also fed by the perceptions about a slow arrival of justice for past crimes.686 At the
same time, both sides started to exhibit unease about the international military presence;
Albanians seeking full independence, and Serbs demanding restoration of the Serbian
Government’s control in Kosovo.
Coercive diplomacy
The post-NATO intervention period was characterised by two distinct types of EU diplomacy
towards Serbia: coercive diplomacy at the official (Track 1) level, which lasted until Milošević
resigned, and the EU’s deepening engagement with the Serbian democrats in the DOS. By
providing support for democratisation in Serbia the EU improved its use of soft power
instruments. Engagement with Serbian pro-EU political groups and politicians later evolved
into official cooperation after a DOS candidate, Vojislav Koštunica, became Yugoslavia’s
President in October 2000. Therefore, the EU’s coercive diplomatic strategy was
complemented with dialogue with Serbian democrats. The political success of DOS at the
September 2000 elections in Serbia was enhanced by the Western support, both through public
show of support and by financial means.
685 R. Dannreuther, ‘War in Kosovo: history, development and aftermath’, in M. Buckley and S.N. Cummings
(eds), Kosovo: perceptions of war and its aftermath, London, Continuum, 2001, p. 25.
686 Rohde, ‘Kosovo Seething’, 2000, op. cit., p. 69.
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According to Alexander George, who first attempted to systematically explain the use of
threats, persuasion and force in diplomatic bargaining, coercive diplomacy entails:
A political-diplomatic strategy that aims to inﬂuence an adversary’s will or incentive
structure. It combines threats of force, and, if necessary, the limited and selective use
of force in discrete and controlled increments. The objective is to induce an adversary
to comply with one’s demands, or to negotiate the most favourable outcome possible,
while simultaneously averting the crisis to prevent unwanted military escalation.687
Coercive diplomacy is also targeted at persuading an opponent to call off or undo an action that
has been initiated, ‘such as giving up territory that has been occupied’.688 EU policy documents
reveal that the Milošević regime was seen as a major threat to regional peace and security in
Europe during the 1990s. Milošević was seen as the principal culprit for regional conflict, and
for repression of Albanians in Kosovo. This region was, according to manyWestern observers,
aimed at asserting Serbian ‘ethnic domination’ over Albanians—rather than at countering an
irredentist political movement, from was a Serbian mainstream viewpoint.689 The political
methods by which the EU pursued coercive diplomacy included the use of targeted sanctions,
threats of collective military action against the SFRJ in 1998, and military support by more
than half EU members for NATO’s military action against FRY.690 The most important
687 Cited in J.S. Levy, ‘Deterrence and coercive diplomacy: the contributions of Alexander George’, Political
Psychology, vol. 29, no. 4, 2008, p. 539.
688 Deterrence threat, on the other hand, is employed to dissuade an opponent from undertaking an action that
has not yet been initiated. US legal definitions, ‘Coercive diplomacy’, http://definitions.uslegal.com/c/coercive-
diplomacy/, (accessed 1 March 2014).
689 V. Pešić, ‘Serbian nationalism and the origins of the Yugoslav Crisis’, Pieceworks, no. 8, US Institute of
Peace, 1 April 1996, http://www.usip.org/publications/serbian-nationalism-and-the-origins-the-yugoslav-crisis,
(accessed 9 March 2014).
690 The EU’s use of targeted sanctions and force in the context of the NATO intervention was discussed in the
previous chapter.
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diplomatic strategy for promoting change in Serbia was the EU’s support for democratic
movements in Serbia under Milošević.
The EU’s support for Serbia’s democratic opposition
The second level of engagement involved EU efforts to support democratic transition in Serbia.
One of the EU’s major projects on this front was Energy for Democracy program. The EU
decision to provide financial support for anti-Milošević groups in Serbia during 1998–2000
was an innovative approach. This political decision followed a similar policy move by the US
Government, both of which were aimed at encouraging democratic reform in FRY and
supported Kosovo’s installed transitional authority as a chosen way forward. Informal
partnerships and political contacts with the Serbian opposition and student groups which the
EU developed in close coordination with the US to support regime change in Serbia had a
positive learning effect for its exercise of soft power. Following the regime change in Serbia,
the EU adopted a policy of political conditionality towards the Serbian Government, which
was consistent with the EU’s broader regional approach to the Western Balkans.
Milošević’s regional policy in 1998–99 was regarded among EU members and allies (the US,
Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada amongst others) as a major threat to peace in
Southeast Europe. Contrary to the belief of anti-EU proponents in Serbia, the EU did not have
a single ‘grand strategy’ towards the third Yugoslavia. The EU formulated a series of steps that
have later assisted with developing a more cohesive foreign and security policy, for example,
towards Kosovo in the late 2000s. As discussed in the previous chapters, the EU struggled to
reach a common position at the start of the Yugoslav crisis in 1991. The issue of offensive
military operation without an explicit authorisation from the UNSC divided the EU members
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also in 1998–99. It caused internal debates in countries such as Germany, which had been
constitutionally precluded from engaging in overseas deployments unrelated to peacekeeping.
This is why some observers say that the Kosovo war radically changed German security policy
as legal amendments were passed to allow Germany to become one of the most active
participants in the NATO-led military operation against FRY.691
The EU adopted an experimental approach to the possibility of regime change for Serbia.
Leading EU institutions learned the lessons of using a two-level strategy, which consisted of
pursuing coercive diplomacy towards the Milošević regime at the official level, and
engagement with the Serbian opposition at the informal level. The latter was broadened to
include developing cooperative relationships with Serbian civil society and student groups. In
addition, the EU gained new expertise after 1991 from the experience it gained with
membership negotiations with post-communist countries. A deeper understanding of
challenges pertinent to the transition from state socialism to market economy as in the context
of Eastern European enlargement (which was discussed in Chapter One) strengthened the EU’s
analytical capacities necessary for its future planning towards the FRY after 1999.
The Western-educated Serbian Prime Minister, Zoran Đinđić (2001–03), was Serbia’s most
influential opposition politician during the Milošević era. Đinđić repeatedly called for Serbia’s
‘return to Europe’.692 This phrase was used in the CEES on the verge of their transition to
democracy in the late 1980s and early 1990s, but Serbia’s transition to democracy occurred a
decade later. During SFRJ, Đinđić was an anti-communist dissident who was amongst thirteen
original founders of the Democratic Party in 1989. His role was vital in negotiating the
691 F. Breuer, ‘Between ambitions and financial constraints: the reform of the German armed forces’, German
Politics, vol. 15, no. 2, June 2006, p. 206.
692 Selected writings by Đinđić are available on the website of a Virtual Museum dedicated to his work,
http://www.zoranĐinđić.org/en/speeches, (accessed 1 March 2014).
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overthrow of Slobodan Milošević with a range of internal actors within the Serbian
establishment, and delivering Slobodan Milošević to The Hague. After becoming Prime
Minister in 2001, Đinđić lobbied intensively for Serbia’s integration into the EU. In order to
improve Serbia’s international financial credibility, his Government delivered a series of
unpopular economic reforms.693
There are four major lessons from the EU’s foreign policy towards FRY and Serbia following
Milo Đukanović’s election to Montenegrin Presidency in 1998. First, the EU displayed a
consistency in its broader approach to democratisation in post-communist Europe by
supporting democratic forces in FRY. Its support for Serbia’s democrats (DOS) was consistent
with its stated commitment to support Eastern European countries on their way to democracy.
At the Strasbourg European Council in December 1989 (after the fall of the Berlin Wall), a
declaration was adopted committing EU members to:
Take the necessary substantive and procedural decisions to ensure that the efforts
undertaken to facilitate the transition taking place in Poland and Hungary and possibly
in other countries of Central and Eastern Europe are co-ordinated and effective.694
Secondly, it appears that the EU foreign policy towards Serbia in 1998–2000 was developed
independently from, but in close policy consultation with the US. Both actors supported the
formation of the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe, which was formed in 1999.
693 This characteristic of transition economies is known as ‘transition recession’ and can be a cause of the fall of
reform-oriented governments. Z. Stojiljković, ‘Socijaldemokratija i političke stranke Srbije’, in Z. Lutavac (ed.),
Ideologija i političke stranke u Srbiji, Belgrade, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung/Fakultet političkih nauka/Institut
društvenih nauka, 2007, p. 126.
694 European Council, ‘Conclusions of the Presidency’, Strasbourg, 8–9 December 1989, http://www.european-
council.europa.eu/media/849019/1989_december_-_strasbourg__eng_.pdf, (accessed 1 March 2014).
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Differences on Serbia displayed amongst the fifteen EU members before the NATO
intervention were reduced after the war regarding the question of regime change. EU leaders
reached a common understanding about the need for Milošević to leave Serbia’s highest
political office. An example of this new approach was demonstrated at the US–EU ministerial
summit in Washington on 9 November 1999, when the US and EU agreed to pursue ‘mutual
efforts to support a democratic transition in Serbia’ by intensifying ‘dialogue with Yugoslavia’s
democratic opposition’.695 At the non-official level, therefore, the EU decided to support more
actively Serbia’s key opposition groups. This soft power approach was previously reserved for
nation-states, particularly the US, and individual EU members, such as Germany and the UK.
A common approach to supporting Serbia’s democratic opposition can also be observed in the
joint press statements following the US-EU-Serbian opposition summit in Berlin in December
1999. US Secretary of State Madeline Albright described this event as a ‘historic dialogue’,
furthermore clearly stating US support for the ambition of the Serbian opposition groups to
embrace European integration. Albright states:
We must consider carefully the changes and initiatives required for your nation truly to
join Europe. … Because we cannot fulfil our vision of a Europe whole and free without
the full participation of a democratic Yugoslavia.696
Consistent with this policy, the European Commission piloted in the late 1990s a program in
Serbia called Energy for Democracy, which was aimed at assisting Serbian opposition
695 US Embassy, ‘Transcript: Albright, Solana, Patten, Halonen on US–EU Ministerial’, 10 November 1999,
http://www.usembassy-israel.org.il/publish/press/state/archive/1999/november/sd21112.htm, (accessed 1 March
2014).
696 US Department of State, ‘Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright: remarks at US–EU–Serbian opposition
meeting’, Berlin, Germany, 17 December 1999, http://1997-
2001.state.gov/www/statements/1999/991217a.html, (accessed 1 March 2014).
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towns.697 The EU’s Energy for Democracy program consisted of organising the transport of oil
and other necessities to Serbian opposition-held towns during the winter months, which were
purposely cut off by the regime because of their opposition to the Milošević regime.698 This
‘informal’ or second-track partnership emerged despite the tense situation in official relations
(track 1) between EU and Serbia. The mass protests of 1996–97 created new impetus for
informal partnerships to develop between the EU and Serbian student protesters, overseas
student groups and opposition politicians.699 The EU’s new approach coincided with the US’s
new approach towards the internal situation in FRY, as the EU and the US started to actively
support the opposition’s activities against Milošević, in both Serbia and Montenegro.700
The EU’s activism in aiding the Serbian opposition contradicts the arguments advanced in the
literature about the EU’s widely perceived passivity, its internal and institutional lack of
cohesion as well as diplomatic inability to prevent or stop the wars of Yugoslav succession and
the Kosovo conflict. While this was true at the track one level, diplomacy at track two level
presents a different picture.701 By forging a closer relationship with the Serbian opposition, the
EU had developed new soft power instruments. Ties with the Serbian opposition have, after
697 Additional efforts by individual EU members and other countries in their support of anti-Milošević activism
in Serbia will not be discussed in this thesis in detail, but for further reading, see C.H. Smith, ‘Serbia–Otpor
Organization’, Statements, House of Representatives, vol. 147, no. 30, Washington, United States Helsinki
Commission, 8 March 2001,
http://www.csce.gov/index.cfm?FuseAction=ContentRecords.ViewDetail&ContentRecord_id=143&ContentTy
pe=S&ContentRecordType=S&Region_id=63&Issue_id=0&IsTextOnly=True&CFID=30872290&CFTOKEN=
70309730, (accessed 1 May 2014).
698 European Commission, ‘Energy for Democracy–First delivery’, Brussels, 23 November 1999,
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-99-60_en.htm, (accessed 1 March 2014). European Commission,
‘Extension of "Energy for Democracy" in Serbia’, 15 February 2000, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-00-
166_en.htm, (accessed 1 March 2014). European Commission, ‘Commission successfully completes Energy for
Democracy in Serbia’, 25 May 2000, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-00-527_en.htm, (accessed 1 March
2014).
699 Interview with the Serbian Ambassador to Australia, Neda Maletić, August 2012.
700 V.J. Bunce and S.L. Wolchik, Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in Postcommunist Countries, Cambridge
University Press, New York, 2011, p. 86.
701 One European Commission official who was interviewed in 2013 but asked not to be mentioned by name
observed that their team was directly responsible for overseeing oil supplies from neighbouring countries to
Serbian opposition-held towns during the oil blockade. In this view, the mission was novel for the EU,
logistically challenging but generally regarded as a success.
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Serbia’s regime change in October 2000, positively influenced the restart in EU-Serbia
relations under Serbia’s first democratic government.
Serbia’s regime change
Among the members of international community, the European Commission advocated
stringent financial and political measures against FRY, whilst at the track two level its officials
developed partnerships with the Serbian opposition.702 In a close coordination effort with other
international partners, particularly the US under the Clinton Administration but also the UN,
the EU resorted to political conditionality and sanctions as major foreign policy tools to
pressure Slobodan Milošević to embark on democratic reform. International sanctions targeted
Milošević’s inner circle, but also had many adverse consequences for the Serbian economy that
was already devastated by the NATO bombing, and previously, by the wars of Yugoslavia’s
succession.703
After the NATO intervention, key opposition activities were primarily coordinated by a newly
formed Serbian student-led resistance network called Otpor.704 The Organisation of Serbian
Students Abroad (OSSI), co-founded amongst others by Vuk Jeremić (who later became the
youngest serving Serbian Foreign Minister and President of UN General Assembly) was
assisting Otpor by drawing international attention to their cause. As one interviewee observed,
OSSI’s London branch collected second-hand cell phones (at the time when cell phone
technology in the Balkans was still very new) and transported them to a regional hub in the
702 This finding was independently confirmed in interviews with three European Commission officials, two in
2011 and one in 2013.
703 M. Uvalić, Serbia’s transition, 2010, op. cit., p. 73.
704 Centre for Applied Non-Violent Action and Strategies (CANVAS), ‘Chronology of events–a brief history of
Otpor’, Canvasopedia, http://www.canvasopedia.org/images/books/OTPOR-articles/Chronology-OTPOR.pdf,
(accessed 1 March 2014).
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Balkans where they were distributed to Otpor members.705 Freedom House, an NGO from the
US, cooperated with institutions from Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and the United
Kingdom to develop Serbia’s civil society networks, which were instrumental in toppling
Milošević from power.706 However, external assistance provided to the under-developed
Serbian civil society sector was not only criticised by Milošević’s allies but also by those who
believed that Serbia should be strictly independent, without any influence from other countries.
This polarisation between pro-Western/pro-EU and anti-Western/pro-neutrality and/or pro-
Russia viewpoints has characterised Serbia’s mainstream political discourses ever since,
representing a major obstacle to Serbia’s European integration. Following Serbia’s regime
change, divisions among the Serbian democrats intensified over the sensitive political issues
of Kosovo and Serbia’s cooperation with international justice institutions—which struck at the
heart of public debate in Serbia about the country’s sovereignty.
Serbia entered a period of democratic transition after a mass revolt in early October 2000. Mass
protests broke out after Milošević refused to accept his electoral defeat in the September 2000
presidential elections, which the DOS candidate, Vojislav Koštunica, was widely believed to
have won.707 A long-standing anti-communist dissident and Milošević’s main rival, Vojislav
Koštunica, on 7 October 2000 became FRY’s last President. Koštunica was pro-EU in
orientation at the time of his election. Due to his disagreements with the communist regime,
705 Interview with the Serbian Government official, 2012, who chose to remain anonymous. Interviews with
former OSSI activists (who were at the time of interview working for the Serbian Government and asked to be
un-identified) indicated that there still is a culture of fear from retribution from political elements dating back to
the Milošević-era, for those who have actively participated in Serbia’s regime change. The same appears to be
the case for those who had some knowledge of the Serbian Government’s money laundering activities through
overseas accounts, including in what are now EU countries (Cyprus in particular), which are still being
investigated. The World Bank–UNODC, ‘Slobodan Milošević’, https://star.worldbank.org/corruption-
cases/node/18665, (accessed 1 March 2014).
706 USAID, ‘Freedom House: support for Serbia’s democratic opposition’, final report, July 1, 2000–31
December 2001, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDABX633.pdf, (accessed 1 March 2014).
707 Montenegro’s pro-reform party led by Milo Đukanović boycotted federal elections in September, thereby
allowing the Montenegrin socialists to win republican representation.
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Koštunica was expelled from the faculty of Law of the University of Belgrade in 1974. In 1989,
he became one of the original founders of the Democratic Party (Demokratska Stranka, DS).
In 1992 (due to leadership disagreements within DS) Koštunica formed another party, the
Democratic Party of Serbia (Demokratska Stranka Srbije, DSS).708 A united democratic
Coalition (Demokratska Opozicija Srbije, DOS) supported Koštunica as their presidential
candidate in September 2000 against Milošević. In October 2000, Koštunica became the third
Yugoslavia’s President until this position was abolished by the looser arrangement of the State
Union of Serbia and Montenegro in February 2003.
After the regime change, opposition leaders became key decision-makers in Serbian politics.
German-educated leader of the Serbian opposition and Doctor of Philosophy, Zoran Đinđić,
became Serbian Prime Minister on 25 January 2001. In the eyes of the West, he was a staunchly
pro-EU politician, who championed a new national discourse for Serbia on its European future.
Member of Parliament and leader of the pro-EU Civil Alliance for Serbia, Goran Svilanović,
became Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs. Despite the regime change in October 2000, a
total break with Milošević-era politics was not achieved after October 2000. Key people from
the previous establishment, including Serbian President Milan Milutinović (in power from
December 1997 to December 2002), remained in top political offices. The continuation of old
regime structures (as a compromise deal) in post-Milošević FRY at the republican (SPS for
Serbia) and federal (Montenegrin SND) levels became a deeply complicating and destabilising
factor for Serbia’s gradually improving relations with the EU. Inadequate reforms affected
internal restructuring, privatisation (which was organised in a hasty manner and without
transparency), and the quality of Serbia’s democratic transformation, especially in the security
708 Koštunica was President of the DSS from 1992 until his party fared badly in the Serbian parliamentary
election in March 2014, prompting him to resign.
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sector. Incomplete reforms have adversely affected Serbia’s European integration, as well as
jeopardised its pro-EU course as will be discussed in the next section.
Different levels of the EU’s foreign policy towards FRY
From 1998 to 2000, the EU continued to pursue a differentiated policy approach towards
Montenegro, by engaging with the pro-reform democratic elites.709 This was in response to
changed domestic political circumstances in FRY, and in particular, Montenegro’s political
distancing from Milošević under its new President (elected in 1998), Milo Đukanović. The EU
had thereby become a more pro-active diplomatic player in reacting to FRY’s changed internal
political situation. This EU behaviour stands in contrast to the events of the early 1990s, when
the EU did not adequately support any opposition groups in Serbia or in Montenegro towards
the Milošević regime.
In the post-Milošević era, the EU also developed a new approach to Serbia using the strategy
of political conditionality. This method was consistent with its regional approach to other
countries in Central-East and Southeast Europe. However, by applying excessive political
pressure on a newly elected democratic government in Serbia to embark on swift political and
market reforms, the EU put a significant burden on pre-existing differences among parties in
the government coalition that won the December 2000 elections.
Despite the fact that the transitional Serbian government also included representatives from
Milošević’s party, the SPS, Serbia’s regime change had a positive impact on its official
709 This is evident, for example, from the European Council’s Presidency Conclusions from 2000 to 2003.
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relations with the EU.710 At the Zagreb Council Summit on 24 November 2000, the EU
officially endorsed the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) as a key framework for
regional policy.711 On 25 November 2000 President of the European Commission, Romano
Prodi, visited Belgrade to sign a Framework Agreement for help and support for FRY. This
agreement enabled the EU to provide political and economic assistance for the country’s
political and economic reforms. Serbia was also granted autonomous trade preferences
(previously given to other Western Balkan countries), but which were not immediately
implemented. A consultative task force between EU and FRY was established to monitor the
progress achieved (later replaced in mid-2003 with the Enhanced Dialogue mechanism).712
FRY was officially included in the SAP in July 2001.
The Council’s Presidency Conclusions of mid-December 2000 confirmed the primacy of SAP
process for reform in the Western Balkans:
A clear prospect of accession, indissolubly linked to progress in regional cooperation,
is offered to [five countries, including FRY] in accordance with the conclusions of
710 SPS member and a former close associate of Milošević, Milomir Minić, became the leader of the transitional
Serbian Government, which was agreed upon on 16 October 2000. In that government, the SPS held fifteen
Deputy Prime Ministerial and Ministerial positions, while the Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO) held nine in
total and the DOS coalition ten. One innovation of that government was that ministerial functions of four key
Ministries (Finance, Justice, Information and Internal Affairs) were conducted by a tri-partite college of
representatives from the three signatories to the transitional arrangement (the SPS, the SPO and the DOS).
Radio-televizija Srbije, ‘Sve srpske vlade od 1990. do 2012.’, 26 July 2012,
http://www.rts.rs/page/stories/sr/story/9/Politika/1107744/Sve+srpske+vlade+od+1990.+do+2012..html
(accessed 30 November 2013). C. Gall, ‘Koštunica agrees to transitional government for Serbia’, New York
Times, 17 October 2000, http://www.nytimes.com/2000/10/17/world/Koštunica-agrees-to-transitional-
government-for-serbia.html, (accessed 30 November 2013).
711 European Commission, ‘Serbia and Montenegro: key events’,
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/serbia_and_montenegro/key_events_en.htm, (accessed 1 March 2014).
712 The task force held five meetings in the period from July 2001 to July 2002 ‘dedicated to considerations of
current, general and sectoral reforms and their compliance with political and economic criteria and European
standards.’ Republic of Serbia, ‘Memorandum of the Government of the Republic of Serbia in Relation to the
Application of the Republic of Serbia for European Union membership’, Belgrade, 2009, p. 1.
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Cologne and Feira. The allocation for the CARDS programme for these countries
amounts to €4.6 billion over the period from 2000 to 2006.713
Serbia’s gradual reintegration into international institutions and access to financial lending
started with a decision of EBRD on 14 December to admit FRY as a member, which became
effective in January 2001. On 20 December, the IMF Board of Directors approved FRY’s
membership application, a decision which was applied retroactively from 14 December. The
same day the IMF approved a loan to support FRY’s reconstruction. IMF membership opened
the way for FRY to join the World Bank in May 2001, which opened up access to WB’s
structural adjustment lending funds. Despite economic support which FRY received during
early stages of its transition, political dichotomy at the federal-state level slowed down
democratisation in FRY and the inflows of foreign capital.
Serbian transitional authorities also entered into negotiations with the Paris and London Clubs
of Creditors to negotiate the rescheduling and cancellation of a part of its colossal external debt.
However, in order to receive financial assistance, FRY had to comply with the main political
condition, which was the meeting of its international obligations in relation to cooperation with
the ICTY. The country’s ‘extreme dependence on international donors’ assistance’ influenced
the transition strategy adopted in 2001, according to Uvalić.714
713 European Council, ‘Presidency Conclusions’, Nice, 7–9 December 2000,
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/00400-r1. per cent20ann.en0.htm,
(accessed 1 March 2014).
714 Uvalić, Serbia’s transition, 2010, op. cit., pp. 121; 124–125. Professor Uvalić was working on restructuring
of the Serbian economy and creating a blueprint for Serbia’s European integration office after Serbia’s
democratic changes. Her contribution to Serbia’s first democratic government is reflective of a general trend
prevalent at the time, when many prominent experts from the Serbian diaspora returned to Belgrade to assist
with economic and political recovery.
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At the official level of engagement (Track 1 diplomacy), a thawing in the EU-FRY’s political
relations came, therefore, with a new leadership team and changed internal political situation.
Mainstream accounts hold that a new era in EU-FRY relations followed the resignation of
Yugoslav President Slobodan Milošević; Prime Minister and Milošević’s principal
Montenegrin ally, Momir Bulatović, and the Serbian Minister of the Interior, Vlajko
Stojiljković.715 On 8–9 October 2000, Koštunica participated in the Biarritz summit during the
French EU Presidency where it was reported that EU members pledged 200 million for FRY’s
reconstruction.716 The French invitation extended to Koštunica gave European recognition to
the new leadership in Belgrade. A European Commission’s mission in Serbia described this act
as ‘a symbolic end of isolation and blockage of Serbia which was run during the 1990s’.717
In reality, however, the EU became involved in FRY’s complicated federal/republican politics,
as it became a leading external actor involved in mediating negotiations on a looser state union
arrangement between Serbia and Montenegro. This move, as could be expected, encountered
resistance from the federal level where Montenegrin socialists disagreed with the idea of
abolishing the federal government. This political act by the EU could have also been the trigger
of President Koštunica’s growing animosity towards the EU, as his job was made redundant
with the change in status quo. His anti-EU attitude took on a more serious policy dimension
during his prime ministership in Serbia between 2004 and 2007–08, which Chapter Six will
discuss.
715 BBC, ‘Milošević allies resign’, 9 October 2000, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/964181.stm, (accessed 1
March 2014).
716 P. Dragišić, ‘Serbia and European Union: a view from Brussels’, L'Europe en Formation, no. 349–350, 2008,
pp. 147–157, www.cairn.info/article.php?ID_ARTICLE=EUFOR_349_0147, (accessed 1 March 2014).
717 Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Serbia, ‘History of relations’,
http://www.europa.rs/en/srbija-i-evropska-unija/History_of_relations.html, (accessed 29 January 2014).
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On 9 October 2000 at a summit in Luxembourg, fifteen EU member states (MS) made a historic
decision (for EU-Serbia relations) to end the oil and air services embargo against FRY. The
country was, by then, one of the most isolated in the world.718 At the Luxembourg summit the
EU retained sanctions against former President Slobodan Milošević and his associates. A
political decision to modify the EU’s diplomatic stance towards FRY was expressed in the
summit’s Declaration on the FRY:
By implementing all of these measures without delay, the European Union intends to
contribute to the establishment of democracy and the rule of law in the FRY, to the
success of the major political, economic and social reforms it will introduce and to its
opening up to Europe.719
The Official Journal of the EU following the summit had also noted that the declaration
provided for a ‘radical review of the European Union’s policy towards the FRY.’720 On 12
October 2000, the US also lifted key economic sanctions against FRY.721 The EU’s and US’s
new foreign policy directions towards FRY had opened the way for FRY to enter the Stability
Pact for Southeast Europe on 26 October 2000, and to obtain membership in the UN on 1
November 2000, thereby becoming a ‘normal’ international citizen again rather than a pariah
state.
718 For a comprehensive list of sanctions against FRY in October 2000, see International Crisis Group,
‘Sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’, Europe Briefing, no. 15, 10 October 2000,
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/balkans/serbia/b015-sanctions-against-the-federal-republic-of-
yugoslavia.aspx, (accessed 1 March 2014).
719 European Council, ‘EU Declaration on the FRY’, Luxembourg, 9 October 2000, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_PRES-00-364_en.htm?locale=en (accessed 1 March 2014).
720 Official Journal of the European Communities, ‘Council Common Position of 9 October 2000 on support to a
democratic FRY and the immediate lifting of certain restrictive measures’, 14 October 2000, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2000:261:0001:0002:EN:PDF, (accessed 1 March 2014).
721 City of Belgrade, ‘New Beginning in 2000–2003’, updated 2 September 2004,
http://www.beograd.rs/cms/view.php?id=201279, (accessed 1 March 2014).
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During his first visit to the European Parliament on 15 November 2000 as Yugoslavia’s new
head of state, Koštunica lobbied for Serbia’s EU membership:
It is because of our firm commitment to step on the soil of European development that
we wish to sign the Association Agreement with the European Union as soon as
possible, and use the provisions of the agreement to direct our political and economic
recovery, and subsequent development, towards European integration. Perhaps the
citizens of the European Union can understand that best if they evoke their historic
memory and those long-past years after World War II, when the prospects for the
Continent and European civilisation itself were extremely uncertain.722
In his speech, Koštunica appealed for Western understanding and gradual integration of the
Western Balkans. Over the next two months, the new Yugoslav leadership resumed diplomatic
relations with the UK, Germany, US, France, Albania, and other neighbouring states. However,
one of the most important obligations that Serbia’s new leadership team was expected to meet
concerned improving relations with its neighbours. With EU mediation, the former Yugoslav
republics signed a Succession Agreement in Vienna on 29 June 2001 regulating their division
of former Yugoslavia’s assets. Uvalić observed that this important agreement, which
represented the EU’s diplomatic success, resolved ‘one of the most disputed questions’ in the
relations between former Yugoslav republics.723 The preservation of good neighbourly
relations in the Western Balkans still remains a key precondition for candidates in this region.
The EU still acts as the main driver of this approach to all outstanding questions regarding
former Yugoslavia’s dissolution through the ‘carrot’ of the EU membership. This incentive
722 European Parliament, ‘Address by Mr Koštunica, President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’,
Strasbourg, 15 November 2000, emphasis added, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//TEXT+CRE+20001115+ITEM-016+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=RO, (accessed 1 March 2014).
723 Uvalić, Serbia’s transition, 2010, op. cit, p. 123.
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also ensured that Serbia’s next parliamentary elections were conducted generally in line with
international democratic standards (notwithstanding some irregularities)—which stood in stark
contrast to the elections conducted during the Milošević period in Serbian politics.
The Serbian parliamentary elections after Milošević
The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe called on the transitional government
in Belgrade to ensure that Serbia’s legislative elections, which were due to take place on 23
December 2000, were free and fair.724 With the pro-European coalition of democratic parties
winning 176 out of 250 parliamentary seats, an international electoral observer mission noted:
The 23 December 2000 parliamentary elections were an important step forward in
Serbia’s transition to democracy. … Notwithstanding the flaws in the legislation and
certain legacies from the previous regime, the elections marked significant progress and
demonstrated a clear will of the administration to dispense with the practices of the
past.725
The electoral results are presented in Chart One on the next page.
724 Council of Europe, ‘Resolution 1230 (2000): situation in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’, 2000,
http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta00/ERES1230.htm, (accessed 1 March
2014).
725 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, ‘Republic of Serbia, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
Parliamentary elections 23 December 2000: final report’, 21 January 2001, pp. 2; 16–17,
http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/serbia/15269, (accessed 1 March 2014).
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Chart 1: Serbian parliamentary elections, 23 December 2000726
Following the US’s example, the EU lifted many residual sanctions against FRY except for
targeted measures against selected persons from the 1990s era. Ivo Daalder observed:
Now that he [Milošević] has gone, Europe is one giant step closer to being peaceful,
undivided, and democratic—a Europe that, far from being a source of danger and
concern as it was during the 20th century, is in fact becoming a strong partner of the
United States in the 21st century.727
Daalder’s analogy demonstrates how the West had viewed Milošević and his anti-Western
allies: as a personified symbol of authoritarianism, whose policies were the single major
obstacle to peace in the region. The perception of Serbia’s culpability for wars in the Balkans
726 The graph, which was prepared by the author of this thesis, shows the total number of seats, and the
percentage of seats obtained by each electoral bloc led by the largest party from each bloc.
727 I.H. Daalder, ‘“He’s Gone”–the end of the Milošević era’, 15 October 2000,






















was associated with policies of the Milošević-era elite and not only Milošević himself,
including other SPS functionaries; his wife, Mira Marković’s JUL coalition of parties, and the
SRS, led by Vojislav Šešelj.728
In the Serbian parliamentary elections of 23 December 2000 the voter turnout was 57.8 per
cent, and the DOS coalition won the majority of parliamentary seats. Major parties that did not
pass the five per cent threshold (required for parliamentary representation) included the Serbian
Renewal Movement (Srpski Pokret Obnove, SPO), which lost 45 seats, and the Yugoslav Left
(Jugoslovenska Levica, JUL), which lost 20 seats. This reflected the public sentiment in Serbia,
as the majority of voters opted for change.
After Serbia’s regime change on 5 October 2000, funding from the EU was conditional upon
the formation of ‘a suitable federal government’, according to a statement by Stability Pact
coordinator Bodo Hombach.729 The coalition of democratic parties made an agreement with
the Radicals (SPS) and the Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO) on 16 October 2000 to hold the
new elections in December. In the 23 December 2000 Serbian parliamentary elections, the
coalition of democratic parties (DOS) won 176 seats (with DS and DSS obtaining 45 seats
each), followed by Milošević’s old party SPS (37), the right-wing and anti-European SRS (23)
and nationalist Stranka Srpskog Jedinstva (SSJ) bloc (14), which was founded by a notorious
former paramilitary leader, Arkan.730
728 It is interesting that Mira Marković, Milošević’s closest confidante, was never charged for complicity by the
ICTY Tribunal, probably because she never held any official Government function. Milošević’s biographer,
Adam LeBor, observed that ‘for Milošević, Mira’s partisan pedigree offered an entrée to Yugoslavia’s elite’.
‘Mira Marković: Slobodan Milošević’s Lady Macbeth’, Independent, 13 March 2006,
www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/mira-markovic-slobodan-Miloševićs-lady-macbeth-469774.html,
(accessed 1 May 2013).
729 P. Fitzpatrick, ‘Hombach announces aid package’, Central Europe Review, vol. 2, no. 35, 16 October 2000,
http://www.ce-review.org/00/35/serbianews35.html, (accessed 1 February 2013).
730 B. Majdanac, ‘Istorijat: posle Drugog Svetskog Rata’, http://www.parlament.gov.rs/narodna-skupstina-
/istorijat/posle-drugog-svetskog-rata.938.html, (accessed 1 March 2014). V. Goati, Partijske borbe u Srbiji u
postoktobarskom razdoblju, 2006, op. cit. p. 84. In 2007, Party of Serbian Unity (Stranka Srpskog Jedinstva,
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The clashes of normative frameworks among Serbian democrats
Differences in normative frameworks of political parties that agreed to form a coalition
government have resulted in a political paralysis and slowing down of reforms in the post-
Milošević federal state. A political anomaly was produced at the federal level in November
2000 with an unlikely alliance between the anti-Milošević political camp, DOS, and the
Montenegrin socialists (Socijalistička narodna partija Crne Gore, SNP)—who were long-time
allies of Milošević’s party. The new federal government was composed of Prime Minister
Zoran Žižić from Montenegro’s SNP, while Miroljub Labus from the G17+ party became
FRY’s Deputy Prime Minister. Uvalić comments that ‘such an unnatural coalition in the
federation made cooperation within the federal government extremely slow and burdensome’,
rendering cooperation with the Đukanović-led Montenegrin government (where SNP was in
opposition) extremely challenging.731
The federal cabinet became increasingly divided between Koštunica and Labus, with the
former pursuing NATO officials for the bombing of Yugoslavia. Miroljub Labus was
supporting the Serbian Prime Minister, who wanted to expand Serbia’s cooperation with the
ICTY. A Montenegrin party, SNP, supported Koštunica given its intimacy with the Milošević-
era policy-making. The parallel existence of three governments (federal, Serbian,
Montenegrin) resulted in the triplication of many ministries and weak policy coordination
among them. This arrangement also delayed the FRY’s engagement with the EU, as trade
preferences granted by the EU were delayed due to the failure to reach a compromise on what
SSJ) merged into SRS. It was re-established in 2014 as an independent party, but it failed ever since the 2000
election to pass the 5 per cent of minimum threshold of votes, which are required for parliamentary
representation.
731 Uvalić, Serbia’s transition, 2010, op. cit., pp. 116–117.
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type of customs seal would be used for Yugoslav exports. These complex issues perpetuated
political risk and uncertainly, and limited the inflow of foreign investment.732
In late June 2001, EU leaders overwhelmingly welcomed the extradition of Milošević to the
ICTY at The Hague. Reactions by EU leaders, including foreign policy head Javier Solana and
European Commission’s President Romano Prodi were supportive of Serbia’s choice to
embrace reform.733 The day after extradition, the EU pledged economic aid in loans and grants
to assist Serbia’s economic recovery. Russian officials commented that Serbia’s deal with the
ICTY was a ‘sell-out’ for Western aid.734 However, this policy decision represented a change
in priorities and most importantly, narratives and practices for the democratic government,
which relied on building closer relationships with the West in order to advance EU membership
as Serbia’s key foreign policy goal.
On 25 June, the Yugoslav Government’s Justice Minister Momčilo Grubač requested that the
ICTY start with the extradition formalities. He defended the federal government’s decision
amid criticism that he was acting outside the government’s constitutional powers, as FRY’s
Constitution forbade the extradition of Yugoslav citizens. His argument was that this did not
represent the same type of extradition as the UN was an international institution, not a state.735
DSS leader, Vojislav Koštunica, protested the Government’s decision, while Prime Minister
Zoran Žižić shortly after resigned in protest because of the breach of a coalition agreement. He
732 ibid., p. 118.
733 A. Poolos, ‘EU reaction: extradition of Milošević celebrated, Moscow dissents’, 29 June 2001,
http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1096830.html, (accessed 1 March 2014).
734 ibid.
735 ‘Yugoslavia Asks Court to Start Milošević Extradition Process’, American Broadcasting Company (ABC)
news, 25 June 2001, http://abcnews.go.com/International/story?id=80867, (accessed 1 March 2014). Grubač,
also a former Dean of Law at the University of Belgrade, is currently an Honorary Council member of the
Democratic Party. Demokratska Stranka website, ‘Momčilo Grubač‘, http://www.ds.org.rs/o-
nama/biografije/57-momcilo-grubac, (accessed 1 March 2014)
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said, however, that cooperation with the ICTY was in his country’s national interest, and
observed:
It is only fair that through a court proceedings we can prove that we were not the
instigators, but the victims in the conflict that has shaken the Balkans during the past
decade.736
The day before the extradition, Berliner Zeitung reported Koštunica as saying that he did not
expect any extradition to go ahead before the donors’ conference for Yugoslavia on 29 June in
Brussels.737 Milošević’s top-secret arrest went ahead with authorisation from the Prime
Minister Đinđić, which exposed rifts in the coalition government. In a country where federal
presidential powers were, until the regime change, too wide, and prime ministers were regarded
as not more than loyal cronies to the regime, this development represented a radical break with
past practices.
Symbolically, the day of Milošević’s extradition coincided with Serbia’s revered St Vitus Holy
day, 28 June. As described in the previous chapter, according to the legend, Serbian martyrs
lost their lives in the 1389 Kosovo battle and Serbia became a vassal state to the Ottomans.
Prince Lazar was killed in this battle, and his youngest daughter Olivera was handed over to
the Ottoman Sultan Bayezid I’s harem as part of the peace settlement—an episode which most
Serbs still regard as a day of national humiliation, but moral victory. The Law on National
Holidays, which was among the first regulations of the 2001 Coalition Government, described
736 ‘Jugoslavenski premijer Zoran Žižić podnio ostavku’, Monitor, 30 June 2001,
http://www.monitor.hr/vijesti/jugoslavenski-premijer-zoran-zizic-podnio-ostavku/37471/, (accessed 1 March
2014). ‘Pala Savezna vlada’, 29 June 2001, Glas Javnosti, http://arhiva.glas-
javnosti.rs/arhiva/2001/06/30/srpski/P01062913.shtml, (accessed 1 March 2014).
737 ‘Milošević wird noch nicht ausgeliefert’, 27 June 2001, Berliner Zeitung, p. 9, http://www.berliner-
zeitung.de/archiv/Milošević-wird-noch-nicht-ausgeliefert,10810590,9914852.html (accessed 1 March 2014).
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St Vitus Day as the day of symbolic remembrance of all Yugoslav nationals who had died
while defending their homeland.738 In July 2001, the work on a joint EU-FRY consultative task
force commenced.
A rift within the pro-EU, 18-member DOS coalition started almost immediately after the
government was formed due to differences between the DSS under federal President Koštunica,
and the DS under Serbian Prime Minister Đinđić. The differences in their respective normative
frameworks weakened the DS-led coalition government that was sworn in on 25 January
2001.739 Two major factors contributed to the escalation of political differences between these
two largest parties within the DOS coalition: the extradition of former President Milošević to
The Hague tribunal, and the murder of a former state-security official, Momir Gavrilović on 3
August 2001 only hours after he had visited Koštunica’s office.740 A report by the International
Crisis Group described Gavrilović’s unsolved murder as a catalyst for exposing a long-hidden
feud between the DSS and the DS, and the DSS’s nature as a ‘conservative nationalist party’.741
Both Gavrilović’s and Đinđić’s murders were symptomatic of the severe domestic weaknesses
in Serbia’s transition. They exposed the difficulty of reforming Serbian state security agencies,
while Serbia suffered from its Milošević–era legacy.742 Targeted killings served to demonstrate
738 Č. Antić, ‘Vidovdan i Srbi. Najveći praznik srpskog naroda’, Politika, 26 March 2013,
http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/Tema-nedelje/Vidovdan-i-Srbi/Najveci-praznik-srpskog-naroda.lt.html (accessed
1 March 2014).
739 On this day in his parliamentary speech, Đinđić said that his government’s priority would be Serbia’s EU
accession ‘at the latest within ten years’, as well as regional political stability, measures to tackle organised
crime, Serbia’s economic sluggishness, and countering the independence moves by Albanians and by the pro-
independence Montenegrin Government. Government of the Republic of Serbia (archived page), ‘Ekspoze
Zorana Đinđića, mandatara za sastav nove Vlade Republike Srbije’, 25 January 2001,
http://www.arhiva.srbija.gov.rs/cms/view.php?id=2054, (accessed 15 August 2013).
740 V. Goati, Partijske borbe u Srbiji u postoktobarskom razdoblju, Belgrade, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and
Institut društvenih nauka, 2006, pp. 226–227.
741 International Crisis Group, ‘Serbia’s transition: reforms under siege’, ICG Balkans Report, no. 117, 21
September 2001, p. 1.
742 During the 1990s, many people from state security organs, such as the former Special Operations Unit Red
Berets, were thought to have been associated with key mafia clans and their alleged involvement in civil wars.
Members of the Red Berets later staged a protest, in November 2001, opposing Serbia’s cooperation with the
ICTY. In June 2002, a high-ranking official from the Serbian Interior Ministry, Major-General Boško Buha, was
assassinated, and members of the Red Berets later arrested in connection with his murder. M. Miljković and
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that violence, and threats of violence against serving officials and politicians, were a reality in
post-Milošević Serbia, representing a serious obstacle to pursuing the pro-European orientation
of Serbian democrats.
Many in the DSS, including Koštunica, regarded Đinđić’s decision to extradite former Serbian
political and military leaders to the ICTY as unconstitutional.743 Immediately after the removal
of Milošević from power, Koštunica said that cooperation with the ICTY would be secondary
priority, as he regarded the ICTY as having an anti-Serb bias.744 Koštunica’s former adviser
Slobodan Samardžić told the author of this thesis, that ‘The Hague conditionality’ became a
reflection of the ‘power and influence’ of several key EU members within the EU’s foreign
policy-making structures (particularly Germany, France, the UK and the Netherlands) as these
countries had pushed for the Hague conditionality to become a top priority in EU dealings with
Serbia. Samardžić remarked that the EU had demonstrated ‘double standards’ in its ‘selective
treatment’ of Serbs at the ICTY; there were significantly fewer court cases for the ‘under-
investigated war crimes’ committed against Serbs in the 1990s, and a significantly lower
number of convictions for crimes against Serbs.745 According to that perspective, ‘Hague
conditionality’ was a major factor that had slowed down Serbia’s European integration, and
one that divided Serbian democrats. Their rifts had eliminated any possibility of more effective
M.A. Hoare, ‘Crime and the economy under Milošević and his successors’, in S.P. Ramet and V. Pavlaković
(eds), Serbia since 1989: politics and society under Milošević and after, 2005, Seattle, University of
Washington Press, p. 217.
743 ‘Milošević’s extradition unconstitutional–Koštunica’, China.org., 29 June 2001,
http://www.china.org.cn/english/2001/Jun/15416.htm, (accessed 9 March 2013).
744 S. Erlanger, ‘Showdown in Yugoslavia’, New York Times, 7 October 2000,
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/10/07/world/showdown-yugoslavia-overview-Milošević-concedes-his-defeat-
yugoslavs-celebrate.html (accessed 1 March 2014). T. Karon, ‘Milošević trial challenges Serbs and the West’,
Time, 28 June 2001, http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,165800,00.html (accessed 11 March
2013).
745 Interview with Slobodan Samardžić (who was when interviewed an elected parliamentarian and the head of
EU studies at the University of Belgrade), Belgrade, July 2010.
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functioning by Serbia’s legislative system, and precluded consensus among democrats for
further reform.746
In August 2001, the DSS accused Đinđić and other members from the DS of links with
organised crime, and refused to continue to support the government.747 The worsening tensions
between the DS and the DSS resulted in the DS-aligned DOS Presidency to expel the DSS
from its ranks in 2002, and to strip the DSS parliamentarians of their mandates. This drastic
move destabilised the Serbian political scene, attracting criticism from the Organization for
Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) since it was a step back from Serbia’s democratic
reform and European integration.748 Gemma Collantes-Celador and Ana E. Junkos observed
that reforms in Serbia’s security sector (comprising defence, police and intelligence services)
were obstructed by ‘military ranks loyal to the Milošević regime’.749
On 12 March 2003, Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić was assassinated on the external steps of the
Ministry of Justice in Belgrade. Deeply anti-communist, Đinđić studied in Germany under the
influential German political philosopher, Jürgen Habermas. In 1994, Đinđić became President
of the Democratic Party (Demokratska Stranka, DS) in Belgrade, the party which he help
establish. The DS presented a political alternative to Slobodan Milošević’s policies that led to
Serbia’s international isolation, and to, what some may call, the ‘demonisation’ of Serbia’s
746 The main challenges to the security sector reform in Serbia were incoherence and a focus on border
management and broader defence reforms, rather than structural changes within the security agencies, which
were still dominated by Milošević-era loyalists. G. Collantes-Celador and A.E. Junkos, ‘Security sector reform
in the Western Balkans: the challenge of coherence and effectiveness’, in Ekergren M., and Simons, Greg (eds),
The politics of security sector reform: challenges and opportunities for the EU’s global role, Farnham, Ashgate,
2011, pp. 127–154.
747 This meant that, effectively, DSS became an opposition party in the Serbian legislature, but the DOS
coalition still held the majority with 131 seats. Bideleux and Jeffries, The Balkans: a post-communist history,
2007, op. cit., p. 288.
748 OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, ‘Republic of Serbia parliamentary election 28 December 2003’,
OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation mission report, Warsaw, 27 February 2004, pp. -4.
749 G. Collantes-Celador and A.E. Junkos, ‘Security sector reform in the Western Balkans’, op. cit., 2011, p.
137.
237
image abroad.750 Following Milošević’s resignation in October 2000, Đinđić became Prime
Minister in a Coalition Government that sought to reform post-communist Serbia and bring its
standards into line with those of the EU. Đinđić’s reform agenda influenced Serbia’s later
decision-makers, including President Boris Tadić (2008–2012).
It is believed that Đinđić was assassinated by rogue elements of a disbanded and criminalised
military unit known as the Red Berets. These units were created for special operations, but
allegedly also for eliminating political opponents and silencing Milošević’s critics.751 Serbia’s
ruling elite under Milošević was composed of: Slobodan Milošević’s socialist party
(Socijalistička Partija Srbije, SPS); his wife, Mirjana Marković’s socialist alliance of the
Yugoslav Left (Jugoslovenska Levica, JUL); nationalist Serbian Radical Party (Srpska
Radikalna Stranka, SRS); and several other minor parties.  Đinđić became Serbia’s third pro-
European assassinated leader in modern history.752 Possible involvement of other high-ranking
former officials in these and other unlawful activities, like corruption, is still being dealt with
in Serbia as a legacy from its recent authoritarian past. As mentioned earlier, successful
resolution of these politically motivated murders remains an important EU accession criterion
for Serbia.
Đinđić’s assassination touched off a further crisis, complicated by the absence of any elected
President of Serbia (after former President, Milan Milutinović’s term expired in 2002).753 The
750 É.Vlajki, Demonizacija Srba: zapadni imperijalizam, njegovi zločini, sluge i medijske laži, 2nd edn, Bad
Vilbel, Nidda Verlag, 2002.
751 D. Spasojević, ‘Group named in plot on Serbia chief’, Global Policy Forum, 9 April 2003,
http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/163/29244.html, (accessed 1 March 2014). One of the
interviewees for this project was a survivor of one such kidnapping, but chose not to be identified by name.
752 The other two leaders included pro-Austrian Prince Mihailo Obrenović III, who was assassinated in Belgrade
in 1868, and the anti-communist King of Yugoslavia, Aleksandar I, who was assassinated in Marseilles during
his official visit to France in 1934.
753 Previously, three presidential election attempts in 2002 and 2003 had failed as they did not meet the
minimum voter turnout of 50 per cent. Before the 2004 presidential election, this requirement was abolished.
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resulting confusion facilitated the rise in public support for parties that were less enthusiastic
about Serbia’s European integration.754 Several members deserted the democratic bloc (DOS)
by November 2003 as the Serbian Government was facing a no-confidence motion it was likely
to lose. This caused further fracturing of the pro-reform bloc, triggering calls by the opposition
for early elections.755 The EU supported Serbia’s pro-European democratic parties ahead of the
parliamentary elections, which took place on 28 December 2003. It appears that the EU’s
support for Serbian democrats was less than in the lead-up to Serbia’s parliamentary elections
in December 2000.756
On 12 February 2002, Milošević appeared at the ICTY facing charges of crimes against
humanity. His three separate indictments were joined under a single prosecution case relating
to crimes committed under his command in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo.757 In
May 1999, during the Kosovo war, Milošević became the world’s first serving head of state to
confront these charges.758 In March 2002, the EU assisted with the signing of Belgrade treaty
on the reconstruction of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia into the State Union of Serbia and
754 Some of these parties, including the radicals, called on Serbia to improve diplomatic and trade relations with
Russia, which was now under the new leadership of Vladimir Putin.
755 The DOS coalition was formally dissolved on 18 November 2003.
756 The US and EU financially aided the DOS presidential candidate (Vojislav Koštunica) before the elections in
September 2000 with millions of dollars. The Yugoslav presidential election was held on 24 September 2000
simultaneously with federal parliamentary elections, which were boycotted by the Montenegrin Government. S.
Erlanger, ‘The fall of Slobodan Milošević’, in J. Wright (ed.), New York Times Almanac, New York, Penguin
Putnam Inc., 2002, pp. 59–60; p. 59. Furthermore, Western assistance included funding for both Serbian
opposition parties and the popular student revolt movement, Otpor. This was the beginning of the EU’s new
practice of cooperating with Serbia’s opposition groups, including pro-European political parties, ahead of
major elections, which was a similar line of policy to that of the US. USAID stated that it assisted Otpor in 2000
with $25 million, but the overall Western funding for Serbia’s regime change has never been publicly stated by
either the US Government or the European Commission. The Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia,
Annual report 2000: Human rights in Serbia 2000, p. 3, http://www.helsinki.org.rs/reports_t10a01.html
(accessed 1 March 2014).
757 A. McDonald, ‘The year in review’, H. Fischer and A. McDonald (eds), Yearbook of International
Humanitarian Law, vol. 5, The Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2002, p. 281.




Montenegro. A constitution charter of a new state union of Serbia and Montenegro entered into
force in February 2003.
The politically motivated assassination of Serbia’s top and most pro-Western politician
plunged the Coalition Government and parliamentary groups into an institutional and political
crisis. Declining levels of trust on the Serbian domestic political scene amongst dominant
political players were manifested through parliamentary debates.759 The DSwere pitted against
the DSS parliamentarians, which had a flow-on effect on the public. The repercussions and
internal political bickering that ensued in Serbian politics have impeded its European
integration processes. A perceived backsliding in Serbian democracy highlighted the need for
the EU to keep a close eye on the security situation in the Western Balkans, which it specifically
referred to as a fragile region in its first security strategy, the European Security Strategy of
2003.
The Serbian Government’s initial response to the assassination might have led to private or
party retributions, thus shifting the country’s focus away from broader and substantive political
and economic transformation. Under enacted emergency measures, the first democratic Serbian
Government conducted a major anti-organised crime operation known as Operacija Sablja,
and 4, 000 people were detained for questioning. Like the political vacuum after Tito’s death
in March 1980, Đinđić’s murder opened space for intra-factional spills and showed a growing
divide between the Serbian political parties. Overall, this sequence of events set back Serbia’s
European integration as several political parties (SRS in particular) reverted back to ethno-
particularist narratives such as the victimhood narrative. Calls for independence in foreign
759 For an analysis of domestic levels of trust in public institutions in Serbia at that time, see E. Gordy, ‘Serbia
after Đinđić: war crimes, organized crime, and trust in institutions’, Problems of post-communism, vol. 51, no.
3, 2004, pp. 10–17.
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policy increased, which was manifested through growing opposition to the Hague tribunal
seeking the remaining Serbian indictees at large.760 Two trends emerged in relation to the EU’s
responses to the murder: a growing concern about Serbia’s democratisation and its future
commitment to European integration.
Global reactions to Đinđić’s assassination at the public discursive level certainly raised doubts
about Serbia’s democratisation and the substantive commitment of its political elites to
European integration. The lack of certainty regarding the causes and motivations behind the
PM’s murder is in 2014, a decade later, on the agenda of EU policy-makers who have listed it
among Serbia’s accession priorities in the wider and ongoing process of EU political
conditionality towards the Western Balkans. This issue demonstrates how past political events
matter in accession negotiations, as well as the extent to which an unsatisfactory resolution of
a major domestic political issue in the candidate state can later adversely affect that country’s
European integration.
EU accession for Serbia had become a deeply internalised political process, in which the ideas
and perceptions of a candidate state for the EU become pivotal for a successful closing of
negotiating chapters of the acquis. The murder of Serbia’s pro-EU Prime Minister brought back
memories of political coups in Serbia domestically, and the perception of Serbia’s instability.
Pettifer observed:
As in all high profile assassinations, the death of the leader concerned is likely to have
a symbolic importance that easily exceeds the actual loss of political skills embodied in
that dead individual. … Coming at a time when Serbia was supposed to be becoming
760 For SRS this was expected as its leader voluntarily surrendered to The Hague, claiming innocence.
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less of a ‘Balkan’ country, the assassination falls into a specific and local historical
tradition.761
Đokić recalled that exactly one hundred years before Đinđić’s assassination, a pro-Austrian
Serbian King Alexander Obrenović and Queen Draga were assassinated in 1903 by a group of
dissenting army officers, after which many European countries cut off diplomatic relations with
Serbia.762 The rival and pro-Russian/pro-French, Karađorđević dynasty, under a Western-
educated leader-in-exile, replaced the Obrenović dynasty. As Serbia’s new ruler, King Petar I
revised the Constitution, using the model of Belgium’s Constitution from 1831, and introduced
a system of constitutional monarchy.763 After diplomatic relations were restored with the
majority of European monarchies, Serbia had, once again, ‘returned’ to European mainstream
politics. This example demonstrates that competing perspectives of Serbia’s uneasy
relationship with major Western European powers and Serbia’s friendship and close relations
with Russia have resulted in tragic outcomes for Serbia during the time of national crises.
Decision-makers in the EU expressed three types of political concerns relating to Serbian
politics after Đinđić. These concerns, which were presented in the European Commission’s
progress reports, related to the rise in nationalism and ethno-particularist discourses in Serbia;
the increasing popularity of the Radicals (SRS) whose political leader was in the ICTY facing
charges of crimes against humanity; and slow security sector reform. The Head of the OSCE
Mission to Serbia and Montenegro, Maurizio Massari, observed that Đinđić’s murder came on
761 J. Pettifer, ‘The Death of Zoran Đinđić–a time for realism’, Occasional brief, no. 97, 23 March 2003,
Wiltshire, Conflict Studies Research Centre, 2003, UK Defence Academy, p. 1.
762 D. Đokić, ‘The assassination of Zoran Đinđić’, 13 March 2013, OpenDemocracy.net,
http://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-yugoslavia/article_1042.jsp, (accessed 1 March 2014).
763 Pro-West European and pro-Russian political affiliations have characterised the formation of modern Serbian
state since its de facto independence from the Ottoman rule in 1817. Serbia then became an autonomous
principality in 1829, reached recognition of its indendent statehood at the Congress of Berlin in 1878, and
became Kingdom in 1882. Both normative affiliations can be observed regarding on the question of Serbia’s EU
membership, as Chapters Six to Eight will discuss.
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top of Serbia’s other regional and internal governance problems.764 Đinđić’s murder also gave
an impression that influential criminal networks had some degree of political influence in
Serbia. European media described the assassination as ‘the biggest setback during the
normalisation processes’ between the EU and Serbia.765
Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov announced that Russia was ‘outraged’ at the crime.766
Greece, which held the rotating EU Presidency in March 2003, said the murder ‘was
incompatible with a sound democratic system’.767 In expressing her shock on the day of Serbian
PM’s assassination, Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs Ferrero-Waldner said that Đinđić,
who was a friend, was ‘one of the fathers of Serbian democracy’ who ‘represented the new
face of Serbia, turned towards Europe’.768 Javier Solana, EU foreign policy chief, said:
A friend of mine has been killed, a very good friend. I had the opportunity of working
with him during the last period of time. I had a very long conversation the day before
yesterday to help him make progress in the development of his country.769
These statements indicate that the improvement in relations between the EU and the Serbian
Government under Đinđić was in part constructed upon close personal relationships and trust
764 Massari also noted that key domestic issues included a rising poverty and declining living standards that
furthermore fed into an uncontrollable cycle of domestic corruption, and a tense security situation in the
Albanian-majority regions including Kosovo. M. Massari, ‘The OSCE Mission to Serbia and Montenegro
Challenges for the Rule of Law’, OSCE Yearbook 2004, Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik,
University of Hamburg, 2005, p. 124.
765 Euractiv, ‘EU-Serbia relations’, 22 February 2010, http://www.euractiv.com/enlargement/eu-serbia-relations,
(accessed 1 March 2014).
766 CNN, ‘World outraged by Đinđić killing’, 12 March 2003,
http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/europe/03/12/serbia.djindjic.reaction/, (accessed 1 March 2014).
767 G. Harding, ‘Europe stunned by Serbian leader's murder’, 12 March 2003,
http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2003/03/12/Europe-stunned-by-Serbian-leaders-
murder/UPI-90171047499608/, (accessed 1 March 2014).
768 Austrian Foreign Ministry, ‘Assassination of Serbian Prime Minister Đinđić: Ferrero-Waldner deeply
shocked’, 12 March 2003, http://www.bmeia.gv.at/en/foreign-ministry/news/press-releases/2003/assassination-
of-serbian-prime-minister-djindjic-ferrero-waldner-deeply-shocked.html, (accessed 1 March 2014).
769 CNN, ‘World outraged by Đinđić killing’, op. cit.
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forged by Đinđić with EU leaders. Đinđić enjoyed a formidable respect in many political circles
within the EU, especially in Germany, where his efforts to bring Serbia back to Europe were
particularly recognised and developed. This might indicate that European integration relies on
a significant degree of trust developing between political leaders, which plays a vital role for
the advancement of further negotiations.
US Senator, John McCain, released a statement on Đinđić’s assassination:
Those who would corrupt and destroy democracy in Serbia presumably hope by their
actions to extinguish the Serbian people's aspirations to live under rule of law and in
liberty as part of a secure and prosperous Europe. They have failed. Killing one man
will not stop reform or diminish the passion of Serbs to be part of the European family
of free nations.770
McCain’s words indicated that Serbia was still seen as being outside Europe, in its backyard,
geographically close but politically still remote from the civilizational European ‘core’, the
EU. Early parliamentary elections were called in 2003 during a political crisis generated by the
assassination. They took place on 28 December 2003, which was one year earlier before
schedule, because of Serbia’s deepening political crisis. An OSCE report (which reported on
the elections) questioned the logic of including three war crimes indictees as leading candidates
in the electoral roll. The OSCE said that these candidacies conveyed ‘the clear intention of
some political parties in Serbia to adhere to the denounced legacy of the past’.771 An
770 J. McCain (US Senator, Arizona), ‘Statement of Senator McCain on assassination of Serbian Prime Minister
Zoran Đinđić’, 13 March 2003, emphasis added, http://www.mccain.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/press-
releases?ID=028d3e17-2f1c-446b-ab9b-ee059f57f476, (accessed 1 March 2014).
771 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, ‘Serbia: parliamentary elections, 28 December 2003:
final report’, 27 February 2004, http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/serbia/24521?download=true, (accessed 1
March 2014).
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increasingly EU-sceptic politician, Vojislav Koštunica, became Serbia’s Prime Minister in
March 2004 after months of negotiations between different Serbian political parties.772
Conclusion
This chapter provided a contextual analysis of regime change in Serbia, which occurred in
October 2000 under combined pressure from domestic and international players. The start of
Serbia’s democratic transition is thus associated with the Milošević regime’s collapse in Serbia.
Key narratives during the regime change period in Serbia were a return to democratic rule and
to Europe, an argument employed by democrats. Serbian exclusionist ethno-centric and
victimhood discourses, however, were still present in the mainstream, especially in the losing
camp (Serbian socialists and radicals). Anti-Western and anti-EU discourses were also visible
in the political realm through rising opposition to the extradition of Serbian citizens to the
ICTY.
The EU’s use of a variety of diplomatic tools, including a soft power strategy to financially
support members of the DOS coalition symbolised a maturing of its instruments of common
foreign and security policy. As a result of this experience, the EU developed better equipped
institutional capacity to deal with civil emergencies after the Kosovo war. One key lesson from
the Serbian transition that the EU could have learned is that investing in partnerships with pro-
EU groups in the context of the regime change in support of democracy was a visionary strategy
that worked. It laid the foundations for trust between the EU and Serbia’s democrats, and for
confidence-building measures that enabled closer dialogue once Serbia’s new leadership was
established.
772 Zoran Živković became Serbia’s Interim Prime Minister was (from 18 March 2003 to 3 March 2004). He
was Minister of Internal Affairs of Yugoslavia between November 2000 and March 2003.
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However, the EU possibly pushed Serbia’s Prime Minister Đinđić ‘too hard too soon’ to
embark on complex reforms without much public consultation. His policies were unpopular
for the tens of thousands of workers who lost their jobs. Many people in Serbia associated his
economic policies with EU political conditionality, even though mass staff lay-offs from the
public sector mainly occurred under pressure from international financial bodies rather than
the EU per se. Social dissatisfaction with the government’s policies was in part responsible for
a shift in voters’ preferences to more conservative political parties in the Serbian parliamentary
elections of 28 December 2003, as the next chapter will argue.773 Đinđić certainly took Serbia
out of a decade-long international isolation. He also instituted Serbia’s cooperation with the
ICTY. Milošević’s arrest by the Serbian Government and his subsequent transfer to the ICTY’s
detention facilities in mid-2001 had polarised the Serbian public, creating a normative division
between the offices of the Serbian Prime Minister and federal President over the extradition of
Serbian citizens to the ICTY. This caused a political crisis within the ruling coalition,
culminating in the exit of Koštunica’s DSS from government, which led to the government’s
restructuring in September 2001.
Đinđić’s personal contacts with Montenegrin President Đukanović, who was his closest
regional ally during the purges of the Serbian opposition in 1998–99, facilitated the FRY’s
peaceful transformation from a federal state to a looser state union in February 2003. This move
cost Vojislav Koštunica his job, which could have contributed to his dislike of the EU. Under
Đinđić’s leadership, Milošević’s extradition to the ICTY represented a milestone, including for
773 L.J. Cohen, ‘Democratic consolidation in Serbia: pitfalls of the post-Đinđić transition’, Wilson Center,
meeting report 294, 2004, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/294-democratic-consolidation-serbia-
pitfalls-the-post-djindjic-transition (accessed 13 March 2014).
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Serbia’s relations with the EU. It is not surprising that the then President of the European
Parliament, Pat Cox, noted:
Zoran Đinđić in many ways symbolised the new democratic state which is Serbia. In
particular he will be remembered for his personal commitment to achieving democratic
reform in Serbia and for his role in bringing Slobodan Milošević to justice.774
Milošević’s extradition, although causing internal divisions, helped restore trust from the West
in Serbia’s new government. Serbia was in return for reform ‘rewarded’ with much needed
development assistance. Residual socio-political discourses from Đinđić’s era, which were in
part formed on the basis of performance and policy decisions by Serbia’s first democratic
government, continue to influence popular perceptions and contemporary narratives about
Serbia’s European integration to this day. Pro-EU and anti-EU discourses in Serbia today are
unanimous on one issue: the democratic transition of 2001–2003 was a missed opportunity to
comprehensively reform Serbia, as the process was cut short by Đinđić’s assassination.
Insistence on some elements of political conditionality (such as through cooperation with
ICTY) pushed aside equally pressing issues of weak democratic structures. Furthermore,
during Đinđić’s time in power, the EU had a golden ‘window of opportunity’ to support reform
process in Serbia. In responding to criticism of his economic and political decisions, Đinđić
once described democratic reforms as an inevitably unpopular political move that necessitated
an uphill struggle with a well-established (socialist) mentality, legacy, interests, entropy and
inertia.775
774 President of the European Parliament, ‘Statement by Pat Cox on the assassination of Zoran Đinđić’,
Strasbourg, 12 March 2003, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/former_ep_presidents/president-
cox/press/en/cp0060.htm, (accessed 1 March 2014).
775 D. Girić, ‘Zoran Đinđić, 11 godina posle’, 9 March 2014, Akter, http://www.akter.co.rs/weekly/33-
politika/78721-zoran-in-i-11-godina-posle.html, (accessed 13 March 2014).
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Undoubtedly, Prime Minister Đinđić’s assassination on 12 March 2003 delayed Serbia’s
European integration and enabled EU-sceptic forces to rise to political prominence after the
December 2003 elections. The recent historical legacy and unresolved political crimes from
Serbia’s authoritarian past during the 1990s continue to influence very strongly the prospects
for Serbia’s accession and perceptions within the EU about Serbia’s readiness to join the
bloc.776 In January 2014, after the first intergovernmental conference with the EU that marked
the start of formal accession negotiations, MEPs Jelko Kacin, Arnaud Danjean, Maria Eleni
Koppa and Marije Cornelissen stated in a letter to the European Commission:
The rule of law in Serbia will not be established until the political background of the
assassination of Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić is fully and comprehensively explored.777
Tanja Miščević, the head of Serbia’s EU negotiating team confirmed on 27 March 2014 that
investigations into Đinđić’s murder have become an official part of the negotiations with the
EU on the judiciary (chapter 23 of the accession negotiations on the acquis).778 MEPs also
urged the EU that other unresolved political murders of prominent journalists and opponents
of the regime conducted in Serbia should form part of the accession negotiations—a topic
which has become a key subject of reporting in the Serbian press since January 2014, also
attracting international attention.779 Several interviewees have pointed out that the Serbian
776 I.M. Jasnić, ‘EU condition–truth about assassination of Đinđić’, 24 March 2014, Blic,
http://english.blic.rs/News/10169/EU-condition--truth-about-assassination-of-Djindjic (accessed 29 March
2014).
777 B. Barlovac, ‘Serbia should resolve Đinđić murder to join EU’, Balkan Insight, 23 January 2014,
http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/resolving-djindjic-s-murder-should-be-part-of-serbia-s-eu-talks-meps,
(accessed 29 March 2014).
778 Tanjug, ‘Investigation into Đinđić’s murder part of EU talks’, 27 March 2014,
http://www.tanjug.rs/news/123190/investigation-into-djindjics-murder-part-of-eu-talks--.htm, (accessed 29
March 2014).
779 Blic, a Serbian daily, has a page dedicated to news stories on this topic, ‘Tag: Ubistvo novinara’, regularly
updated, http://www.blic.rs/tag/2383/Ubistvo-novinara, (accessed 29 March 2014).
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Prime Minister’s assassination in Belgrade on 12 March 2003 had, ‘without any doubt’,
delayed Serbia’s European integration by many years, whilst tarnishing its reform-orientated
image in the West.780
780 Interview with Serbia’s prominent political activist Sonja Licht, President of NGO Belgrade Fund for
Political Excellence, Belgrade, June 2010. Interview with Ivan Vejvoda, Executive Director of the Balkan Trust
for Democracy and former Adviser for international relations and European integration to the Serbian Prime
Ministers Zoran Đinđić and Zoran Živković, Belgrade, June 2010.
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CHAPTER SIX
EU–Serbia relations during Koštunica’s time in power
Serbia needs to redefine its national identity and statehood in order to become capable
of integrating into the EU. … [Serbs] still feel isolated, misunderstood and mistreated
by the West, and have not yet come to terms with the baneful legacies of Milošević’s
misrule. While they want to ‘join Europe’, they do not fully trust it, and the feeling is
reciprocated. Both sides need now to work to overcome their mutual
incomprehension.781
This chapter will predominantly focus on analysing EU-Serbia relations under the coalition
government led by the DSS leader, reformer and national conservative Vojislav Koštunica
between 2004 and 2008.782 Koštunica wielded executive decision-making powers, and his
policies were important for the continuation of Serbia’s democratic reforms. Roughly around
the same time, a social democrat, Boris Tadić held the post of Serbian President, which was
important for Serbia’s international image, which was heavily damaged by Đinđić’s
assassination.783 Where applicable, this chapter will draw comparisons to previous Serbian
781 J. Batt, ‘The question of Serbia’, Chaillot paper 81, Institute for Security Studies (ISS) of the European
Union, August 2005, pp. 8–9, emphasis added.
782 In 2004, Koštunica’s DSS party was moderately pro-EU, but also conservative and Christian democratic in
its political outlook. In February 2006, DSS became a member of the liberal conservative International
Democrat Union, currently chaired by the former Prime Minister of Australia, John Howard. Upon signing the
acceding charter, Koštunica said that DSS shared the same values of other like-minded parties in that group,
such as the respect for democracy, minority rights and, ‘most important of all, the principles of social
responsibility’. FONET, ‘DSS među konzervativcima’, B92, 4 February 2006,
http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2006&mm=02&dd=04&nav_category=11&nav_id=187520,
(accessed 1 February 2013).
783 Boris Tadić became President of the DS in February 2004, and was the most pro-European voice in the
Serbian ruling elite during Koštunica’s time in power. He advocated Serbia’s Euro-Atlantic integration, regional
reconciliation, a diplomatic solution to the Kosovo issue, and EU accession. Tadić’s popularity in the West and
his constitutional duty to represent Serbia abroad (as well as to appoint or dismiss Ambassadors of Serbia) put
him in a formidable position to improve Serbia’s image in the West.
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Governments and electoral results to illustrate any relevant political changes that impacted on
Serbia’s relationship with the EU.
Ideological differences between the DSS and the DS (and between their leaders, Koštunica and
Tadić respectively) generated bitter political divides among Serbian democrats, who were the
main drivers of Serbia’s reform process after the regime change.784 This situation allowed an
anti-EU and ultra-nationalist party, SRS, to gain more parliamentary seats, which represented
a legislative and normative obstacle to Serbian reforms, frequently using Kosovo as a political
bargaining chip.785 Serbia’s uneven European integration process during Koštunica’s time in
power will be, therefore, analysed in the context of a growing political influence of the SRS.786
The clashes in normative frameworks of Serbia’s main coalition partners generated a situation
in which Serbia’s European integration was slowing down.
This chapter will also examine how the EU’s policy of conditionality encouraged constitutional
changes and overall reform process in Serbia.787 The examples of the EU’s influence in Serbia’s
presidential elections aim to show that external support for pro-European candidates appears
to have led to further evolution of the EU’s regional policy in the Western Balkans. This
784 Although both leaders were democratic, they held different values and future visions about Serbia. Especially
as Koštunica increasingly came to rely on the Radical vote in Parliament to maintain power, differences between
him and Tadić grew wider. H.K. Haug, ‘Kosovo in Serbian politics since Milošević’, in O. Listhaug, S.P.
Ramet, and Dulić, D. (eds), Civic and uincivic values: Serbia in the post-Milošević era, Budapest, Central
European University Press, 2011, p. 345.
785 Since 2001, the SRS more than tripled parliamentary representation. In the 2001 parliamentary elections, the
SRS won only 23 seats, while in the 2004 parliamentary elections it obtained 82 seats, and in 2007, 81.
786 The SRS’s anti-EU rhetoric influenced political discourses in Serbia. It was probably also a catalyst for the
formation of a broad spectrum of anti-EU social groups across Serbia.
787 Stefano Bianchini has argued that the EU encouraged a shift towards democratic values in Serbia after 2001,
but that much of this effort was limited by the nature of Serbia’s transformation. In his view, Serbia was still a
divided society, which affected its political behaviour. The author notes, however, the influence of political
discourses on normative social discourses. The symbiosis of both perspectives would result in the conclusion of
a mutually constitutive nature between elite-level discourses (promulgated by inherently social decision-makers)
and social attitudes among the electorate (which are heavily influenced by elite-level discourses). S. Bianchini,
‘The EU in the values and expectations of Serbia: challenges, opportunities, and confrontations’, in O. Listhaug,
SP. Ramet, and D. Dulić (eds), Civic and uncivic values, 2011, op. cit., p. 78.
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involvement also serves to illustrate that Serbia’s European integration was a highly normative,
political, and negotiated process. Its progress was heavily dependent upon compromises made
by the ruling elites under the influence of EU support for pro-democratic parties. This thesis
argues that a lack of consensus among Serbian democrats, during Koštunica’s Prime
Ministership, slowed down Serbia’s European integration. The EU’s support for Serbian
democrats at election times, which is discussed later in this chapter, helped Serbia’s pro-EU
parties to provide a suitable alternative to a rising tide of Euroscepticism at home.788
Serbia’s parliamentary elections (2003)
The International Election Observation mission noted that the Serbian parliamentary elections
of 28 December 2003 were conducted in line with OSCE commitments, but expressed concerns
about the lack of reform of the legislative electoral framework that had been left unchanged
since the regime change in October 2000.789 The US Government stated after the victory of
pro-European forces in these elections:
The government of the United States is committed to assisting Serbia and Montenegro
during the difficult, but necessary, transition process and looks forward to working with
the new government in Belgrade in achieving our mutual goals. 790
This statement demonstrates the continuity in the approach by the US that was complementary
with Serbia’s European integration. The EU High Representative for Foreign and Security
788 Such an approach included the EU’s engagement with a wider array of political actors in Serbia.
789 OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, ‘Republic of Serbia (Serbia and Montenegro): parliamentary election 28
December 2003’, OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation mission report, Warsaw, 27 February 2004, p. 2.
790 US Department of State, ‘Serbian election results’, 29 December 2003, http://2001-
2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2003/27569.htm, (accessed 1 March 2014).
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Policy, Javier Solana, conveyed the EU’s satisfaction with the election result in Serbia as well
as its relief that the anti-EU party, the SRS, would not be able to form Serbia’s next
government:
The extremist nationalist forces, while strengthened as a result of the elections, will not
be able to form a government. I am therefore confident that the necessary basis exists
for a re-launch of the reform efforts, for further progress towards Europe and for a
continuation of the successful policy of good neighbourliness.791
The US and EU statements indicate that Serbia’s democratic reforms were supported by its
Western partners. The West in using words such as ‘our mutual goals’ showed solidarity with
the pro-democratic camp in Serbian politics.
Chart 2: Serbian parliamentary elections, 28 December 2003792
791 European Commission, ‘Statement by Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the CFSP, on the
Parliamentary elections in Serbia’, Brussels, 29 December 2003,
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/declarations/78546.pdf, (accessed 1
March 2014).
792 This chart, which was created by the author, shows election results, by party and percentages won in the

























The DSS formed a minority government with democratic centre-right parties in March 2004,
the Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO) led by anti-Milošević and pro-democracy nationalist
Vuk Drašković, who became Foreign Minister; the New Serbia Party (NS) led by the Capital
Investments Minister, Velimir Ilić; and the pro-EU G17+ party led by Deputy Prime Minister
and liberal economic reformer, Miroljub Labus.793 The DSS-led government also secured votes
from SPS (22) for passing vital legislation, which meant that the DSS could not be seen to be
too interventionist against former SPS-appointed public officials. The new governing coalition
sidelined liberal democrats (including LDP and DS), but it also excluded the SRS to the great
relief of Serbia’s pro-European bloc and the West.794
The SRS had won the highest number of seats (82) in the 2003 Serbian parliamentary elections,
gaining 59 additional parliamentary seats since the December 2000 parliamentary elections.
This represented the highest increase for any single political party in Serbia. This was a cause
for concern among many observers, as the SRS was part of the SPS-led government from 1998
to 2000—during the Milošević-era.795 Kristina Galjak, a spokesperson for the EU High
Representative for Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana, commented after the December
2003 elections that the EU would continue to support Serbia’s pro-reform parties, but that they
needed to unite to overcome personal differences among their leaders to defeat the influence
of ultra-nationalists.796
793 Koštunica was elected Prime Minister on 4 March 2004 with 130 votes for, 113 against, and 1 abstention out
of 244 MPs present in the chamber. These figures indicate that parliamentary opposition against him was
relatively high (just over 40 per cent).
794 S. Woehrel, ‘Serbia and Montenegro: current situation and US Policy’, in U.R. Nichol (ed.), Focus on
politics and economics of Russia and Eastern Europe, New York, Nova Science Publishers, 2007, pp. 235–250;
p. 238.
795 P. Ford, ‘Serbian Radical Party surge may complicate reform’, The Christian Science Monitor, 30 December
2003, http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/1230/p07s01-woeu.html, (accessed 1 March 2014).
796 BBC in Serbian, ‘Međunarodne reakcije na izbore u Srbiji’, 30 December 2003,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/serbian/news/2003/12/031230_serbiareactions-later.shtml (accessed 1 March 2014).
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The rise in the radical (SRS) vote appeared to have ‘more to do with social protest than
resurgent nationalist extremism’; the voter behaviour appeared to be driven by public
perceptions of ‘elite corruption, abuse of power, association with organised crime, ineffectual
government performance and the inexplicably bitter divisions between the “democratic”
parties’.797 Researcher Máire Braniff has posited that democratic changes in Serbia in October
2000 were, by comparison, also fuelled by domestic factors (widespread dissatisfaction with
the Milošević regime) combined with international pressure following the NATO
bombardment.798 Serbia’s recent history of armed conflict made international observers,
including in the EU, much more cautious about the electoral success of the SRS, prompting the
EU to pledge more public support for pro-EU parties (DS in particular) in the lead-up to
Serbia’s next elections.799
Serbia’s presidential elections (2004)
The EU put pressure on the Serbian political elites ahead of the presidential elections in June
2004 in an attempt to encourage cooperation by the pro-EU forces among the feuding
democrats. The EU’s support for the democrats (especially the DS) was aimed at neutralising
ultra-nationalists, whom the EU did not trust, believing the SRS would take Serbia back into
international isolation.800 The SRS was also formally presided over by an ICTY indictee,
797 J. Batt, ‘Serbia on the eve of the elections’, Institute for Security Studies (ISS) of the European Union, 2
November 2003, http://www.iss.europa.eu/fr/publications/detail-page/article/serbia-on-the-eve-of-elections/
(accessed 1 March 2014).
798 Braniff, Integrating the Balkans, 2011, op. cit., p. 124. Post-transition disillusionment in other post-
communist European states and a turn to the political right was also observed in Romania, Hungary and
Slovakia.
799 ibid., p. 126.
800 D. Kosanović, ‘Tadić or Nikolić: Europe or isolation’, Southeast European Times, 26 June 2004,
http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2004/06/040624-DUSAN-001
(accessed 1 March 2014).
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Vojislav Šešelj, who endorsed Tomislav Nikolić as SRS’s official presidential candidate.801
The balance of power became more favourable for pro-EU parties when a DS presidential
candidate, Boris Tadić, was elected president in Serbia’s first successful presidential elections
after three failed attempts to hold an election.802 Under EU pressure, Serbia had abolished the
requirement for a compulsory 50 per cent voter turnout for the electoral result to be valid. This
regulatory change facilitated a successful outcome in electing a new Serbian president,
especially since the voter turnout was again below 50 per cent.803 International observers
concluded that the elections was conducted in line with OSCE commitments and Council of
Europe standards, hailing the initial steps the Serbian Government had taken towards electoral
reform.804 Thus, Serbia passed its first major procedural test of democracy in presidential
elections, and the voters elected Serbia’s first non-communist president.
The EU’s pre-election policy aimed at encouraging Serbian voters to choose a moderate, pro-
EU candidate and proved in this case to be a success. Methods to which the EU resorted
included providing positive incentives such as more political commitment to Serbia’s European
integration (reflected in bringing about a European partnership program for the State Union of
Serbia and Montenegro); issuing pro-Tadić statements in the Serbian and European press,
including through diplomatic signalling via a third party (Serbian Foreign Affairs Minister);
and by favouring one candidate over the other by publicly welcoming the pro-EU candidate in
801 NIN journalist Stevan Nikšić observed that as a presidential candidate Nikolić attempted to position himself
as a moderate nationalist who was willing to talk to the international community and focus on economic issues.
However, his association with ultra-nationalist Šešelj made his prospects of receiving EU support non-existent,
at that time.  S. Nikšić, ‘Serbia chooses Europe’, Cord Magazine, July 2004, p. 4.
802 As federal Defence Minister, Tadić initiated Serbia’s significant reforms in the defence sector, which was
still filled with staff loyal to Milošević—many of whom resisted the reforms.
803 The first round of voting attracted 47.7 per cent and the second round 48.3 per cent of the electorate. Election
Guide, ‘Republic of Serbia: elections’, http://www.electionguide.org/countries/id/242/, (accessed 1 March
2014).
804 J. Franklin, ‘Serbia (Serbia and Montenegro) presidential elections June 2004’, Nordem report, no. 8, 2004,
p. 15, http://www.jus.uio.no/smr/english/about/programmes/nordem/publications/nordem-report/2004/08.pdf,
(accessed 1 March 2014).
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Brussels before the final round of the elections.805 The importance of electing a pro-EU
president in Serbia lay in the need for the West to have a reliable partner in Serbia to push for
more democratic reform, sideline SRS influence and to counter-balance already existing
nationalist tendencies within the Serbian Government coalition.
Tadić’s main rival in the 2004 presidential elections was the SRS candidate Tomislav Nikolić,
who sought to create a new image for the SRS by calling for regional disarmament.806 In the
first round of the presidential elections, which was held on 13 June 2004, Nikolić came first,
followed by Tadić.807 This result indicated the need for more EU pressure to convince
Koštunica (who did not declare his support for Tadić before the first round of elections) to
support the DS candidate. The second round of elections was scheduled for 27 June. On 14
June, the Council adopted the first European Partnership for Serbia and Montenegro, including
Kosovo under UNSCR 1244.808 This document reaffirmed the Thessaloniki Summit’s decision
that conditionality within the SAP framework would continue to guide further European
integration in the Western Balkans.
Gergana Noutcheva has noted that the EU interfered strongly in the elections as it could not
allow the SRS candidate to win, suspecting that the SRS in power would derail Serbia’s reforms
and jeopardise the EU investments in Serbia. Noutcheva has also observed that, paradoxically,
the EU at that stage shared with the SRS, DS and SPS a predilection for the preservation of the
805 Diplomatic signalling is a method in diplomatic communication, for which potential audiences can be both
international and domestic. C. Jönsson and K. Aggestam, ‘Trends in diplomatic signalling’, in J. Meliseen (ed.),
Innovation in diplomatic practice, London, Macmillan Press, 1999, p. 151.
806 D. Kosanović, ‘Tadić or Nikolić–Europe or Isolation’, 26 June 2004, op. cit.
807 N. Wood, ‘Pro-European democrat wins presidential election in Serbia’, New York Times, 28 June 2004,
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/28/world/pro-european-democrat-wins-presidential-election-in-serbia.html
(accessed 1 March 2014).
808 Official Journal of the European Union, ‘Council decision of 14 June 2004 on the principles, priorities and
conditions contained in the European Partnership with Serbia and Montenegro including Kosovo as defined by
the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999 (2004/520/EC)’, 26 June 2004,
http://www.seio.gov.rs/upload/documents/Izvestaji/EU_Partnership_eng.pdf, (accessed 1 March 2014).
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Serbia and Montenegro federal state. This move was resisted by the pro-independence
Montenegrin Government, and the G17+ party within the Serbian Government (especially the
Deputy PM, Miroljub Labus, who was President of the G17+).809 The Robert Schumann
Foundation found that despite the fact that the DS presidential candidate, Boris Tadić, who was
‘the political heir to former Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić’, enjoyed Western support and
support of most Serbian democratic parties, ‘heavy international pressure’ was needed to
convince Koštunica to publicly declare support for Tadić over Nikolić before the second round
of elections.810 The then Serbian Foreign Minister Vuk Drašković from the SPO, one of the
key coalition partners of the DSS, conveyed a pre-election message following discussions with
EU ministers about his country:
No one in Europe wants Serbia and Montenegro to remain outside Euro-Atlantic
integration. They don’t want to have an empty hole between Slovenia and Thessaloniki.
It is in Europe’s interest that the hole gets filled with a truly European quality of life.811
The SPO’s support for the DS candidate possibly also stemmed from a personal issue
Drašković and his wife had with the SRS’s political legacy. The SRS was part of the Milošević-
led government when assassination attempts were made on Drašković’s life in 1999 and 2000.
His close associates (including his wife’s family members) were killed in October 1999 in a
road incident that was blamed on the regime’s security agencies.812 Apart from third party
809 G. Noutcheva, European foreign policy and the challenges of Balkan accession: conditionality, legitimacy
and compliance, New York, Routledge, 2012, p. 175.
810 Despite the personal differences that existed between Koštunica and Tadić, the latter’s presidential victory
had the potential to trigger parliamentary elections and tilt the balance of power away from the DSS towards the
DS. Foundation Robert Schumann, ‘The pro-European candidate Boris Tadić is elected president’, 27 June
2004, http://www.robert-schuman.eu/en/eem/0315-the-pro-european-candidate-boris-Tadić-is-elected-president
(accessed 1 March 2014).
811 D. Kosanović, ‘Tadić or Nikolić–Europe or Isolation’, 26 June 2004, op. cit.
812 At a trial in 2013, former Heads of Yugoslav security services and the special forces unit JSO (the same
notorious unit that was behind PM Đinđić’s assassination) were implicated in these politically motivated
murders. V. N., ‘Novi dokazi na suđenju protiv šefova DB-a za atentat na Draškovića’, Novosti, 27 November
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diplomatic signalling (through Drašković) and individual statements by EU foreign ministers,
the EU’s support for Tadić’s presidential bid also came from the European Council.
The European Council’s Conclusions on 17–18 June 2004 specifically mentioned the Serbian
presidential election. This document reiterated, firstly, the importance of the 1 May 2004
enlargement, which ended Europe’s traditional East/West divide with the accession of eight
post-communist states (alongside two island states, Cyprus and Malta). This invocation of other
successful examples of accession by post-communist countries was a diplomatic incentive for
Serbia and Montenegro to pursue European integration; it was also a signal of support for
Serbia’s democratic forces and Tadić. The EU also lent support for reforms at the State Union
level, which was a common policy goal of the DSS and the EU (despite Montenegro’s
objections). In this way, the EU stated its position was to preserve the joint state, but it also
acknowledged the individual efforts the Serbian and Montenegrin republics needed to make
towards further democratisation and economic reform. The EU encouraged Serbian voters to
participate in the election, and ‘in doing so, to ensure that Serbia moves decisively away from
the isolation of the past and towards European integration.’813 In the same statement, the EU
emphasised that cooperation with Serbia should rest on ‘the basis of a shared commitment to
European values’; hence stating support for the DS candidate who already shared EU values
and was more willing to cooperate with the West (EU, US and NATO) than the SRS
candidate.814 The compatibility between their normative frameworks made their cooperation
easier when Tadić was elected as Serbia’s new President.
2013, http://www.novosti.rs/vesti/naslovna/hronika/aktuelno.291.html:465838-Novi-dokazi-na-sudjenju-protiv-
sefova-DB-a-za-atentat-na-Draskovica, (accessed 1 March 2014).
813 The Council Conclusions stated that ‘the presidential elections in Serbia on 27 June represent a crucial
moment for Serbia, for the state union of Serbia and Montenegro and for the development of their relations with
the European Union’. Council of the European Union, ‘Presidency Conclusions, 17–18 June 2004’, Brussels, 19




Apart from common institutions, top EU foreign policy bureaucrats, including the High
Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, and the EU
Commissioner for External Relations, Chris Patten also publicly expressed support for Tadić
before the second round of the presidential elections on 27 June 2004. On 21 June, Javier
Solana received Tadić in Brussels, declaring:
The European Union will not be completed unless Serbia, as a very important country,
will be a member of the European Union. Serbia needs a president who brings Serbia
closer to the EU and who shares the same values and for this will be a friend amongst
friends.815
For his part, Commissioner Patten remarked that the Serbian people were facing a choice at the
ballot box between joining the European family or Belarus.816
Following Tadić’s victory, Solana announced:
Boris Tadić is a friend of Europe and I am looking forward to working with him in his
new functions. The people of Serbia have clearly expressed their desire for a European
future for Serbia. The EU stands ready to help them to achieve this objective. … I also
815 EU, ‘Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the CFSP, met with Boris Tadić, Presidential Candidate and
Leader of the Serbia's Democratic Party’, Brussels, 21 June 2004, emphasis added,
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/declarations/81142.pdf, (accessed 1 March
2014).
816 Patten’s comment was a reiteration of his earlier statement on the same issue. ‘Interview with Commissioner
Chris Patten’, Southeast Europe TV Exchanges, 30 March 2004, http://www.seetv-
exchanges.com/archive/videos/2004/chris-patten.731.html, (accessed 10 April 2013). Serbian Foreign Minister
Drašković, when asked in an interview about Patten’s remarks, commented that Serbia’s Euro-Atlantic
integration was delayed because the EU insisted on more cooperation by Serbia with the ICTY. D.
Bukumirović, ‘Drašković: Građani će snositi posledice svog izbora’, Emisija “Kažiprst”, 22 June 2004,
http://www.b92.net/info/emisije/kaziprst.php?yyyy=2004&mm=06&nav_id=144114, (accessed 1 March 2014).
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expect the new President of Serbia and the Serbian Government to continue being fully
engaged in the process of solving the pending issues at the State Union level.817
Words such as ‘friend’ used by a top EU official suggest like-mindedness in diplomatic
relations, indicating that a significant degree of trust had developed by that stage between the
EU and the DS.818 Trust refers to a willingness to take risks regarding the behaviour of others
based on the belief that potential trustees will ‘do what is right’. 819 The EU saw Tadić as a
Serbian reformer, with whom it was possible to negotiate and cooperate. Its pro-DS statements
indicated solidarity, but also expectations about the DS’s reliability and responsibility. These
were virtues that the EU expected to see from the Serbian leaders in their dialogue with
Montenegro within the fractious State Union, with Bosnian Serbs (some of whom wanted
independence from Bosnia-Herzegovina), pro-independence Kosovo Albanians and with anti-
independence Kosovo Serbs.
The election of Serbia’s pro-EU president, Boris Tadić, demonstrated the effectiveness of the
EU’s soft power in Serbia, as the EU’s supportive statements for Tadić’s candidacy yielded
results. Serbia’s other democratic parties that were by no means supporters of the DS
(particularly the DSS, the SPO and the G17+) recognised, under the EU’s pressure, the
importance of a more united democratic front against the Radicals ahead of the second round
of presidential elections. The effectiveness of EU foreign policy in the Western Balkans,
817 Council of the European Union, ‘Statement by Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the CFSP, on the
occasion of the election of Boris Tadić as President of Serbia’, Brussels, 28 June 2004, emphasis added,
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/declarations/81253.pdf, (accessed 1 March
2014).
818 Trust at the leaders’ level in diplomatic relations generally reduces transaction costs. As a normative
construction (which Yu et al. also call ‘informal institution’) trust can have a positive aspect on trade and other
aspects of any bilateral relationship. S. Yu, J. De Haan, and S. Beugelsdijk, ‘Trade, trust and institutions’,
CESifo Working Paper Series, no. 3571, September 2011, p. 1.
819 A.M. Hoffman, ‘A conceptualisation of trust in international relations’, European Journal of International
Relations, vol. 8, no. 3, September 2002, p.  375.
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therefore, notably improved when compared to the EU’s incoherent, slow-to-respond, reactive
rather than pro-active, and generally sluggish performance only a decade earlier. It has become
more strategically oriented in a broader effort to bring about structural changes in the third
country. Keukeleire et al. defined structural diplomacy as a process of ‘dialogue and
negotiation with third countries aimed at sustainably influencing or shaping political, legal,
economic, financial, social, security and/or other structures’ in target countries.820 By directly
supporting a pro-EU candidate over a nationalist one, the EU diversified its diplomatic
involvement in Serbian politics. The European Commission’s pro-active attitude made an
impact on the voters and encouraged more cohesion among Serbian democratic parties during
the second round of Serbia’s 2004 presidential elections, because they elected Tadić as Serbia’s
next president. As Serbia remained the test-case for EU diplomacy, the victory of Tadić (who
was generally open-minded about pursuing further EU-oriented reforms) resulted in a political
cohabitation between the pro-EU DS, with the President’s position, and conservative DSS
democrats under Prime Minister Koštunica. These two leaders held different normative
frameworks, as the DS was a social democratic party, and the DSS was a Christian democratic
party that was, in general, more conservative on social issues.
EU relations with Serbia within the State Union
The new Serbian DSS-led government, which was formed on 4 March 2004, committed Serbia
to European integration on the basis of three pillars. In his speech on 2 March, the Serbian
Prime Minister-elect said that there was no alternative to European integration of his country.821
820S. Keukeleire, R. Thiers and A.Justaert, ‘Reappraising diplomacy: Structural diplomacy and the case of the
EU’, in Brian Hocking and Jozef Batora (eds), ‘Special issue: the European Union and diplomacy’, The Hague
Journal of Diplomacy, vol. 4, no. 2, 2009, p. 146.
821 Koštunica said that his government will pursue ‘an intensified pro-EU politics’. Vlada Republike Srbije,
‘Ekspoze Vojislava Koštunice mandatara za sastav Vlade Srbije’, 2 March 2004,
http://www.arhiva.srbija.gov.rs/vesti/2004-03/02/343974.html, (accessed 1 March 2014).
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Koštunica also recalled how in the late 19th century Serbia and Montenegro, as independent
states, were well-integrated into mainstream European politics. This had remained the case, in
his view, until the communists stopped this development after seizing power and creating a
communist Yugoslavia with an iron fist.822
The first pillar of the new government was the pledge by the DSS leader to maintain the State
Union with Montenegro.823 However, the Montenegrin ruling party (Demokratska Partija
Socijalista Crne Gore, DPS) was in favour of independence, believing that a quicker path to
Montenegro’s EU accession would be achieved if pursued independently from Serbia—a claim
which both the EU (at that stage) and Koštunica disputed. Under EU pressure, Serbia and
Montenegro signed the Belgrade Agreement on 14 March 2002, which resulted in the name-
change for the joint state from Yugoslavia to Serbia and Montenegro. Their leaders also agreed
to adopt the Charter on the State Union in early 2003.824 The EU was originally involved in the
Charter’s drafting stage.825 On 4 February 2003, a highly decentralised joint state came into
existence; the position of FRY President (then held by Koštunica) ceased to exist, and a pro-
independence Montenegrin politician, Svetozar Marović, became President of the State Union
of Serbia and Montenegro.826 Both the Belgrade Agreement of 2002 and the Constitutional
Charter of 2003 provided an option for the withdrawal of either republic (or both) from the
822 ibid.
823 This was in agreement with EU expectations, as the same condition was formally three months later
presented to the Serbia and Montenegro in its first European Partnership agreement of June 2004.
824 First European Partnership for Serbia and Montenegro, op. cit., p. 23.
825 The final draft charter was a watered-down version of the EU’s draft. A.S. Trbovich, The Legal geography of
Yugoslavia’s disintegration, New York, Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 399.
826 Marović’s position as the State Union President was a compromise solution to appease the Montenegrin side.
He was also the Deputy President of the leading pro-independence Democratic Party of Socialists (SDP) headed
by Montenegrin Prime Minister Đukanović (then and now in that position). Marović supported Milošević until
Đukanović broke ranks with Milošević and won the Montenegrin elections in 1997. Marović delivered an
apology to all Croatian and Bosnian citizens for any harm done to them by citizens of Montenegro and Serbia
did any harm. In September 2005, Montenegro threatened to pull all Montenegrin staff from the joint
institutions in response to a dispute between Marović and the Serbian Minister of Finance from G17+ over a
controversial defence contract, causing a major political crisis. ‘Povlačenje Crnogoraca iz Beograda’, B92, 16
September 2005, http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2005&mm=09&dd=16&nav_id=176643,
(accessed 1 March 2014).
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common state after a three-year moratorium expired and a referendum on independence had
been held. This meant that from effectively February 2006, any republic could hold the
independence referendum. For the referendum to take place, it was important to obtain the
EU’s consent given that European integration remained the primary goal of the joint state,
which rested (according to Article 3 of the Constitutional Charter) on the political compromise
between Serbia and Montenegro.827 However, due to the earlier existence of distinct economic
systems in Serbia and Montenegro, economic integration at the federal level was impossible to
achieve in a short period of time, and the country’s official dialogue with the EU was becoming
uneasy over this issue.828
The second pillar of the incoming DSS-led Government concerned Serbia’s relations with
Kosovo, which was an autonomously-run protectorate outside direct Serbian control and under
international administration (UNMIK). Koštunica advocated the safe return of all displaced
persons from Kosovo, and more autonomy and better protection for the remaining Serbs in
Kosovo. Paradoxically, only two weeks later, Serbs and other non-Albanians suffered the
biggest spate of violence during the anti-Serb riots (on 17 March 2004) that only served to
harden the Serbian Government’s attitude towards Kosovo’s administration. The third pillar
rested on the strengthening of democratic institutions and the rule of law, and legal
827 As a disincentive for separation, the Constitutional Charter specified that a republic which decided to leave
the common state, would not be able to inherit the international legal personality of the State Union, and would
need to apply for membership of international organisations on its own, which was a costly process.
828 The State Union’s common institutions included the President, Parliament of 126 seats (91 for Serbia and 35
for Montenegro), a constitutional court and council of ministers (in areas such as: foreign affairs, defence,
internal and external economic relations (including those with the EU), and protection of minority and human
rights). However, the two republics maintained separate fiscal and monetary policies, including central banks
and currencies. Montenegro’s currency had been, since 2001, the German deutschmark; later on, it adopted the
Euro as its national currency even though it was not formally part of the Eurozone, the reserved domain for EU
members. Serbia’s currency is the dinar. Montenegro maintained a separate Minister for Foreign Affairs, had its
own diplomatic missions abroad and participated also in common missions. The only exclusive areas of Union
competence were defence and human rights. J. Kim, ‘Serbia and Montenegro Union: prospects and policy
implications’, CRS report for Congress, 2 February 2005, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21568.pdf,
(accessed 1 March 2014).
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harmonisation with a colossal volume of EU regulations—an enormous task with which the
EU was ready to assist. Koštunica also called for a formal affirmation of the State Union’s
status in its relationship with the EU.
At that stage (in March 2004) there was no contractual relationship with the EU. Political and
technical dialogue was conducted through the Enhanced Permanent Dialogue mechanism,
which had replaced the ‘Consultative Task Force’ framework.829 The Enhanced Permanent
Dialogue met only several times a year, and held its first meeting at the ministerial level in June
2004.830 Its main task was to ‘encourage and monitor reforms on the basis of the European
Partnership adopted by the EU Council in June 2004 and updated in January 2006’.831 As a
mechanism of dialogue it was to remain in place as a transitional arrangement until a formal
agreement, the Stabilisation and Association Agreement, was signed and ready to bring
Serbia’s relationship with the EU to a higher level.
The political inability to harmonise the economic systems of Serbia and Montenegro by the
second half of 2004 stalled the State Union’s dialogue with the EU on the Stabilisation and
Association Agreement.832 In order to avoid further deadlock, the EU proposed the so-called
‘twin-track approach’, which separated cooperation with each republic into two parts:
autonomous regulatory areas (trade, economic and sectoral policy) and activities with the State
Union in exclusive areas of the Union’s competence (particularly international political
829 The consultative task force was a framework for dialogue between the EU and the FRY between 2001 and
July 2003, when it was succeeded by the Enhanced Permanent Dialogue mechanism.
830 European Commission, ‘Serbia and Montenegro: 2005 progress report’, Brussels, 9 November 2005, p. 4,
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/registre/docs_autres_institutions/commission_europeenne/sec/2005/1428/COM_
SEC(2005)1428_EN.pdf, (accessed 11 May 2013).
831 European Commission, ‘Enlargement: EU-Serbia relations’,
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/serbia/eu_serbia_and_montenegro_relations_en.htm, (accessed 1 March 2014).
832 J. Kim, ‘Serbia and Montenegro Union: prospects and policy implications’, 2005, op. cit.
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obligations and human rights).833 On 5 October 2004, EU Commissioner Chris Patten visited
Belgrade together with High Representative Javier Solana to announce the new approach, as
well as a feasibility study to report on the State Union’s capacity to start negotiations with the
EU on the Stabilisation and Association Agreement. His message was that full cooperation
with the ICTY ‘remains a fundamental prerequisite for deepened relations with the EU’.834 For
2005 and 2006 combined, the EU budgeted €90 million for the joint State Union’s
institutions.835 This financial commitment demonstrated the EU’s policy of seeking to maintain
the State Union, despite the fact that the Montenegrin Government was against this policy, and
some Serbian democratic parties (the G17+) too.
The visit to Belgrade by senior EU officials provided a political incentive for the Serbian
Parliament to pass a resolution on 14 October 2004 committing Serbia as a matter of ‘the
highest and undisputed political priority’ to the European integration process, as well as stating
its intention to join NATO’s Partnership for Peace program.836 This resolution was welcomed
by a number of regional organisations including the OSCE, as it demonstrated that Serbia was
becoming more committed to European integration.837 It also gave a mandate to the Serbian
Government to prepare a national strategy for accession to the EU, as well as committing it to
report to Parliament every three months about the progress of reforms. Furthermore, the
political conditionality that was embedded in Commissioner Patten’s study resulted in better
cooperation between the Serbian judiciary (the Special Court for War Crimes) and the ICTY’s
833 Serbian European Integration Office, ‘Draft National Strategy of Serbia for the Serbia and Montenegro’s
Accession to the EU’, May 2005, Belgrade, pp. 7–8.
834 EU press release, ‘Commissioner Patten to visit Belgrade, 5 October 2004’, 4 October 2004,
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-04-1171_en.htm, (accessed 1 March 2014).
835 S. Woehrel, ‘Serbia and Montenegro: current situation and US Policy’, 2007, op. cit., p. 245.
836 National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia, ‘Resolution on the Accession to the European Union’, 2004,
http://www.parlament.gov.rs/activities/european-integration/documents.611.html, (accessed 1 March 2014)
837 OSCE, ‘OSCE Mission welcomes adoption of pro-EU resolution by Serbian Parliament’, 14 October 2004,
http://www.osce.org/serbia/56831, (accessed 1 March 2014).
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Prosecutor’s Office, which was recognised by the UN and EU.838 Although the two most
important indictees remained free (Ratko Mladić and Radovan Karadžić), thirteen former
officials ‘voluntarily surrendered’ by late April 2005, their assets were frozen and some were
even allowed (with the Serbian Government’s guarantees) to return to Serbia to await trial.839
The latter development demonstrated a higher degree of trust by international legal institutions
in the DSS-led Serbian Government when compared to previous years. It was a sign that the
Serbian Government had earned the ICTY’s trust, and the EU’s dual approach of combining
political pressure with incentives (the so-called ‘carrot and stick approach’) yielded positive
results.
On 7 April 2005, the EU agreed for amendments to be made to the Constitutional Charter, to
extend the mandate of the joint parliament, which had been in crisis since March 2005, when
its mandate expired.840 Commissioner Patten’s completed feasibility study, which the Council
endorsed in April 2005, observed that the State Union was sufficiently prepared to start the
Stabilisation and Association Agreement negotiations. Patten’s report, however, stressed that
negotiations should be suspended if the State Union or either of the two republics did not
honour their commitments. Satisfied with the major recommendation from Commissioner
Patten’s study, the DSS emerged as the largest democratic party in Serbian politics.841 In a sign
838 The UN’s opinion mattered greatly to the EU, which was committed to multilateralism and made the ICTY’s
positive assessment of Serbia’s cooperation a precondition for Serbia’s European integration.
839 BETA, ‘Hronologija izručivanja Tribunalu’, B92, 20 July 2011,
http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2011&mm=07&dd=20&nav_id=526606, (accessed 1 March
2014).
840 This agreement, which extended the mandate of the State Union Parliament, was signed by the President of
Serbia and Montenegro, Svetozar Marović, Serbian President Boris Tadić, Montenegrin President Filip
Vujanović and the EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana. The two
republics had been unable to agree on the organisation of direct elections, with Montenegro refusing to hold
elections before a referendum on independence in 2006. It demonstrated the EU commitment for the
continuation of the State Union. Inter-Parliamentary Union (2005), ‘The world of Parliaments’,
http://www.ipu.org/news-e/19-9.htm, (accessed 1 March 2014).
841 DSS’s legislative clout was also strengthened by a merger of two minor parties, the People’s Democratic
Party (NDS) and the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS), into the DSS.
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of solidarity with European values, the DSS and G17+ joined the European People’s Party
(EPP) in June 2005 as associate members. Their symbolic affiliation with an influential
European party federation of Christian-democratic, conservative and people’s EU parties
granted them privileged status in relation to other parties in Serbia, especially ‘from the aspect
of obtaining European legitimacy and new possibilities for lobbying’.842 By comparison, the
DS was admitted as an observer to the Party of European Socialists in December 2006. A
deeper engagement of the DSS with European institutions was an important step for both the
EU and Serbia under the Koštunica Government, which signalled that Serbia was deeper
integrating in Europe.843
Commissioner Patten’s recommendations provided the basis for the European Commission’s
drafting of negotiation directives on the Stabilisation and Association Agreement. These
directives were presented to the Council in July 2005, which formally endorsed them on 3
October 2005.844 The EU officially opened negotiations on the Stabilisation and Association
Agreement with the State Union on 10 October 2005 in Belgrade. Symbolically, this reaffirmed
the commitment of the EU and State Union representatives to European integration. For
Koštunica and the majority of Serbian democrats (except for the G17+), the preservation of the
State Union had particularly powerful symbolism of unity with the Montenegrin people, whom
they considered fraternal, in spite of the Montenegrin Government’s pro-independence
stance.845 The official ceremony was attended from the EU side by the EU Commissioner for
842 S. Orlović, ‘Europeanisation and Democratisation of Parties and Party System of Serbia’, Politics in Central
Europe, vol. 31, no. 2, 2007, p. 101.
843 For the DSS, it was a reward for deeper engagement with the EU, and had an effect of a positive incentive for
Serbia’s further Europeanisation.
844 In July 2005, Serbia and NATO signed an agreement by which Serbia allowed the NATO-led international
peacekeeping Kosovo Force (KFOR) to pass through Serbia. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, ‘NATO’s
relations with Serbia’, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-7FE946EE-
E497D1B8/natolive/topics_50100.htm?blnSublanguage=true&selectedLocale=uk&submit=select, (accessed 1
May 2014).
845 For similarities and differences between Serbia and Montenegro, see Michael. A. Schuman, Serbia and
Montenegro (Nations in Transition), New York, Facts on File Inc., 2004. For commentary about the
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Enlargement and EU Neighbourhood policy, Olli Rehn, and UK Ambassador David Gowan.846
The Serbian Prime Minister appeared satisfied with what seemed like, at last, a clear
demonstration of the EU’s commitment to his country’s European integration.847
The Kosovo issue as an obstacle to deeper EU-Serbia relations
Despite an improvement in EU-Serbia relations under the DSS leadership, in November 2005
significant changes relating to the Kosovo situation were a catalyst for a gradual slowing down
of Serbia’s European integration. The UN’s decision to open discussions on Kosovo’s future
status was received coldly by the Serbian Government, which considered Kosovo to still be
Serbia’s autonomous province; Serbian leaders kept emphasising the democratic character of
post-Milošević Serbia as a reason for which Kosovo should not be granted independence. Their
normative position was that Kosovo is part of Serbia and should not create an international
precedent for secession. However, the Serbian Government’s perceptions of Kosovo’s status
stood in stark contrast with the reality on the ground in Kosovo, where the Serbian
Government’s rule was held legitimate only by the Serbs, who represented less than 10 per cent
of Kosovo’s citizens. In addition, many Western governments and international entities,
including the UN and the EU, supported Kosovo’s democratic reforms after the 1999 war on
the basis of its de facto governance model that was independent from Serbia’s jurisdiction.
On 21 November 2005, the Serbian Parliament adopted a resolution which stressed that
Serbia’s territorial sovereignty is inviolable. Prime Minister Koštunica in his introductory
Montenegrin Government’s activities to create a separate linguistic and religious identity from the unitary one
with Serbs, see N. Dallas, ‘Montenegro: no longer Serbia’s junior partner’, Neos Kosmos, 23 May 2012,
http://neoskosmos.com/news/en/montenegro-no-longer-serbias-junior-partner (accessed 1 June 2012).
846 The UK held, at that time, the rotating Presidency of the Council. Moreover, Olli Rehn was the EU’s
Commissioner for Enlargement from 2004 to 2009.
847 Serbian European Integration Office (SEIO), ‘Stabilisation and Association Agreement’,
www.seio.gov.rs/info-service/questions-and-answers.259.html(accessed 1 March 2014).
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remarks in parliament said that the resolution represented a ‘historic day’ for Serbia, as regards
‘Kosovo and Metohija’, which ‘is part not only of Serbian history, but also … its people,
territory, tales and culture’. The importance of this resolution, he said, was highlighted by the
fact it was dealing with Serbian ‘roots and identities’. Koštunica also said that by adopting this
resolution, the parliament would demonstrate to all external observers that it was committed to
finding a diplomatic solution to the Kosovo situation but within Serbian territorial borders. Any
other solution, he said, would constitute a ‘forced partitioning’ of a historical part of Serbian
territory.848
Such an emotive terminology shows how much attachment Serbia’s democratic parties,
including the DSS, had wedded to the idea of Kosovo as Serbia’s inseparable heartland. This
attitude, which exists among anti-EU and pro-EU parties alike, with the notable exception of
LDP, is part of Serbia’s identity politics and religious discourses, which are only strengthened
by reports of human rights abuses against Serbs in Kosovo after the NATO intervention. It
represents a complicating factor for the EU’s political conditionality towards Serbia, which
postulates that a demonstration of good neighbourly relations is expected of all applicants for
EU membership, including Serbia and Kosovo.
Upon receiving the mandate from the parliament to proceed with political dialogue on the
Kosovo question, the Serbian Government assembled a negotiating team on Kosovo in
December 2005 to represent Serbia’s position in the multilateral dialogue being held under UN
auspices. The negotiating team, which adopted its first working program a month later, was co-
chaired by President Tadić and Prime Minister Koštunica, which shows the high level of
848 Otvoreni Parlament, ‘Šesta sednica drugog redovnog zasedanja, 2005’, 21 November 2005,
http://www.otvoreniparlament.rs/2005/11/21/281326/page/1/, (accessed 1 March 2014).
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importance of this issue for Serbia. Interestingly, on this one issue Serbian democrats appeared
to be united, pledging to oppose Kosovo’s independence by peaceful means through the UN.849
The negotiating team’s formation was, in a way, Serbia’s response to the Kosovo report of
October 2005 by Ambassador Kai Eide, a Norwegian diplomat.850 The UN Secretary-General
appointed Eide to undertake a comprehensive review of the situation in Kosovo following the
mass unrest in Kosovo in 2004 that left more than a dozen people dead and thousands of Serbs
displaced.851
What appeared to be an emerging consensus in the West regarding Kosovo’s final status has
become a major divisive domestic issue in Serbia, and a challenge for the unity among Serbian
democrats. The Serbian Government’s unfulfilled promise to its constituents that Serbia would
quickly join the EU disappointed many voters in Serbia as the date of promised accession kept
shifting.852 At the same time as advocating neutrality regarding Kosovo’s status, in multilateral
institutions the EU expressed support ‘for a secure, democratic, prosperous and multi-ethnic
Kosovo with its place in Europe’; however, the EU representatives only briefly referred to the
UNSC resolution 1244 in their statements. This resolution was the basis for the Serbian
Government’s position, as it recognised Serbia’s sovereignty in Kosovo.853
849 ‘Pregovarački tim održao sastanak’, B92, 6 December 2005,
http://www.b92.net/info/komentari.php?nav_id=181912, (accessed 1 March 2014).
850 For an analysis of Ambassador Kai Eide’s report, see D. Magalachvili, ‘Kosovo: a critique of a failed
mission’, Mediterranean Quarterly, vol. 16, no. 3, summer 2005, pp. 118–141.
851 Ambassador Eide’s report assessed that the status quo in Kosovo was unsatisfactory. He recommended that
the international community (including the EU) use the leverage of future status talks as an incentive for further
reform, whilst also noting the fragility of inter-ethnic relations in Kosovo. Ambassador Eide’s report is attached
as an Annex in a letter from UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan. ‘Letter dated 7 October 2005 from the
Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council’, S/2005/635, p. 7, 7 October 2005,
http://www.unosek.org/docref/KaiEidereport.pdf, (accessed 13 March 2013).
852 P. Petrović, ‘EU sad i nikad: azilant koji nema gde da se vrati’, Koreni, 10 May 2011,
http://www.koreni.net/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=2452 (accessed 13 March 2013).
853 EU Delegation to the UN, ‘EU Presidency statement–the situation in Kosovo’, 13 April 2004, http://www.eu-
un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_3390_en.htm, (accessed 13 March 2013).
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In his article in The Washington Post, Serbian Prime Minister Koštunica warned about the
domino-effect that Kosovo’s independence proclamation could have on other cases:
Resolving the problems of national minorities through self-determination (especially in
the case of nationalities that already have their own countries nearby) inevitably leads
to border changes and all the dangerous complications that this entails.854
In defending Serbia’s position, Koštunica remarked:
Democracy, in Serbia as anywhere else, is essentially based on the equality of all and,
no less important, on trust. … And where faith is lost, there can be no democracy.855
In the second quote, Koštunica was referring to the trust and faith Serbia was placing in
international institutions and international law as a ‘guarantor’ of the principle of inviolability
of national borders.856 Since norms are also socially constructed and based on a system of
shared meaning and understanding of these norms, Koštunica in his deliberations on Kosovo
and Serbia did not take into account the emergence of humanitarian intervention and
responsibility to protect concepts, which were developed in response to a dire security situation
in former Yugoslavia during the 1990s. Moreover, Koštunica’s normative framework
precluded him from applying the same conclusion for Kosovo Albanians, who did not trust or
have faith in the Serbian Government after the Kosovo conflict—just as the majority of Serbs
from Kosovo did not trust Kosovo Albanians. The Serbian democrats were not seen as being
854 V. Koštunica, ‘Justice for Serbia’, The Washington Post, 12 July 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/07/11/AR2006071101202.html (accessed 9 June 2013).
855 ibid.
856 The selectivity of narratives, including in his emphasis on Serbian victimhood narratives can be observed
from this article. ibid.
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significantly more ‘legitimate’ in the eyes of Kosovo Albanians, despite the fact that they
actually never lived under the Serbian rule since Serbia became a democracy. In November
2006, President of the Democratic Party of Kosovo, Hashim Thaçi, stated that he was assured
by US officials that the decision for Kosovo independence was agreed upon between the EU
and other international officials.857
Immediately after the Kosovo conflict ended, and the UN established new administrative order
in Kosovo, no serious effort was made by the EU or other international actors to support
confidence-building measures between Serbs and Albanians at the people-to-people level; or
between the Serbian Government and the transitional authorities in Priština—which saw the
other side as rivals for international recognition.858 Since efforts from the EU were principally
focused on providing humanitarian assistance, technical and legal advice and on institutional
engineering, inadequate attention was being paid to the issue of trust between the two rival
communities.859 Their unaddressed tensions caused a further escalation of violence on 17
March 2004, which was less than five years after Kosovo became de facto separated from
Serbia. This event many in Serbia perceive as a repetition of the infamous Croatian Operation
Storm.860
857 Beta, ‘Thaci says status decision has been made’, B92, 17 November 2006,
http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2006&mm=11&dd=17&nav_id=38021, (accessed 1 May
2013).
858 Both the Serbian democrats and Kosovo Albanian leaders sought recognition in international forums for their
own respective positions on the Kosovo issue. On the one hand, Serbia would emphasise its constitutional and
historical ‘right’ to rule over Kosovo, as Koštunica’s article in The Washinton Post demonstrates. On the other
hand, Kosovo Albanians would invoke their ‘moral right’ to have a state after living under repressive regimes
and Serbian rule which has resulted in large-scale violence, triggering NATO intervention.
859 For further discussion, see S. Eckhard, ‘Political Engineering in Kosovo: lessons from confronting theory
and practice’, Amsterdam Social Science, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 21–46.
860 M. Marković, ‘Albanska “Oluja” je proterala 4.000 Srba’, Večernje Novosti, 16 March 2014,
http://www.novosti.rs/vesti/naslovna/dosije/aktuelno.292.html:482924-Albanska-Oluja-je-proterala-4000-Srba
(accessed 18 March 2014).
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This view regarding the assumed ‘complicity’ of Western governments in several ethnic
cleansing campaigns of Serbian civilians in the region presents a normative obstacle to Serbia’s
European integration. It is shared by many members across different Serbian political parties,
not just those which oppose Serbia’s European integration and advocate closer relations with
Russia. Especially those Serbs who were directly affected by the ethnic cleansing campaigns
still feel that their grievances have not been addressed—especially those relating to human
rights and crimes against humanity committed against themselves and those known to them.
This victimhood narrative has a wide resonance among the Serbian voters. A tendency by
Serbian political and religious leaders to over-emphasise this aspect of Serbia’s recent past has
slowed down Serbia’s reforms, as the Serbian Government’s limited energy and resources were
heavily invested in making this narrative known to international audiences. An additional item
on the list of grievances in this perspective was Montenegro’s independence referendum. The
EU’s role before the referendum was held strengthened this discourse about the ‘West’
recreating boundaries and dividing societies in the Western Balkans, the leaders of which all
strive to join the EU.861
Montenegro’s referendum on independence
The EU held a political dialogue at the ministerial level with State Union representatives in
February 2006. This was same month when the three-year probation period expired after which
either republic could seek the EU’s support to hold referendum on independence. The
Montenegrin Government was, by that stage, in full swing preparing for the referendum.862
861 This perspective that criticises overly-intrusive, managerial role of the West (defined as NATO and EU
members in the context of the Western Balkans) in regional affairs, coupled with Serbian victimhood narratives
is particularly advanced by the SRS, DSS, Dveri Srpske, but also members of pro-EU political parties. See, for
instance,
862 International Crisis Group, ‘Montenegro’s Independence Drive’, Europe Report, no. 169, 7 December 2005,
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/balkans/montenegro/169-montenegros-independence-drive.aspx
(accessed 13 March 2013).
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According to a report produced by the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, three key contentious
issues relating to the referendum were majority requirements for the referendum to pass, the
participation in the referendum of Montenegrins residing in Serbia, and the composition of the
referendum administration.863
Responding to the worsening relationship between the Serbian and Montenegrin governments,
the EU appointed a mediator, special envoy Miroslav Lajčak from Slovakia, who introduced a
requirement for a 55 per cent majority vote as a minimum requirement for the referendum to
pass. This was a threshold that the Montenegrin Government claimed was too high.864
According to Kenneth Morrison, it was under EU pressure that Montenegro introduced an
electoral regulation that Montenegrins who resided outside Montenegro for more than three
years could not vote. Many of them, in Morrison’s view, would have voted against the
independence.865 The EU’s role in this referendum is still criticised by nationalist intellectuals
and right-wing parties in Serbia as the reason why Serbia should abandon European integration.
863 V. Canas (General Rapporteur, Portugal), ‘Independent Montenegro: early assessment and prospects for
Euro-Atlantic integration’, 2007 annual session, http://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?SHORTCUT=1162,
(accessed 13 March 2013). This report also noted that Montenegrin voters had turned against maintaining the
State Union after a large funeral in Belgrade was held for the deceased Slobodan Milošević, and the stalling of
progress in relations with the EU due to Serbia’s lack of compliance with the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The pro-independence Montenegrin camp, which won in the referendum by a
small but significant margin, invested many resources in their campaign which would later see Montenegro
proceed with the NATO integration at a faster pace than Serbia.
864 I. Traynor, ‘Montenegro fights to change rules for independence vote’, 27 February 2006,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/feb/27/eu.balkans (accessed 1 March 2014).
865 K. Morrison, Montenegro: a modern history, London, I.B. Tauris, 2009, p. 200. For a more recent
assessment of Montenegro’s post-independence politics, see K. Morrison, ‘Change, continuity and
consolidation: assessing five years of Montenegro’s independence’, LSEE Papers on South Eastern Europe,
issue 2, February 2011, http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/48039/1/__Libfile_repository_Content_LSEE_Change, per
cent20continuity(author).pdf, (accessed 13 March 2013). In the aftermath of Montenegro’s independence,
thousands of Montenegrins who were residing in Serbia had to choose which citizenship they would hold, as
dual citizenship was not permitted as political relations between Serbia and Montenegro soured after the
independence. J. Džankić, ‘Montenegrin mists: politics, citizenship and identity’, Citizenship in Southeast
Europe, 29 March 2011, http://www.citsee.eu/citsee-study/montenegrin-mists-politics-citizenship-and-identity,
(accessed 30 May 2013).
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By that stage, discontent and animosity towards the EU were growing among Serbian
politicians. This was principally because of the ambiguous role of the EU in appearing to
encourage Kosovo independence while on the other hand still reiterating the importance of
UNSCR 1244. The Serbian leadership hence appeared to be losing faith in the EU’s declared
intention to remain status-neutral regarding Kosovo. Many Serbs and anti-independence people
in Montenegro blamed Brussels for succumbing to Montenegro’s moves towards and
international lobbying for independence, instead of focusing on serious corruption issues in
Montenegro. Apart from the Kosovo issue and the complications in EU-Serbia relations as
regards Montenegro’s preparations for the referendum on independence, the nature of Serbia’s
cooperation with the ICTY had become a major challenge in Serbia’s relationship with the EU.
Delays to Serbia’s European integration: the ICTY issue
In February 2006, UN war crimes chief prosecutor, Carla Del Ponte, appealed for more EU
assistance to the ICTY in order to pressure Serbia into complying with the agreed cooperation
goals, warning of the consequences of non-cooperation:
The conditionality imposed by the European Union in the context of the negotiations
on a stabilization and association agreement is of key importance. Serbia knows that
negotiations may be suspended or may never conclude if Belgrade fails to cooperate
fully with the ICTY. I need now a stronger support of the European Union to have
Mladić in The Hague very soon. Clear deadlines associated with clear sanctions will
produce early results.866
866 UN ICTY, ‘ICTY Weekly Press Briefing’, 22 February 2006, http://www.icty.org/sid/3538 (accessed 21
April 2012). T. Küchler, ‘UN prosecutor urges Brussels to suspend Serbia talks’, 1 February 2006,
http://euobserver.com/enlargement/20810 (accessed 1 March 2014). Prosecutor Del Ponte had previously also
appealed for assistance from the international community, by declaring: ‘The factors which really influence the
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This statement is illustrative of how political conditionality towards Serbia was closely
associated with the ICTY’s assessments. It had never happened in the history of European
integration (before Croatia’s and Serbia’s accession) that a UN body influenced EU accession
processes to such an extent. By linking the issue of Serbia’s accession with its cooperation with
the ICTY, the EU’s pressure on the Serbian Government produced divisive results for Serbian
internal politics. A division among Serbian democrats, including within the governing
coalition, slowed down the pace of Serbia’s European integration.
In February 2006, Rasim Ljajić, the Minister for Human and Minority Rights from a minor
coalition party (Democratic Party of Sandžak), and President of the National Council for
Cooperation with the ICTY867 declared:
The Hague Tribunal is an obstacle because of which, if we do not remove it, we cannot
move forward [in European integration]. It is an obligation which we must fulfil. It is
like a millstone around our neck, or a weight hanging on our legs. With [these
obstacles], we cannot run towards Europe.868
completion strategy of the ICTY are threefold: the financial needs of the Tribunal, the timely arrest of the
indictees at large, and the support needed to establish credible domestic jurisdictions. All three are beyond the
Tribunal’s control, but they can and must be addressed by the international community.’ UN ICTY, ‘Address by
Carla del Ponte, Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, to the
United Nations Security Council’, The Hague, 30 June 2004, http://www.icty.org/sid/8404, (accessed 1 March
2014).
867 This agency was originally established as a subsidiary body of the Council of Ministers of the State Union of
Serbia and Montenegro. On 31 May 2007, following the dissolution of the State Union, the Serbian Government
decided to establish a new agency for Serbia’s cooperation with the ICTY. Beta, ‘Osnovana Vladina kancelarija
za saradnju sa Tribunalom’, Blic, 4 June 2007, http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Politika/5099/Osnovana-Vladina-
kancelarija-za-saradnju-sa-Tribunalom, (accessed 21 April 2013).
868 The Republic of Serbia Office of the War Crimes Prosecutor (February 2006), ‘Interview with Rasim Ljajić:
the only way to gain someone’s confidence is to tell the truth’, Justice in Transition, no. 3,
http://www.tuzilastvorz.org.rs/html_trz/(CASOPIS)/ENG/ENG03/873.pdf (accessed 21 April 2013).
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The normative convergence between the EU and the ICTY regarding what kind of behaviour
was expected of an EU membership aspirant was displayed when the EU linked Serbia’s
European integration with Serbia’s cooperation with the ICTY.869
Following a negative assessment by the UN chief prosecutor of Serbia’s level of cooperation
with the ICTY, the EU ceased negotiations on the Stabilisation and Association Agreement
(SAA) with the State Union on 3 May 2006. The EU’s decision was made just before the third
round of negotiations was due to take place several days later. According to international
human rights NGO Amnesty International, this was a signal from the EU that impunity for war
crimes accused must finally end. Amnesty International also called on the Serbian Government
‘to provide the Tribunal with unrestricted access to military and other archives requested by
the [ICTY’s] Chief Prosecutor, in line with their international obligations’.870 Tardiness in
providing information to the ICTY that was considered to be from top-secret or restricted
material was widely interpreted as a lack of political will on Serbia’s part.871
The suspension of talks with the EU related to Serbia’s failure to locate and arrest one of the
key ICTY indictees at large, Ratko Mladić—a Bosnian Serb military leader. The EU’s decision
came about after a negative report from the chief ICTY prosecutor Carla Del Ponte regarding
Serbia’s cooperation with the ICTY.872 The EU Commissioner for Enlargement, Olli Rehn,
said that the reason for Mladić’s successful evasion of arrest lay in the fact that ‘security
869 J. Simpson, ‘Is Serbia gearing up for Hague cooperation’, 21 February 2005, http://iwpr.net/report-
news/serbia-gearing-hague-cooperation, (accessed 21 April 2013).
870 Amnesty International, ‘Serbia and Montenegro: EU sends signal that impunity must finally end’, 5 May
2006, http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/EUR70/005/2006/en/54c59bf9-d433-11dd-8743-
d305bea2b2c7/eur700052006en.html, (accessed 21 April 2013).
871 Serbia has still not made available its communist-era archieves of the state security services. It is also the
only post-socialist country that did not deliver a resolution denouncing the crimes of its totalitarian, communist
past.  Tanjug, ‘SPO ponovo traži otvaranju tajnih dosijea’, 4 January 2014,
http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Politika/432190/SPO-ponovo-trazi-otvaranje-tajnih-dosijea, (accessed 3 March 2014).
872 On 11 August 1999 with the UNSCR 1259, Carla del Ponte was appointed as the ICTY’s chief Prosecutor
for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.
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services and especially military intelligence have not been fully under the civilian, democratic
control of the Serbian Government’.873 The EU’s deadline for Mladić’s arrest was the end of
April 2006. In addition to the EU suspending talks on a vital new agreement (SAA) with Serbia,
the US Government suspended $7 million in assistance to the Serbian Government (but not
$62 million in humanitarian aid and assistance for democracy promotion).874
This move demonstrated similarities between the EU and the US Government’s foreign policy
approaches in conditionality towards Serbia. Julie Kim from the Congressional Research
Service correctly observed that ‘to varying degrees, conditionality policy has held up Euro-
[Atlantic] integration processes in the Western Balkans that would otherwise likely have gone
forward’.875 This approach appeared to risk delaying Serbia’s application for NATO’s
Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, despite the fact that Serbia had achieved significant
reforms in the defence sector since 2001, and formally applied to join the PfP in 2003.876
Western conditionality on this issue also deepened an already existing political divide among
Serbia’s key political parties, as the halt in accession talks was a major source of political
instability between coalition partners.
The principal negotiator with the EU, Serbian Deputy Prime Minister Miroljub Labus from the
G17+, resigned immediately following the EU’s decision to suspend the negotiations.877 Labus
873 T. Küchler, ‘EU suspends talks with Serbia’, EU Observer, 3 May 2006,
http://euobserver.com/enlargement/21498 (accessed 1 March 2014). It was widely believed at the time that
Mladić was hiding in Serbia and that he received tip-offs from within the Serbian Government that helped him
avoid being arrested.
874 ‘US aid to Serbia-Montenegro suspended over Mladić’, Southeast European Times, 1 June 2006,
http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2006/06/01/feature-01,
(accessed 1 March 2014).
875 J. Kim, ‘Balkan cooperation on war crimes issues’, 16 June 2006, CRS report, The Library of Congress, p. 1,
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=715072, (accessed 1 March 2014).
876 ibid., p. 6.
877 This created significant problems for Serbia’s capacity to negotiate with the EU. The new lead negotiator was
appointed in June. As negotiations continued to be stalled that negotiating team also resigned. This shows that
the EU’s decision to stop negotiations with Serbia had a detrimental effect on Serbia’s negotiating team, which
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also asked fellow G17+ members (who were government ministers at the time) to follow suit,
which they did. The timing of the Serbian Government crisis during the campaigning for the
upcoming Montenegrin referendum possibly strengthened the pro-independence camp as it
signalled to Montenegrin voters that their future in the EU may indeed be jeopardised because
of Serbia’s problem with the ICTY. The independence referendum was held on 21 May 2006,
and passed by a slim margin of 0.5 per cent (the total vote for independence was 55.5 per
cent).878
The Montenegrin republican parliament declared independence from the State Union on 3 June
2006. Serbia’s first official reaction came from the president’s office, as Tadić stated his
preference for a common state but accepted the will of the Montenegrin people.879 Koštunica,
who campaigned against Montenegro’s separation from the State Union, was deeply
disappointed, and in his first public statements on this issue only focused on the practical
question of Serbia’s legal succession to the State Union.880 The Serbian Parliament declared
independence on 5 June 2006, and recognised Montenegrin independence on 15 June 2006.
This ended three years of political uncertainty regarding the joint state, which had encountered
many problems from the start.
Many regional observers (especially in Montenegro) criticised the EU’s insistence on the
preservation of the joint state. Ranko Krivokapić, the head of a pro-independence Montenegrin
was in disarray for a prolonged period of time. I. Traynor, ‘Isolated Serbia spirals into crisis as deputy PM
quits’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 5 May 2006, http://www.smh.com.au/news/world/isolated-serbia-spirals-
into-crisis-as-deputy-pm-quits/2006/05/04/1146335869648.html?from=rss, (accessed 1 March 2014).
878 Vesti, ‘Crna Gora i Srbija od juče nezavisne države’, 23 May 2006,
http://www.srpskadijaspora.info/vest.asp?id=7261, (accessed 16 June 2013).
879 BBC, ‘Serbia accepts Montenegro result’, 23 May 2006, ttp://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/5009242.stm,
(accessed 1 March 2014).
880 B92, ‘No congratulations from Koštunica’, 2 June 2006,
http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2006&mm=06&dd=02&nav_id=35174, (accessed 1 March
2014).
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party (SDP) and a loyal coalition partner to the Montenegrin President, Milo Đukanović’s DPS,
commented that the joint state delayed Montenegro’s European integration and jeopardised
democratisation in that republic.881 Đukanović himself considered that independence was the
only option as early as 2001. Đukanović criticised external pressures to maintain the State
Union and even linked it to the Kosovo issue:
[Because there is] an absolute absence of vision in the international community for
solving the Kosovo problem, Montenegro is being asked to give up its plans to be an
independent state.882
Others had called the State Union a ‘quasi state’, which was artificially created and kept alive
with external assistance.883 Some Montenegrin independence supporters believed it was an act
of appeasement in relation to the Serbian Government under the DSS (which resisted the idea
of Montenegro’s separation from Serbia) in return for their compliance on issues such as
cooperation with the ICTY, and flexibility on Kosovo. Montenegro also refused to harmonise
tariffs and other aspects of the two republican economies, such as creating a single currency.884
Marko Papić suggests that the EU went far beyond conditionality in using the leverage of the
promise of EU membership to become involved in the day-to-day constitutional problems of
the joint state.885 The EU’s insistence on maintaining the joint state, the constitutional troubles
of which were evident from the start, also diverted much-needed energy, political will and
881 D. Nikolić-Solomon, ‘Srbija i Crna Gora: nesrećan brak’, Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 21 May
2005, http://iwpr.net/sr/report-news/srbija-i-crna-gora-nesrecan-brak, (accessed 21 May 2013).
882 T. Judah, ‘Goodbye to Yugoslavia?’, The New York Review of Books, 8 February 2001,
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2001/feb/08/goodbye-to-yugoslavia/?page=2, (accessed 1 May
2012).
883 S. Vučetić, ‘Poludržava na 'probnom radu'’, Blic, 30 March 2002,
http://www.blic.rs/stara_arhiva/drustvo/22896/Poludrzava-na-probnom-radu, (accessed 21 May 2013).
884 The joint state did not even have a shared national anthem.
885 The EU’s political conditionality towards Serbia was strengthened by that approach. M. Papić, ‘Rolling up
the sleeves: how EU policy towards Serbia and Montenegro acts as the glue that holds the State Union together’,
Review of European and Russian Affairs, vol. 2, no. 2, 2006, p. 63.
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resources from more pressing issues of European integration, including institutional reform,
and engagement with the wider electorate to explain to them the potential benefits of EU
accession.
After the State Union’s dissolution, the EU differentiated official political dialogue with Serbia
and Montenegro into two separate paths. The European Commission, backed by the Council,
indicated to the Serbian Government that the accession talks could resume once full
cooperation with the ICTY had been established. The EU retained Serbia’s preferential trade
status (which was put in place after Serbia’s regime change), the pre-accession financial
assistance (which for Serbia in 2006 was €167 million) and allowed Serbia to continue its
participation in cross-border programs with neighbouring EU members.886
In order to re-establish its credibility, the Serbian Government adopted and presented to the
Council of Ministers, in July 2006, an action plan on cooperation with the ICTY, which
received a positive response from the EU when President Barroso of the European Commission
conveyed the EU’s satisfaction with the plan.887 The second political dialogue meeting at the
ministerial level took place on 16 October 2006 in Luxembourg, ahead of Serbia’s referendum
on a new constitution. The main topic was the continuation of Serbia’s dialogue with the EU,
subject to Serbia’s full cooperation with the ICTY. The Foreign Ministers of the UK, the
Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries were particularly adamant that the dialogue would
886 The latter measure was part of a broader EU approach to improve security in its border regions. European
Commission, ‘Serbia 2006 progress report, 8 November 2006, p. 5,
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2006/nov/sr_sec_1389_en.pdf, (accessed 1 March 2014).
887 G. Tuhina, ‘NATO i EU očekuju konkretne poteze’, Radio Slobodna Evropa, 19 July 2006,
http://www.slobodnaevropa.org/archive/news/20060718/500/500.html?id=676119, (accessed 1 March 2014).
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continue only when the ICTY Chief Prosecutor, Carla Del Ponte, was completely satisfied with
Serbia’s performance.888
In December 2006, Serbia joined NATO’s PfP program, which was a US initiative launched
in 1994 with the purpose of establishing ‘strong links’ between NATO, its new democratic
partners in the former Soviet bloc, and some of Europe's traditionally neutral countries ‘to
enhance European security’.889 As a partner country to NATO in the PfP program, Serbia
gained access to specific funds for the modernisation of its military. NATO also opened a
Military Liaison Office in Belgrade.
Serbia’s constitutional changes
After Montenegro’s independence, Serbia was put under more pressure by the EU to change
its old constitution (dating from 1990) to reflect democratic changes and the country’s pro-
European integration. The Serbian Parliament adopted a draft constitution on 30 September
2006 in a hasty process for which the official justification was to ‘preserve’ Kosovo within
Serbia.890 The draft constitution was put to a referendum, held on 28–29 October 2006, where
53.04 per cent of voters supported its adoption.891All major political parties, including the DSS
and the DS declared their support for the draft constitution (although framing it in different
terms). This demonstrated a shared commitment by the majority of political parties in Serbia
888 ‘EU and Serbia: decisive week’, 8 October 2006, Večernje Novosti,
http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2006&mm=10&dd=08&nav_id=37206, (accessed 1 March
2014).
889 US Department of State, ‘NATO: Partnership for Peace’, 19 May 1995,
http://www.fas.org/man/nato/offdocs/us_95/dos950519.htm, (accessed 1 August 2013).
890 V. Pešić, ‘State capture and widespread corruption in Serbia’, Working Paper, no. 262, Center for European
Policy Studies (CEPS), March 2007, p. 5, footnote 19.
891 ibid., pp. 5–6.
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to keep Kosovo within Serbia under its constitution.892 The new constitution was officially
adopted on 8 November 2006, and contained a preamble that stated: ‘The province of Kosovo
and Metohija is an integral part of the territory of Serbia’, with substantial autonomy.893
The language used in the term ‘Kosovo and Metohija’ again invoked Serbia’s claims to
Kosovo, and religious heritage of the Serbian Orthodox Church (‘Metohija’). Following the
adoption of Serbia’s new constitution, the prime minister called for early parliamentary
elections, which took place in January 2007. They resulted in a political cohabitation
arrangement between the DSS, the DS and the G17+. This was a government during which
Serbia’s negotiations with the EU on the Stabilisation and Association Agreement started, but
because of the Kosovo issue, Serbia’s overall relationship with the EU became more
complicated.
The Venice Commission adopted a draft opinion on the new Serbian Constitution in its session
on 17–18 March 2007.894 The Venice Commission noted that there was a lack of public
discussion before the draft text was adopted.895 It also observed that large parts of the
constitution were difficult to amend as it lacked a clear distinction between the legislature and
judiciary. In the Venice Commission’s opinion, the constitution contained complicated rules
892 The only Serbian political party that argued that Kosovo was forever lost to Serbia was the Liberal
Democratic Party, led by Čedomir Jovanović who had become (after the prime minister’s assassination in 2003)
Deputy Prime Minister in the DS-led Serbian Government.
893 World Intellectual Property Organization, ‘The Constitution of Serbia’, 8 November 2006,
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=7378, (accessed 13 March 2013).
894 The European Commission for Democracy through Law (also known as the Venice Commission) is the
Council of Europe’s primary advisory body on constitutional matters. One of its principal tasks is ‘to help states
wishing to bring their legal and institutional structures into line with European standards and international
experience in the fields of democracy, human rights and the rule of law’. The draft opinion of the Venice
Commission on the 2006 Serbian constitution is used as a reference point in the European Commission’s
progress reports for Serbia.
Council of Europe, ‘For democracy through law—the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe’,
http://www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/pages/?p=01_Presentation, (accessed 1 March 2014).
895 European Commission for Democracy through law (Venice Commission), ‘Draft opinion on the constitution
of Serbia’, Opinion no. 405/2006, Strasbourg, 9 March 2007,
http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL(2007)037-e, (accessed 1 March 2014).
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on restrictions to fundamental rights. It was also critical of the role of political parties in the
Serbian legislature, whose powers and influence on the judiciary were deemed to be too
wide.896
Marijana Pajvančić provides a useful, independent analysis of the Serbian Constitution.897
Article 1, which states that Serbia is founded on the basis of ‘belonging to European principles
and values’, does not specify which ones are particularly European as opposed to universally
accepted democratic principles and values (as defined by other international and UN
treaties).898 Pajvančić also observed that the word ‘belonging’ rather than ‘adherence’ or
‘acceptance’ of European principles and values promotes linguistic inconsistency in the
constitution and makes the ‘belonging’ appear extremely vague. However, Article 16 which
relates to Serbian foreign policy, refers to international law and makes no mention of European
principles or legal traditions.899
At first glance, it would appear that Serbia could not officially recognise Kosovo’s
independence as this territory is regarded in the constitution as part of the Serbian state, unless
Serbian citizens opted for a referendum.900 However, in Pajvančić’s opinion, a public
referendum would not be a compulsory measure. In this view, the part of the constitution that
discusses Kosovo’s status (Article 182) is situated within the section on territorial organisation
896 However, the Venice Commission also acknowledged that the number of articles dedicated to fundamental
rights is ‘quite remarkable in absolute and in relative terms’, and that the Constitutional Court could apply these
rights in full conformity with European standards.The Commission’s final conclusion was that much would
depend on the implementation.
897 This extensive report analysed every article of the constitution. M. Pajvančić, Komentar Ustava Republike
Srbije, Belgrade, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2009, http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_22016-1522-1-
30.pdf?110224180850 (accessed 10 June 2013).
898 ibid., pp. 12–13.
899 Article 16 of the constitution states that Serbia’s foreign policy is based on ‘universally accepted principles
and regulations of international law’. It also states that all concluded international treaties ought to be
compatible with the national constitution, ibid., p. 24.
900 Kosovo appears in this context in the Preamble, and in Articles 114 and 182, which treat Kosovo and
Metohija as an autonomous region within Serbian national boundaries, ibid., pp. 9, 148, 232.
285
of the state. Since the constitution does not specifically mention territorial organisation as the
question over which, in the process of constitutional amendments, there would need to be a
compulsory referendum, Pajvančić concludes that any this measure would, therefore, be
optional and subject to the decision of the Serbian Government, but not compulsory under the
new constitution.901
Serbia’s parliamentary elections of 21 January 2007: the second
Koštunica Government
The EU supported the DS-led bloc in the Serbian parliamentary elections as it wholeheartedly
supported Serbia’s European integration, and future in Europe. The DS campaign was entirely
premised upon Serbia’s European integration, including the symbolism attached to its flag
colours (blue and yellow, the same as EU’s colours) and a campaign slogan ‘Because life
cannot wait’ that promised a better future for Serbian families with Serbia in the EU.902 The
results were encouraging for pro-EU parties as the DS gained an additional forty-one seats. The
number of parliamentary seats won by parties in these elections, and the percentage of
parliamentary representation, are displayed in the chart that follows.
901 ibid., p. 233.
902 N. Rajković, The politics of international law and compliance: Serbia, Croatia and The Hague Tribunal,
Hoboken, Taylor & Francis, 2011, p. 90.
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Chart 3: Serbian parliamentary elections, 21 January 2007
Since the December 2003 parliamentary elections, the DSS lost ten seats, while the SRS lost
only one. The G17+ lost twelve seats, while the SPO lost all thirteen seats and was unable to
enter parliament. The SPS lost six seats, while the LDP gained eight seats. The minority
political parties gained an additional representation.903 This could have been a sign that
Koštunica’s approach to promoting the role of national minorities yielded results.904
The public support for the Radicals (SRS) remained strong, possibly as a result of Milošević’s
sudden death while in the Hague Tribunal’s custody (in May 2006), which strengthened anti-
Hague and anti-Western feelings among the Serbian voters.905 A Dutch toxicologist claimed
that a combination of medications that Milošević was taking, one of which was difficult to
903 This includes two new seats for Sandžak in the European Serbia party; one for the Albanian Coalition from
Preševo Valley; one for the Roma Union of Serbia, three for the Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians, and one for
the Roma Party.
904 In 2004 Serbia established the Council for National Minorities. Under Koštunica as prime minister, Serbia
improved minority protection in the fields of education and language rights, but ‘the level of protection varies
from region to region and from group to group’. World Directory of Minorities, ‘Serbia overview’, July 2008,
http://www.minorityrights.org/4028/serbia/serbia-overview.html, (accessed 10 June 2013).


























obtain in the Netherlands, could have potentially ‘killed’ him.906 This claim increased anti-
Western sentiment among some Serbs, especially those who were already against cooperation
with the ICTY.907
Those groups and individuals in political, media, NGO and academic circles in Serbia who
vehemently oppose Serbia’s European integration sometimes refer to the ICTY’s alleged bias
against Serbs as the reason why Serbia should distance itself from ‘Western institutions’,
especially the EU and NATO. In March 2014, Živadin Jovanović (a former Minister of Foreign
Affairs of FRY from January 1998 to November 2000) from the Belgrade Forum for the World
of Equals observed:
The Hague Tribunal is an instrument of power-projection by NATO members, which
shifts the responsibility for Yugoslavia’s dissolution and war crimes that occurred
during the 1999 NATO aggression [against Yugoslavia] from NATO leaders, who are
real culprits, to Serbs, who are victims. In a broader sense, the Hague Tribunal is an
instrument of forced obedience and dictatorship in international affairs.908
One can discern Serbia’s victimhood narrative in the paragraph above, with a constructed
dichotomy of ‘us’ (‘just Serbs’) versus ‘them’ (‘unjust Westerners’). A perception of Serbia’s
denial of war crimes, marginalisation by the West, and a desire for Serbia to have more
906 In the days before his death, Milošević complained in a letter to the Russian embassy that he was being
‘poisoned’, and that he had not been receiving the right medical treatment for his heart condition. M. Simons,
‘Expert suggests Milošević died in a drug ploy’, New York Times, 14 March 2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/14/international/europe/14Milošević.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0, (accessed 1
March 2014).
907 ‘Borislav Milošević: Sloba ubijen u Hagu’, Vesti, 11 March 2006, http://www.vesti-
online.com/Vesti/Srbija/122883/Borislav-Milošević-Sloba-ubijen-u-Hagu (accessed 1 March 2014).
908 Ž. Jovanović, ‘Srpsku “demokratiju” pripremili “stelt” bombarderi i “tomahavk” rakete’, Nova Srpska
Politička Misao, 1 March 2014, http://www.nspm.rs/srbija-i-nato/srpsku-demokratiju-pripremili-stelt-
bombarderi-i-rakete-tomahavk.html?alphabet=l, (accessed 15 March 2014).
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‘freedom’ in international relations can be also identified from Jovanović’s statements above.
This dichotomy of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ is not helpful for a candidate country like Serbia, as it
seeks to legitimise anti-Western viewpoints. It will be important for the Serbian Government
to receive public support for the membership of the EU before it can accede. Serbia’s European
integration process might be further delayed in the future if anti-Western narratives become
more widely shared by the Serbian public.
The SRS, as the political party that had won approximately a third of parliamentary seats in the
2007 elections was another ‘norm entrepreneur’ as regards Serbian victimhood narratives.909
They influence public debates regarding Serbia’s European integration, creating more public
opposition towards the prospect of Serbia’s membership in the EU. In the future, these
discourses might complicate Serbia’s relationship with the EU even more, especially if the
government decides to hold a referendum on Serbia’s membership of the EU.
After protracted negotiations, the DS, the DSS and the G17+ agreed to form government on 15
March 2007, only minutes before the midnight expiry of the constitutional deadline, and to
retain Koštunica as prime minister.910 The slowness of this deal showed the fragility of the new
government, which pledged to preserve Kosovo within Serbia; to advance Serbia’s European
integration process, and to improve Serbia’s cooperation with the ICTY. The Serbian
Government welcomed the EU’s decision of 13 June 2007 to resume accession talks with
909 Tanjug, ‘Šešelj otkriva: “Zapadne zemlje sklopile zaveru protiv Srbije”’,
http://www.24sata.rs/vesti/aktuelno/vest/seselj-otkriva-zapadne-zemlje-sklopile-zaveru-protiv-
srbije/29544.phtml (accessed 1 March 2014). See also Velika Srbija, Novine Srpske Radikalne Stranke, no.
2994, December 2007, http://www.srpskaradikalnastranka.org.rs/pdf/vs/vs2994.pdf (accessed 1 March 2014).
910 M. Stojić, ‘Election briefing 50: Europe and the Serbian parliamentary elections of May 2008, European
Parties Elections and Referendums Network, 2008, p. 2,
https://www.sussex.ac.uk/webteam/gateway/file.php?name=epern-election-briefing-no-50.pdf&site=266
(accessed 1 March 2014).
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Serbia.911 The requirement of Serbia’s ‘full cooperation’ with the ICTY was replaced with the
need to have official guarantees by the Serbian Government in the form of a written ‘executive
agreement’.912 This shows that the Dutch opposition had, at least for a brief period, eased off
to allow the EU to continue with its negotiations with Serbia.
The Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Serbia was officially initiated on 7
November 2007. The final approval from the EU was delayed for a year under pressure from
the Dutch Government, which insisted that it would not approve the SAA until the remaining
Serbian indictees wanted by the Hague Tribunal were captured.913 This EU decision to
postpone the next phase of the SAA talks dealt a diplomatic blow to the Serbian pro-EU
reformists, especially the DS. It demonstrated that some EU members (the Dutch) did not have
confidence in the Serbian Government’s promises that they would actually arrest the remaining
indictees at large. The EU’s decision to postpone the SAA with Serbia was a case in which one
EU member (the Netherlands) was not satisfied with the candidate state’s performance in one
subject area of the negotiations. The delay in Serbia’s European integration at that time was
another manifestation of the ‘problemic partners’ issue that can occur in European integration,
which was discussed in the Introduction. At the same time, international negotiations over
Kosovo’s status under US-EU-Russia umbrella talks, broke down. This provided another
setback for the pro-EU agenda of the DS in particular, as Tadić ran against Nikolić, for the
second time, in Serbia’s presidential elections.
911 ‘Serbia heralds EU decision to resume rapprochement talks’, EU Business, 7 June 2007,
http://www.eubusiness.com/europe/serbia/1181232001.91, (accessed 1 March 2014).
912 Rajković, The politics of international law and compliance, 2011, op. cit., pp. 90–91.
913 In 2002, the Dutch Cabinet resigned after a report was published, criticising the Dutch Government’s role in
the Srebrenica genocide, which is believed to have been masterminded by Ratko Mladić. Due to this sensitivity,
the Netherlands was often insisting more than some other EU members on Serbia’s full cooperation with the
ICTY.
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Serbia’s presidential elections in 2008
Political discourses ‘contribute to the build-up of social relationships between people, and …
help to construct systems of knowledge and belief’.914 Dominant political discourses, including
pro-EU and anti-EU narratives, serve to attract popular legitimacy for their proponent’s
viewpoints. Before the first round of presidential elections, the SRS candidate Tomislav
Nikolić was emphasising Serbia’s choice for a political alliance with Russia. The DS candidate,
Boris Tadić, framed the elections in his campaign material as a choice for Serbia’s future ‘in’
or ‘outside’ the EU.915 Discourses that the two candidates advanced in their campaigns related
to Serbia’s European integration. Moreover, Koštunica refused to support Tadić’s candidacy—
which was a departure from the position he adopted ahead of the second round of the 2004
presidential elections, when the EU managed to convince Koštunica and other democrats to
unite against the SRS candidate.916 In early 2008, differences between the Serbian Government
and the EU over policy towards Kosovo were widening, as Koštunica was beginning to
advocate that Serbia would need to find an alternative to its pro-EU orientation.
In the first round on 20 January 2008, Nikolić was the preferred candidate, followed closely by
Tadić. On 1 January 2008, the visa facilitation and readmission agreements between the EU
and Serbia entered into force, which added an additional impetus for the DS candidate. Before
the second run-off on 3 February 2008, the EU flagged a special visa abolition package for
Serbia and an improvement in economic relations, which also boosted Tadić’s candidacy.
914 N. Fairclough, Discourse and social change, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1993, p. 64.
915 This was an over-simplification of European integration, as this attitude did not take into consideration
difficult compromises which Serbia would need to make in the process of negotiating its EU membership.
916 The difference was that in 2004 Serbia was part of the State Union with Montenegro. At that time, the EU
and Serbia both wanted to maintain the federal state, which increased the EU leverage over Serbian prime
minister.
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In the second round, the DS candidate won over his rival from the SRS with 50.31 to 47.97 per
cent of the vote, but with a slimmer margin compared to the second round of the 2004
presidential elections in which the outcome was 53.97 to 46.03 per cent in favour of Tadić.917
The slimmer margin achieved by the DS against the SRS was possibly a sign of a growing anti-
Western/EU attitude among the Serbian electorate as the issue of Kosovo’s independence was
at the forefront of public discourses in Serbia.918 It was also for this reason that the EU needed
to offer a stronger membership promise to Serbia.
Following the victory of a proven pro-EU Serbian President (Tadić was sworn in on 15
February), a revised European Partnership for Serbia was adopted on 18 February 2008. On 29
April 2008, the EU and Serbia signed the SAA and the Interim Agreement on Trade and Trade-
related issues, seven years after the SAA was signed with Croatia. Before the parliamentary
elections, the European Commission handed over to Serbia the ‘roadmap’ on visa
liberalisation, which was aimed at achieving visa-free status for Serbian citizens travelling to
the Schengen zone for a short stay and with biometric passports. Symbolically, this
liberalisation indicated Serbia’s break with its legacy of isolation, which began in the early
1990s. This was another sign of the EU’s continuing support for Serbia’s European integration,
which was increasingly internally resisted by Prime Minister Koštunica because of the Kosovo
issue.
917 Nikolić’s stronghold was reflected in the vote from Kosovo Serbs (71.43 per cent of the vote compared to
43.25 per cent in the autonomous province of Vojvodina, 47.97 in Central Serbia, and 45.41 per cent in
Belgrade). Republička Komisija, ‘Izbori za predsednika republike, ponovljeno glasanje 3. februar 2008,
Tomislav Nikolić’, 14 February 2008, http://www.rik.parlament.gov.rs/cirilica/propisi_frames.htm, (accessed 1
March 2014).
918 Tadić’s vote attracted only 27.46 per cent of Kosovo residents, 55.34 per cent of those in Vojvodina, 48.93
per cent of voters from Central Serbia, and 52.58 per cent of the electorate in the City of Belgrade. Republička
Komisija, ‘Izbori za predsednika republike, ponovljeno glasanje 3. februar 2008, Boris Tadić’, 14 February
2008, http://www.rik.parlament.gov.rs/cirilica/propisi_frames.htm, (accessed 1 March 2014).
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In his address to the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly on 2 October 2007,
Koštunica called for a negotiated solution between Albanians and Serbs. Amongst other things,
he said that ‘The proposal we [Serbia] have presented in New York says that Serbia is ready to
offer the Albanian national minority the status of the most privileged national minority in the
world’. Koštunica appealed to ‘fundamental European values’ and called on the member states
of the Council of Europe not to break their promise to respect UNSCR 1244. As some countries
were preparing to recognise Kosovo’s independence, Koštunica criticised this policy referring
to it as a ‘violent and unilateral solution’, which threatened ‘not only the Balkans but the entire
international order’ that was supposed to safeguard state sovereignty and territorial integrity of
all UN members.919
The EULEX mission and Serbia’s reactions
At the Council meeting in late 2007, the EU leaders noted with ‘deep regret’ the breakdown of
‘Troika’ negotiations. These talks between Kosovo Albanians and the Serbian Government
lasted four months and were jointly mediated by the US, Russia and EU. They had failed to
find a mutually acceptable solution on the Kosovo issue that would satisfy both Kosovo
Albanians and the Serbian Government.920 At that meeting, the EU leaders declared a plan to
create a civilian mission of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), which became
known as the European Union Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX). The Republic of Cyprus
weakened the unified approach by abstaining from the vote.921 By agreeing to send a civilian
919 Council of Europe, ‘Vojislav Koštunica: Kosovo’s future status should be based on fundamental European
values’, 2 October 2007,
http://www.coe.int/t/dc/files/pa_session/sept_2007/20071002_speech_Koštunica_en.pdf, (accessed 1 March
2014).
920 European Council, ‘Presidency conclusions’, Brussels, 14 February 2008,
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/97669.pdf, (accessed 9 June 2013).
921 D. Cadier, ‘EU mission in Kosovo (EULEX): Constructing ambiguity or constructive disunity?’,
Transatlantic security paper, no. 3, June 2011, Foundation for Strategic Studies, Johns Hopkins University, p. 4.
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mission to Kosovo (which later became the EU’s third largest ESDP mission), the EU
implemented a key recommendation from the Ahtisaari Plan.922
The Ahtisaari Plan was based on a policy proposal according to which Kosovo’s supervised
independence provided the best way forward for regional security and long-term peace in the
Western Balkans; despite the adverse implications it would have for a unified EU foreign
policy or the Serbian Government. This situation was an example of a time when normative
frameworks of Serbia and the EU diverged. Serbia was insisting on the need to continue with
the multilateral negotiations. This position was upheld by Russia in the UNSC discussions on
19 December 2007, but several EU members and the US took a view that further talks would
be futile and blocked Russia’s proposal.
On 26 December 2007, the Serbian National Assembly adopted a Resolution on the protection
of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and constitutional order of the Republic of Serbia. This
resolution make it clear that the Serbian Government held the view that the deployment of
EULEX would represent a breach of Serbia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, which
Koštunica called ‘illegal’.923 He also stated:
Serbia owes a debt of gratitude to Russia because it has been a firm and principled ally
all the while, defending international law and Serbia’s right not to have its territory
usurped.924
922 United Nations Security Council, ‘Addendum: comprehensive proposal for the Kosovo status settlement’,
Letter dated 26 March 2007 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council,
2007, http://www.unosek.org/docref/Comprehensive_proposal-english.pdf, (accessed 9 June 2013).
923 National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia, ‘Seventh sitting of the second regular session of the National
Assembly of the Republic of Serbia in 2007’, 26 December 2007,
http://www.parlament.gov.rs/Seventh_Sitting_of_the_Second_Regular_Session_of_the_National_Assembly_of
_the_Republic_of_Serbia_in_2007.6537.537.html, (accessed 1 May 2014).
924 ibid.
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Koštunica’s choice of words such as ‘ally’ alluded to the other side of the argument, to the
position that the EU was not an ally, at least not on this issue that was regarded as central to
Serbia’s national interests. The Serbian Minister for Kosovo and Metohija, Slobodan
Samardžić, also accused the EU and the US for ‘demotivating Kosovo Albanians’ during the
Troika negotiations by ‘promising independence’ to their leaders.925 In an interview for this
thesis, Samardžić reiterated this view by observing that Serbia was unable to successfully
bargain with the Kosovo Albanians within the Troika framework because of intense ‘external
pressures’.926
The Ahtisaari Plan that recommended a supervised independence for Kosovo ran against the
policies of all major parties in Serbia, not just the DSS. Outside of Serbia, it was cautiously
greeted by a number of NGOs, including the International Crisis Group.927 Furthermore, it
contained elementary provisions of Kosovo’s future constitution, which would have
superseded any previous laws applicable to Kosovo passed in Belgrade. This meant that the
new Serbian Constitution, which treated Kosovo as an autonomous but not independent
territory, located within the Republic of Serbia’s national boundaries, would be effectively
contradicted.928 Kosovo’s proclamation of independence would embarrass the Serbian
Government (with Russia as its main supporter on the Kosovo issue in international forums).
925 ibid.
926 Interview with Slobodan Samardžić, Belgrade, July 2010.
927 International Crisis Group, ‘Kosovo: no good alternatives to the Ahtisaari plan’, Europe Report, no. 182, 14
May 2007.
928 It was not clear what kind of autonomy for Kosovo the Serbian Government was proposing. The relationship
between the Kosovo Albanians and the Serbian Government was characterised by a deep mistrust and
unresolved human rights issues. One of Koštunica’s suggestions was to extend autonomy to Kosovo with
‘international guarantees’, but he did not go into detail as to what would happen if Kosovo Albanians refused to
accept his proposal.  Demokratska Stranka Srbije, ‘Obraćanje Predsednika Vlade Srbije Vojislava Koštunice
Narodnoj Skupštini Srbije’, 26 December 2007, http://dss.rs/obracanje-predsednika-vlade-srbije-narodnoj-
skupstini-srbije/, (accessed 1 March 2013). It was also unclear how the Serbian Government thought that
Kosovo Albanians would accept the rule from Belgrade as legitimate after the conflict in 1998–99 forced
hundreds of thousands of Albanians into exile, the majority of whom were still traumatised by that experience.
The majority of Serbs from Northern Kosovo refused to negotiate with the Kosovo Albanian authorities, which
presented a policy dilemma for the EU that was focused on the creation of democratic institutions in Kosovo.
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The government would be regarded as a weak and ineffective promoter of ‘Serbian national
interests’ among its constituents, as more than 100,000 Serbs from Kosovo fled following the
1999 conflict, and many more Serbian voters could trace lineage from that region.929 Public
opposition to Kosovo’s independence could not be ignored by any of Serbia’s major political
players, as it would have equated to, as one observer described it, political suicide.930
The EU’s position led to a breakdown of the trust Serbian leaders had in the EU institutions,
as the DSS called for Serbia to realign its foreign policy towards Russia.931 Externally, the
ideological rift among Serbian democrats that became more pronounced in early 2008 over
Kosovo made many observers wary about Serbia’s long-term commitment to the EU.932
Kosovo’s proclamation of independence on 17 February 2008 adversely affected political
relations between the EU and Serbia as Serbia withdrew ambassadors from EU member states
which had recognised Kosovo’s independence, and which were, by May 2008, in a majority in
the European Council (17 out of 27 members).933
At the same time as differences were increasing between Serbia and the EU on the question of
Kosovo’s final status, the EU urged Serbia to continue with reforms that would help create a
929 All post-Milošević governments in Serbia, including the present-day government, regarded Kosovo’s
preservation within Serbia’s territorial borders as a key national interest.
930 V. Bjekić, ‘Srbija utvrđuje pregovaračku poziciju’, Balkans: Regional reporting & sustainable training, BCR
Issue 5562 August 2005, http://iwpr.net/sr/report-news/srbija-utvrdjuje-pregovaracku-poziciju, (accessed 9 June
2013).
931 Demokratska Stranka Srbije, ‘Obraćanje Predsednika Vlade Srbije Vojislava Koštunice Narodnoj Skupštini
Srbije’, 26 December 2007, op. cit.
932 The rift was deepening between the DS and the DSS, which were Serbia’s largest pro-reform parties since
the 2007 parliamentary election. DPA News Agency, ‘EU and Kosovo deepen Serbian coalition rift’, Deutsche
Welle, 5 January 2008, http://www.dw.de/eu-and-kosovo-deepen-serbian-coalition-rift/a-3039893, (accessed 10
June 2013). D. Bilefsky, ‘Rift over closer ties to Europe ignites Serbian political crisis’, 6 February 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/06/world/europe/06serbia.html?_r=0, (accessed 14 June 2013).
933 European Commission, ‘Serbia: 2008 progress report’, Brussels, 5 November 2008, p. 5,
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/press_corner/key-
documents/reports_nov_2008/serbia_progress_report_en.pdf, (accessed 9 June 2013).
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more favourable political climate for the SAA talk to proceed.934 By doing so, the EU was
reminding the Serbian Government of its membership goal to join the EU. Among other
countries in the Western Balkans, the FYROM and Croatia had achieved by that stage official
candidate status, while Serbia was clearly lagging behind. The reasons for which Serbia’s
association agreement with the EU was delayed were linked to political differences between
the Serbian and EU leaders regarding Serbia’s role and place in the region, which will be
discussed in the next section.
Divisions among Serbian democrats
A key regional public opinion polling group, Median Gallup, provided a useful snapshot of
political attitudes towards the EU in Serbia. In 2004, Median Gallup found that 22 per cent of
the respondents in Serbia were ‘Euro-enthusiasts’; 35 per cent were ‘Euro-realist’; 29 per cent
were ‘Euro-sceptic’ and 13 per cent were ‘Euro-phobes’.935 They conducted in the same year
another survey for members of Serbia’s major political parties. The survey found that members
of the DS under Boris Tadić were more committed to the EU than members of the DSS. Thirty-
seven per cent of DS members were ‘Euro-enthusiasts’, while 42 per cent were ‘Euro-realists’.
DSS supporters were 51 per cent Euro-realist in outlook, while 24 per cent of them were Euro-
934 Since 2007, Serbia was included in the EU’s pre-accession instrument, the IPA funding program,
implemented by the European Commission’s delegation in Belgrade. This financial package (€164.8 million for
2007) demonstrated the EU’s ongoing commitment to Serbia’s reform process. European Commission, ‘Serbia:
2007 progress report’, Brussels, 6 November 2007, p. 5,
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2007/nov/serbia_progress_reports_en.pdf, (accessed 9 June
2013).
935 Euro-enthusiasts identified with the following statement: ‘Europe is very close to me and I think that we
must make every effort to join it, which includes fulfilling all the conditions that it sets’. Euro-realists identified
with this statement: ‘I can’t say that Europe is particularly close to me, but I see integration in the EU as
necessary and we must work on that’. Meanwhile, Euro-sceptics opted for the following statement: ‘I am
doubtful about the intentions of Europe and the West in general and I think we must go very cautiously and
slowly in possibly integrating into its structures’. Euro-phobes identified with the following view: ‘Integration
with Europe would mean the domination of European and other powers over our nation; Serbia does not belong
to that world and so we should nurture our traditional values and not get caught up in the European rat-race’.
Batt, ‘Serbia on the eve of the elections’, 2 November 2003, op. cit., p. 4.
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sceptic. Euro-enthusiasts in the DSS comprised only 17 per cent. Given these results, it was
not surprising that in times of diplomatic crises or impasse relating to EU issues, political
differences between the DS and the DSS became even sharper.936
Four particular domestic issues presented significant normative challenges for the functioning
of the DSS-led government, involving the EU. These included political and normative domestic
clashes of views regarding Serbia’s cooperation with the ICTY; divergent viewpoints of the
majority of EU members and Serbia regarding Kosovo (including its status, the partition
proposal and its treatment in the new Serbian Constitution); security crises (including in
particular the anti-Western and anti-Albanian riots in Serbia following Kosovo’s proclamation
of independence, which worsened Serbia’s image in the West), Serbia’s ambiguous
relationship with NATO, and the Serbian parliamentary resolution on military neutrality.
Differences in views between Koštunica and the EU regarding Serbia’s cooperation with the
ICTY deepened rifts among Serbian democrats. The EU insisted on Serbia’s full cooperation
with the ICTY. The European Commission’s Ambassador to Bosnia-Herzegovina, Michael
Humphreys, accused the Serbian Government in 2004 of not doing all it could to arrest the
remaining ICTY indictees at large, who were suspected of being hiding with the assistance of
the Serbian military and former generals.937 Koštunica insisted that as with the case of many
Croats being tried in Croatia for war crimes, more indicted Serbs should have been allowed to
936 Dušan Spasojević has described this period in Serbian politics when differences were pronounced over the
question of European integration (2003–2008) as an era of polarised pluralism. D. Spasojević, ‘Odblokirana
tranzicija–političke podele u Srbiji nakon 2000. godine’, Godišnjak Fakulteta političkih nauka, vol. 5, no. 5,
2011, p. 121.
937 ‘EU official: top Bosnian Serb war crimes fugitives moving across border with Serbia-Montenegro’,
Southeast European Times, 25 February 2004,
http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2004/02/040225-SVETLA-
001, (accessed 1 May 2013).
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face trials in domestic courts.938 Koštunica’s DSS, but also the SRS and the SPS regarded the
ICTY as a political organisation that seemed biased against Serbs, while they believed the
Hague Tribunal showed more flexibility towards cases involving the citizens of Croatia and
Bosnia-Herzegovina.939 A clash of normative frameworks between the Serbian Government
and the EU on this issue led to a temporary suspension of negotiations with the EU in 2006.
However, the issue was politically resolved after the Serbian parliamentary elections in July
2007 with the formation of a reformist Serbian Government, which included the DS, the DSS
and the G17+.
Differences in views over Kosovo’s separation from Serbia had threatened to derail Serbia’s
progress towards achieving candidate status for EU membership. Kosovo’s declaration of
independence on 17 February 2008 triggered a political crisis in Serbia. Although the EU did
not officially recognise Kosovo’s independence, the EU working documents and other policy
papers (including for funding purposes), addressed and funded Kosovo as an independent
entity.940 Several EU countries, including Germany, France, Italy and the UK, who are
collectively the largest contributors to the common EU budget, publicly expressed support for
Kosovo’s independence in the years preceding the proclamation, which the Serbian
Government was resisting. Serbia’s formal proposal to the UN seeking, for the first time, ethnic
938 BBC, ‘Text: Koštunica interview’, 17 September 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3667120.stm,
(accessed 11 May 2013).
939 In his role as the third Yugoslavia’s President, Koštunica observed in an interview in 2002 that in his view,
the Hague Tribunal was one-sided. He believed that The Hague did not respect the promise made to four
indictees who handed themselves over to the court, which held that they could represent themselves while on
bail, rather than being in detention until the end of court proceedings. Serbian Ministry for Foreign Affairs,
‘Koštunica: The Hague does not respect given promises’, Bilten, 9 December 2002,
http://www.mfa.gov.rs/Srpski/Bilteni/Srpski/b091202_s.html, (accessed 11 May 2013).
940 European Commission, ‘Annexes to 2004 Report on Phare—Country sections and additional information’,
Staff working document, 23 December 2005, http://old.eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52005SC1773:EN:HTML, (accessed 1 May 2013).
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partition of Kosovo in late March 2008 showed its lack of trust in the Kosovo authorities and
the EU’s role as a conflict mediator.941
After Kosovo declared independence, anti-Western riots erupted in Serbia on 21 February
2008. The riots in Belgrade, in particular, received extensive media coverage in the EU as the
embassies of several EU states and candidate states (Croatia) and the US embassy were
attacked. This event adversely affected Serbia’s standing abroad and in turn, worsened the EU’s
political dialogue with the Serbian Prime Minister Koštunica, who decided to withdraw
ambassadors from countries which had recognised Kosovo’s independence.942 The riots and
the removal of Ambassadors cast doubts on the genuineness of Serbia’s desire to join the EU.
Public opinion polls also showed a decline in support within the EU for further EU enlargement
in the Western Balkans, and Serbia’s accession in particular.943
Serbia’s military neutrality also caused divisions among the Serbian democrats. On 26
December 2007, the Serbian Parliament passed a resolution (with 220 for, 3 abstentions and
14 against) that confirmed Serbia’s military neutrality, and preservation of Serbia’s territorial
integrity and sovereignty. No other EU aspirant from post-communist Europe had previously
done so.944 Serbia’s unique position under Koštunica’s prime ministership differentiated it from
other post-communist candidate states and its neighbours, the majority of whom followed the
pattern of Euro-Atlantic integration by firstly joining the UN, then the OSCE, NATO and the
EU. During the second Koštunica government, anti-Western narratives became more
941 I. Traynor, ‘Serbia asks UN for partitioning of Kosovo’, 25 March 2008,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/mar/25/serbia.kosovo, (accessed 1 May 2013).
942 As at April 2014, many of the withdrawn ambassadors have not been replaced. The decision not to replace
ambassadors could have been a cost-saving measure, but one that would not have been received well in the EU
countries without a diplomatic representation from Serbia at the highest (ambassadorial) level.
943 Another reason for a decline in the support for further enlargement, or enlargement fatigue, is the protracted
economic crisis in the EU.
944 L, Varga, ‘Odnos konteksta Evro(atlantskih) integracija Srbije i pojedinih političkih kriterijima za članstvo u
EU’, Izazovi Evropskih Integracija, vol. 5, Belgrade, Službeni Glasnik, 2009, p. 9.
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prominent in Serbia, and calls increased for Serbia to retain its military and political neutrality
from the West (NATO and the EU), just as it did during Tito’s era. The DSS, the SRS and the
SPS displayed a strong antagonism towards the Atlantic component of European integration,
principally because of NATO’s bombardment campaign in 1999, and towards the EU because
of its perceived role in Kosovo’s independence. Koštunica stated in a speech following
Kosovo’s proclamation of independence:
Now it is more than clear that the merciless destruction of Serbia in the NATO bombing
had only one goal, and that is to turn Kosovo into the first NATO state in the world.945
The DSS’s anti-Western statements in the Serbian media before Serbia’s next parliamentary
elections caused more divisions among Serbian democrats, and became another factor
destabilising Serbia’s democratic consolidation.
Conclusion
This chapter sought to present an overview of the challenges at the republican and the State
Union level regarding Serbia’s relationship with the EU. While the EU used the language of
closeness with the Serbian Presidency under Boris Tadić in 2004, it had managed to develop a
pragmatic working relationship with the DSS-led Serbian Government under Koštunica in
2004 and 2005 in particular. The EU also insisted on the preservation of the State Union, to
Montenegro’s irritation, as it preferred a regional approach to their individual paths towards
European accession. Serbia and the EU respected the result of the Montenegrin referendum in
May 2006 and Montenegro’s peaceful separation from Serbia, which Tribovich described as
945 D. Bilefsky, ‘Serbia formally proposes ethnic partition of Kosovo’, New York Times, 25 March 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/25/world/europe/25kosovo.html?_r=0, (accessed 1 March 2014).
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‘an immense and insufficiently recognised’ foreign policy success of the EU towards this
region after 2000.946 The energy spent on maintaining the common state and the EU’s level of
involvement on constitutional day-to-day issues in the State Union was possibly too much
investment in a defunct state. That effort potentially deflected much-needed resources away
from other reform-focused priorities of European integration, such as judicial and
administrative reform in both republics.
Further, the DSS-led government between March 2004 and July 2008 was criticised on a
number of accounts. Criticism covered various issues, for instance, Serbia’s inability to
establish democratic civilian control over the army and police; the Serbian leaders’ inability to
arrest the two remaining ICTY indictees at large, and the lack of adequate human rights
protection mechanisms in the new Serbian Constitution. Serbia’s proclamation of its military
neutrality and the secession of one part of its constitutional territory during Serbia’s European
integration made this country different from other regional post-communist states and possibly
more vulnerable to external security shocks. Kosovo’s proclamation of independence was a
challenge for future cooperative dialogue between the EU and Serbia, especially after several
embassies of EU members and formal candidates were attacked in contravention of
international diplomatic protocols. The violent protests sent a negative signal to the EU
institutions and the general European public about Serbia’s readiness to accept the Euro-
Atlantic orientation in its foreign policy.
The Koštunica factor in the EU’s relationship with the State Union proved on the whole to be
a factor of stability and commitment to the foreign policy goals of the EU in 2004 and 2005,
which aligned with those of the DSS. At the same time, the EU applied political pressure at
946 Trbovich, The Legal geography of Yugoslavia’s disintegration, 2008, op. cit.
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crucial moments in 2004 and 2005, which resulted in significant improvements to Serbia’s
cooperation with the ICTY. This indicated that as a higher degree of trust started to develop
between the EU and the DSS, the EU’s carrot-and-stick approach was accomplishing results.
Despite many inter-party differences, a broad consensus was achieved among Serbia’s
democrats during Koštunica’s era that marginalised the political influence of the Radicals.
The co-habitation agreement between the DSS and the DS lasted until 8 March 2008, when
Koštunica publicly stated that the coalition government had fallen over the issue of Serbia’s
continued European integration, and called for early parliamentary elections on 11 May 2008.
The EU’s soft power had ultimately failed to win over the DSS whose position on Kosovo’s
independence could not be reconciled with the EU’s divided stance, or those key EU members
who firstly insisted on upholding UNSCR 1244, then changed their policy towards supporting
Kosovo’s proclamation of independence. Internal political divisions among Serbian democrats
have also proven to be extremely detrimental to Serbia’s European integration. This confirms
that European integration is a normative process affected by internal consensus reached among
dominant political elites in the candidate state. Any major disagreement between them can
delay or hinder further European integration, as happened in Serbia’s case particularly towards
the end of Koštunica’s prime ministership. The EU’s inability to reach a common policy on
Kosovo’s independence proclamation raises a question about the foreign policy effectiveness
of the EU in the Western Balkans. The issue of trust, which is pivotal for the maintenance of
close diplomatic relations (including among former foes) had once again resurfaced as a
challenge for further EU-Serbia cooperation. Kosovo’s independence proclamation caused
further delays in Serbia’s European integration due to differences in normative and political




Turn towards Europe: EU-Serbia relations under the DS-
SPS coalition
This chapter will examine the EU’s diplomatic activities ahead of the Serbian presidential and
parliamentary elections in 2008, and outline the milestones and key challenges in the EU-
Serbia relationship under the coalition government (7 July 2008–27 July 2012). Two dominant
parties in the ‘For European Serbia’ governing coalition were the DS and the reformed SPS,
which after 3 December 2006 was under new leadership.947 During this period, decreasing
levels of public support for Serbia’s EU orientation, and growing opposition by EU citizens
(especially in the ‘older’ member states, EU-15) to further EU enlargement were main political
and social barriers to Serbia’s European integration. These societal attitudes will be examined
through the analysis of key public opinion polls in Serbia, and the EU’s Eurobarometer survey
results.
The significance of identity politics, as defined by Manuel Castells, will be drawn upon to
highlight a major ‘values debate’ between Serbia’s pro-EU and anti-EU political standpoints—
a normative rift which ensured that Serbia’s European integration path became more
challenging despite the relative stability within the new coalition after the parliamentary
elections in May 2008.948 The Kosovo issue and the question of Serbia’s continued European
947 On 3 December 2006, a former presidential candidate of the SPS, Ivica Dačić, was elected President of his
party. Since 2003, Dačić had become a pro-European reformer within the SPS. He marginalised the influence of
the SPS’s anti-EU faction (filled with Milošević loyalists) in January 2003, after they unsuccessfully attempted
to expel him from the party, and made Milošević’s position in the party rather symbolic by becoming a de facto
leader. After the death of Milošević and before Serbia’s snap parliamentary election of January 2007, Dačić was
elected President of the SPS. For a useful discussion of the SPS party transformation, see A. Konitzer ‘External
veto actors, public opinion, and the transformation of EU-skeptic parties in Croatia and Serbia’, National
Council for Eurasian and East European Research Working Paper, University of Washington, 2010, pp. 36–49.
948 In the case of the Serbian 2008 elections, these social constructs related to Serbia’s foreign policy orientation,
especially European integration. Castells, The power of identity, 2010, op. cit., p. 7.
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integration were factors in Serbian politics that further divided Serbian democrats, and as such,
they will be examined in this chapter. The question of Serbia’s European integration during the
period of analysis also caused the most significant change on the Serbian political scene with
the weakening of the largest anti-EU party, the SRS. Its former Deputy President, Tomislav
Nikolić and his allies, including Aleksandar Vučić, broke away from the SRS and formed a
new political party, the Serbian Progressive Party (Srpska Napredna Stranka, SNS), which
declared itself in favour of Serbia’s European integration.949
The Serbian parliamentary elections of 11 May 2008
President Tadić’s re-election on 3 February 2008 provided a further impetus to Serbia’s
European integration path, which was much needed as Serbia’s SAA negotiations with the EU
were blocked on 16 January 2008 by Belgium and the Netherlands over the issue of Serbia’s
lack of sufficient cooperation with the ICTY. Tadić was sworn in as Serbia’s President on 15
February 2008, as Kosovo was preparing to declare independence only two days later. The
EU’s closer political relationships with pro-EU parties in Serbia may have contributed to a
slight increase in public support for Serbia’s EU accession (by 1 per cent), and a greater
decrease in public opposition to that prospect (by 6 per cent) between November 2007 and May
2008.950 Javier Solana, the EU foreign policy chief, rejected claims that the EU was interfering
949 It is interesting to observe that after Serbia’s regime change, the SRS and the SPS were both internally
divided between anti-European and pro-EU factions, and between those who supported the old party leaders
(Šešelj and Milošević respectively) and reformers who wanted a change in the party leadership. In the SPS in
2003, Dačić managed to convince the majority of SPS members of the need for a gradual leadership change
when Milošević was in The Hague. By December 2006, Dačić was elected President of the SPS despite
objections from former Milošević loyalists who did not share his pro-European vision. In the SRS, Nikolić did
not manage to break the party’s allegiance from the old party leader, and ICTY indictee, Vojislav Šešelj. By
forming a new political party, the SNS, in October 2008 he managed to build a new image for his team of
loyalists whilst advocating Serbia’s EU accession.
950 An opinion poll conducted by the Serbian European Integration Office (SEIO) in November 2007 recorded
that if a referendum on Serbia’s EU membership had been held at the time of the questionnaire, 66 per cent of
respondents would have voted for, and 18 per cent would have voted against Serbia’s EU accession. The
corresponding figures in May 2008 were 67 and 12 per cent respectively. Republic of Serbia, ‘The EU
perspective of Serbian citizens trends: results of a public opinion poll’, SEIO, December 2008,
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in Serbian elections by favouring the DS over the SRS candidate—despite the fact that on many
occasions the EU representatives cautioned against the election of Nikolić.951
In February 2008, the EU Commissioner for Enlargement, Olli Rehn, described the 2008
presidential elections as Serbia’s choice between ‘a nationalist past and a European future’.952
This had remained his position also after the coalition government fell in March 2008 in the
lead-up to Serbia’s parliamentary elections in May 2008.953 The EU’s willingness to cooperate
with Serbia was conditional upon the Serbian Government’s fulfilling political conditionality
criteria, in particular locating, arresting and handing over the remaining indictees from the wars
of the 1990s.954 Hence, Serbia’s European integration was, over a decade since the Bosnian
conflict ended, still linked to its management of responsibility for the crimes authorised by
individuals considered to be hiding in Serbia. The EU viewed the Serbian Government’s
apparent inability to capture the remaining indictees at large as a sign of their lack of political
will to recognise their responsibility, and thereby confront the culture of denial of war crimes
that had taken root in Serbia.955
Serbian Foreign Minister, Vuk Jeremić, addressed the European Parliament’s Foreign Affairs
Committee on 20 February 2008. In his speech, he criticised the recognition of Kosovo’s
http://www.seio.gov.rs/upload/documents/prezentacije/european_perspective_serbia_dec_2008.ppt, (accessed 1
April 2013).
951 ‘Serbia’s parties slam Solana over EU deal’, Balkan Insight, 9 April 2008,
http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/serbia-s-parties-slam-solana-over-eu-deal (accessed 1 April 2013).
952 ‘Serbia offered EU co-operation deal’, Aljazeera, 3 February 2008,
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2008/01/2008525125437866675.html (accessed 1 April 2013).
953 European Commissioner for Enlargement, Olli Rehn, ‘Europe’s smart power in its region and the world’,
speech, 1 May 2008, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-08-222_en.htm?locale=en, (accessed 1 April
2013).
954 Tanjug, ‘Brussels: Support for pro-European bloc’, B92, 30 March 2008,
http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2008&mm=03&dd=30&nav_id=48932, (accessed 12 April
2013).
955 For the role of national elites, and narratives of irrationality when dealing with the issue of war crimes in
contemporary Serbia, see J. Obradović-Wochnik, Ethnic Conflict and war crimes in the Balkans: the narratives
of denial in post-conflict Serbia, London, I. B. Tauris & Co., 2013, pp. 5–7, 163–171.
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independence by four EU members on that day (UK, France, Germany and Latvia). He
highlighted a contradiction that he found in the EU’s attitude towards the Kosovo status with
the promise of EU membership to Serbia:
Creating desolation out of the promise of a European future. This is what the
governments of some of your countries have done by recognizing the unilateral, illegal
and illegitimate declaration of independence of … Kosovo and Metohija. … And I am
ashamed, because for all the talk about reason and Enlightenment … Europe is rapidly
becoming just another place where might makes right. … Is this the way to treat
friends?956
The language used in his speech was symptomatic of the tension and frustration within the
Serbian Government, which was confronted with seemingly two incompatible goals of
preserving Kosovo within Serbia diplomatically, and deepening integration with the EU.
Despite Serbia’s disagreement, and warnings from Russia and China, more EU members
progressively recognised Kosovo’s independence.957 Czech President Vaclas Klaus warned
that this precedent may trigger a domino effect in Europe, which echoed sentiment Koštunica
expressed in his 2006 article for The Washington Post.958 However, five EU countries hold out
against recognition. EU members were, once again, not united on the question of Kosovo’s
statehood, which presents a challenge for the EU’s coherence in foreign policy.
956 ‘Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremić addresses EP Foreign Affairs Committee’, B92, 20 February 2008, emphasis
added, http://www.b92.net/eng/insight/pressroom.php?yyyy=2008&mm=02&nav_id=47861, (accessed 12 April
2013).
957 ‘China expresses concern over Kosovo’, China Daily, 19 February 2008,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-02/19/content_6464411.htm (accessed 12 April 2013).
958 ‘Europe split on Kosovo independence’, Euractiv, 18 February 2008,
http://www.euractiv.com/enlargement/europe-split-kosovo-independence-news-219427, (accessed 12 April
2013).
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The International Steering Group (ISG) for Kosovo was formed in Vienna on 28 February 2008
pursuant to the Ahtisaari Plan to assist with the implementation of Kosovo’s final status
process. The ISG included the European Commission and NATO.959 As with the Ahtisaari
Plan, Serbia claimed that the ISG had no legitimate legal or political basis under international
law. This position was stated in a letter of protest written by Serbia’s Foreign Minister to the
UN Secretary-General on 29 February 2008.960 The EU’s role in Kosovo’s transition—from an
international, UN-mandated protectorate to an EU-supervised entity—disappointed many
Serbs, turning them against Serbia’s European integration. The Serbian Government’s position
at the time was that the EU was overtly sympathetic towards the Kosovo Albanian statehood
aspirations, while ignoring aspirations by Serbs from Kosovo to remain within Serbia’s
territorial boundaries (the majority of Serbs from Kosovo was living outside Kosovo since the
end of NATO’s military intervention in 1999).961 With the dispatch of the EULEX mission to
Kosovo, the EU’s role became central to the day-to-day management of Kosovo affairs.962 The
Serbian Government resented the EU’s technical, financial, political and diplomatic support
for the Kosovo Albanian institutions. The Serbian Government was facing the prospect of
domestic instability. Internal divisions arose among coalition partners over how best to
959 On 4 February 2008, a Dutchman, Pieter Feith, was appointed in a dual role as ‘EU Special Representative
and International Civilian Representative for Kosovo’. His mandate is set out in the Council Joint Actions
2008/123/CFSP and 2009/137/CFSP and Council Decisions 2010/118/CFSP, 2010/446/CFSP and
2011/119/CFSP. European External Action Service, ‘Pieter Feith, EU Special Representative in Kosovo’, p. 2.
Upon his appointment, Feith said that the EU would stay in Kosovo until it joined the EU, and described his role
as an advisory one to the Kosovo Government, rather than administrative. Ž. Jevtić, ‘Fejt: ostajemo dok Kosovo
ne uđe u Uniju’, Blic, 12 March 2008, http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Blic-SR.pdf (accessed 12
April 2013).
960 Security Council Report, ‘Update report no. 1: Kosovo’, 13 February 2008,
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/update-report/lookup-c-glKWLeMTIsG-b-3945613.php?print=true,
(accessed 12 April 2013).
961 The US’s involvement in the same matter contributed to an already widespread anti-Americanism in Serbia,
which emerged as a social and political phenomenon in the 1990s because of international sanctions and the
NATO bombardment. BETA, ‘Strongest anti-American sentiment in Serbia, Pakistan’, 7 July 2009, B92,
http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2009&mm=07&dd=07&nav_id=60329 (accessed 12 April
2013).
962 Until then the primacy of the US role was considered to be crucial for the maintenance of regional peace and
security, especially considering the US role in negotiating the Dayton Peace Accord. The EULEX mission was a
sign that EU foreign policy had evolved since the 1990s to include a pro-active role in building up Kosovo’s
governance institutions.
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approach the issue of ‘an amputation of 15 per cent of Serbian territory’ (with Kosovo’s
separation from the republic) in the context of a heated public debate on this topic and the next
parliamentary elections.963
The ‘values’ debate in Serbia over Kosovo and EU accession
For Serbian political parties, describing the elections as ‘for’ or ‘against’ Serbia’s European
integration (DS), and as ‘for’ or ‘against’ Serbia itself (DSS-NS, SRS) was a pre-election
strategy intended to boost the voters’ support.964 Their attitude towards the EU also reflected
their own position on the direction of Serbia’s reform process. As widespread unemployment
and poverty were serious challenges for Serbia’s economic reforms, it is unsurprising that
European integration was framed in economic terms. The pro-EU parties in the lead-up to the
parliamentary elections appealed to the benefits the Serbian citizens could enjoy by getting
closer to the EU.965 Hence, the DS-led coalition adopted pro-European slogans.966 Another
pro-EU party, the LDP, used the slogan that highlighted the freedom of movement as a key
aspect of that cooperation.967 On the other hand, parties that advocated Serbia’s greater self-
reliance, limited cooperation with the EU and closer ties with Russia appealed for Kosovo and
963 BETA/Reuters, ‘Koštunica: Serbia rejects Kosovo’s independence’, B92, 16 July 2007,
http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2007&mm=07&dd=16&nav_id=42469 (accessed 12 April
2013).
964 This largest pro-EU coalition of parties was called For a European Serbia–Boris Tadić. It was made up of
the Democratic Party (DS), G17+, the Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO), the League of Social Democrats of
Vojvodina and the Sandžak Democratic Party. The campaign was led by a democrat and long-standing anti-
communist dissident, Dragoljub Mićunović, from the DS.
965 European Commission, ‘Serbia: 2007 progress report’, 26 November 2007, op. cit., p. 30.
966 These slogans included: Europe means a more certain future, European means more modern education, and
Europe means new working places–work can’t wait. See also M. Stojić, ‘Election briefing No. 50: Europe and
the Serbian parliamentary election of May 2008’, 2008, op. cit.¸ p. 5.
967 Their slogan for the 2008 elections was Spread the word: Serbia without borders. The LDP split from the DS




Metohija–the heart of Serbia (SRS), and Support Serbia (DSS-NSS). The Socialists (SPS) used
the slogan of Rise up Serbia, alluding to Serbia’s national revival.
The significance of a national political debate with fixed positions on Serbia’s European
integration was probably most clearly evident in the 2008 parliamentary elections, as at the
next parliamentary elections, support for this process was more diffused among old and new
political players. Apart from the economic aspects of Serbia’s cooperation with Europe,
Serbian political parties debated whether and how Serbia should continue negotiating with the
EU after Kosovo declared independence. EU foreign policy analyst, Karen E. Smith, observed
that the EU offered Serbia many incentives to boost Serbia’s pro-EU electoral camp despite
the Kosovo challenge. One of these ‘carrots’ included the EU’s offer on a revised European
Partnership in February and a promise to sign the SAA before the elections, although the
Netherlands previously blocked that proposal in mid-January preventing a common
approach.968
During the Slovenian Presidency of the EU, which had a pro-independence approach towards
the Kosovo issue, the EU had a unified position when the Council approved on 4 February
2008 the EU Special Representative and authorised EULEX’s deployment.969 EU members’
positions towards Kosovo appeared, however, disunited following the Kosovo Parliament’s
independence proclamation two weeks later as domestic considerations were ‘stronger than
any embarrassment’ that a divided EU foreign policy could bring.970 The lack of unity was
968 K.E., ‘Keys to facilitate the monitoring of the Spanish foreign policy and international relations in 2008’,
CIDOB Yearbook 2009, Barcelona, 2009, pp. 25–31; p. 26.
969 B. Berisha, ‘The role of EU in peace building and peace mediation in Kosovo’, 10 February 2014,
Politiikasta, http://politiikasta.fi/artikkeli/role-eu-peace-building-and-peace-mediation-kosovo, (accessed 1
March 2014).
970 Smith, ‘Keys to facilitate the monitoring of the Spanish foreign policy and international relations in 2008’,
op. cit.
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evident in the Spanish Government breaking ranks with other EU members. The Spanish
leaders insisted that the EULEX should proceed only with explicit consent from the UN
Security Council.971
One day before the Kosovo Parliament proclaimed independence, the Kosovo Ministry within
the Serbian Government conducted an opinion poll to examine public attitudes to the Kosovo
issue and European integration. The results showed that 67 per cent of the respondents believed
that Serbia should join the EU, while 74 per cent ‘would not trade EU integration for the
recognition of Kosovo independence’.972 Two-thirds also opposed Serbia’s membership of
NATO, and 60 per cent wanted Serbia to strengthen ties with Russia.973 The moves which
Serbia undertook towards developing a closer relationship with Russia had become a normative
challenge to Serbia’s European integration, as political discourses were re-created and
advanced about the necessity for Serbia to align its foreign policy with Russia at the expense
of European integration.974
Serbia regarded Kosovo’s independence declaration on 17 February 2008 as a violation of
UNSCR 1244, the Helsinki Act and the Serbian Constitution. The independence declaration
stated that Kosovo was a special case, but not a model for other regions.975 This element was
971 To obtain consent was initially difficult because of Russia’s support for Serbian opposition to any changes to
its constitutional and territorial borders. S. Sebastián, ‘Serbia’s parliamentary elections: domestic and regional
dilemmas’, FRIDE Comment, April 2008, London School of Economics, p. 9,
www.fride.org/download/COM_Serbia_Elections_ENG_abr08.pdf (accessed 16 May 2013).
972 B92, ‘Serbians want both Kosovo and EU’, 29 February 2008,
http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2008&mm=02&dd=29&nav_id=48080 (accessed 12 April
2013).
973 ibid.
974 Both Koštunica and Tadić supported Serbia’s energy deal with Russia, under which the majority stake (51
per cent) of the Serbian state-owned oil company, NIS, was sold, under market value, for €400 million to a
Russian company (Gazprom). This transaction was part of a wider agreement between the Serbian and Russian
officials for Russia’s supply of oil and gas to Serbia. Gazprom took over its stake in NIS in February 2009,
agreeing to absorb Serbia’s accumulated debt from previous Russian energy sales to Serbia.
975 The declaration was supported by all present Kosovo Albanian parliamentarians, but Serbian representatives
in the Kosovo Parliament boycotted the official delivery of the declaration by being absent from the chamber.
311
probably emphasised to reassure some EU members, which had concerns about the potential
impact on separatist groups in their countries of Kosovo’s self-determination.976 The issue of
secession was of particular concern to Spain, Italy, France, Romania and Slovakia. The
declaration, furthermore, underlined the intention by the Kosovo authorities ‘to take all steps
necessary to facilitate full membership in the EU’, and to implement the reforms required for
‘Euro-Atlantic integration’, which referred to the NATO membership.977 It stressed Kosovo’s
‘deep historical, commercial and social ties with Serbia’, and called for more reconciliation
between ‘our people’, which was in line with the EU’s approach of facilitating good
neighbourly relations of different ethnic communities in the Western Balkans.978Kosovo’s new
flag was also adopted with colours blue and yellow symbolising its aim of belonging to the EU.
On 18 February 2008, the EU adopted a new European Partnership program for Serbia, which
included Kosovo under UNSCR 1244. This was a signal of its support for the continuation of
Serbia’s European integration process, although by including Kosovo in this program—one
day after its proclamation of independence—it showed that EU members were divided over
how best to accommodate Serbia’s opposition to Kosovo’s independence.979 The timing of this
decision led many Serbs to believe that the EU was offering closer relations to Serbia in
exchange for its permissive attitude towards Kosovo. The EU also declared that a separate
program was being prepared for Kosovo, without specifically mentioning the Serbian
976 Despite this appeal, pro-Russian groups in Georgia invoked Kosovo’s secession as a precedent by which they
sought independence from Georgia in international forums. A parallel to Kosovo’s case was in 2014 made by
pro-Russian groups seeking independence of Crimea in Ukraine. L. Kardaku, ‘EU rejects Crimea-Kosovo
comparisons’, Southeast European Times, 14 March 2014,
http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2014/03/14/feature-01,
(accessed 16 March 2014).
977 BBC, ‘Full text: Kosovo declaration’, 27 February 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7249677.stm,
(accessed 12 July 2013).
978 ibid.
979 Had all EU members been in agreement regarding Kosovo’s independence proclamation, Kosovo would
probably not have been included in a partnership program with Serbia. This could have been a strategy of
appeasing the Serbian Government in order to encourage Serbian leaders to continue with European integration.
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Government’s role in this process.980 In the funding schemes, Kosovo was also being treated
as a separate entity.981
As key EU institutions, including the European Commission, sought to reconcile the fact that
the EU did not have a unified stance on Kosovo’s independence, the tension surrounding this
issue was still evident in the language that the EU was using. On the one hand, in official
communication with Serbia, the EU indicated that it acknowledged Serbia’s position by
including the part ‘Serbia with Kosovo under UNSCR 1244’. On the other hand, it financially
aided the functioning of independent Kosovo institutions alongside other donors (UN, US, and
NATO). The security situation in Kosovo was monitored by both NATO and the United
Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), which was preparing to work
alongside the EULEX mission once it became operational.
Many Serbian political parties, including the DSS, regarded the EU’s position as a double
standard. However, since the majority of the Council’s membership supported the EULEX
mission, this policy stance had contributed to a diminution in trust between the EU and major
Serbian political parties. Political tensions regarding Kosovo’s status had become a major
challenge for Serbia’s closer dialogue with the EU. With its opposition to Kosovo’s
980 Partnerships are ‘flexible instruments, designed to reflect the progress made by the countries concerned’. The
implementation of policy goals set out in the Partnership is observed through the SAP framework, ‘particularly
through the Commission’s annual progress report’. Europa, ‘European Partnership with Serbia, including
Kosovo’, 21 May 2008, http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/enlargement/western_balkans/r18015_en.htm,
(accessed 12 April 2013).
981 The EU stated: ‘At the end of the Multiannual Indicative Financial Framework (MIFF) for 2009–2011
(including 2007 and 2008) Serbia and Kosovo will have been allocated €976.8 million and €395.1 million
respectively. Under the CARDS program from 2000 to 2006, financial assistance to Serbia and Kosovo,
including Montenegro, totalled €2.6 billion’, ibid. Despite the availability of different funding programs for
Serbia, Igor Novaković, President of Palilula shire in Southern Serbian town of Niš, said that the lack of
flexibility in the EU program guidelines, and the lack of local expertise outside Belgrade with how to master
some very complicated applications for EU grants, made it very difficult for many Serbian NGOs and
institutions to be successful in obtaining EU support. His shire, for instance, benefited more from Bulgaria’s
cross border programs than from the direct EU’s funding allocations for Serbia. Interview with Igor Novaković,
Niš, January 2012.
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independence proclamation and violent protests in Belgrade, Serbia risked being seen again as
an outsider in Europe.
On a normative level of political discourses in Serbia, Western support for the new political
order in Priština was cited as the reason why Serbia must seek closer alliance with Russia.
Kosovo’s independence proclamation facilitated the rise of extreme right groups in Serbia,
which opposed Kosovo’s independence, including by violent means. In publicly staged and
extensively promoted protests (especially through social media) right-wing groups (including
ultra-nationalist groups such as Naši, Ponos and 1389) attacked ‘European values’ which they
believed threatened Serbia’s alliance with Russia and its traditional way of life.982 They sought
to marginalise pro-EU voices in Serbian society by publicly condemning ‘foreign-financed’
NGOs. They also put pressure on the Serbian Government to keep financing the so-called
parallel institutions in Kosovo, especially in the North where Serbs were in the majority.983 The
groups that oppose EU accession often see civil society structures and critical media reporting
as an act of intrusion by foreign governments.984 Instead of neutrality, these groups openly
demand that Serbia pursues closer relations with Russia, which was seen as a protector of
Serbian interest in international forums.985 Socially and politically constructed discourses
982 Right-wing groups regard Serbian national identity through the normative lenses of patriotism, Orthodox
Christianity and family structure. According to Castells, ‘patriarchy requires compulsory heterosexuality’,
which was true for these groups that accused the EU of ‘importing gay rights to Serbia’, of financing NGOs that
they considered to be anti-patriotic and thus illegitimate, and seeking to change Serbian society. Castells, The
power of identity, 2010, op. cit., p. 261. Many of the values which these groups advocated, however, were
imagined rather than real, because life in Serbia’s urbal areas was modern rather than traditional.
983 During the next Serbian Government, parallel institutions became a major point of disagreement between
Serbia and the EU in relation to the Kosovo issue, which was, during the period under investigation, the key
thorn in the relationship apart from cooperation with the ICTY between EU and Serbia.
984 B. Barlovac, ‘Serbia's far right wants NGOs labelled as “Foreign Agents”’, Balkan Insight, 7 December
2012, http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/serbia-s-rightists-call-for-labelling-ngos-traitors, (accessed 3
March 2014).
985 Radio-Televizija Srbije, ‘Dveri: Okrenuti leđa Evropskoj uniji’, 9 April 2013,
http://www.rts.rs/page/stories/sr/story/9/Politika/1301780/Dveri per cent3A+Okrenuti+le per centC4 per
cent91a+Evropskoj+uniji.html, (accessed 1 May 2013). ITAR-TASS News agency, ‘Russia, Serbia sign
strategic partnership declaration’, 24 May 2012, http://en.itar-tass.com/archive/693905, (accessed 1 April 2014).
The Serbian Government signed a‘strategic partnership’ agreement with Russia in May 2012 under the pro-EU
SNS-SPS coalition, whose policies on European integration will be discussed in the next chapter.
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which emphasised amity between Serbs and Russians served to legitimise these groups’
opposition to Serbia’s membership in the EU.
Serbia’s right-wing groups tend to be affiliated with soccer team fan clubs. Serbian
commentator Ivan Čolović described them as armed ‘hooligans’, who are extremely violent,
and use symbols such as hand grenades, skulls, crosses (with the addition of their preferred
soccer club emblem), and nationalist emblems, including pictures of Serbian medieval
martyrs.986 In this way, not only major political parties but also minor fringe groups seek to
alter public opinion about Serbia’s strategic choices, which demonstrates the extent to which
the Kosovo issue influences socio-political cleavages in modern-day Serbia.
A collective memory element embodied in discussions over Kosovo emerged at the forefront
of Serbian political debates ahead of the major elections, which the EU sought to remedy by
providing further incentives, such as agreeing to offer a SAA agreement to Serbia under special
conditions. Although numerically a small minority, the significance of right-wing elements in
the Serbian electorate became even greater during the course of the next government. Their
organised attacks on a gay rights march in Belgrade in 2010 revived images of the Western
Balkans as a violent region, and Serbia in particular as a nationalistic and intolerant country.
Before the march, the EU’s head of mission to Serbia, Vincent Degert, said: ‘We are here to
celebrate the values of tolerance, freedom of expression and assembly’.987 The violent protests
did not have a positive effect on Serbia’s reputation in the EU and the West more generally.
986 I. Čolović, ‘Navijači: huligani i novi fašizam’, Peščanik, 13 September 2012,
http://pescanik.net/2012/09/navijaci-huligani-i-novi-fasizam/, (accessed 12 April 2013).
987 M. Lowen, ‘Scores arrested in Belgrade after anti-gay riot’, 10 October 2010,
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-11507253, (accessed 13 December 2013).
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Serbia’s new coalition government and the Radical Party split
The Belgrade-based Centre for Free Elections and Democracy (CeSID) predicted that the SRS,
an anti-EU party, would obtain the largest number of seats on a single party preferred basis.988
This prediction was not surprising given the overall public mood in Serbia following Kosovo’s
independence proclamation. The tenacious popularity of the SRS provided additional
motivation for EU foreign ministers to informally meet in Slovenia to overcome political
hurdles before the conclusion of a major political agreement with Serbia could take place. Ian
Bancroft aptly commented:
In engineering the signing of a stabilisation and association agreement (SAA), the EU
has attempted to influence the outcome in favour of the more pro-European parties.989
It was probably a strategy of political communication which aimed to influence the electoral
mood in Serbia by motivating the voters to take part in the elections.
The EU’s mobilisation strategy possibly contributed to the highest voter turnout in Serbian
2008 elections since 2000, for both the presidential (68.1 per cent in the run-off vote) and
parliamentary (61.35 per cent) elections. However, analysts observed weaknesses in the EU’s
strategy about how to bring Serbia closer to the EU without undermining the conditionality
framework, problems of credibility given the growing enlargement fatigue in the EU, and
confusion among EU officials about how to deal with the Serbia-Kosovo dispute.990
988 B92, ‘CeSID: SRS looking set for victory’, 24 April 2008,
http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2008&mm=04&dd=24&nav_id=49718, (accessed 12 April
2013).
989 I. Bancroft, ‘Unintended consequences’, 10 May 2008,
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2008/may/09/unintendedconsequences, (accessed 12 April 2013).
990 Sebastián, ‘Serbia’s parliamentary elections: domestic and regional dilemmas’, 2008, op. cit., p. 6.
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On 29 April 2008 in Luxembourg, Serbia and the EU signed the SAA as well as an Interim
Trade Agreement. 991 The then Serbian Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremić described it as ‘a historic
day’ for Serbia-EU relations.992 The EU, however, adopted the decision not to implement the
ratification phase of the agreement until Serbia improved cooperation with the ICTY, which
could only happen only after parliamentary elections and under Serbia’s new leadership. While
it represented a fulfilment of democratic Serbia’s key foreign policy goal, the pre-membership
agreement embodied in the SAA deepened the rift among the democrats. The deal was signed
by the Serbian Deputy Prime Minister from the DS, Božidar Đelić, and the EU Enlargement
Commissioner in the presence of representatives from 27 member states and Serbian President
Tadić. The fact that only DS representatives were present on the occasion of the agreement’s
signing indicated that the agreement did not have a broad-ranging consensus among Serbian
democrats at that time, which furthermore demonstrated that Serbia’s European integration was
a source of domestic political instability.
The DSS regarded the signing by the Serbian side as an anti-state act, and Koštunica proclaimed
that Đelić’s signature ‘amounts to treason’.993 The DSS bloc and the Radicals (SRS) also
painted the agreement with the EU as undermining Serbia’s sovereignty and statehood rights
guaranteed under international law. In line with its previously stated anti-EU policy, the
Radicals opposed any agreement with the EU. Leader of the socialists, Ivica Dačić, did not
show prior to the elections a clear predilection for policy in this direction. However, his choice
991 European Commission, Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and
their member states, of the one part, and the Republic of Serbia, of the other part,
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/serbia/key_document/saa_en.pdf (accessed 1 April 2013).
992 V.P. Zimonjić, ‘Serbia: agreement with EU deepens rift’, IPS News, 2 May 2008,
http://www.ipsnews.net/2008/05/serbia-agreement-with-eu-deepens-rift/, (accessed 27 April 2013).
993 ibid.
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to enter into a coalition with the DS was a signal that the SPS opted for Serbia’s future in the
EU.
In 2008, the World Bank estimated that Serbia and Montenegro hosted some 600,000 refugees
and internally displaced, from Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo.994 Large refugee
communities were an electoral factor influencing Serbia’s mainstream political discourses, as
well as domestic perceptions about the former Yugoslav republics that were once wartime
foes.995
Chart 4: Serbian parliamentary elections, 11 May 2008
Serbia’s early parliamentary elections held on 11 May 2008 were contested by 22 entities.996
The DS argued for continuation of dialogue with the EU, alongside the LDP and the G17+,
while the SRS and the DSS-NS coalition vehemently opposed it, presenting it as a loss of
sovereignty, national pride and historical territory. Of the major political parties, the SRS won
994 World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples, ‘Country report: Serbia and Montenegro’, July 2008,
http://www.minorityrights.org/4028/serbia/serbia-overview.html, (accessed 1 March 2014).
995 The electoral influence of Serbian communities from other former Yugoslav republics in the elections in
Serbia is a separate research topic, and will not be discussed here in any further detail.



























78 seats (only three less than in 2007), the DS coalition 102, the DSS-NS bloc won 30
(seventeen less than in 2007), and the SPS-led bloc 20 (four more than in 2007), while the LDP
bloc won 13 seats (two more than in 2007).997 While recognising that the elections broadly
adhered to the international standards for democratic elections, an OSCE report observed that
an area of particular concern included the disproportionate control of political parties over the
parliamentary mandates of their candidates.998 This effectively meant that political parties
would choose after the elections which candidates on the party ticket should obtain mandates,
thus potentially undermining the transparency of the democratic system.
The ideological split over Serbia’s continued European integration caused intra-party
transformation among traditionally anti-EU parties. It split the radicals (SRS) into two separate
entities after the elections, with the deputy leader of SRS (Tomislav Nikolić) adopting a more
conciliatory tone towards negotiating with the EU. His positive approach to the EU earned him
an expulsion from the SRS. In October 2008, Nikolić and his followers registered a new
political party, the Serbian Progressive Party (Srpska Napredna Stranka, SNS), which drew in
members of other political parties, in particular the pro-monarchist SPO.999 Many prominent
party members defected to the Progressives from the Radicals, which seriously weakened the
influence of the Radical Party in the Serbian National Assembly.1000 Serbia’s leading political
analyst, Predrag Simić, has commented that the DS supported the formation of the SNS because
997 Of the major coalition partners within For a European Serbia bloc, the DS won 64 seats (no change) and the
G17+ won 24 seats (five more than in 2007). Republika Srbija, Republička Izborna Komisija, ‘Izveštaj o
ukupnim rezultatima izbora za narodne poslanike Narodne Skupštine Republike Srbije‘,
http://www.rik.parlament.gov.rs/cirilica/propisi_frames.htm (accessed 1 March 2014).
998 OSCE, ‘Republic of Serbia: Early parliamentary elections 11 May 2008’, OSCE/ODIHR Limited election
observation mission final report, Warsaw, 29 August 2008,
www.osce.org/odihr/elections/serbia/33212?download=true, (accessed 1 March 2014).
999 Interview with the EU officials (A. Cammarata and T. Gnocchi), January 2010, Belgrade.
1000 The SRS could not pass the required threshold in the Serbian 2012 parliamentary elections, whereas the SNS
gained 73 seats, which was only 5 less than SRS gained in 2008 elections. This demonstrated the ability to
command popular support by former SRS party members, Tomislav Nikolić (current Serbian President) and
Aleksandar Vučić (current Prime Minister of Serbia).
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the DS leader Tadić supported the idea of forming a two-party system for Serbia.1001 The EU
also supported the emergence of the SNS.1002 The question of Serbia’s European integration
thus had a transformative effect on Serbian domestic politics, with the previously strong SRS
support base diminishing due to the SNS’s emergence as a new political player. This was also
a tribute to the EU’s enhanced diplomatic capacities, as its soft power of attraction managed to
weaken what was previously Serbia’s single largest opposition group, the SRS. It also
illustrates their pragmatic readiness to engage with ruling parties holding reservations about
the EU in the hope of shifting their orientation.
The new government brought together the DS, the SPS and several minor parties, pledging to
continue working with the EU while committing to finding a diplomatic solution to the Kosovo
question. The Serbian National Assembly elected a non-partisan but DS-endorsed candidate,
Mirko Cvetković, as Prime Minister on 7 July 2008.1003 Ivica Dačić from the SPS became a
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Internal Affairs, while Jovan Krkobabić from the
minority PUPS party also became a Deputy Prime Minister. Amongst other functions, the DS
gained the key ministries, including Foreign Affairs, Defence, Finance, Justice, Kosovo-
Metohija, and Agriculture. The G17+ took over the Ministry of Economy and Regional
Development. The SPS took over ministries of Infrastructure, Energy and Mining, and
Education, while representatives from three minor coalition partners took over several
1001 P. Simić, ‘Serbia: continuity and change after 2012 elections’, International Relations Quarterly, vol. 4, no.
1, spring 2013, p. 8; http://www.southeast-europe.org/pdf/13/dke_13_a_dk_Predrag-Simic_Serbia-2012.pdf,
(accessed 1 March 2014). This DS strategy eventually backfired when Nikolić used this excuse to justify his
decision not to form a coalition with the DS in the lead-up to the 2012 parliamentary election. Tanjug,
‘Opposition leader advocates two-party system’, 21 April 2012, B92,
http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2012&mm=04&dd=21&nav_id=79890, (accessed 1 March
2014).
1002 Interviews with EU diplomats, Belgrade, 2011.
1003Mirko Cvetković was the longest-serving Serbian prime minister since the regime change in 2000, who entered
politics as an independent, DS-backed candidate with international development expertise.
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ministerial positions.1004 The small number of positions for SPS party officials became a
possible cause of resentment for the SPS leader, who was regarded as the key power-broker in
the formation of government. His decision to enter into a coalition government with Tadić was
seen as reflecting his determination to reinvent his political party as a mainstream centre-left
social democratic party, which can share power with other democratic parties.1005
Serbia’s internal politics and EU-Serbia relations
During the DS-SPS government, there was progress in the relationship with the EU, although
some believe that the progress was too slow for a government that had won on a pro-EU
platform. The Kosovo issue continued to preoccupy Serbia’s international diplomacy, which
ran against the principle of solidarity with the EU’s agreed positions that potential candidates
are expected to display. This resulted in reduced support for the governing coalition, especially
for the DS, which was responsible for many unpopular changes in its ministerial area of
responsibility.1006 One of the first acts of the new Government was to arrest on 22 July 2008 a
key ICTY indictee at large, Radovan Karadžić, who was at the time living and working in
Belgrade in disguise and under an assumed name. The Guardian reported that the arrest came
after a tip-off from an unnamed foreign intelligence agency, which indicated that a higher level
of trust had developed between Serbia and its foreign partners.1007 Reactions in the EU to his
arrest and swift extradition to the ICTY were overwhelmingly positive, with the European
1004 In 2011, a Cabinet reshuffle resulted in the removal of several ministers, but the allocated ministries were
largely retained among Coalition partners. Two major changes were that the Serbian Prime Minister also
became the Minister of Finance, and G17+ gained a Deputy Prime Ministerial post.
1005 W.C. Thompson, Nordic, Central, and Southeastern Europe 2013, The World Today Series, 13th edn,
Lanham, Stryker-Post publications, 2013, p. 444.
1006 The appointment of DS party members in senior management roles across the Serbian public sector had
been severely criticised by both local and international observers, with the government accused of nepotism and
corruption. However, nepotism in employment did not diminish under the SNS-SPS Serbian Government.
‘Nepotizam u Srbiji’, Al-jazeera Balkan, 9 June 2013, http://balkans.aljazeera.net/vijesti/nepotizam-u-srbiji,
(accessed 3 March 2014).
1007 J. Borger, ‘Radovan Karadžić, Europe’s most wanted man, arrested for war crimes’, The Guardian, 22 July
2008, www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jul/22/warcrimes.internationalcrime, (accessed 12 April 2013).
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Commission’s President Barroso stating that the arrest was ‘very important for Serbia’s
European aspirations’.1008 With this act, the DS-SPS coalition demonstrated its commitment to
develop better working relationship with the ICTY and by doing so, came closer to fulfilling
its ambition to integrate Serbia deeper with the EU.
Three interviewees from the European Commission’s delegation in Belgrade all noted that the
high-profile arrests of ICTY indictees by the DS-SPS ruling coalition and the domestic trials
of lower ranking officials restored the EU’s confidence in the Serbian Government’s
willingness to proceed down its European integration path. However, two of the three also
remarked that this was not enough to convince more sceptical voices in the EU regarding
Serbia’s willingness to fulfil political conditionality. An equally important test was, in their
view, Serbia’s approach to the Kosovo issue after its independence, in particular to the north
where Serbia supported parallel institutions but did not have an autonomous oversight over the
border with Kosovo.1009
In September 2008, Serbia held several rounds of high-level discussions in Brussels, Paris and
Berlin on the future of its relations with the EU.1010 After numerous political deliberations
within the UN framework on the Kosovo question, the Serbian Government adopted a decision
in December 2008 to support the EULEX deployment. After the Serbian National Assembly
ratified the SAA agreement the Serbian Government decided to voluntarily initiate the
implementation of the interim trade agreement in January 2009. This action involved a gradual
1008 ibid.
1009 Interviews with the European Commission Officials in Belgrade, 2011 (see Appendix 2). The lack of
adequate border management later became a focus of the EU’s political conditionality towards Serbia due to a
rising asylum-seeker problem in which Serbia was the transit country for illegal migration into the EU.




liberalisation schedule (over six years) to assist Serbian industrial and agricultural producers
prepare for trade competition from the EU.1011
Serbia’s national allocation under IPA funding for 2009 was €194.8 million, which represented
a slight increase from the previous year when Serbia received €190.9 million.1012 Due to the
economic crisis, Serbia received exceptional budgetary support of €100 million and also
benefited from an IPA crisis package for the Western Balkans.1013 In addition, Serbian
participation in several cultural, employment, customs and research programs was also co-
financed by the EU. The EU praised Serbia’s Law on Political Parties of May 2009, which
made stricter rules for registration and would reduce the number of parties that were only
created for taxation and other non-political purposes.1014
In July 2009, the European Commission recommended lifting the visa obligation for Serbian
citizens, subject to ‘Serbia meeting the outstanding criteria before the Council of the EU takes
its decision, after consultation of the European Parliament’.1015 In September 2009, Serbia and
EULEX signed a protocol on police cooperation. The European Commission’s annual progress
report for Serbia noted:
1011 Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Serbia, ‘Serbia–EU trade liberalisation’,
www.europa.rs/en/srbija-i-evropska-unija/eu-serbia-trade.html, (accessed 1 November 2013).
1012 European Commission, ‘Serbia: 2008 progress report’, op. cit., p. 6; European Commission, ‘Serbia: 2009
progress report’, Brussels, 14 October 2009, p. 6,
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2009/sr_rapport_2009_en.pdf, (accessed 1 May 2013).
Serbia also benefited from so-called multi-beneficiary programs, such as cross-border cooperation programs
with neighbouring countries, and civil society development programs under the European Initiative for
Democratisation and Human Rights.
1013 European Commission, ‘Serbia: 2009 progress report’, op. cit., pp. 6–7.
1014 ibid., p. 7.
1015 ibid., p. 5.
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As a potential candidate for EU membership, Serbia aligned itself with 93 Common
Foreign and Security Policy declarations from a total of 128 relevant declarations
adopted by the EU during the reporting period.1016
This type of assessment of Serbia’s alignment with EU policies, which was not present in the
previous report, meant that the EU had started to take note of Serbia’s actual alignment with
the EU’s common foreign policy declarations in international forums. However, Serbia’s
historical relationship with Russia was certainly of interest to many in the EU. During his visit
to the European Parliament in early November 2009, Serbian Foreign Minister, Vuk Jeremić,
confirmed that link:
As for Russia, we have a historical relation which goes back centuries. We have the
same alphabet, we share the same faith. We are culturally very close, we have been
partners and allies in world conflicts and today Russia is also an important supporter
when it comes to our diplomatic efforts to defend our territory and sovereignty. … And
I think one day when Serbia joins the EU, Serbia can help improve the understanding
between Russia and the EU.1017
Serbian politicians, therefore, stressed their country’s uniqueness by referring to its political
relationship with Russia, which received a further boost during the DS-SPS Government in the
energy sector, and in trade.1018
1016 European Commission, ‘Serbia: 2009 progress report’, op. cit.
1017 European Parliament, ‘Serbia’s Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremić pledges EU future for Belgrade’, 9 November
2009, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?language=EN&type=IM-
PRESS&reference=20091106STO63894, (accessed 12 April 2013).
1018 In April 2009, Serbia extended free trade agreement with Russia. In July 2011, Serbia completed a
harmonisation of trade with the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. Vojvodina Investment
Promotion, ‘Free trade agreements’, http://www.vip.org.rs/Free_Trade_Agreements, (accessed 1 May 2013).
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On 30 November 2009, the Council of the EU published a document on visa liberalisation for
selected Western Balkan countries, which was the legal basis for visa liberalisation with Serbia.
The Council made this decision despite fears among some member states about the potential
for an influx of asylum seekers from these countries into the EU. On 19 December 2009 (the
revered St Nicholas Day in Serbia) the EU lifted its visa requirement for Serbs travelling for
three months or less to Schengen area countries (EU-27 without Ireland and the UK). During
the last fortnight of the Swedish Presidency of the EU, Serbia formally applied for EU
membership on 22 December 2009. In February 2010, the Interim Agreement on Trade-related
matters entered into force, following the Council’s recommendation of 7 December 2009
advising the Commission to start preparations for the entry into force of this agreement.
Political debates over Srebrenica
On 31 March 2010, the Serbian Parliament adopted a landmark motion on Srebrenica after
thirteen hours of debate, which demonstrated the divisiveness of this issue among Serbian
political parties.1019 The DS initiated public debate on Srebrenica in January 2010, which
bitterly divided Serbian political parties, including the democrats, because it put the spotlight
on Serbia’s role in one of the most brutal episodes of violence during the 1990s.1020 The
importance of bringing about a resolution on this issue was regarded as the first step in Serbia’s
official recognition of past crimes committed by Serbs during the Bosnian war. It was also
1019 The declaration passed a required majority of 125 votes with 127 votes for and 21 against, out of 173 MPs
present. BBC, ‘Serbian MPs offer apology for Srebrenica massacre’, 31 March 2010,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8594625.stm, (accessed 1 May 2013).
1020 ‘Srebrenica deli srpski parlament’, Politika, 12 January 2010,
http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/Politika/Srebrenica-deli-srpski-parlament.lt.html (accessed 12 April 2013).
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important for ‘regaining a positive reputation and credibility abroad’.1021 As one researcher
observed:
Srebrenica not only became a symbol, but also a veritable buzzword that stirred up and
polarized the Serbian population.1022
The public and political parties were divided on the proposed motion, which would condemn
crimes committed against Bosnian Muslim men and boys in Srebrenica in July 1995. As a
leading civil society organisation in Serbia, the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights,
observed in February 2010:
The dilemma still remains in Serbia’s predominant political and intellectual circles
antagonizing the West and Europe. Playing on its huge influence on the public sphere
and the support from a considerable part of the media, this conservative bloc insists on
the country’s geostrategic orientation that does not imply the stance about Europe
without an alternative.1023
The SRS and the DSS proposed an alternative view of Serbia’s foreign policy, believing that
Serbia’s future should not lie with the EU but in regional political neutrality, closer relations
with Russia and economic self-sufficiency. The most serious divisions on Srebrenica among
political parties emerged between the DSS and the coalition government, while several other
opposition parties, including the SNS, argued that crimes against Serbs should have been
1021 D. Mehler, ‘Understanding normative gaps in transitional justice: the Serbian discourse on the Srebrenica
Declaration 2010’, Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe, vol. 11, no. 4, 2012, p. 145.
1022 ibid., p. 131.
1023 Helsinki Committee for Human Rights, ‘Serbia and the World in 2009: still standing at a crucial juncture’,
Helsinki Bulletin, no. 60, 2010, http://www.helsinki.org.rs/doc/HB-No60.pdf, (accessed 1 November 2013).
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condemned in the same document.1024 Although the declaration described the killings of
Bosniaks as a massacre rather than as genocide; its adoption was regarded as an important step
in regional reconciliation and a positive sign for Serbia’s EU accession.1025 Serbian civil society
groups, including the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights, cautioned that Serbia’s
commitment would be fully demonstrated with the arrests of the remaining indictees.1026
Professor Slobodan Samardžić from the DSS condemned the Srebrenica declaration, which, in
his view, singled out Serbian crimes rather than condemning all crimes committed by all sides
in the former Yugoslavia.1027 Branko Ružić from the SPS observed that Serbia had with this
resolution finally become a ‘transformed nation’.1028 This was, overall, a bold step in regional
reconciliation efforts, which was recognised as such by many EU members. Domestically, the
DS started to be seen as putting European integration at the forefront of public debate to avoid
discussions about pressing economic issues, including declining living standards in Serbia and
increasing poverty.1029
On 14 June 2010, the Council decided to start the SAA ratification process with Serbia, which
effectively unblocked Serbia’s road towards EU accession. The ICJ’s decision of July 2010,
which stated that Kosovo’s independence proclamation was not in contradiction of
international law, further weakened the Serbian Government’s position on the Kosovo issue in






1028 ibid. In 2009 and 2010, Serbia’s Deputy PM, Ivica Dačić from the SPS, received awards for his commitment
to Serbia’s European integration, which was another sign that Milošević’s former party (SPS) was transformed.
In August 2013, Ružić assumed the function of ‘Minister without Portfolio’, who was in charge of Serbia’s
European integration.
1029 J. Cerovina and B. Baković, ‘Evropske integracije–privilegija vlasti’, 4 January 2010,
http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/Politika/Evropske-integracije-privilegija-vlasti.lt.html, (accessed 1 November
2013).
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international forums, despite Russia’s support.1030 Although the ICJ opinion was not binding,
supporters of Kosovo’s independence believed this decision was a historic opportunity for
Serbia and Kosovo to establish bilateral relations, and ‘unblock their paths to greater European
Union integration’.1031 The President of Kosovo hailed the ICJ’s opinion, using the opportunity
of that occasion to thank ‘the US, the EU and all other democratic countries’ that played a
‘unique role in assisting Kosovo’.1032
On 19 January 2011, the European Parliament ratified the SAA, which meant that it was up to
individual EU members to ratify the agreement before it could enter into force.1033 On 31
January 2011, Serbia replied to the European Commission’s complex questionnaire. The arrest
of Ratko Mladić on 26 May 2011 was a clear sign that Serbia was committed to fulfilling the
ICTY conditionality. On 12 October 2011, the European Commissioned granted Serbia official
candidate status based on one key priority—further progress in the development of relations
with Priština. Upon fulfilment of this priority, the European Council confirmed Serbia as a
candidate country on 1 March 2012. However, this positive outcome in EU-Serbia relations
was not enough to keep the DS-SPS Coalition in power, as the results of the 2012 presidential
and parliamentary elections would show.1034
1030 International Court of Justice, ‘Accordance with international law of the unilateral declaration of
independence in respect of Kosovo (Request for Advisory Opinion)’, 22 July 2010, http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=4&case=141&p3=4, (accessed 1 November 2013).
1031 International Crisis Group, ‘Kosovo and Serbia after the ICJ Opinion’, Europe Report, no. 206, 26 August
2010,
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/206%20Kosovo%20and%20Serbia%20after%20the%20ICJ%
20Opinion-1.pdf, (accessed 1 November 2013).
1032 The Kosovo Presidency website, ‘Izjava Predsednika Sejdiu nakon objavljivanja savetodavnog mišljenja
Medjunarodnog Suda Pravde, o legitimnosti proglašenja nezavisnosti Kosova’, 22 July 2010,
http://www.president-ksgov.net/?page=3,6,1256, (accessed 1 November 2013).
1033 The DS-SPS Government was not in power when the SAA finally entered into force, after the last
ratification by Lithuania occurred on 18 June 2013.
1034 The election outcome will be explained in the next and final chapter of this thesis.
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Public opinion polls in Serbia and the EU
While public opinion polling in Serbia, especially in terms of attitudes towards the rest of the
world, is a relatively new phenomenon, the EU has on the contrary conducted its
Eurobarometer surveys of attitudes since 1973. Selected in-depth public opinion surveys from
2009 and 2010, as well as another set of survey results from the Serbian European Integration
Office (SEIO) have demonstrated the changing attitudes of people in Serbia towards the EU,
from large support to below-majority support levels.1035One shortcoming of the Eurobarometer
reports is that only a few reports have specifically dealt with individual EU membership
applicants. One shortcoming of the Gallup reports is that full data sets are not publicly
available, and subsequent surveys have not always covered the same span of options when
asking the questions.1036
Public opinion surveys in Serbia
The results of a Serbian public opinion poll show that public support for Serbia’s EU accession
dropped considerably during the DS-SPS coalition government between mid-2008 and mid-
2012.1037 This was the case despite the diplomatic success of this pro-EU Serbian Government
in securing a place for Serbia on the white Schengen list, which meant that for the first time in
1035 This is particularly true for so-called Old member states (EU-15) where public opposition to further
enlargement and/or Serbia’s accession in particular is high, as will be shown later in this chapter with data from
the Eurobarometer reports.
1036 Unline the 2010 report, the 2009 Balkan Gallup report for Serbia did not have ‘military’ as an option under
‘institutions’ in which respondents were asked to rate their level of trust. This inconsistency makes it somewhat
more difficult to compare the results on a year-to-year basis. Furthermore, Balkan Gallup reports are available
for 2009 and 2010 only. The Gallup reports are an initiative of the European Fund for the Balkans, and are
available in the public domain and on selected themes only for the years of 2008–2010. ‘Reports: Balkan
Monitor’, Gallup, http://www.balkan-monitor.eu/index.php/reports, (accessed 1 March 2014).
1037 Since 2002, SEIO conducted bi-annual surveys of public opinion in Serbia with a question: ‘If a referendum
were to be organised tomorrow asking “Do you support the accession of your country to the EU”, how would
you respond’. Republic of Serbia, SEIO, http://www.seio.gov.rs/documents/national-documents.223.html,
(accessed 1 March 2014).
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nine years since Serbia’s regime change, Serbian citizens with biometric passports were able
to travel visa-free to Schengen countries for a specific duration of time. The DS-SPS
Government also successfully negotiated Serbia’s formal candidacy for EU membership in
2012. One clue to public sentiment can be found in the Gallup opinion polls, which were
conducted in Serbia in that period.
At the time of parliamentary elections in May 2008, the majority of Serbian citizens supported
Serbia’s European accession (67 per cent were for, 12 per cent against).1038 In June 2012, just
after Serbia’s parliamentary, presidential and local elections, support among the respondents
for Serbia’s EU membership fell below half (49 per cent), while one in four respondents (25
per cent) were against it, as per results from surveys presented on the next page.1039
1038 In May 2008, which was the month of the parliamentary elections in Serbia, 67 per cent of respondents said
they would vote were in favour of Serbia’s EU accession, while 12 per cent said they were against Serbia’s
membership of the EU. Republic of Serbia, ‘European orientation of the Serbian citizens: trends’, SEIO, June
2011, slide 3,
http://www.seio.gov.rs/upload/documents/nacionalna_dokumenta/istrazivanja_javnog_mnjenja/javno_mnjenje_j
un_2011.pdf, (accessed 8 May 2014).
1039 The graph shows public support for Serbia’s EU accession between 2008 and 2012. Data was taken from the
previously cited graph (ibid, slide 3) and Republic of Serbia, SEIO, ‘European orientation of the Serbian
citizens: trends’, December 2013, p. 4,
http://www.seio.gov.rs/upload/documents/nacionalna_dokumenta/istrazivanja_javnog_mnjenja/mnjenje_decem
bar_13.pdf, (accessed 8 May 2014).
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Chart 5: Public support for Serbia’s EU accession, 2008–20121040
Another report published by the Gallup in late 2009 found that most respondents were
pessimistic about the economic situation and the Serbian Government’s ‘general policy
direction’.1041 The report also found that the institutions respondents trusted most were
religious organisations (67 per cent).1042 It is for this reason, therefore, that discourses which
the Serbian Orthodox Church disseminates regarding the EU may influence the public opinion
in Serbia.1043 This was almost double the result for trust in national government (35 per cent),
1040 This chart was prepared by the author, as per the previous footnote.
1041 Gallup Balkan Monitor, ‘Voices of the Balkans: 2009 summary of findings’, 2009, pp. 16, 22,
http://www.balkan-monitor.eu/files/BalkanMonitor-2009_Summary_of_Findings.pdf, (accessed 30 November
2013).
1042 According to the World Factbook, 84.6 per cent of people in Serbia identify as ‘Serbian Orthodox’, 5 per
cent as Catholic, and 3.1 per cent as Muslim. CIA, ‘Serbia’, op. cit.
1043 The position of the Serbian Orthodox Church tends to be sceptical on the question of whether Serbia should
join the EU, especially in a scenario that the Serbian Government was put under pressure from some EU
members to recognise Kosovo as an independent state before it can join the EU. Individual positions of key
religious figures within the Church also may vary. Any criticism towards the Church regarding its conservative
stance on Serbia’s European integration is interpreted by the conservatives in the Serbian society as an attack on
Serbian ‘national identity’, understood in this view to be inseparable from Serbia’s Christian Orthodox
traditions. This normative debate extended into the realm of politics and religious minority rights, which are not
the subject of this thesis. For critical views regarding the Church’s alleged negative influence on Serbia’s
European integration process, see M. Matić, ‘Atak na evropsku budućnost Srbije’, E-novine.com, 3 June 2014,
http://www.e-novine.com/srbija/srbija-tema/104410-Atak-evropsku-budunost-Srbije.html (accessed 4 June
2014). M. Vukomanović, ‘O čemu crkva (ne)može da se pita’, Peščanik, 17 July 2005,
http://pescanik.net/2005/07/o-cemu-crkva-nemoze-da-se-pita/, (accessed 4 June 2014). For a positive view
regarding the Church’s influence on Serbia’s European integration, see G. Živković, ‘Evropska unija i
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which was trusted even less than EU institutions (40 per cent). The Serbian respondents were
most distrustful of NATO (15 per cent).1044 Many Serbs continue to view NATO in negative
light, supporting to the Serbian Government’s policy of military neutrality.1045 Some groups in
Serbia tend to associate membership of NATO with EU accession, citing that all new EU
members from Central and Eastern Europe first became NATO members before joining the
EU.1046 Therefore, when the Euro-Atlantic component of Serbia’s foreign and defence policy
is emphasised, Serbian public opinion appears to be less supportive of Serbia’s European
integration.
The results of the 2010 Balkan Monitor report showed a drop in Serbian public support for the
EU. Less than a majority of citizens (44 per cent) believed that the EU was a ‘good thing’ for
Serbia, which represents a decrease of 6 per cent from the previous year.1047 At the same time,
only 41 per cent of interviewed respondents believed that Serbia would be welcomed into the
EU. Respondents in Serbia in 2010 trusted the military the most (74 per cent), then religious
organisations (66 per cent), EU institutions (43 percent), the judicial system (38 per cent) and
the national government (35 per cent).1048
nacionalni identitet’, Pravoslavlje—Novine Srpske Patrijaršije, no. 1040, 15 July 2010,
http://pravoslavlje.spc.rs/broj/1040/tekst/evropska-unija-i-nacionalni-identitet/ (accessed 4 June 2014).
1044 Gallup Balkan Monitor, 2009, op. cit., p. 26. The DS-SPS Government improved Serbia’s relationship with
NATO. In October 2008, the Serbian Government signed an agreement on sharing classified information with
NATO and its partner countries. In 2009, Serbia agreed to an Individual Country Partnership with NATO, which
is an agreement aimed at outlining different ways for developing closer relations between NATO and Serbia For
an overview of Serbia-NATO relations, see M. Nič and J. Cingel, ‘Serbia’s relations with NATO: the other
(quieter) game in town’, 10 January 2014, http://www.cepolicy.org/publications/serbias-relations-nato-other-
quieter-game-town, (accessed 2 May 2014).
1045 For a broader discussion about Serbia’s neutrality concept in the 21st century, see I.S. Novaković (ed.),
‘Neutralnost u 21. veku: pouke za Srbiju’, Zbornik radova, International and Security Affairs Centre, Belgrade,
September 2013.
1046 Anti-EU groups in Serbia, including the right-wing Dveri Srpske political party and the conservative DSS
are quick to emphasise the connection between European integration and NATO membership, although the
latter has never been listed among political conditionality requirements during previous rounds of EU
enlargement.
1047 Gallup Balkan Monitor, ‘Voices of the Balkans: 2010 summary of findings’, 2010, p. 7, http://www.balkan-
monitor.eu/files/BalkanMonitor-2010_Summary_of_Findings.pdf, (accessed 30 November 2013).
1048 ibid., p. 31.
332
When asked which countries made it harder for Serbia to negotiate with the EU, the majority
of respondents identified the Netherlands (33 per cent), then Germany (11 per cent) and the
UK (11 per cent). This might indicate that there is an awareness among the Serbian respondents
regarding the problematic partners issue in Serbia’s efforts to join the EU. This awareness
might have been informed by the reporting of ‘sticks’ from the EU and the Serbian
Government’s disappointment regarding Serbia’s membership bid, which always became an
overly-politicised issue in Serbian politics.1049 Each time that an EU member would block the
EU’s talks with Serbia, which delayed Serbia’s further European integration, this would receive
extensive media coverage in Serbia, which tended to be overly focused on criticism rather than
on how Serbia could improve its prospects to join the EU.
Public opinion in the EU
In 2006, the EU conducted a public opinion survey called Special Eurobarometer report (EBR)
255 in order to investigate the levels of public support for further enlargement, including for
countries from the Western Balkans.1050 In that report, Serbia and Montenegro were treated as
a single entity, although the Montenegrin Government was at that stage preparing for a
referendum on independence. The surveyed EU citizens indicated that the main future
challenges for EU hopefuls included respect for human rights; inclusion of minority groups;
reconciliation/cooperation with neighbouring countries, and challenges related to democratic
governance.1051
1049 Tanjug, ‘Holandski parlament blokirao ratifikaciju sporazuma EU sa Srbijom’, 8 June 2011,
http://www.24sata.rs/vesti/aktuelno/vest/holandski-parlament-blokirao-ratifikaciju-sporazuma-eu-sa-
srbijom/4091.phtml, (accesed on 1 May 2014).
1050 European Commission, ‘Special Eurobarometer 255: Attitudes towards European Union Enlargement’, July
2006, p. 2, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_255_en.pdf (accessed 7 March 2014).
1051 ibid., p. 63.
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Survey results indicated that support among twenty five EU members (EU-25) for further
enlargement was 45 per cent, while opposition to it was 43 per cent, which shows that on the
eve of further enlargement (that was to include Bulgaria and Romania in 2007), EU public
opinion was quite divided.1052 Specifically for Serbia and Montenegro, support for their EU
membership was 47 per cent, while opposition stood at 33 per cent.1053 Countries which most
opposed Serbia and Montenegro’s EU membership were Austria (65 per cent), followed by
Luxembourg (57 per cent), Germany (55 per cent) and Italy (45 per cent), where opposition
outweighed support for accession.1054 In the EU, opposition to further enlargement increased
between 2008 and 2012, as the chart produced from data extracted from annual Eurobarometer
reports shows below.
Chart 6: EU citizens’ support for enlargement1055
1052 ibid., p. 3.
1053 ibid., p. 67–68.
1054 ibid., p. 68.
1055 This chart was prepared by the author from multi-annual Eurobarometer reports from 2008 to 2012.
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Between the EBR 67 and the EBR 78, public support for further enlargement declined from 49
per cent to 38 per cent respectively.1056 During the same period, opposition to EU enlargement
increased from 39 per cent to 52 per cent respectively.1057 There were also several trends to
emerge from the survey results. One trend that came to light in reports 67 to 78 was that support
for further enlargement was significantly higher among those states which acceded since 2004
(‘new members’), than among older EU members (EU-15).1058Another trend that emerged was
that those EU citizens who trusted the EU more tended to support further EU enlargement
more. Generally, the lowest levels of support for further enlargement were found in Austria,
Luxembourg and Germany.
The Eurobarometer report 69 specifically mentioned countries from the Western Balkans, and
more EU citizens were against Serbia’s potential membership (47 per cent) than were
supportive of it (38 per cent).1059 Another report (EBR 71) found that age was a ‘significant
factor’ in attitudes towards enlargement, as just over a third of respondents aged 55+ were in
favour of it (34 per cent), compared to more than half of those aged 15–24 (57 per cent).1060
Furthermore, education beyond the age of 19 was also demonstrated to correlate with positive
1056 European Commission, ‘Standard Eurobarometer 67: public opinion in the European Union’, November
2007, pp. 188–190,
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb67/eb67_en.pdf, (accessed 9 March 2014). European
Commission, ‘Standard Eurobarometer 78: public opinion in the European Union’, November 2012, pp. 88–89,
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb78/eb78_publ_en.pdf, (accessed 7 March 2014).
1057 ibid.
1058 European Commission, ‘Standard Eurobarometer 68: public opinion in the European Union’, May 2008, pp.
117, 124, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb68/eb68_en.htm, (accessed 1 March 2014). In the
EBR 70, amongst those people who trusted the EU, 58 per cent supported further enlargement compared to 30
per cent among those who did not trust the EU. European Commission, ‘Standard Eurobarometer 70: public
opinion in the European Union’, June 2010, pp. 227–230,
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb70/eb70_full_en.pdf, (accessed 9 March 2014).
1059 European Commission, ‘Standard Eurobarometer 69: public opinion in the European Union’, November
2008, pp. 19, 28, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb69/eb69_en.htm, (accessed 1 March 2014).
Other reports predominantly focused on ‘EU enlargement’ as a broadly defined category, rather than specific
countries.
1060 European Commission, ‘Standard Eurobarometer 71: public opinion in the European Union’, September
2009, pp. 159–160; http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb71/eb71_std_part1.pdf, (accessed 1 March
2014).
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attitudes to enlargement.1061 People who stayed at home or who were retired were more
doubtful of further enlargement.1062 Similar broad trends were found in subsequent reports. An
overall decline in support for EU membership across the EU was a particularly worrying trend
for the Serbian Government, as much as other candidate states.1063
Prelude to the Serbian elections: the Kosovo challenge
This trend of low public support in the EU for further enlargement (‘enlargement fatigue’) was
discouraging for the DS-SPS Government, which had worked hard to meet many of the
conditions set by the EU—even at the expense of domestic unpopularity. This was particularly
relevant to Serbia’s cooperation with the ICTY—the fulfilment of which was the major
condition for further progress in the accession negotiations. Despite the initial scepticism of
many international and local observers regarding the SPS’s role in the Serbian Government,
for the first time since Milošević was overthrown in 2000, the SPS showed a serious political
desire to cooperate with international justice institutions. Ivica Dačić worked on overcoming
domestic institutional challenges that prevented previous attempts at arresting Serbian indictees
at large.1064 By August 2011, Serbia had extradited all remaining indictees at large to the ICTY,
which cleared what was previously regarded as the primary obstacle to its EU candidacy.1065
1061 The report states that ‘Students and those who had studied beyond the age of 19 were most likely to support
further enlargement of the EU, recording 61 per cent and 47 per cent respectively’. ibid., p. 161.
1062 This category reported 35 per cent for both supporters and opponents of further enlargement.
1063 Interestingly, a survey conducted in Serbia in 2014 also found that people with higher levels of education
exhibited more positive views about the EU. Ninamedia Research, ‘Život u Srbiji–izazovi i mogućnosti’, op.
cit., p. 6.
1064 First Deputy Prime Minister, Ivica Dačić, had also been the Minister of Interior Affairs since July 2008.
1065 ‘Hadžić’s arrest clears key hurdle for Serbia's EU bid’, The Oxford Analytica Daily Brief, 21 July 2011.
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When the German Chancellor visited Serbia in August 2011, she delivered a set of ‘tough
conditions’, urging Serbs to dismantle ‘parallel institutions’ in North Kosovo.1066 Such a strong
position by Germany indicated that this EU member was willing to play a more assertive role
in regional affairs in the Western Balkans, by putting pressure on Serbia to show a greater
flexibility towards the Kosovo issue. This demand, which is also known as the Kosovo
conditionality, had become another major hurdle for Serbia’s European integration process.1067
This ran counter to Serbia’s international diplomatic efforts which were focused, after Kosovo
proclaimed independence, on countering its international recognition, particularly through its
contacts inside the NAM.1068 Serbia’s outspoken Foreign Minister, Vuk Jeremić, was
particularly active in this area, referring to Kosovo as ‘Serbia’s Jerusalem’ and using his
political influence and diplomatic skills to convince other countries not to recognise Kosovo
as an independent state.1069 The Kosovo issue thus indirectly led the Serbian Government and
diplomats to create a more active policy towards the NAM countries.
Serbia’s inflexibility regarding Kosovo’s participation in regional forums for the most part
during the DS-SPS Government also backfired as it resulted in Serbia’s self-imposed absence
from many important regional meetings to which Kosovo representatives were also invited.
Serbia’s diplomatic efforts resulted in a delay in Kosovo attaining membership of many
international and regional organisations. This policy triggered backlash against Serbia amongst
1066 B. Weber, ‘A date for Belgrade? Conditionality, German leadership and Serbia’s path to the EU’,
Democratization Policy Council, Berlin, June 2013, http://democratizationpolicy.org/pdf/briefs/serbiapolicy.pdf,
(accessed 8 September 2013). T. Spaić, ‘Poruka Angele Merkel: Politika ‘i Kosovo i EU’ je prošlost za Srbiju’,
26 August 2012, http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Tema-Dana/273241/Poruka-Angele-Merkel-Politika-i-Kosovo-i-EU-
je-proslost-za-Srbiju, (accessed 13 September 2013).
1067 N. Tomić, ‘When the carrot is not sweet enough: conditionality versus norms as modes of EU influence on
Serbia’s foreign policy’, Südosteuropäische Hefte, vol. 2, no. 1, 2013, p. 77.
1068 The intensity of Serbia’s diplomatic attempts to block Kosovo’s recognition could be compared to China-
Taiwan diplomatic struggles and lobbying attempts for recognition over last two decades.
1069 ‘Serbian Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremić: Kosovo ‘is our Jerusalem’’, Der Spiegel, 31 May 2010,
http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/serbian-foreign-minister-vuk-jeremic-kosovo-is-our-jerusalem-a-
697725.html, (accessed 1 March 2013).
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supporters of Kosovo’s independence (particularly in EU members like Germany) which were
ardent supporters of an independent, law-abiding and European Kosovo.1070
Domestically, members of the Serbian Government were also facing allegations of corruption.
In Transparency International’s 2011 corruption perception index, Serbia was ranked 86th out
of 183, the place it shared with Bulgaria.1071 In the year before, Serbia was ranked 78th out of
178 countries, which meant that from 2010 to 2011 public perceptions of corruption in Serbia
had perceptibly increased.1072 The European Commission closely monitored corruption issues
in Serbia, noting that progress in prosecuting corruption cases, especially high-level cases, had
been particularly slow during the DS-SPS Government.1073 This could have been the case, in
part, because the Serbian Government was focused too much on the Kosovo issue.
After Kosovo declared independence, Serbian government officials sought to counter
international recognition of Kosovo by UN members whilst attempting to put the Kosovo issue
back into the UN’s framework as the principal reference point. Serbia’s outspoken Foreign
Minister, Vuk Jeremić, was especially active in this area, whose attitude of vigorously trying
to convince other countries that Kosovo should remain within Serbia triggered resentment
amongst many Western diplomats and supporters of Kosovo’s independence from Serbia,
1070 Interview with European Commission officials, Brussels, May 2012.
1071 Of other candidates and potential candidates for EU accession, Bosnia-Herzegovina (91st spot), Albania (95th
spot) and Kosovo (112th spot) scored worse that Serbia. Transparency International, ‘Corruption perception
index 2011’, http://www.transparency.org/cpi2011/results, (accessed 17 May 2013).
1072 The increase in corruption perceptions was slight: from 3.5 score points in 2010 to 3.3 score points in 2011
on a scale from 10 (very clean) to 0 (highly corrupt). Transparency International, ‘Corruption perception index
2010’, http://www.transparency.org/cpi2010/results, (accessed 13 May 2013). With the change of government,
the corruption perceptions index for Serbia slightly improved as it reached 80th spot in 2012 (out of 176) and
72nd place in 2013 (out of 177), with 3.9 score points for both years. Transparency International, ‘Corruption
perceptions Index 2012’, December 2012, http://www.transparency.org/cpi2012/results, (accessed 18 May
2013). Transparency International, ‘Corruption perceptions Index 2013’,
http://www.transparency.org/cpi2013/results (accessed 18 May 2013).
1073 European Commission, ‘Serbia: 2010 progress report’, 9 November 2010, p. 11,
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2010/package/sr_rapport_2010_en.pdf, (accessed 13 May
2014).
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especially in Germany. Despite the fact that the European Commission delivered a positive
opinion (to the Council and European Parliament) on Serbia’s membership application on 12
October 2011, opposition from Germany delayed further progress in EU-Serbia relations. As
in the situation in which the SFRJ was at loggerheads with West Germany before 1967,
Germany’s verdict on further progress in the EU’s deepening relationship with Serbia was
critical. Germany’s pivotal contributions to the EU budget and the Bundestag’s increased
parliamentary input following the Treaty of Lisbon’s entry into force indicated that Germany
was willing to play a more active role by specifying new agendas in the EU’s political
conditionality towards Serbia.1074
This was despite the fact that the DS-SPS Government worked hard to meet the EU’s ICTY
conditionality—the fulfilment of which was key to unlocking Serbia’s accession negotiations,
particularly with the Netherlands.1075 Even though the European Commission delivered a
positive opinion or avis to the Council and the European Parliament on Serbia’s membership
application on 12 October 2011—which was a major milestone in Serbia’s European
integration—Germany’s opposition interrupted this progress at the December Council
meeting.1076 Germany’s assent regarding further progress in the EU’s deepening relationship
with Serbia was becoming of critical importance although it was concerned with Serbia’s
relationship with Kosovo rather than with Germany itself.1077
1074 Amongst other things, the Treaty of Lisbon increased the powers of national parliaments in decision-making
in many areas of common foreign policy action, especially enlargement.
1075 The Netherlands was especially insisting that this obligation be met, although the Dutch Government later
dropped its veto and unblocked Serbia’s membership bid (in October 2010) despite the fact that Serbia did not
deliver by that stage all indictees at large. I. Traynor, ‘Serbia moves a step closer to joining EU’, 26 October
2010, www.theguardian.com/world/2010/oct/25/eu-ministers-serbia-membership, (accessed 20 May 2013).
1076 European Commission, ‘Commission Opinion on Serbia’s application for membership of the European
Union’, Brussels, 12 October 2011, http://www.media.srbija.gov.rs/medeng/documents/european_commission-
opinion_en.pdf (accessed 1 March 2013).
1077 N. Marković, ‘Nemački ovčar i balkanski tvor: uloga Nemačke u procesima evropskih integracija Republike
Srbije’, Sveske, no. 103, March 2012, pp. 34–44.
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By specifically linking regional cooperation conditionality in relation to the Serbia-Kosovo
dialogue with the process of Serbia’s European integration (EU-Serbia relations), the EU’s
actions with Germany at its helm on this issue indicated several things. It indicated that support
for Serbia’s non-compromising position on the Kosovo issue and Serbia’s insistence on
UNSCR 1244 had little, if any support among EU members. It also left the impression that
Germany would take a lead role in the enlargement policy. It also signalled that Germany’s
political weight on this issue was significant and that it wanted Serbia to conclude specific
agreements with Kosovo in order to allow Kosovo to negotiate a new SAA with the EU. It also
showed that Germany pressured Serbia to conduct a high-level dialogue with Kosovo leaders,
which, under the DS-SPS Government, appeared to be unrealistic.
Diplomatic pressure from Germany compelled the Serbian Government to eventually show
more flexibility on the question of Kosovo’s regional representation. Germany’s pressure
represented ‘sticks’, or a coercive diplomatic strategy within the EU’s conditionality
framework.1078 As discussed in previous chapters, apart from rewards (‘carrots’) or closer
cooperation/engagement, political conditionality relies on ‘sticks’ for enforcement in the form
of delays in decisions, warnings, punishments, sanctions or other coercive methods. Germany’s
diplomatic pressure hence yielded some positive results with regard to the Serbia-Kosovo
dialogue, as it pressured the Serbian Government to think outside its normative framework
about the region’s future in its technical dialogue with Priština. It also signalled to Serbia that
if its leaders wanted their country to join the EU club, they had to be more willing to
compromise on the Kosovo issue. But the Serbian Government was worried about a domestic
backlash if it were to initiate any direct dialogue with the Kosovo Government. This inflexible
1078 The German Government’s attitude also reflected sensitivities to domestic politics in Germany, in particular
low levels of public support for further EU enlargement after Croatia joined the EU.
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position by the Serbian Government was at odds with the EU’s preference for a unified and
coherent regional approach regarding European integration of the entire Western Balkans.
The shift in primary focus within the EU’s political conditionality from Serbia’s cooperation
with the ICTY (which was for most part completed) to ‘normalisation of relations with
Kosovo’, had the consequence of alienating many Serbs from supporting DS policies. This
development also encouraged right-wing groups in Serbia to intensify their support for Serbs
in northern Kosovo, where a major security incident in late November 2011 left several German
and Austrian peacekeepers injured. Serbia’s standing in EU circles was diminished as a result
of this incident.1079 On 2 December 2011, Serbia reached an integrated border management
agreement with the Kosovo authorities under EU auspices.1080 Despite this diplomatic success
for the EU, Serbia’s European integration was slowing down, once again. On the same day (2
December), the German Chancellor told the German Parliament ahead of a major EU meeting
on 5 December:
Since Serbia had not sufficiently lived up to expectations of normalising its relations
with Kosovo–its only path towards the EU–the conditions for granting it candidate
status are lacking.1081
Germany believed that violent clashes in Kosovo indicated that Serbia was not ready as yet for
the candidate status. This ran against the European Commission’s recommendation to grant
1079 ‘Serbia and Kosovo reach border deal’, Al-jazeera, 3 December 2011,
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2011/12/201112303521299708.html, (accessed 1 March 2014).
1080 This agreement was reached during the 8th round of technical dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo under
EU auspices. The Kosovo prime minister’s press release stated that ‘by accepting the agreement, Serbia has in
practice recognised the inter-state border with Kosovo’. The Republic of Kosovo, Office of the Prime Minister,
‘Press release–The eighth round of technical dialogue is concluded’, 3 December 2011,
http://www.kryeministri-ks.net/?page=2,9,2541, (accessed 1 March 2014).
1081 ‘Berlin blocks Serbia's EU bid over Kosovo’, Oxford Analytica Daily Brief, 2 December 2011.
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Serbia the EU candidature.1082 The European Council on 8–9 December 2011 did not grant
candidate status to Serbia, prompting the resignation of the Serbian Deputy Prime Minister
with responsibility for EU accession, Božidar Đelić. This was discussed later in the European
Parliament. A Member of the European Parliament, Adrian Severin, observed:
The postponement of the decision, contrary to the EU’s own assessment, has therefore
caused a political crisis in Belgrade, which is likely to confirm the Serbian
Eurosceptics’ thesis that the pro-European policy of the current Serbian Government
and President Tadić has failed.1083
The EU’s decision to delay giving a candidate status to Serbia was undoubtedly a significant
diplomatic blow to the DS-SPS Government. Serbia’s largest opposition party, the SNS, was
at the same time putting additional pressure on the government by calling for early
parliamentary elections and the President’s resignation. Many people in Serbia also resented
President Tadić (who was also President of the DS), associating him with the economic policies
of the DS-SPS government that have resulted (directly or indirectly) in Serbia’s unemployment
rate to reach 24 per cent.1084 Tadić was, nonetheless, actively involved in promoting Serbia’s
cooperative image with the EU abroad, and was for this reason seen as a reliable partner by
many in the West.1085
1082 M. Sheahan, ‘Merkel says Kosovo clash shows Serbia not ready for EU’, 2 December 2011, Reuters,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/02/us-serbia-kosovo-merkel-idUSTRE7B112A20111202, (accessed 1
March 2014).
1083 European Parliament, Parliamentary questions, Questions for written answer to the Commission, ‘European
Council’s decision not to grant EU candidate country status to Serbia’, 6 January 2012, Adrian Severin MEP,
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=WQ&reference=E-2011-
012401&format=XML&language=EN, (accessed 1 May 2013).
1084 BBC, ‘Serbia elections: Tadić and Nikolić to face run-off’, 7 May 2012, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
europe-17978121, (accessed 1 March 2014).
1085 T. Loza, ‘Serbia’s super president’, European Voice, 16 June 2011,
http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/serbia-s-super-president/71356.aspx, (accessed 1 March 2014).
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Conclusion
Serbia’s engagement with the EU was expanded under the DS-SPS Government. The Socialists
(SPS) proved themselves to be reformists, who advocated Serbia’s European integration. Their
leader and Deputy Prime Minister, Ivica Dačić, became one of the key powerbrokers in
Belgrade-Priština negotiations under EU auspices. The fact that Serbia’s two most influential
political parties shared a similar view regarding Serbia’s European integration provided greater
stability to the coalition government enabling it to govern for a full term, which was not the
case with previous democratic governments. However, the DS’s inflexibility on the Kosovo
issue became a challenge for Serbia’s negotiations with the EU. This could have been in part
the reason why the EU was looking at other potential partners for dialogue in Serbian politics,
as will be demonstrated in the next chapter.
The national discourses in Serbia regarding European integration became even more polarised
after the parliamentary elections of May 2008, as rifts among democrats intensified. The key
division was between a group of political parties whose leaders wished to see Serbia not
continuing accession negotiations but rather becoming politically neutral, and those who saw
Serbia’s future closely integrated within Euro-Atlantic structures (EU and NATO). Both sides
of this debate resorted to appeals to history to justify their positions. This period in Serbian
politics also saw the rise of the radical right, which gradually became a challenge to the
government and promoted anti-EU and pro-Russia political discourses in the public discursive
space. Although the EU lent some support to the coalition government in the next elections,
the rise of the SNS with a pro-EU outlook provided a challenge to the DS’s influence in Serbian
politics.
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After three of Serbia’s most important indictees at large were delivered to the ICTY (Radovan
Karadžić in July 2008, Ratko Mladić in May 2011 and Goran Hadžić in July 2011), Serbia put
itself in a good position to be granted candidate status at the Council’s summit in December
2011. However, EU citizens were showing even greater signs of enlargement fatigue (as
evident from declining public support for further EU expansion in Eurobarometer reports).
Some EU members where the unease about new accessions was amongst the highest in the EU,
such as The Netherlands, started to highlight other issues (for instance, corruption) that risked
further delaying Serbia’s progress in European integration. The EU’s political conditionality
approach towards Serbia seems to have worked with respect to cooperation with the Hague
tribunal and in speeding up Serbia’s legal reforms (for example, hundreds of new legal
regulations were passed to harmonise Serbia’s legal system with the EU under the DS-SPS
Government). It also encouraged more regional cooperation between Serbia, Croatia and
Bosnia-Herzegovina in particular.1086 However, the EU’s enlargement fatigue, and possibly,
the enhanced Serbian cooperation with Russia (including a free-trade agreement, new loans
and the acquisition by Russians of majority stakes in Serbian energy companies) probably
encouraged EU member states to seek more pro-EU commitment from Serbia.
Meanwhile, the Serbian Government demanded through its diplomatic representation in key
EU capitals firm proof of the EU’s seriousness about its integration, such as a specific date for
the accession negotiations.1087 The strong focus on the ‘date’ for Serbia’s accession talks was
1086 Interview with the President of the Serbian National Assembly, Slavica Đukić-Dejanović, Belgrade, June
2010.
1087 S. Tisdall, ‘Goran Hadžić’s arrest had made Serbia’s case for the EU overwhelming’, The Guardian, 21 July
2011, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/jul/20/goran-hadzic-serbia-eu, (accessed 1 March
2013).
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also evident in fieldwork interviews, where this topic seemed to be given more prominence
than the quality of reforms or the implementation of new, EU-compatible laws in Serbia.1088
Although the Western Balkans remained an area of ‘unfinished business’ for the EU, other
priorities such as the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty and the development of the EU’s
diplomatic arm (the European External Action Service), alongside pressing economic issues,
were probably higher on the EU’s agenda. Additional political conditionality, provided
alongside approval of Serbia’s official candidature, could have been, in part, the reason for
Serbia’s EU accession fatigue. In Serbia, support for the DS in particular was seriously
diminishing. The rise of right-wing political groups was a factor that could not be discounted,
as some of these groups were even calling for mass protests against the government. A
downward trend of declining intra-EU support for further enlargement and strict conditions in
the EU’s political conditionality regarding Kosovo did not improve prospects for Serbia’s EU
accession, as the government headed towards the prospect of electoral defeat.
1088 Interview with the SEIO’s Deputy Director, and an interview with Serbia’s Deputy Minister for Economic
and Regional Development, June 2010.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
Back to East/West bridging? EU-Serbia relations under
the SNS-SPS coalition
If one considers the currently prevailing scepticism regarding further EU enlargement,
it is remarkable that the prospect of a future in the EU is still sufficiently attractive to
motivate governments in the Western Balkans to make quite painful concessions. It also
confirms the idea that the remaining political and security issues in the Western Balkans
can be best resolved if the EU engages actively and if it plays the enlargement card
well.1089
This chapter analyses developments in recent EU-Serbia relations by assessing major domestic
changes and key themes in political debates in Serbia from before the parliamentary election
in May 2012, until late May 2014. It assesses the consequences for EU-Serbia relations after a
major shift in the Serbian voters’ preferences favoured prominent political actors from the
Milošević era. For the first time since Serbia’s democratic breakthrough in 2000, Serbian voters
drifted away from supporting key former DOS Coalition members (DS and DSS) towards
electing political parties led by politicians who held prominent positions in the Serbian
Government in the late 1990s—Nikolić, Vučić and Dačić. The outcomes of the parliamentary
(6 May 2012) and presidential elections (6 and 20 May 2012) will be analysed in that context,
including the impact of a SNS-SPS Coalition deal on Serbia-Kosovo dialogue within the wider
framework of the EU’s political conditionality.1090
1089 S. Lehne, ‘Kosovo and Serbia: towards a normal relationship’, Policy Outlook, Carnegie endowment for
international peace, March 2012, p. 3, www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Kosovo_and_Serbia.pdf, (accessed 1
May 2013).
1090 Under the SNS-SPS coalition, Serbia continued the previous government’s policy of expanding ties with
former NAM partners (including in the Middle East and Asia) for trade, investment and general economic
development purposes as foreign investment flows from the EU were adversely affected by the financial crisis.
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The EU’s mediation role in the Serbia-Kosovo dispute will be assessed in light of new regional
agreements. The results of early parliamentary elections in 2014 will also be discussed, as they
ensured that the SNS continued governing in coalition with the SPS. The parliamentary election
results meant that the SNS-bloc’s electoral success has anchored the consolidation of SNS
influence in Serbian politics, and Aleksandar Vučić from the SNS became Serbia’s Prime
Minister.1091 The Serbian President (a founder of the SNS but no longer a party member) and
Prime Minister (President of the SNS and Prime Minister of Serbia) now share a similar foreign
policy outlook, although some analysts believe that Nikolić is strongly pro-Russian, and that
Vučić became a pro-EU Serbian politician.1092 Their public statements indicated that Serbia is
seeking to find a new balance between East and West, despite its still strategically pivotal
European integration course.
Serbia’s problematic partners: The Netherlands and Germany
As mentioned earlier, apart from satisfying the Copenhagen criteria, the European Council
decided in the late 1990s that Western Balkan countries needed to meet two additional
accession criteria:
 demonstrate willingness to implement regional cooperation with neighbouring states, and
1091 The Prime Minister in the previous government, Ivica Dačić, became Minister for Foreign Affairs in the
second SNS-SPS Government. This was crucial for the continuation of the process of Serbia’s European
integration, as Dačić was the lead player in Serbia’s dialogue with Kosovo. His appointment as Foreign Minister
was meant to ensure continuity in Serbia’s difficult negotiations with Kosovo under EU auspices.
1092 This previously occurred in 2008 when Tadić (from the DS) was President, and a DS-backed independent
candidate became Serbia’s Prime Minister, which provided a source of stability for the government that ruled
full term. Nikolić and Vučić frequently downplayed what was reported in the media as personal disagreements,
and asserted themselves as speaking with one voice vis-à-vis major international developments, including the
situation in Ukraine in which Serbia declared neutrality. I. Novaković, ‘Serbien’, Dialog Südosteuropa, im
Zwiespalt Südosteuropa, Friedrich Ebert Foundation, 2014, p. 13.
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 fulfil all their international obligations, including cooperation with the ICTY, the Dayton
Peace Accords and UNSCR 1244.
These criteria stem from the particular historical circumstances of post-conflict societies in the
Western Balkans. The EU expects countries in that region to demonstrate a willingness to
cooperate with former political foes in order to resolve any major outstanding issues from the
wars of Yugoslav succession, including border issues. This was the EU’s method of promoting
reconciliation in the Western Balkans. As one interviewee observed, after Romania’s and
Bulgaria’s accession, the EU inherited problems from these two countries (including high
levels of corruption and delays in reforms) which its institutions found difficult to counter using
traditional intergovernmental dialogue, so they had to resort to more coercive diplomatic
methods.1093 There was no more political will amongst EU members to accept any new states
from the Western Balkans, following Croatia’s entry, unless they were ready to fulfil all
specified conditions and demonstrate a full commitment to the political, economic and
normative goals, standards and values of the EU.1094
Values of the EU in the context of Serbia’s European integration imply:
… the acceptance of EU positions and their implementation in passing the laws,
strategies and system reforms, as well as consistent alignment with declarations,
statements and common foreign policy positions of the EU.1095
1093 Following Romania’s and Bulgaria’s accession, the EU had to resort to threats of funding cuts in order to
motivate the national authorities in these two countries to take further action on battling high-levels of
corruption and inefficient governance. V. Pop, ‘Romania, Bulgaria risk more EU aid cuts’, EU Observer, 12
February 2009, http://euobserver.com/justice/27599 (accessed 1 May 2013).
1094 Interview with MEP, Petru Luhan, Canberra, April 2011.
1095 N. Petrović and I. Novaković, From four pillars of foreign policy to European integration: is there a will for
strategically orienting Serbia’s foreign policy, International and Security Affairs Centre, ISAC Fund Belgrade,
2013, p. 39.
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This is also why the European Commission specifically refers to these additional yet often
understated criteria in its annual progress reports for Serbia, and considers them as crucial when
devising strategy for further enlargement in the Western Balkans. It is because of these
additional criteria that progress in many Western Balkan countries’ European integration has
been delayed.1096
Uvalić notes that often, the criteria relating to compliance with international obligations have
been used:
… in an arbitrary way, depending on the opinion of individual experts or … regarding
Serbia, of the position of one country [the Netherlands].1097
However, the outcome from all integration processes with the EU has historically been
dependent upon positive resolution of any major bilateral dispute it had with any EU member.
As reiterated in earlier chapters, this is because of the principle of unanimity, as enlargement
is a policy area in which the consent of all EU members is required before a candidate can
join.1098 Such was the case with the UK’s application that was blocked for years under a French
veto until their bilateral relationship improved, as described in Chapter Two. Similarly, the
SFRJ’s relations with the EU were formalised only after the Yugoslav Government made a
breakthrough in its dispute with West Germany in late 1967. For such breakthroughs to happen,
it sometimes takes a change of leadership in the EU member state blocking closer relations, or
an alteration in the domestic policies of the state seeking closer ties. Although the criteria for
1096 These criteria were not required of Central and East European countries during the 1990s. They were
specific to post-conflict states in the Western Balkans to demonstrate their progress in addressing specific issues
arising from their recent history of conflict.
1097 Uvalić, Serbia’s transition, 2010, op. cit., pp. 228; 236.
1098 In addition, parliamentary ratification is needed for the SAA.
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joining the EU are far more complex today for the Western Balkan states than was the case for
Europe’s post-communist hopefuls in the 1990s, the regional cooperation requirement has
many advantages, such as bringing about a quicker resolution to arbitration cases.1099 The
Kosovo issue for Serbia is, therefore, a major test of the EU’s foreign policy effectiveness, of
its diplomatic capability, and of its broader policy of enlargement in the Western Balkans.
A delay in the EU’s decision to grant Serbia formal candidacy status in December 2011, at
Germany’s insistence, weakened the position of the DS before the elections.1100 One
explanation usually offered for Germany’s comparatively tougher position towards Serbia than
for EU candidates in previous rounds is a strongly felt enlargement fatigue, and a perception
that Serbia did not come to terms with the wartime crimes conducted during the 1990s.1101 It is
important to note here that Germany’s sensitivities regarding the question of dealing with one’s
wartime or criminal past have been affected not only by the concerns of its citizens, which were
increasingly sceptical about further enlargement, but also by its own historical legacy.
Germany’s experience of having to deal with historical baggage, and the issues of guilt and
remorse after the Second World War has most likely played a role in its treatment of Serbia.1102
1099 For example, the EU mediated in a border dispute between Croatia and Slovenia before the former’s EU
accession could go forward. The compromise agreement reached between these states with EU mediation
allowed Croatia to move faster towards EU membership after the dispute was settled.  In addition, Croatia was
required to improve its cooperation with the ICTY before it was admitted into the EU. For details, see A.
Geddes and A. Taylor, ‘Those who knock on Europe’s door must repent? Bilateral border disputes and EU
enlargement’, KFG working paper, no. 54, Free University Berlin, 2013, http://userpage.fu-
berlin.de/kfgeu/kfgwp/wpseries/WorkingPaperKFG_54.pdf, (accessed 1 March 2014).
1100 The SNS blamed the DS of not leading Serbia in the right direction, emphasising that the SNS had become
the largest political party in Serbia. Srpska Napredna Stranka, ‘Tomislav Nikolić i Aleksandar Vučić’, 6
December 2011, https://www.sns.org.rs/lat/press-centar/tomislav-Nikolić-i-aleksandar-vucic-06122011,
(accessed 1 March 2014).
1101 France regarded Germany as an enemy before the creation of the Coal and Steel Community, yet the Soviet
threat and shifts in their domestic circumstances allowed both countries to develop higher levels of trust and
cooperation in the 1950s.
1102 This separate subject of inquiry necessitates further research in order to establish a clearer connection
between Germany’s conditionality towards Serbia and Germany’s experiences of coming to terms with its own
wartime past.
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Germany’s criticism of Serbia’s reform process and the previously outlined delay in Serbia’s
negotiations with the EU represented a significant diplomatic blow to the Serbian Government.
At the same time, Serbia’s largest opposition party, the SNS, was calling on the President to
resign. According to data collected by the Serbian European Integration Office, in December
2011 support for Serbia’s EU membership was 51 per cent, and the public opposition to this
prospect was 28 per cent. When compared to the polling results from May 2008 (67 per cent
for and 12 per cent against), the public sentiment against Serbia’s EU membership significantly
increased between 2008 and 2011.1103
An agreement (‘asterisk agreement’) was reached between Serbia and Kosovo on 24 February
2012 during the 9th round since the technical negotiations began in March 2011. The agreement
stipulated that the name ‘Kosovo*’(with an asterisk) will be the only denomination to be used
and the footnote to be applied to the asterisk will read: ‘This designation is without prejudice
to positions on status, and is in line with the UNSC 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo
Declaration of Independence’.1104 This was a compromise solution as Serbia insisted on
upholding UNSC 1244 in a strict sense, despite Kosovo’s independence proclamation having
received a further boost from the ICJ Opinion. The asterisk agreement enabled Kosovo to
participate in regional forums more regularly and without diplomatic protests and walkouts by
Serbian officials.
On 28 February 2012, EU Foreign Ministers formally endorsed the European Commission’s
avis on Serbia’s candidacy, thereby clearing the final hurdle for the issue to be considered by
1103 SEIO, ‘Images’, http://www.danas.rs/upload/images/news/2013/1/28/tab-za-0203_ocp_w380_h300.jpg, (c
on 1 March 2014)
1104 EU at the UN website, ‘EU facilitated dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia: agreement on regional
cooperation and IBM technical protocol’, 24 February 2012, http://www.eu-
un.europa.eu/articles/es/article_11884_es.htm, (accessed 1 May 2013).
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the Council. On 1 March 2012, the Council confirmed Serbia as an official candidate for EU
membership. This was a major milestone for Serbia, which enables it to have access to more
pre-accessions funds. Its success was a tribute to the DS-SPS Government’s efforts to secure
Serbia’s spot in the queue towards EU membership. The confirmation of Serbia’s official
candidate status opened up opportunities for further reform, and for benefits reserved for formal
candidates under specific conditions.
The EU’s decision was seen in Serbia as the government’s diplomatic success, which
emboldened President Tadić to resign ten months earlier than expected, and announce the
holding of early presidential elections on the same day as parliamentary and local elections.
This move was supposed to provide a boost to his party’s electoral prospects. However, others
thought that this move in the middle of an electoral campaign for Serbia’s legislative elections
had the potential to increase dissatisfaction among many voters, and possibly contribute to
blank votes and voting abstention as a form of social protest.1105 These latter observations
proved to be correct, as the number of blank voting papers doubled from the 2008 elections.1106
This showed the Serbian public’s dissatisfaction not only with the government but also with
the options it was facing at the ballot box.
1105 A. Ivanji, ‘Ostavka predsednika Srbije Borisa Tadića: pastir i vuk’, Vreme, 5 April 2012,
http://www.vreme.com/cms/view.php?id=1045473 (accessed 1 May 2013). I. Jovanović, ‘Tadić’s resignation
stirs Serbian public’, Southeast European Times, 5 April 2012,
http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2012/04/05/feature-01
(accessed 1 May 2013).
1106 In the 2012 elections, blank votes constituted 4.3 per cent in the presidential and 4.19 per cent in the Serbian
parliamentary elections. ‘Kreativni, a nevažeći: Prisetimo se za koga je Srbija glasala na prošlim izborima’,
Eizbori.com, 13 February 2014, http://eizbori.com/kreativni-a-nevazeci-prisetimo-se-za-koga-je-srbija-glasala-
na-proslim-izborima-foto/, (accessed 2 October 2013). Deputy President of DS, Jelena Trivan, observed that a
blank vote was a form of ‘electoral abstinence’ in the Serbian 2012 elections, but that ‘a vote with a Mickey
Mouse also counted’ as it further legitimised ‘the strongest party’ (SNS) and indirectly led to fewer votes for the
staunchly pro-EU parties, the DS and the LDP. ‘Kome pripadaju nevažeći glasački listići’, Pravni Portal, 27
February 2014, http://www.pravniportal.com/kome-pripadaju-nevazeci-glasacki-listici/ (accessed 1 March
2014).
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The normative impact of Kosovo-related conditionality in Serbia
The shift in primary focus of the EU’s political conditionality from Serbia’s full cooperation
with the ICTY to political dialogue with Kosovo was widely publicised, and criticised, in the
Serbian media. This aspect of conditionality prompted anti-EU supporters and political parties
(including DSS) to reignite collective memory discourses on Kosovo and intensify their
support for Serbs in northern Kosovo. Some political entities, including the far-right ‘Serbian
Doors’ (Dveri Srpske), which has, since January 1999 until its formal registration in March
2012, operated as an anti-government/anti-EU organisation, were even calling for the
President’s resignation, labelling his more conciliatory position on Kosovo as a national
humiliation. Serbia’s smaller political parties capitalised on a growing anti-government
resentment among the voters to attract popular support for their policies. Serbia’s European
integration was, once again, emerging as a key electoral issue ahead of the 2012 parliamentary
elections.
Interviews with selected interviewees in Belgrade and Brussels one month before and one
month after Serbia’s parliamentary elections in 2012 suggested that observers of, and
participants in the process of Serbia’s European integration, were concerned about the Kosovo
issue becoming (like the Hague conditionality) another major barrier to Serbia’s EU entry—in
part because of the problematic partners issue.1107 Another major theme was related to the
elections which were a deciding factor in the political battle between the DS and the SNS, just
as was the case in the 2008 elections. The fieldwork data showed that the EULEX
1107 The fieldwork included meetings with civil society representatives, EULEX and EU delegation
representatives, Serbian Government officials and opposition leaders, and political reporters from the major
Serbian newspapers, Politika, Blic and Večernje Novosti. Daily articles were analysed from these sources in the
two weeks before the parliamentary elections. Key themes concerned the state of Serbian economy and the
strength of Serbia’s national currency, European integration, and Serbia’s relationship with Kosovo, Croatia and
Bosnia-Herzegovina (Republika Srpska in particular).
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representatives had actively engaged pro-EU opposition parties in informal policy dialogue
before and immediately after the elections. This was a sign of evolution in the use of non-
traditional EU foreign policy instruments in Serbia, as such informal meetings had hitherto
usually been organised by diplomatic representatives from key EU member states, as well as
the US and Russia.1108
During one of those informal meetings, which the author attended, key themes concerned
Serbia’s democratic reforms after the elections, and relations with Kosovo. EULEX
representatives, who were fluent in Serbian and well-informed about major political
developments including within political parties, asked questions about Serbia’s relations with
Kosovo. By engaging with the Serbian opposition parties, the EULEX staff were involved in a
process of socialisation of Serbian opposition.1109 EULEX representatives asked questions
about possible future alliance between different political parties in Serbia, the identity of
individuals who were likely to be in key official and advisory functions, and the type of
relationship with Kosovo that could be expected to result from various scenarios of power-
sharing arrangements. This seemed to indicate an increased willingness on the part of the EU
to engage with pro-EU opposition parties, albeit in an informal manner, in order to facilitate a
change in Serbia’s policy approach to the Kosovo issue.
Informal dialogue with pro-EU opposition parties was not new for the EU, as the EU had
previously engaged in informal dialogue with the Serbian opposition in the late 1990s and 2000
as described in Chapter Five. The key difference was the change in focus from the DS to the
1108 Conversation with a Serbian opposition leader Nikolić, Belgrade, April 2012.
1109 At this informal meeting, the author’s work was made known to the EULEX representatives, who agreed to
the author’s presence during meeting subject to the proviso that specific details (such as names and positions of
the EULEX officials) other than the major topics covered not be revealed. The observations reported here are,
therefore, the author’s own conclusions.
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SNS, especially since the SNS had begun to advocate dialogue with Kosovo Albanians at the
highest level to replace technical talks. The US particularly welcomed this development.1110
EU foreign policy towards Serbia has, therefore, become much more strategically focused and
proactive in comparison to its fragmented and reactive approach in the early 1990s. This was
remarkable as five EU members did not recognise Kosovo’s independence. Despite this
challenge, EU institutions such as EULEX (which reported to High Representative Ashton)
were engaged in informal political discussions with the opposition. The author, as an observer
during some of these discussions, interpreted such EU action to be a sign of maturity and
evolution in the EU’s foreign policy instruments and use of soft power. It also indicated that
the EU was thinking more strategically, going beyond widespread public expectations of
another DS-SPS Government to consider other political options for Serbia.
Serbian parliamentary and presidential elections in 2012
Serbia’s EU policy was once again an important topic at the ballot box, with one major
difference from the 2008 elections—the SNS was also advocating Serbia’s EU membership,
and its conservative leaders had gained enough popularity to present the most serious threat to
the DS in Serbian politics. The Serbian parliamentary elections of 6 May 2012 did not result in
a clear majority win for any political party. The SNS won the highest number of seats, followed
by the DS and the SPS. This shift was initially received with scepticism across Europe, as
political observers feared a return to Milošević-era nationalist policies after the electoral results
became known—which are presented in the chart below.1111
1110 Simić, ‘Serbia: continuity and change after 2012 elections’, spring 2013, op. cit., p. 4.
1111 Some commentators unsurprisingly labelled Nikolić a ‘pro-Russia nationalist’. G. Vogt, ‘Nationalist Nikolić
wins Serbian election’, Examiner, http://www.examiner.com/article/nationalist-Nikolić-wins-serbian-election
(accessed 1 May 2013). Others recognised Nikolić’s political will to intensify Serbia’s European integration
efforts. I. Jovanović, ‘Serbia’s Nikolić: a changed man?’, Southeast European Times, 28 May 2012,
http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2012/05/28/feature-01
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Chart 7: Serbian parliamentary elections, 6 May 2012
Before the elections, it was widely believed that the SPS would again form the government
with its previous Coalition partner, the DS. However, the DS wanted to have a Prime Minister
from its ranks, and refused to form any coalition with the SNS, the DSS or the SRS. Tadić, as
President of the DS, warned that Serbia’s parliamentary elections in 2012 were of critical
importance for Serbia’s European future. He labelled his SNS opponents as ‘people who
created the 1990s—violence against other people and religions and overall destruction’, who
‘could reverse the entire process of European modernisation of Serbia’ that started under the
DS-led Serbian Government in 2001.1112 However, in its 2012 report for Serbia the European
Commission also echoed the Serbian opposition parties’ claims that media reporting prior to
the 2012 elections was politically biased:
(accessed 1 May 2013). The author’s impression from fieldwork discussions with Nikolić was that he was more
of a pragmatist in his new role rather than a hard-core nationalist that he was during the 1990s.
1112 The DS campaign was particularly negative towards the SNS, which was portrayed as highly nationalistic.
However, this did not correspond with the political platform of a new party (SNS) led by familiar politicians but
with reformed views. Views expressed on contentious regional issues, however, especially regarding disputes
























Media reporting was also noted as insufficiently balanced and analytical, which pointed
to the wider need to clarify the issue of media ownership.1113
While the elections were fought along traditional political lines, the EU and Kosovo themes
were heavily present in the pre-election campaigning. In a repeat meeting with one leader from
the Serbian opposition, it was clear ahead of the 2012 elections that Kosovo would be a major
issue, and that for it to be resolved, Serbia would need to significantly modify its position on
Kosovo and the issue of Serbs in northern Kosovo if it wanted to become closer to the EU club.
The DS was not willing to promise to the Socialists the position of prime minister, and this was
a key reason why the socialists entered into a power-sharing arrangement with the Progressives
(SNS). The Socialists (SPS) under its leader, Ivica Dačić (a key figure in the previous coalition
government), and the SNS—founded by Serbia’s main opposition leader Tomislav Nikolić
(then President of the SNS) and his deputy, Aleksandar Vučić—formed a governing coalition
in July 2012.1114 In what was an innovation for many observers, the SNS called for a
government of national unity, inviting several office holders from the opposition parties to join
it. One of those people was Milica Delević from the DS, who has vast experience dealing with
the EU as the head of the Serbian European Integration Office, but she turned down the
opportunity to become Serbia’s first female Foreign Minister as her party was against it.1115
This was a demonstration of commitment by the new government to support Serbia’s European
integration efforts, even if that meant inviting selected DS members. The refusal to join the
1113 European Commission, ‘Serbia: 2012 progress report’, 10 October 2012, p. 6.
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2012/package/sr_rapport_2012_en.pdf, (accessed 13 May
2014).
1114 In the 1990s, Dačić was Milošević’s party (SPS) spokesperson. Nikolić, at that time in SRS, was Deputy
prime minister of Serbia (in 1998–99) and Deputy prime minister of FRY (in 1999–2000), while Vučić (who
was a member of the SRS during the 1990s) was Serbia’s Minister for Information (1998–2000).
1115 ‘Vučić: Milica Delević ne ulazi u vladu’, Radio-Televizija Srbije, 19 July 2012, http://xn--p1acc.xn--
90a3ac/page/stories/sr/story/9/Politika/1142388/Vu per centC4 per cent8Di per centC4 per cent87 per
cent3A+Milica+Delevi per centC4 per cent87+ne+ulazi+u+vladu+.html (accessed 15 April 2013).
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government was a sign that the majority of them did not trust the SNS-led Serbian Government
to lead Serbia towards the EU.
Other groups drawn into the new coalition included the URS (formerly G17+) and two minor
parties led by Bosniaks. Rasim Ljajić, of the minority Social Democratic Party of Serbia,
become Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign and Internal Trade and
Telecommunications. Sulejman Ugljanin, of the Party of Democratic Action of Sandžak,
assumed the position of Minister without Portfolio.1116 While the new governing coalition
remained committed to Serbia’s European integration as a key strategic goal, the European
Commission expressed concerns, in late 2012, about Serbia’s lack of progress in judicial
reform, the absence of parliamentary oversight over executive government, and the number of
cases against Serbia in the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECfHR’), which represented 6
per cent of all filed applications with the Court.1117 Even though the majority of cases against
Serbia related to ‘the excessive length of court cases and to non-enforcement of domestic
judgments’, the high number of cases lodged with the ECfHR did not help create a good
impression of Serbia among EU members.1118 It is likely that judicial reform will become more
significant as Serbia’s path towards EU membership progresses further, evolving into a more
highly prioritised item in the EU’s political conditionality towards Serbia.
In the Freedom House report for 2012, which evaluates the democratic reform of states in
transition, including in the Western Balkans, Serbia registered the lowest score in the ‘judicial
1116 It is interesting to note here that these two politicians were bitterly divided over the Bosnian war, with the
former accusing the latter of supporting Wahhabism in Bosnia. Wahhabism is an imported version of Islam from
the Middle East, and continues to be seen by some local Muslim communities, especially in the Sandžak region,
as a threat.
1117 To illustrate the complexity of judicial reform, the European Commission observed that Serbian courts in
2011 ‘received 2.23 million new cases, resolved 2.65 million cases and were left with a backlog of 3.34 million
cases’. European Commission, ‘Serbia: 2012 progress report’, op. cit., pp. 11, 13.
1118 ibid., p. 13.
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framework and independence’ democratic performance criterion. It appeared to have
performed worse than in 2003, as the Freedom House table reproduced below shows.
Table 1: Serbia’s democracy scores (2012)1119
The table also shows that scores for media independence had been declining since the DS-SPS
coalition took office in 2008; the score for this criterion was worse in 2012 than in 2003.
Although improvement can be observed in the scores for Serbia’s ‘civil society’ and democratic
governance (at the national and local levels), challenges in the judicial sector have the potential
(if left unresolved) to spill over into other policy areas, affecting efforts against organised
crime, high-level corruption cases and minority rights. Independence of the media is likely to
1119 A. Nenadović, ‘Nations in Transit: Serbia’, Freedom House, 2012,
http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Serbia_final.pdf, (accessed 21 October 2013). The lower the
score, the more democratic a country is judged to be.
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become a bigger problem for Serbia’s EU accession, as it is also marked by normative
discourses.
Diplomatic signalling from the EU
In May 2012, Serbia was invited, for the first time, to participate in a multilateral economic
dialogue through the Council’s meeting on pre-accession fiscal surveillance.1120 This indicated
both capacity and greater willingness on Serbia’s part to participate in the fiscal surveillance
and economic policy coordination process—a major component of the EU’s fiscal and
monetary union. Serbia also demonstrated through this forum its commitment to continue with
European integration, which was particularly important at that moment as Serbia had national
elections.
In the run-off presidential election on 20 May 2012, Boris Tadić lost to Tomislav Nikolić,
having faced him for the third time since 2004 at the ballot box. This was a double blow for
the DS, which with this loss was left without any official function for the first time since
Serbia’s democratic changes in 2000.  The disastrous result for the DS led to internal divisions
within the party, restructuring and ultimately, Boris Tadić’s resignation.1121 The fact that the
EU Commissioner for Enlargement, Štefan Füle, personally attended the presidential
inauguration ceremony on 11 June 2012, demonstrated the EU’s clear commitment to working
closely with the new Serbian President, despite his Eurosceptic past.1122
1120 European Commission, ‘Serbia: 2012 progress report’, op. cit., p. 5.
1121 In 2014, Tadić formed a new political party, New Democratic Party (Nova Demokratska Stranka).
1122 ‘Nikolić inaugurated: EU path is Serbia’s future’, Balkan Open Report, 13 June 2012,
http://www.balkanopen.com/article.php?id=715 (accessed 1 May 2014).
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In his speech at Nikolić’s inauguration, EU Commissioner Füle said that he particularly
welcomed the fact that the Serbian President’s first official visit abroad would be to Brussels
on 14 June, which he told Nikolić was ‘a clear sign of the priority you attach to Serbia’s
European orientation’.1123 However, Nikolić’s first trip abroad, which occurred between the
time he won the elections and the formal start of his Presidency on 31 May 2012, was in fact
to an annual meeting of Putin’s United Russia Party, with which SNS has a party-to-party
bilateral relationship. According to the press reports, Nikolić advised Russia of Serbia’s
European integration path when they met on the margins of this event. 1124 Nonetheless, Putin
indicated that he was willing to grant Serbia a new loan as well as to support it on the Kosovo
issue in international fora. Symbolically, this trip was another demonstration of the difficulty
attached to Serbia’s balancing of its pro-Western and pro-Russia orientation, its economic
needs as well as its normative commitment to both the EU and Russia.
Developments within the Democratic Party have indirectly helped to consolidate the influence
of the Progressives in Serbian politics, as the SNS took over the leading position previously
held by the DS as Serbia’s largest pro-EU political party. In line with the EU demands of
Serbia’s new leadership, the SNS-SPS coalition announced that its focus would be the fight
against corruption and improving economic growth. According to a SEIO public opinion poll,
public support for Serbia’s EU membership declined in 2012, falling to a historic low of 41 per
cent by December 2012.1125 A key initiative in Serbia’s European integration since the
parliamentary election was the Brussels agreement. This was a major EU diplomatic success
1123 He also noted that during Nikolić’s Presidency, key challenges would be Serbia’s continuation of dialogue
with Kosovo and implementation of reforms in key areas such as the judiciary and the fight against corruption.
Štefan Füle, European Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood, ‘Policy Speech at the
inauguration of President Nikolić’, Belgrade 11 June 2012, 11 June 2012, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_SPEECH-12-432_en.htm?locale=en (accessed 21 October 2013).
1124 Radio Televizija Srbije, ‘Nikolić sa Putinom’, 26 May 2012,
http://www.rts.rs/page/stories/sr/story/9/Politika/1109852/Nikolić+sa+Putinom.html (accessed 21 October
2013).
1125 Republic of Serbia, SEIO, December 2013 report, op. cit., p. 4.
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in bringing former foes from the Western Balkans to the same bargaining table after Serbia
came under SNS leadership.
The Brussels Agreement
Under the SNS-SPS Government, the EU continued to facilitate dialogue between Belgrade
and Priština, moving the talks beyond technical dialogue to the political level.1126 For the first
time ever, the Prime Ministers of both Serbia and Kosovo met in Brussels on 19 October 2012
and opened a high-level dialogue. Many rounds of negotiations facilitated by the EU foreign
policy chief, Baroness Catherine Ashton, yielded a landmark result in April 2013 with the
conclusion of the so-called 15-points agreement (officially known as ‘First Agreement of
Principles Governing the Normalization of Relations’)—the Brussels Agreement.1127 Although
the Serbian Prime Minister Ivica Dačić’s signature did not imply that Serbia would recognise
Kosovo’s independence, it represented a significant ‘concession acknowledging Kosovo as a
bounded political entity’.1128
Serbia’s new policy towards negotiating with Kosovo authorities was a sign that the SNS-SPS
coalition was ready to show more flexibility in return for concessions from the EU and the
promise of even closer relations. The change in Serbia’s policy also demonstrated the
transformative power of the EU’s membership promise. Serbia’s major success in this
diplomatic quest was the reaching of an agreement with the Kosovo Government to form the
1126 Mediation involves an ‘active search for a negotiated settlement to an international or intrastate conflict by
an impartial third party’. The third party can draw up the agenda, call and chair negotiating sessions, propose
solutions and even employ threats and promises towards the rivals. G. R. Berridge and A. James, A dictionary of
diplomacy, 2003, op. cit., p. 171.
1127 ‘Text of historic agreement between Serbia and Kosovo’, European Voice, 19 April 2013,
http://www.europeanvoice.com/page/3609.aspx?&blogitemid=1723 (accessed 1 May 2013).
1128 D. Bechev, ‘Serbia, Kosovo and the benefits of normalisation’, April 2013, http://esharp.eu/big-
debates/external-action/108-serbia-kosovo-and-the-benefits-of-normalisation/, (accessed 1 May 2013). The
Serbian and Kosovo leaders were nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize following this agreement.
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Association of Serbian Municipalities in the north. Most political parties in the Serbian
Parliament supported the agreement, except for the DSS. The DSS parliamentarian, Slobodan
Samardžić, called it an ‘act of betrayal of national interests’.1129 Many Serbs in North Kosovo
rejected the Brussels agreement, calling for a referendum on the issue.
The Kosovo Parliament ratified the agreement on 27 June 2013, despite some obstructions and
protests from a minor, ultra-nationalist party.1130 The Brussels agreement led to an exchange
of liaison officers between Belgrade and Priština, whose role was to monitor the agreement’s
implementation.1131 On 28 June 2013, the EU made a landmark resolution to open accession
negotiations with Serbia in January 2014. On the same day, the EU agreed to open negotiations
on the SAA with Kosovo. In September 2013, the Serbian Parliament learned that Germany’s
Bundestag would monitor key provisions of the Brussels agreement, in particular the local
elections in Kosovo on 3 November.1132 With this political signalling, Germany was affirming
its leading role on Kosovo conditionality. This was relevant as Germany was also the highest
individual country donor to Serbia from the EU, having provided over €1.2 billion since
2000.1133
In October 2013, the EU set up a special fund to assist the development of Serb municipalities
in Kosovo. EU Enlargement Commissioner Štefan Füle said that the first instalment of funding
1129 ‘Serbian Parliament supports agreement about Kosovo’, Independent Balkan News Agency, 26 April 2013,
http://www.balkaneu.com/serbian-parliament-supports-agreement-kosovo/, (accessed 8 August 2013).
1130 John Petersen, ‘Kosovo Assembly ratifies the ‘Brussels Agreement’, 22 July 2013,
http://www.infoecmi.eu/index.php/kosovo-assembly-ratifies-the-brussels-agreement/ (accessed 8 August 2013).
1131 ‘Priština, Belgrade set to exchange liaison officers’, 16 June 2013, http://www.eubusiness.com/news-
eu/kosovo-serbia.p6v, (accessed 8 August 2013).
1132 InSerbia Network Foundation, ‘Bundestag to monitor implementation of Brussels agreement between
Belgrade and Pristina’, 11 September 2013, http://inserbia.info/today/2013/09/bundestag-to-monitor-
implementation-of-brussels-agreement-between-belgrade-and-pristina/, (accessed 7 December 2013).
1133 Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Serbia, ‘EU assistance to Serbia’,
http://europa.rs/en/eu_assistance_to_serbia.html, (accessed 2 February 2014).
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of €15 million was a demonstration of the EU’s commitment to the Brussels agreement.1134 On
23 December 2013, the European Commission adopted the 2013 IPA national program for
Serbia, totalling €178.7 million.1135 The EU delegation to Serbia stated:
A mark of special trust between us is that in 2014 Serbia takes over management of EU
funded projects. There are currently over 600 on-going projects under implementation
covering a wide range of sectors for the overall benefit of Serbian citizens.1136
However, despite higher levels of trust developing between EU and Serbia in vitally important
economic matters, the biggest obstacle in their relations is now Serbia’s close relationship with
Russia (evident in Serbia’s refusal to show solidarity with EU sanctions against Russia), and
the question of Kosovo’s final status.1137
The issue of bilateral disputes was evident with Lithuania delaying its ratification of the SAA
with Serbia. In April 2013, following Prime Minister Dačić’s personal visit to the Lithuanian
Government to resolve a bilateral issue, the Lithuanian Parliament ratified the SAA—thereby
removing the final obstacle, as it was the last EU member state to do so. The Lithuanian issue
with Serbia stemmed from bilateral disputes, such as the privatisation of a Serbian company in
which a Lithuanian company has economic interests, and possibly also the fact that a Serbian
1134 InSerbia Network Foundation, ‘EU sets up special fund for development of Serbian municipalities in
Kosovo’, 31 October 2013, http://inserbia.info/today/2013/10/eu-sets-up-special-fund-for-development-of-
serbian-municipalities-in-kosovo/, (accessed 7 December 2013).
1135 Other ongoing support included funding for Civil Society Facility (€2.5 million), the TEMPUS programme
(€4 million), and funds for refugees under the Regional Housing Programme (€12 million). Delegation of the
European Union to the Republic of Serbia, ‘EU assistance to Serbia’, op. cit.
1136 ibid.
1137 For a useful overview of Serbia-Russia relations in a broader historical context, see Ž.N. Petrović (ed.),
‘Russia Serbia Relations at the beginning of the 21st century’, International and Security Affairs Centre,
Belgrade, 2010.
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Government nominee, former Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremić, was elected as President of the
UN General Assembly over the Lithuanian candidate (by a vote of 99 to 85).1138
After the SAA came into force in September 2013, the major tasks which Serbia still needed
to fulfil were establishing a free-trade agreement with the EU and harmonising Serbian laws in
line with the acquis.1139 Under the provisions in the extensive SAA agreement, Serbia is
required to gradually abolish duties on imports from the EU, including for Serbia’s traditionally
highly protected agricultural goods. Serbia’s current lead negotiator in dialogue with the EU,
political scientist Tanja Miščević has observed that Serbia’s priority will be on political reforms
since economic reforms have been ongoing since 2010 when Serbia unilaterally decided to
implement the interim trade agreement and started to abolish customs duties.1140 Serbia and the
EU pledged to co-sponsor the formation of implementation and oversight bodies, including the
Stabilisation and Association Council, the Stabilisation and Association Committee and the
Stabilisation and Association Parliamentary Committee, which will all be made up of
representatives of the EU and Serbia. As Miščević points out, the most important new element
arising from the SAA’s entry into force is Serbia’s obligation to ‘adjust parts of its foreign
policy to harmonise them with the common positions of the EU, when relevant’.1141 This has
proven to be a challenging task in respect of Serbia’s relationship with Russia.
1138 United Nations General Assembly, ‘General Assembly elects Serbia’s foreign minister Vuk Jeremić
President of 67th session’, 8 June 2012, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/ga11253.doc.htm, (accessed 8
August 2013).
1139 InSerbia Network Foundation, ‘Lithuanian Parliament ratified the Stabilization and Association Agreement
(SAA) with Serbia’, 16 June 2013, http://inserbia.info/today/2013/06/lithuanian-parliament-ratified-the-
stabilization-and-association-agreement-saa-with-serbia/, (accessed 8 August 2013).
1140 Email correspondence with Tanja Miščević, July 2010. ‘Tanja Miščević as Serbia’s chief negotiator in EU
membership talks’, Balkan Inside, 1 September 2013, http://www.balkaninside.com/tanja-miscevic-as-serbias-
chief-negotiator-in-eu-talks/, (accessed 12 November 2013).
1141 ‘Serbia’s EU stabilisation deal comes into force’, Balkan Open Report, 8 September 2013,
http://www.balkanopen.com/article.php?id=1445, (accessed 8 August 2013).
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Table 2: Serbia’s alignment with the Common Foreign and Security Policy statements1142
Progress report Percentage of alignment with EU declarations and Council decisions
2010 69 per cent (51/74)1143
2011 ‘most instances’1144
2012 99 per cent (69/70)1145
2013 89 per cent (31/35)1146
In the early parliamentary election on 16 March 2014, the SNS bloc won an overwhelming
parliamentary majority. The political ‘marriage of convenience’ between the SNS and the SPS
continued, while the electoral success of the DS was seriously undermined by votes leaking
from DS to the former Serbian President, Boris Tadić, and his New Democratic Party (NDS).
The DSS did not pass the parliamentary threshold for the first time since the DOS Coalition’s
victory in 2000, which means that now all Serbian political parties with parliamentary
representation have a pro-EU policy approach. This could represent a decisive maturing of
Serbia’s European integration process as only parties that supported Serbia’s European
integration entered Parliament.1147 This is despite the fact that Serbia’s alignment with EU
foreign policy positions seems to be falling away. Due to Serbia’s refusal to support the EU’s
position on the Ukrainian crisis in 2014, it is most likely that in the EU’s next progress report
1142 Table 2 is the author’s own work.
1143 European Commission, ‘Serbia: 2010 progress report’, op. cit., p. 5,
1144 European Commission, ‘Serbia’s analytical report’, 12 October 2011, p. 128,
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2011/package/sr_analytical_rapport_2011_en.pdf,
(accessed 13 May 2014).
1145 European Commission, ‘Serbia: 2012 progress report’, 10 October 2012, p. 62,
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2012/package/sr_rapport_2012_en.pdf, (accessed 13 May
2014).
1146 European Commission, ‘Serbia: 2013 progress report’, 16 October 2013, p. 59,
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2013/package/sr_rapport_2013.pdf, (accessed 13 May
2014).
1147 Izbori 2014, ‘Konačni rezultati parlamentarnih izbora 2014’, 25 March 2014, http://eizbori.com/konacni-
rezultati-parlamentarnih-izbora-2014/, (accessed 1 May 2014).
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for Serbia this gap will become even more pronounced. The results of the Serbian 2014
parliamentary elections are presented in the chart that follows.1148
Chart 8: Serbian parliamentary elections, 16 March 2014
Serbia’s democracy scores have also remained intact since the arrival of the SNS-SPS coalition
in mid-2012.1149 This indicates that domestic challenges to reform do not seem to have withered
away significantly since 2011. As this thesis has argued, domestic factors are important for
moving the reform process forward, but not enough. The split within Serbian democrats has
weakened the support base for this political group in Serbian politics, while the SNS coalition
has been as strong as ever. The normative factors, however, are precluding further advancement
in the relationship with the EU as Serbia is once again witnessing a re-introducing of the
East/West bridging idea by the dominant political elites, especially the SNS. The political will
1148 All charts, including chart 8, are the author’s own work.
1149 M. Savić, ‘Nations in Transit: Serbia’, Freedom House, 2014,
http://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Serbia_Proof2_upload.pdf, (accessed 29 May 2014). In this report,

























to show solidarity with the EU in the foreign policy domain seems to have been seriously
affected by the Ukrainian-Russian crisis, in which both the EU and the US are politically
invested. While Serbia’s administrative capacities have improved since 2011, as noted in the
annual European Commission’s progress reports, and while the country has advanced in its
dialogue with Kosovo authorities, the lack of a comprehensive view by the Serbian
Government in relation to broader goals of EU accession is likely to cause further
complications in Serbia’s EU accession process. The priority for the current government has
been Serbia’s economic growth. Expansion of traditional partnerships to include new financial
partners, such as the United Arab Emirates and India, points to two things. Firstly, Serbia is
investigating options for growth that originate in the ‘East and West, South and North’, without
focusing exclusively on improving its market access into the EU countries or local conditions
for exporters. Secondly, by building relationships with countries like Belarus, the Serbian
Government has demonstrated a continuity in foreign policy from the previous government
that, for example, initiated closer ties with Azerbaijan.1150 As the EU membership perspective
seem to be a more distant if still strategic goal, normative factors from Serbia’s collective
memory and ruling elites are, once again, creating obstacles on its EU accession path.
1150 The City of Belgrade erected a monument to former president of Azarbaijan, Heydar Aliyev (the father of
the current president in Baku) as a signal of Serbia’s new diplomatic relationship with this country. Two years
later, under Serbia’s new leadership, Azarbaijan erected a monument to late Serbian-American inventor and
physicist, Nikola Tesla, which may indicate a continuity in a newfound friendship between the two countries.
Radio Free Europe, ‘Belgrade erects statue to former Azerbaijani President’, 8 June 2011,
http://www.rferl.org/content/belgrade_erects_statue_to_ex-azerbaijani_president/24229017.html (accessed 5
December 2013). ‘Azerbaijani and Serbian Presidents attend inauguration of monument to Nikola Tesla’, 8




Despite the fact that the formal opening of accession negotiations between the EU and Serbia
took place in January 2014, the opening of chapters has been delayed because of the elections
in the EU.1151 The head of EU delegation to Serbia and former British Ambassador to Serbia,
Michael Davenport, said that the progress in EU-Serbia relations will depend on the
implementation of the SAA and ‘Serbia’s responses to the EU’s technical questions’, including
in its dialogue with Kosovo.1152 Since its ratification, the Brussels Agreement has been
unevenly implemented, causing some concerns among observers of regional politics that
tensions might re-escalate between Serbia and Kosovo if the EU does not maintain the
momentum of a clear membership prospect for both Belgrade and Priština.1153 The EU High
Representative criticised both the Serbian and Kosovo leaders for not doing enough to ensure
the implementation of this agreement.1154
Two high-ranking EU officials visited Serbia in April 2014, High Representative Ashton and
EU Enlargement Commissioner Füle. The EU Delegation’s head in Belgrade, Ambassador
Michael Davenport, described these visits as ‘the strongest signal of the EU support to
Serbia’.1155 Major issues highlighted during Commissioner Füle’s visit included Serbia’s
further economic and legal reforms as well as the ‘normalisation of relations with Priština’—
1151 RTS, ‘Pregovori sa EU počinju kontrolom finansija’, 7 May 2014,
http://www.rts.rs/page/stories/sr/story/9/Politika/1591934/Pregovori+sa+EU+po%C4%8Dinju+kontrolom+finan
sija.html, (accessed 10 May 2014).
1152 Radio-Televizija Vojvodine, ‘Devenport: Otvaranje poglavlja 23 i 24 verovatno 2015’, 22 June 2014,
http://www.rtv.rs/sr_lat/politika/devenport-otvaranje-poglavlja-23-i-24-verovatno-2015._496709.html,
(accessed 23 June 2014).
1153 Tanjug, ‘Debate on scope of implementation of Brussels agreement’, 27 April 2014,
http://www.tanjug.rs/news/126891/debate-on-scope-of-implementation-of-brussels-agreement.htm, (accessed 1
May 2014).
1154 InSerbia Network Foundation, ‘Ashton: PMs of Serbia and Kosovo are behind Brussels Agreement’, 23
March 2014, http://inserbia.info/today/2014/03/ashton-pms-of-serbia-and-kosovo-are-behind-brussels-
agreement/, (accessed 1 May 2014).
1155 Xinhua, ‘EU enlargement continues, including Serbia: Davenport’, 9 May 2014,
http://en.ce.cn/World/Europe/201405/09/t20140509_2791085.shtml, (accessed 10 May 2014).
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the Kosovo conditionality.1156 During Füle’s visit, the Serbian President complained that he
did not feel that Serbia was being treated equally by all EU members:
I know that by meeting the conditions we will make it possible for citizens to live in a
well-organised country, a legal state, equal to the others, but for the time being, I do not
feel that we are exactly equal to everyone in the EU.1157
The statement signals that an important part of the Serbian leadership may feel that Serbian
needs are being ignored. This might also suggest that the attraction of EU membership, despite
being given a boost in the official opening of negotiations, was waning for Serbian voters,
whose EU scepticism remained high. It also demonstrates the limits of the EU’s economic
diplomacy with Serbia, as the soft power approach necessitates the building of a common
normative platform towards building closer relations in all domains.
A testing moment for Serbian diplomacy occurred in May 2014 when EU representatives called
on Serbia to show solidarity and align itself with the EU sanctions against Russia following the
escalation of the Ukrainian crisis.1158 As the Serbian leadership chose not to support the
common EU position on sanctions (unlike Montenegro, for example) and declared neutrality,
the question arose once again as to where Serbia’s solidarity in its foreign relations may lie in
the future despite notable progress in EU-Serbia relations under the SNS-SPS coalition. Like
several EU states (Bulgaria, Austria and Italy in particular), Serbia has cooperated on the South
1156 The President of the Republic of Serbia, ‘President Nikolić with Stefan Fule’, 5 May 2014,
http://www.predsednik.rs/en/press-center/news/president-Nikolić-stefan-fule (accessed 10 May 2014).
1157 ibid.
1158 ‘Serbia’s careful balancing act on Ukraine’, Euractiv, 9 May 2014,
www.euractiv.com/sections/enlargement/serbias-careful-balancing-act-ukraine-302018, (accessed 10 May
2014). In early July 2014, EU Ambassador Davenport said that Serbia should seek to align its foreign policy
with the EU. Tanjug, ‘Serbia “should align foreign policy with EU”’, 10 July 2014,
http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2014&mm=07&dd=10&nav_id=90931 (accessed 11 July
2014).
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Stream project, which the European Commission has expressed reservations about. Serbia’s
foreign policy dilemma over the case of Russian sanctions shows that normative considerations
in Serbian foreign policy as well as national discourses play a major role in its decision-making,
which in turn could affect Serbia’s EU candidacy assessment by EU institutions and member
states. As a candidate for EU accession, Serbia is required to align its foreign policy with the
EU’s common decisions, such as the sanctions. It will take more than a careful choice of words
for the new Serbian Government under the SNS and the SPS to explain its neutrality position
towards Russian-Ukrainian crisis and its refusal to support the EU sanctions against Russia.
An escalation of quasi-nationalist rhetoric in Serbia has been noted since the last election. The
new Serbian Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić declared in May 2014 that ‘the West’, including
the EU, has asked Serbia to support sanctions against Russia, but:
Serbia has demonstrated that it has its own policy which is the best for us [Serbia],
which respects moral values, European integration but also its friends [Russia] who did
not implement sanctions against Serbia and did not bomb us [Serbia], and that is very
important, with whom we have very successful economic relations.1159
Vučić effectively highlighted the need for Serbia to maintain a third way (‘its own policy’),
just like Tito’s Yugoslavia did in any conflict between East and West whilst reaping economic
benefits from both sides. This normative position of Serbia’s most important decision-maker,
the prime minister, shows that national discourses and collective memory remain highly
relevant in the dynamic process of the European integration of post-communist countries like
1159 Tanjug, ‘Vučić: Zapad je tražio da uvedemo sankcije Rusiji’, 11 May 2014,
www.novosti.rs/vesti/naslovna/politika/aktuelno.289.html:491153-Vucic-Zapad-je-trazio-da-uvedemo-sankcije-
Rusiji (accessed 13 May 2014).
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Serbia, and post-conflict societies in the Western Balkans generally. Observing these normative
constructs as an indication of political sentiment, public discourses and diplomatic signalling
to determine Serbia’s position is going to be more relevant than ever before in evaluating the
progress of EU-Serbia’s accession negotiations.
Conclusion
This chapter has examined EU-Serbia relations under a conservative, SNS Government
coalition with the SPS. Under their leadership, Serbia negotiated a breakthrough result under
EU auspices in its relationship with Kosovo, resulting in their first bilateral political agreement
in April 2013 that sought to address the needs of both sides. However, as the implementation
of this agreement has been slow, the EU is deliberating about the best way forward. A logical
conclusion from the EU’s experience in the Balkans over the past decade would be to continue
to provide adequate incentives and clear prospect of membership to both parties, which is the
most important motivating factor for them to continue to resolve differences in a peaceful
manner. At the socio-political level, victimhood narratives, advanced by both Serbs and
Albanians, are continuing, representing a recurring obstacle to finding a permanent solution.
When the massive flooding of early May 2014 struck Serbia as well as Bosnia-Herzegovina
and Croatia, causing over €1 billion in damage to these countries’ economies, it was said that
only such a common tragedy could bring people from the former Yugoslavia closer together to
the point where they might express unconditional solidarity towards one another. However, as
the flooding also uncovered a mass-grave in Bosnia of what is suspected to be Bosniak victims,
traditional normative constructs and discourses regarding the conflict of the 1990s in the
Balkans will certainly not wane.
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As the consequences of the major flooding disaster are further evaluated, Serbia’s economic
development is likely to experience a setback in the short term. While the EU’s initial response
was criticised in the Serbian media for being too slow, the EU indicated it would allow Serbia
to use special funds up to the value of €1 billion once the damages were properly assessed.
Meanwhile, individual EU countries have provided financial and technical assistance and
support, alongside other major donors (Japan, the US, Russia and the UAE).1160
Over the foreseeable future, Serbia’s European integration will remain a highly normative
process domestically, in which ideological differences are likely to cause further delays in the
progress of reform. Similarly, bilateral disputes are equally significant to political
conditionality for Serbia’s prospective accession. While public opinion in Serbia and in the EU
towards Serbia’s EU accession remains reserved, and the EU becomes more inwardly focused
because of events such as European parliamentary elections, its attractiveness for countries in
the Western Balkans will be maintained only by a commitment by the EU to accept candidates
from the Western Balkans. However, European accession is a political and normative process
that is constantly renegotiated. For this reason, the narratives surrounding it ought to be
carefully watched and analysed, as the EU will need to reinforce its economic carrots with a
longer-term soft power strategy. Only when Serbia’s normative interests are more closely
aligned with those of the EU, including in the foreign policy domain, will it be easier for both
parties to deepen their cooperation on the path towards Serbia’s eventual accession.
1160 The EU’s response to the floods in the Western Balkans was the ‘biggest ever operation of the Community
Mechanism for Civil Protection’, and it included twenty-two EU members. InSerbia Network Foundation,
‘Davenport: First chapter in EU negotiations could be opened by the end of the year’, 10 July 2014,
http://inserbia.info/today/2014/07/davenport-first-chapter-in-eu-negotiations-could-be-opened-by-the-end-of-
the-year/, (accessed 10 July 2014).
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Serbia also needs to be reassured that Serbs who are living in Kosovo are not overlooked and
marginalised. In accordance with its current Constitution, the Serbian Government still regards
Kosovo as its own territory as elaborated in its constitution—a position which Kosovo
authorities find highly offensive. In order to avoid another protracted issue, the EU could grant
to both Serbia and Kosovo more scholarship opportunities and temporary labour rights, support
for reform in public administration, the judicial sector and national rebuilding. More
engagement from the EU rather than less, and a better articulated communications strategy
could assist in countering negative perceptions of the EU among Serbs, the majority of whom
have not travelled to the EU over the past twenty years because of sanctions and economic
hardship, but also because of the normative influence of ongoing anti-EU political rhetoric at
the societal level in post-Milošević Serbia.
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THESIS CONCLUSION
It takes a huge effort to free yourself from memory, but when you succeed, you start
to realise that you’re capable of far more than you imagined.1161
European integration is a deeply social and negotiated political process with a strong normative
dimension. This thesis analysed the key political and normative challenges to Serbia’s EU
accession in order to explain why Serbia’s European integration process has been particularly
difficult and highly uneven, and characterised by frequent delays. One key research finding is
that in its relationship with Serbia, the EU has frequently resorted to coercive diplomatic
strategies in order to encourage changes to Serbia’s domestic and international behaviour (a
strategy that was also applied to Bulgaria and Romania). However, this strategy increased some
of the pre-existing divisions among Serbian democrats, leading to an even greater internal
political instability, and slowing down the pace of domestic reform in the context of
Europeanisation.
A major factor that distinguishes Serbia from earlier cases in European integration (the CEES
in particular) is the fact that some of the most important members for the EU’s enlargement
policy (Germany, France, Italy and the UK) actively supported a military operation against
FRY in 1999. The normative legacy of this conflict, especially anti-Western discourses in
Serbia that skyrocketed following the NATO intervention, continue to adversely affect Serbia’s
political discourses and complicate all efforts undertaken by Serbian political leaders to deepen
their country’s engagement with the EU.1162
1161 Wikiquote, ‘Paolo Coelho’, http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Paulo_Coelho, (accessed 11 July 2014).
1162 Anti-Serbian discourses in the West, which were not examined in this thesis, could potentially provide
further insight into delays in negotiations with Serbia on the EU’s side. Further research would be required
before any such link could be established and proven. Further research is indeed needed to show how the
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A normative debate between pro- and anti-Western political discourses in Serbia, and the
collective memory of past conflicts, has profoundly influenced Serbia’s European integration.
For this reason, a new approach is needed in order to better comprehend key obstacles to
Serbia’s European integration. Constructivist methods (such as historical discourse- and
contextual analysis, and a position that political and diplomatic interactions between political
elites of two or more negotiating partners are inherently social processes) served as a starting
point for developing a discourse-based conceptual framework in this thesis in order to examine
EU-Serbia relations within a broader historical perspective. This thesis presented an additional
approach to the three dominant approaches—structural, cultural and regulative—which seek to
explain Serbia’s delayed EU accession by using a different conceptual framework.
Structural, cultural and regulative approaches
The proponents of structural explanations argue that Serbia’s institutional reform has stagnated
due to its insufficiently developed structures (including poorly reformed and oversized
bureaucracy, technological backwardness, outdated management practices, corruption, and
other factors). These structures have purportedly prevented Serbia, over the past fourteen years,
from achieving deeper Europeanisation. The EU attempted to address the lack of local expertise
and public knowledge in Serbia about EU affairs, and to close the knowledge- and skills gap
by providing over $2 billion of financial and technical assistance to Serbia since 2001, which
kick-started Serbia’s institutional reform but has seen limited progress at the level of normative
attitudes held by Serbia’s policy-makers.
normative frameworks of other candidates have affected their European integration experiences to better inform
the EU on its expansion processes and allow other potential candidates to critically assess their own progress
towards deeper integration.
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The proponents of structuralist perspectives contend that resistance to domestic reform in
Serbia was inherited from institutional practices that derive from Serbia’s earlier historical
periods (the Milošević era, communist Yugoslavia, and royalist Yugoslavia). For Serbia, as a
latecomer in European integration, this means that its political elites will continue to face
institutional hurdles in adapting to EU standards because of deep-seated structural deficiencies
and outdated institutional and managerial practices. These are supposedly linked to Serbia’s
institutional ‘mentality’ that impedes innovation and flexibility.
According to this perspective, the most effective Serbian policy-makers after 2000 were those
who managed to operate outside the formal institutional framework. These individuals are
epitomised in the figure of Serbia’s assassinated Prime Minister, Zoran Đinđić, who made a
political decision to arrest and extradite Milošević to The Hague Tribunal for war crimes,
despite the existence of regulations that precluded Serbian nationals from being extradited,
especially a former head of state. While Milošević’s extradition was one among many points
of disagreement between the two largest Serbian democratic parties (the DS and the DSS) in
the early 2000s, it represented a turning point for Serbia’s relationship with the West,
particularly the EU.
From a structuralist perspective, Eriksen argued that Serbia needs more courageous individuals
like Đinđić to implement (often unpopular) reforms in order to strengthen administrative,
judicial and economic capacities. He highlighted that partocracy and nepotism in Serbia are
serious challenges, which inhibit further institutional reform. The magnitude of challenges that
Serbia’s first democratic government faced since coming to power in January 2001 is aptly
illustrated in an observation made by Milica Uvalić. As a Serbian-Italian political economist
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who had temporarily returned to Serbia in 2000 to assist with the new government’s
democratisation agenda, Uvalić recalled:
In December 2000 and early 2001, the Federation Palace lacked not only computers,
fax machines and photocopying facilities, but even ordinary paper. On occasion of the
first important visit of an EU delegation in March 2001, a document was prepared on
ongoing reforms to be distributed to members of the EU delegation, but there was no
paper to print it. …The EU delegation had no understanding of the need to provide
equipment …1163
Igor Novaković, a former President of Palilula shire in Niš, made a similar kind of observation
when he was interviewed for this thesis. Novaković described the EU’s funding guidelines (for
programs aimed at strengthening Serbia’s democratic capacities at the local level) as too
inflexible. He said that the EU guidelines required local implementation partners in his own
shire to purchase office equipment made only inside the EU.1164 ‘We could not find a printer
that was made in the EU’, he said, ‘and, therefore, we were left without a much-needed office
tool until a private donor stepped in’. These examples show how the EU took for granted
Serbia’s capacity to comply with the most basic requirements and how the inflexibility of the
EU’s institutional requirements represented a challenge to the implementation of EU-funded
projects in (at the time) potential candidate states. Structural perspectives are often too focused
on identifying weaknesses in Serbia’s institutional capacities without explaining how
difficulties in EU-Serbia dialogue, especially at the institutional level, have been overcome.
1163 Uvalić, Serbia’s transition, 2010, op. cit., pp. 133–134.
1164 Interview with Igor Novaković, January 2012, op. cit.
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Cultural explanations for Serbia’s delayed accession tend to emphasise as a key reason for
Serbia’s delayed reform its cultural ‘legacy’ of anti-liberalism, authoritarianism and extreme
nationalism, which is linked to the perception of an overly interventionist role of the Serbian
Orthodox Church in Serbian politics. Sabrina P. Ramet is a representative of this approach. In
many of her works, Ramet derives a contentious conclusion about the lack of progress being
linked to Serbia’s cultural mentality. This trait is seen as being inherited from Serbia’s religion
and cultural traditions, which are pre- or even anti-modern.
Cultural explanations for Serbia’s delayed accession tend to emphasise Serbia’s ‘cultural
legacy’ of anti-liberalism, authoritarianism and extreme nationalism as a key reason for delayed
reform. In turn, this is also linked to the perception of an interventionist role by the Serbian
Orthodox Church in Serbian politics. Sabrina P. Ramet is a representative of this approach. In
many of her works, Ramet derives a contentious conclusion about the lack of progress being
linked to Serbia’s cultural mentality. This mentality is seen as being inherited from Serbia’s
religious and cultural traditions, which are perceived as being against modernisation.
Cultural arguments, however, underestimate the influence of liberal democratic forces in
Serbian society, choosing instead to focus on the failure of successive governments to influence
change in Serbia’s ‘cultural mentality’. As such, culturalists do not give enough attention to
the growing influence of pro-Western and liberal ideas in Serbia. For instance, in the 1990s,
Serbian liberalism was openly revived by Đinđić and student movement Otpor by providing a
political and ‘cultural’ alternative to the Milošević regime. Cultural approaches also do not
explain the variations in Serbia’s domestic policy-making or intra-party transformations that
can led to a significant normative reorientation (as the example of the break with the SRS past
by the SNS shows). Nationalism and cultural traditions is too simple an explanation to capture
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obstacles to Serbia’s domestic reform, and ‘ignorance of the West’ is an equally unconvincing
argument about where the roots of the challenges between EU and Serbia might lay.
Regulative approaches focus on Serbia’s failure to meet the stringent EU accession criteria,
which are embedded within the EU’s conditionality framework. Scholars of these approaches
often tend to either criticise or praise the EU’s political conditionality towards Serbia, which is
an overarching framework by which the EU can evaluate Serbia’s annual progress (such as
through European Commission reports). The proponents of this perspective rarely undertake a
deeper evaluation of how accession criteria towards Serbia was developed, and under what
conditions accession norms have allowed for the hardening or softening of specific policy
areas. Regulative approaches, therefore, do not adequately explain the variations in the EU’s
policy towards Serbia. They also cannot explain various nuances in the EU policy, such as
informal diplomatic engagement by establishing dialogue with the opposition through the
innovative ‘Energy for Democracy’ program. Further research was needed in order to try to
explain the political nature of Serbia’s European integration.
While these three approaches provide some credible evidence in explaining Serbia’s inability
to integrate with the EU, the normative approach espoused in this thesis provides a holistic
approach to identify the determining factors preventing Serbia’s accession to the EU. This
approach suggests that the hurdles to Serbia’s accession stem from ideational and discursive
factors. The political nature of the EU accession process requires that the process of European
integration be constantly negotiated, without a pre-determined result in mind. Diplomatic
negotiations are a complex variable to study. This thesis focused on several smaller illustrative
cases, for instance, by analysing the EU’s role in Serbia’s presidential and parliamentary
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elections. This showed that the challenges to a deeper engagement between the EU and Serbia
are political and normative in nature, rather than material or ‘cultural’/religious.
In order to explain the normative factors, this thesis resorted to the methods which are
frequently used by the scholars of constructivist orientation. These include discourse analysis,
a genealogical approach and de-construction of dominant patterns of political thought and
political discourses during different periods of Serbian politics after the Second World War.
The majority of studies on EU-Serbia relations, save for a few notable examples, focus on the
period after 1990 rather than examining a rich diplomatic history of cooperation which
characterised EU-Yugoslavia relations for most of the Cold War. This thesis went beyond the
events which marked a ‘formal’ start of EU-Yugoslavia relationship (in 1968) by explaining
why the relationship had not been formalised earlier. It found that there were several specific
conditions which inhibited dialogue between the states of integrating Western Europe and non-
aligned Yugoslavia. These conditions included low levels of trust, solidarity and divergence in
foreign policy outlooks between EU members and Yugoslavia. The issue of ‘problematic
partners’, which was also found in the UK’s earliest experiences with European integration,
prevented Yugoslavia from advancing further in its dialogue with the EU, until it resolved these
differences with key EU members in which domestic conditions had also changed.
By examining diplomatic and political relations between the EU and Serbia since the Second
World War, as well as drawing on several themes from the EU’s integration history, this thesis
sought to derive important lessons and conclusions from this study about Serbia’s current
relationship with the EU. These lessons can improve the understanding of the normative
obstacles Serbia is facing today with regard to its EU accession path.
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The experience of building closer relations with the EU is, therefore, part of Serbia’s diplomatic
history, which has been largely forgotten, as the majority of academic output on this topic
focuses on the wars of Yugoslavia’s dissolution and the Kosovo conflict. The author’s research,
which was informed by extensive semi-structured interviews with a range of participants,
indicates that normative obstacles on Serbia’s EU accession path continue to inhibit dialogue
between the EU and Serbia. The factors of trust, solidarity and problematic partners can be
used as part of a normative research framework when delving deeper into the question of why
Serbia is still lagging behind in its European integration. A clash in normative frameworks
between the EU and democratic Serbia derives from an ever-present theme in Serbian political
history: the re-current idea of neutrality in foreign policy and East/West bridging. These ideas
represent a normative challenge to further progress in EU-Serbia relations. They are closely
related to the concept of solidarity, which is one lesson that can be learned from the experiences
of the Eastern enlargement.
The examination of these narratives in Serbian foreign policy uncovered Serbia’s much longer
diplomatic history. In essence, Serbia needed to balance, for its survival, as an independent
state, between the East and the West. This concept has been interpreted differently by Serbia’s
political leaders throughout history. This is precisely the narrative which can be detected in
discussions on Serbia’s foreign policy today, which clashes with the EU’s solidarity principle.
In addition, even if Serbia fulfils all formal requirements for accession, the quality of its
bilateral relations with EU members will be the determining factor in whether it is accepted
into the EU or not.
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Lessons from the Eastern enlargement
The unanimity principle of the EU requires all EU members to agree before another country
can join the bloc. An illustrative case study of Eastern enlargement showed that in the early
1990s, there was a general congruence in normative frameworks between the majority of EU
states and the CEES, which were eager to ‘re-join’ Europe. In order to build political support
from inside the EU, the Višegrad countries in particular have been active by cultivating formal
and personal dialogue with influential EU leaders, and by maintaining strong support from the
European People’s Party bloc within the European Parliament. Although trust was not
immediately built between the formerly authoritarian nations and EU members, the solidarity
which the CEES expressed with the common EU positions (including in the UN votes)
improved the levels of trust which is necessary for the issue of problematic partners to be
successfully overcome.
This political hurdle was best demonstrated in recent years between Slovenia and Croatia, with
Slovenia blocking Croatia’s membership negotiations due to unresolved bilateral issues. Only
with EU mediation have the two countries managed to sign a compromise agreement, which
effectively allowed Croatia to fulfil its ambition to ‘re-join Europe’. Similarly for Serbia, as in
the case during the Cold War between Yugoslavia and West Germany, any unresolved bilateral
issues can escalate during the last stage of its accession process, causing more delays. In
addition, enlargement fatigue, which has been in recent years particularly observed among
older EU members (EU-15) was in this thesis represented through the chart outlining
Eurobarometer survey data. This data was presented alongside public opinion polls for Serbia,
which also showed that enthusiasm among Serbian nations for EU membership has declined
during the same surveyed period (2008–2012). Serbia’s victimhood narratives, in particular
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after Kosovo proclaimed independence in February 2008, have influenced popular perceptions
about the EU’s regional role.
Victimhood narratives
This thesis also argued that the development of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy
mechanisms came about, in part, as a response to the Yugoslav wars. It was precisely this
period in EU history (the 1990s) that specifically influenced the development of the CFSP
instruments, and fostered further integration between member states. The Yugoslav crisis
presented particular challenges to EU policy-making for which new institutional, political and
administrative solutions were needed. Ultimately, the geopolitical situation in the 1990s helped
promote deeper integration in the EU, and in some aspects of the CFSP, such as conflict
prevention.  However, it gave Serbia a ‘bad name’ in regional politics, and further study would
need to be done in order to examine how this problem can be ameliorated in the future; through
better coordinated public diplomacy or by other means.
Another finding in the thesis is that victimhood narratives of the Albanians and Serbs in relation
to the Kosovo issue (apart from being unhelpful for conflict resolution) have actually
obstructed confidence-building measures and mediation efforts pursued by the EU. The
evolution of the EU’s foreign and security policy tools since the Lisbon Treaty, has enabled it
to take a more pro-active role in resolving regional crises in the Western Balkans, which stands
in stark contrast to its ineffective and often confusing policy responses to the crisis in
Yugoslavia, particularly the wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Kosovo during the
1990s.
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It is also important to note that the flexibility in the EU’s approach to domestic changes in
Serbia has been a catalyst for change, the prime example being the EU’s innovative linkages
with the Serbian opposition during the Milošević regime. This thesis found that the EU’s soft
power methods were particularly effective in ‘informal’ or second-track diplomacy by
encouraging liberal democrats to promote a new political narrative to the internationally
isolated Serbian electorate in 2000, thus encouraging them to vote for pro-EU leaders and
increase popular pressure that had led to Serbia’s regime change. The EU is the most engaged
external political actor in the Western Balkans, precisely because of the attractiveness of its
membership to the remaining non-EU states in that region which acts as the ‘magnet’ for
change.  If the policy goal of Serbia’s EU accession is seen as complementary by both the
Serbian Government and the EU, and if both parties show more flexibility in addressing
difficult issues, then it is possible that delays in Serbia’s accession will be less frequent as time
progresses. There is much scope for further research in assessing normative factors that have
contributed to delays in other EU accession cases, such as Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the
FYROM, Georgia, Kosovo, Moldova, Montenegro, Turkey and Ukraine.
The history of European integration has demonstrated that solidarity, trust and a pan-European
vision of unity prevailed over narrow national perceptions and victimhood discourses in Europe
after the Second World War. But for that to occur, political leadership in integrating Europe
was incredibly important, just as it is today, as regards to Serbia’s EU accession prospects.
While Kosovo is likely to remain a deeply emotional issue for Serbs, the current Serbian
Government, so far, has been more constructive in its diplomatic approach than any previous
Serbian Government on this issue. But the implementation of bilateral agreements between
Belgrade and Priština still rests on the political will in Brussels to enforce the agreed
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commitments, particularly as deep mistrust marks political relations between two former foes,
who still see each other this way.
The way forward
In December 2013 at the EU summit in Brussels, British Prime Minister, David Cameron,
threatened to veto future enlargements of the EU, including the accession of Serbia and
Albania.1165 As the problematic partners issue has illustrated in Chapter Two, low levels of
trust can delay one country’s accession prospects, as the UK itself experienced during the
1960s. The high numbers of asylum seeker applications from the Balkan countries in the EU,
since the Schengen regime for some Balkan countries was lifted in 2009, could have
contributed to a growing anti-enlargement sentiment among EU members. However, as the
British Government is involved in a heated domestic debate about the UK’s future in the EU
and Scotland’s referendum on independence, it is clear that domestic divisions and normative
clashes among existing EU members, and not only in the applicant state, can delay future
accessions.
Serbia’s European accession process, however, requires that Serbia becomes aligned not only
with Brussels as a regulative and administrative core of Europe, but also normatively.
However, as political tension is rising between the West and Russia over energy security in
Europe and the fragile security situation in Ukraine, Serbia will be increasingly pushed to
choose between East and West. Considering the recent pronouncement by Serbian President,
Tomislav Nikolić, that Serbia ‘must not make a choice’ between East and West (which was
1165 G. Parker, A. Barker and J. Fontanella-Khan, ‘David Cameron threatens to veto future EU enlargements’,
The Financial Times, 20 December 2013, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/19974932-698f-11e3-aba3-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz2ssZKf4nb, (accessed 10 May 2014).
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reiterated by Foreign Minister Ivica Dačić) and taking into account strong public support for
such a policy position in Serbia, it seems likely that delays in Serbia’s EU accession might
continue in the near future. While the history of Serbia’s non-alignment is unlikely to be
repeated in the same form as during the Cold War, the ideas of Serbia’s independence and
neutrality in foreign policy will continue to present major obstacles to Serbia’s European
integration.
Over the foreseeable future, Serbia’s European integration will remain a highly normative
process, in which ideological differences between Serbia’s democrats (like in the past) could
cause further delays. Similarly, bilateral disputes are significant to political conditionality for
Serbia’s prospective accession. While public opinion in Serbia and in the EU remains reserved
towards Serbia’s EU accession, and the EU becomes more inwardly focused, the attractiveness
of EU membership for countries in the Western Balkans will be maintained only by a clear and
unambiguous membership prospect.
Since European accession is a political and normative process that is constantly renegotiated,
the narratives and diplomatic signals surrounding it ought to be carefully watched and analysed.
The EU will need to substantiate its economic ‘carrots’ with a longer-term soft power strategy
towards the Western Balkans. It should also address the issues of security and the protection
of all minorities in Kosovo, including Serbs, which should show to Serbia that the needs of its
citizens in Kosovo are addressed. The precarious human rights situation for non-Albanian
ethnic minorities in Kosovo is a reminder that when the EU’s attention is focused too much on
institutional and administrative reform, the much needed confidence-building measures will
suffer.
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More engagement from the EU rather than less, and a better articulated communications
strategy could assist in countering negative perceptions of the EU among Serbs. More than half
of Serbia’s population has not travelled to the EU over the past twenty years because of
sanctions, economic hardship and the normative influence of ongoing political anti-EU rhetoric
at the societal level in post-Milošević Serbia. Recent statements by the President-elect of the
European Commission, Jean Claude Juncker, that there will unlikely to be further enlargement
for the next five years, will be a discouraging sign for Serbia, prompting some of its democratic
elites to seek closer engagement with other partners outside the EU.
Mapping the future: four scenarios
In May 2014, the European Fund for the Balkans issued a policy paper in which four scenarios
for the future of the Western Balkans were outlined: the status quo, which according to the
authors, has reduced the speed and traction of European enlargement in the region; Turkey’s
model of alienation from the EU; abandoning enlargement and increased unpredictability in
the region; and a single large enlargement for the Western Balkans.1166 As the examples of the
UK’s and Croatia’s delayed accession demonstrated, problematic partners represent a serious
obstacle for candidates, but it can rarely be unforeseen. The example of Serbia’s delayed
negotiations with the EU because of Lithuania’s veto serves to illustrate the relevance of this
concept for Serbia’s European integration path. Serbia should strive to develop good working
relations with all EU members, and engage more specifically with those countries that have
indicated their reservations about Serbia’s membership. The Kosovo issue has precluded
Serbian diplomacy to focus on developing its influence inside the EU, and this still remains the
1166 Centre for Southeast European Studies, ‘The unfulfilled promise: completing the Balkan enlargement’,
Policy paper, Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group, May 2014, http://balkanfund.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/05/Policy-Paper-Completing-Enlargement-2.pdf, (accessed 17 May 2014).
388
case, although the SNS-SPS Government has been remarkably open about the need to improve
difficult relations with Croatia and Germany as a starting point.
In terms of mapping the future scenarios for Serbia’s European integration, this thesis takes the
view that Serbia must first improve its image in the West by becoming a more reliable partner
to the EU before any new breakthrough should be expected in its European accession process.
Serbia will also need to show solidarity with the EU on common EU decisions in the area of
foreign and security policy. This is a requirement expected of EU candidates, which the
European Commission is using in its annual assessments of Serbia’s suitability to join the EU.
Without a genuine commitment to showing solidarity with the EU, it will be difficult for any
new applicants, including Serbia, to convince other EU members to accept their EU
membership bid.
But the challenge of normative constructs and memory of the wars of Yugoslav succession will
not be easy to tackle. The EU can influence further change in Serbia by, once again, engaging
with a broader range of actors. However, the EU’s current is short-sighted, tending to centre
on security and strategic dimensions more than normative or discursive factors. An
understanding of the latter is particularly crucial in overcoming obstacles towards Serbia’s
European integration.
The responsibility rests on the Serbian Government to recognise this challenge and educate
their citizens about the benefits and realistic expectations of EU membership—provided that it
itself is aware of these benefits, which go beyond financial. Serbian victimhood discourses, the
concept of East/West bridging and the neutrality principle will need to be considered when
negotiating further European integration framework for Serbia. Both the EU and the Serbian
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Government will need to approach their dialogue process with more flexibility and innovation,
but the membership prospect for Serbia, whilst not pre-determined, should at least be more
credible.
European integration cannot be completed until all remaining Balkan states are given the same
chance to thrive inside the EU, as other states from the same region who have already acceded
to the EU. The inclusion of post-communist countries into the EU served to overcome Europe’s
traditional divisions, making the region more united and the EU stronger as an international
actor. It also enhanced the EU’s diplomatic skills. However, to overcome the remaining
challenges in the relationship between the EU and Serbia, researchers should recognise which
normative obstacles have been responsible for halting Serbia’s political and diplomatic
development in recent historical eras.
Further research will be certainly needed for the next phase of EU-Serbia relations, as the
formal accession negotiations began in January 2014. This thesis has broadened research
inquiry into challenges to Serbia’s European integration, which could offer a useful framework
for further study. Ultimately, Serbia’s membership of the EU would be good for Europe and
good for Serbia and for its non-EU external partners—even if Serbia will be able to join the
EU only after 2019. Serbia’s accession into the EU would be a historic example of how the
EU’s soft power, with its transformational capacity, managed to overcome, together with
Serbia’s political leaders, normative obstacles to the EU’s further enlargement into the Western
Balkans. It could also serve as a model for other candidates, and as an example of what the EU
diplomacy can achieve when it adopts a broader vision of solidarity.
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APPENDIX ONE: MAPS
Map 1: Royalist Yugoslavia.1167
1167 ‘Kraljevina Jugoslavija’, Wikimedia Commons,
http://sh.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kraljevina_Jugoslavija#mediaviewer/Datoteka:Scs_kingdom_provinces_1920_192
2_en.png, (accessed 1 December 2013).
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Map 2: Axis/fascist occupation of Yugoslavia during the Second World War.1168
1168 ‘Fascist occupation of Yugoslavia’, Wikimedia Commons,
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Axis_occupation_of_Yugoslavia_1941-
43.png#mediaviewer/File:Fascist_occupation_of_yugoslavia.png, (accessed 1 December 2013).
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Map 3: Socialist Yugoslavia.1169
1169 ‘Map of former Yugoslavia’, Wikimedia Commons,
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/d/d1/Map_of_Former_Yugoslavia.png/1024px-
Map_of_Former_Yugoslavia.png, (accessed 1 December 2013).
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Map 4: State Union of Serbia and Montenegro in 2005.1170
1170 ‘Map of Serbia and Montenegro (2005)’, University of Texas,
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/europe/serbia_montenegro_pol_05.jpg, (accessed 1 December 2013).
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Map 5: Serbia in 2013.1171
1171 ‘Map of Serbia (2013)’, University of Texas, http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/cia13/serbia_sm_2013.gif,





1965: The EU is in informal negotiations with the SFRJ on a prospective trade
agreement.
1967: Declaration on Bilateral Relations was signed on 2 December, establishing a
framework for closer economic relations.
1968: Yugoslavia becomes Europe’s first socialist state to accredit an ambassador to the
EU.
On 15 October, the EU and Yugoslavia begin negotiations on a comprehensive
trade agreement.
1970: In March, the EU and Yugoslavia sign a non-preferential trade agreement in
Brussels, which came into force in May that year.
1971: Yugoslavia becomes a member of the European Cooperation in the field of
Scientific and Technical research, a group under the auspices of the Council.
1973: EU and Yugoslavia sign their second five-year agreement.
1974:
1975:
EU and Yugoslavia establish regular ministerial meetings.
EU and Yugoslavia establish two sub-committees with task of exchanging
information on development of cooperation in agricultural industry and
technology.
1976: EU and Yugoslavia issue a Joint Declaration on bilateral relations in December,
and Yugoslavia gains access to the European Investment Bank loan facility.
1980: EU and Yugoslavia sign a Cooperation Agreement in April, which is more
comprehensive than the EU’s agreements with other Mediterranean countries.
The EU opens a delegation in Belgrade.
1985: In March, the EU and Yugoslavia establish an agricultural research working
group.
1986: EU and Yugoslavia engage in discussions on energy planning.
1987: In December, the EU and Yugoslavia sign an Additional protocol of economic
adaptation, and a Second Protocol on Financial Cooperation.
1990: Yugoslavia expresses interest in EU membership.
1992: The EU sanctions against FRY come into force.
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2000: On 9 October, the EU lifts some sanctions against FRY following the overthrow
of Milošević.
2003: The murder of Serbian Prime Minister in March sets back Serbia’s EU integration.
2004: On 1 October, the European Council opens a process for Stabilization and
Association Agreement with Serbia.
2005: On 3 May, the EU calls off talks with Serbia, urging it to improve cooperation
with the ICTY.
On 1 October, the EU and Serbia launch negotiations for Stabilization and
Association Agreement.
2006: On 3 May, the EU suspends talks on the SAA with the State Union of Serbia and
Montenegro over its failure to arrest Mladić.
After Montenegro declares independence in June, Serbia re-affirms its
commitment to continue negotiations with the EU.
In July, Serbia delivers an action plan on improving cooperation with the ICTY.
2007: On 13 June, the EU resumes negotiations with Serbia.
On 7 November, the EU initiates the Stabilization and Association Agreement
with Serbia. The Netherlands and Belgium demand that Serbia must first improve
its cooperation with the ICTY.
On 14 December, the European Council approves a European Security and
Defence Policy mission for Kosovo, a decision which the Serbian Prime Minister
Koštunica opposes.
2008: On 1 January, agreements between the EU and Serbia on visa facilitation and on
readmission enter into force.
On 4 February, the EU establishes a European Union Rule of Law Mission
(EULEX) to support Kosovo’s transition.
After Kosovo proclaims independence on 17 February, rioting in Belgrade
damages embassies of several EU countries.
On 18 February, the EU adopts a revised European partnership for Serbia.
On 29 April, the EU and Serbia sign the SAA and interim agreement on trade and
trade-related issues in Luxembourg.
In May, the European Commission gives Serbia the ‘Roadmap on visa
liberalisation’.
On 8 September, the Serbian National Assembly approves ratification of the SAA.
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In December, the EULEX takes over supervision of Kosovo from the UN.
2009: In July, the European Commission recommends that visa liberalisation is granted
to Serbia.
In November, the Council of Ministers reached a decision to abolish visa
restrictions for Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia, which comes into force on 19
December.
On 19 December, visa requirement is waived for Serbian nationals travelling to
Schengen countries on a biometric passport
On 22 December, Serbia applies for EU membership.
2010: On 14 June, the Council of Ministers decides to forward the Stabilization and
Association Agreement with Serbia to the national parliaments of EU member
states for ratification.
On 25 October, the Council of Ministers sends Serbia’s candidacy request to the
European Commission, which then embarked on preparing a pre-accession
questionnaire of 37 volumes and over 5,000 pages.
2011: On 31 January, Serbia responds to the EU questionnaire.
On 12 October, the European Commission recommends Serbia for EU candidate
status, subject to further progress in Belgrade’s relations with Priština.
On 9 December, the European Council postpones a decision on Serbia’s
candidature under pressure from Germany, following a security incident in
Kosovo’s North.
2012: On 1 March, Serbia becomes an official candidate for EU membership.
2013: In April, under EU auspices Serbia and Kosovo form the Brussels Agreement.
On 28 June, the European Council endorses the Commission’s opinion to start
negotiations with Serbia.
On 1 September, the Stabilization and Association Agreement between the EU
and Serbia enters into force.
On 17 December, the Council adopts the negotiating framework with Serbia and
committed to hold the first intergovernmental conference in the near future.
2014: On 21 January, the EU-Serbia intergovernmental conference takes place, marking
the official beginning of Serbia’s accession negotiations with the EU.
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APPENDIX THREE: INTERVIEWS
Interview questions for the interviewees from the European Union
1. What are the key defining characteristics of the EU’s foreign policy towards Serbia?
2. Who are the key actors within the EU involved in the shaping of the EU’s foreign policy
towards Serbia, and who are those responsible for the implementation of EU policies
towards this country?
3. What have been the major challenges the EU has encountered in its negotiations with
Serbia over the latter’s prospective accession?
4. Which actor/institution in Serbia is the most difficult negotiating partner from the EU’s
perspective?
5. Do you think it would be good thing to the EU if Serbia acceded?
6. What do you consider to be the main obstacles for the EU’s enlargement policy towards
Serbia?
7. In which policy areas would you like to see significant improvements regarding EU-
Serbia relations?
8. What role, in your opinion, do historical past and memory of recent conflicts (from the
1990s era) play in the shaping of the EU’s conditionality towards Serbia?
9. Do you think that the key EU foreign policy goals in its relationship with Serbia have
been achieved over the past five years?
10. What are likely to be the key foreign policy priorities for the EU in its relations with
Serbia over the next five years, from the EU perspective?
11. Do you think that the EU would be more or less secure following Serbia’s accession?
12. How do you think Serbia’s prospective membership of the EU may affect life in the EU
and regional stability?
13. Is there anything else that you would like to add to your responses?
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Interview questions for the interviewees from Serbia
1. What are the key defining characteristics of the EU’s foreign policy towards Serbia?
2. Who are the key actors in Serbia involved in the shaping of Serbian foreign policy
responses towards the EU, and who are those responsible for the implementation of
relevant policies in this regard?
3. What have been the major challenges that Serbia has encountered in negotiating its
accession with the EU?
4. Which actor/institution in the EU is the most difficult negotiating partner from Serbia’s
perspective?
5. Do you think it would be a good thing for Serbia to join the EU?
6. What do you consider to be the main obstacles to Serbia’s European integration?
7. In which policy areas would you like to see significant improvements regarding EU-
Serbia relations?
8. What role, in your opinion, do historical past and memory of recent conflicts (from the
1990s era) play in the shaping of Serbia’s responses towards the EU, including its
conditionality policy?
9. Do you think that Serbia’s key foreign policy goals in its engagement with the EU have
been achieved over the past five years?
10. What are likely to be the key foreign policy priorities for Serbia’s engagement with the
EU over the next five years, from a Serbian perspective?
11. Do you think that Serbia would be more or less secure after it joined the EU?
12. How do you think Serbia’s prospective membership in the EU may affect life for
Serbian citizens and regional stability?
13. Is there anything else that you would like to add to your responses?
400
Key interviewees
o Dr Slavica Đukić-Dejanović, Parliamentary Speaker of the Serbian National
Assembly, Socialist Party of Serbia (Belgrade, January 2010)
o Tomislav Nikolić, then opposition leader of the Serbian Progressive Party (Belgrade,
January 2010; Belgrade, April 2012)
o Branko Ružić, Member of the Serbian National Assembly and member of
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe; Socialist Party of Serbia
(Belgrade, January 2010)
o Srđan Srećković, Minister for Diaspora, Serbian Renewal Movement (Belgrade, June
2012)
o Dr Slobodan Samardžić, Faculty of Political Science, University of Belgrade, former
Minister for Kosovo and Metohija, and Member of the Serbian National Assembly;
Democratic Party of Serbia (Belgrade, July 2010)
o Dr Miroslav Hadžić, Faculty of Political Science, University of Belgrade, and
Director of the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy, NGO (Belgrade, July 2010)
o Dr Tanja Mišćević, Faculty of Political Science, University of Belgrade, and former
Head of the Serbian European Integration Office (email correspondence, July 2010)
o Nikola Lukić, Director of EU section, Serbian Ministry for Foreign Affairs (Belgrade,
January 2010)
o Interview with an employee of the Serbian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, UN section,
(April 2012)
o Interview with an employee of the UN Library, UN Headquarters, New York (April
2011)
o Sonja Licht, president of the Foreign Policy Council at the Serbian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, and President of the Belgrade Fund for Political Excellence, NGO,
sociologist and political activist (Belgrade, June 2010)
o Ivan Vejvoda, former senior advisor on foreign policy and European integration to
Prime Ministers Zoran Đinđić and Zoran Živković, and executive director of the
Balkan Trust for Democracy, NGO (Belgrade, June 2010)
o Neda Maletić, Serbian Ambassador to Australia, Democratic Party (Canberra, August
2012)
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o Vladan Dinić, journalist and editor-in-chief of the weekly newspaper Svedok
(Belgrade, June 2010)
o Marko Lopušina, journalist of the Večernje Novosti Serbian daily newspaper and
publicist (Belgrade, June 2012)
o John Bosnich, Serbian Radical Party member and Serbian-Canadian political activist
(Belgrade, June 2012)
o Alberto Cammarata, European Commission delegation to Serbia, Director of the
Serbian Integration Unit and Economic Affairs (Belgrade, January 2010; June 2012)
o Thomas Gnocchi, Senior officer at the European Commission delegation to Serbia
(Belgrade, January 2010)
o Edgar Thielmann, EU Fellow (ANU Centre for European Studies) and former
coordinator for the EU’s ‘Energy for Democracy’ program (Canberra, April 2012)
o Srđan Majstorović, Deputy Director, Serbian European Integration Office (Belgrade,
June 2012)
o Živadin Jovanović, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (1998–2000), President of the Belgrade Forum for the World of Equals,
NGO (June 2012)
o Miodrag Lekić, previously Minister of Foreign Affairs of Montenegro, Ambassador
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and then Serbia and Montenegro, and
university lecturer (Rome, June 2012)
o Bojana Todorović, Head of the multilateral negotiations section, Serbian Ministry of
Economy and Regional Development (Belgrade, January 2010)
o Igor Novaković, President of Palilula shire of the city of Niš, and university lecturer
(Niš, January 2012)
o Petru Luhan (Romania), Member of European Parliament, Canberra, February 2011.
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